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PREFACE 
It is important in the field of political science to 
bridge the gap between broad-scale scale political theory 
and more specific empirical policy analysis. To fail at this 
endeavor is to produce work that is imbalanced; either being 
too shallow and empirically unconvincing or failing to tie 
into those larger questions of political inquiry which real-
ly matter. 
This work represents an attempt to bridge that gap and 
explore the juncture where normative theory and empirical 
analysis intersect. The broader theoretical question at hand 
regards the performance and appropriateness of pluralism as 
a form of democratic organization. Does pluralism function 
as the optimal form of democratic decisionmaking and gover-
nance or is it, as critics claim, deeply flawed, especially 
in its treatment of certain supposedly more vulnerable types 
of policy initiatives? 
This study concentrates upon ecological issues as the 
specific policymaking context within which such theoretical 
questions will be addressed. By analyzing in a given case 
the way in which ecological values, initiatives, and poli-
cies are treated within a pluralist system, this study exam-
ines both how pluralist structures influence this specific 
area and what this case tells us about the claims of plural-
ism as democratic theory. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PLURALISM AND ECOLOGY 
Among conservationists, there is an unspoken con-
viction that something in the American political 
process is inherently inhospitable to environmen-
tal protection; that "politics" undermines sound 
environmental policies established in the public 
interest while nature's private exploiters profit. 
Walter Rosenbaum 
If in fact environmentalism is costing an elite 
group billions of dollars--which it is--perhaps 
discarded theories of pluralism should be re-
viewed and rethought. 
Joseph Petulla 
Pluralist Theory And Its Critics 
The Development of Pluralist Theory 
Although its intensity and fashionability have waxed 
and waned over the years, the debate between pluralism and 
its critics still remains the central issue in American 
democratic theory. As articulated in the 1950s and 60s by 
political scientists such as David Truman, Robert Dahl, and 
Earl Latham, pluralism and its closely related predecessor, 
group theory, propose that American politics can be under-
stood as a system of competition and bargaining between and 
2 
among political elites and organized interests.1 This inter-
play between and ever-shifting equilibrium among competing 
interests is, to the pluralists, the essential dynamic of 
American politics. 
While featuring some elements of centralized author-
ity, the pluralist process is also seen to be marked by a 
considerable fragmentation and decentralization of power and 
~heoretically provides, therefore, numerous opportunities 
for political inputs to enter the system. It is, according 
to William Kelso, a "mixed form" of governance that is 
"neither highly centralized nor highly decentralized."2 In 
terms of public participation, pluralist theorists claim 
that the optimal avenue for an individual to affect policy 
is by engaging in or supporting group activity relevant to 
that individual's concerns.3 As such, participation in a 
pluralist system is open, but not in a direct or strictly 
majoritarian manner. 
While group theories of politics were to become the 
centerpiece of the discipline in the post-World War Two era, 
they were by no means new theories, but instead refinements 
and reworkings of much older ones. "The language of the 
1David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf 
1951); Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1961); Earl Latham, "The Group Basis of Poli-
tics: Notes for a Theory" American Political Science Review 
52:2 (June, 1952), 376-397. 2William Kelso, American Democratic Theory (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1978), 216. 3Ibid. 4. 
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group approach," G. David Garson points out, "is rooted 
deeply in American political thought,"4 and at least in the 
American context, those roots can be traced all the way back 
to the eighteenth century. 
James Madison, for one, clearly recognized the pivot-
al and unavoidable role of groups, or factions as he called 
them, in American politics. In fact, the bulk of Madison's 
political philosophy focused upon how a republic could best 
avoid their potentially ill effects. In addition to recom-
mending that government structures be divided both by loca-
tion (federal and state) and branch, Madison felt that fac-
tions could be controlled by constituting a republic large 
enough to embrace a great diversity of factions.s This, it 
was thought, would create enough competition and rivalry 
amongst the numerous factions to retard the formation of 
majority faction mischief . 6 
A half-century later, John Calhoun in his own conser-
vative way, reiterated this notion of the centrality of 
groups in American politics. As part of his defense of 
slaveholding interests, Calhoun argued that only his "con-
current majority" which recognized and respected established 
interests was truly constitutional. Calhoun rejected simple 
4 G. David Garson, Group Theories of Politics (Beverly 
Hills, CA: Sage, 1978), 25-26. 
5 James Madison, "Federalist #10" in Roy P. Fairfield 
(editor), The Federalist Papers 2nd ed. (Garden City, NY: 
Anchor, 1966), 16-23. 
6 H.R. Mahood, Interest Group Politics in America (Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 4. 
4 
numerical majorities as being akin to Madison's feared ty-
rannical majority factions.? 
Finally, to this pair of proto-group theorists one 
certainly must add Alexis de Tocqueville whose keen eye long 
ago recognized the prominence of organized groups in Ameri-
can politics as he observed that, "In no country in the 
world has the principle of association been more success-
fully used or applied to a greater multitude of objects, 
than in America."8 Echoing Madison and Calhoun, Tocqueville 
found groups or "associations," as he called them, to be the 
only reliable obstacle to tyranny. Associations provided, to 
Tocqueville, an antidote to America's severe individualism 
which, by atomizing society and leaving each individual weak 
and helpless, left the public vulnerable to hysterical mass 
appeal and the tyranny of the majority. 9 
Another early group theorist, turn of the century 
political scientist Arthur Bentley, is often singled out as 
an especially seminal figure in the development of modern 
pluralist thought. Though largely ignored in his day, Bent-
ley was resurrected a half-century later and hailed by plur-
alists as a genius.10 In an attack upon the legalism and 
formalism so prevalent in the political science of his day, 
7 John Calhoun, "A Disquisition on Government" in Kenneth 
Dolbeare (editor), American Political Thought (Chatham, NJ: 
Chatham House, 1984), 269-285. 
8 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Richard 
Heffner (editor) (New York: Mentor, 1956), 95. 
9 Ibid. 198-202. 10 Garson, 25-26. 
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Bentley developed a stark group determinism which rejected 
the significance of formal institutions in and of them-
selves. Instead, Bentley found the origins of all political 
activity in the interplay of groups. "The balance of group 
pressures," he stressed, "is the state of society" and so-
ciety, as he saw it was "nothing other than the complex of 
groups that compose it." 11 Not merely satisfied to elevate 
the status of groups in the field of political science, 
Bentley sought to define all of the field in those terms. 
"When the groups are adequately stated," Bentley observed of 
political inquiry, "everything is stated, when I say every-
thing, I mean everything. "12 
By the 1950s, the various group theories which had 
been around in one form or another for a century and a half 
began to be organized into a singular body of thought which 
soon thereafter gained dominance in political science. The 
earliest modern group theorists Truman and Latham, each 
presented far more subtle and sophisticated versions of 
Bentley's hypothesis which, while still maintaining the pri-
macy of groups in politics, offered a much more solid analy-
tical framework. Truman stresses that: 
The behaviors that constitute the process of govern-
ment cannot be adequately understood apart from 
groups, especially organized interest groups which 
are operative at any given point in time. Whether we 
look at an individual citizen, the executive secre-
11 Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1908), 222, 259. 
12 Bentley quoted in Mahood, 5. 
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tary of a trade association, at a political function-
ary, at a legislator, administrator, governor, or 
judge, we cannot describe his participation in the 
government institution, let alone account for it, 
except in terms of interests with which he affiliates 
and with which he is confronted.13 
Not long after Truman's groundbreaking The Governmen-
tal Process, Robert Dahl's Who Governs? continued to add 
subtlety, complexity, and multi-dimensionality to group 
theory. Dahl's work went beyond a crude reliance on groups 
as the only explanatory factor to include the role of gov-
ernment as its own entity as well as the structural charac-
teristics of government regarding, for example, the degree 
of centralization, bureaucratic behavior, and the political 
rules of the game. The result of Dahl's effort, which came 
to be known as pluralism, represented the most sophisticated 
manifestation of group theory and dominated American politi-
cal science throughout much of the 1960s. 
The Nature of Pluralist Theory 
From the start, pluralist theory has had both a des-
criptive and a prescriptive dimension. 14 Not only do plural-
13 Truman, 502. 
14 While many who write on this subject use the terms 
group theory, interest group theory, interest group liberal-
ism, and pluralism interchangeably, Garson distinguishes 
group theory as the broader umbrella term under which plur-
alism is merely one particular reformulation. While techni-
cally that may be so, this study, like most of the litera-
ture, will employ the term pluralism (as it has thusfar) in 
a slightly less restrictive manner than does Garson. It 
shall encompass the work of Garson's "true pluralists" such 
as Dahl and his successors as well as those immediate group 
theory relatives of pluralism (such as the work of Truman or 
Latham) which speak to the same issues and capture many of 
7 
ists attempt to show how and why American politics can be so 
successfully characterized by pluralism, but also why this 
system is preferable to any other form of democratic organi-
zation. Broadly stated, the main points of pluralist theory 
are as follows: 
1. Groups and group interaction with government are at 
the center of American politics. Empirically and normative-
+y, pluralists adhere to the idea that the most effective 
and appropriate route for public participation in the poli-
tical process is through the joining or supporting of the 
organization or organizations which best represent one's po-
litical interests. According to the pluralists, a system of 
civic participation channelled through groups is the optimal 
form for the representation of one's interests as it avoids 
the limitations of strictly electoral representation as well 
as the undemocratic excesses of more direct majoritarian 
styles of representation (such as, for example, referen-
da) . is 
2. The American public is fragmented by a extreme di-
versity of political, social, and economic interests. Conse-
quently, identifying a single monolithic public interest is 
problematic at best, impossible at worst. Instead of think-
ing in terms of the public and the public's interest, plur-
the same themes. Thus, for the purposes of clarity and con-
sistency the term pluralism will be used exclusively in this 
stud1,. Garson, 91. . 
1 William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glen-
coe, IL: Free Press, 1959), 60-70; Kelso, chaps. 3-4. 
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alists tend to conceive of specific interests and specific 
issue publics. Issue publics are that sector of society 
which finds a given issue relevant enough to their own par-
ticular concerns and interests to actually or potentially 
participate. 16 
3. Due to its relatively decentralized nature, the 
American political system has an abundance of entry points 
through which groups can gain the access to policymakers 
necessary for effective participation. As a result, a fairly 
diverse collection of groups and public officials tend to be 
involved in any given policy decision. This decentralization 
extends access points both vertically and horizontally; that 
is, between federal, state, and local levels of government, 
as well as between various branches and/or agencies within 
any of those levels. Normatively, this situation is general-
ly seen by pluralists as a quite beneficial expansion of op-
portunities for group (and thus ultimately citizen) involve-
ment in policymaking and the redress of grievances. 17 
4. Politics is, above all, a process of bargaining, 
negotiation and compromise forced upon competing interests. 
Because of the decentralized nature of pluralist politics, 
practically any concerned or affected group in a given pol-
16 For a discussion of issue publics see Gerald Pomper, 
Elections in America (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1974), 
94-95. 
17 While a number of pluralists make this point, it is, 
perhaps, most thoroughly laid out in Wallace Sayre and Her-
bert Kaufman, Governing New York: Politics in the Metropolis 
(New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960). 
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icy decision has, according to the pluralists, at least some 
say. This abundance of potential veto points forces all the 
political actors involved to partake in a process of give-
and-take invariably involving some degree of dealing, bar-
gaining, and compromise. Dahl notes this characteristic of 
pluralist politics: 
When one looks at American political institutions in 
their entirety .... what stands out as a salient feature 
is the extraordinary variety of opportunities these 
institutions provide for an organized minority to 
block, modify, or delay a policy which the minority 
opposes. Consequently, it is a rarity for any coali-
tion to carry out its policies without having to bar-
gain, negotiate, and compromise with its opponents.18 
One benefit of what Kelso calls the "open, fluid" na-
ture of pluralism,19 is that it allegedly encourages a free 
and constant flow of information as each rival group wanting 
to influence policy will naturally communicate a great deal 
of information to bolster their case. As a result, the pro-
cess of give-and-take bargaining works against the suppres-
sion of information by any policymaking elite or single in-
terest .20 The process, therefore, guarantees a broadening of 
policymaking debates. 
In addition, the involvement of rival groups and the 
necessity of bargaining, according to the pluralists, will 
in most cases assure that the final policy outcome does not 
completely ignore or violate the interests of a particular 
18 Robert Dahl, Pluralistic Democracy in the United States 
(Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1956), 326 19 Kelso, 13. 
20 Ibid. 16-19. 
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group. Thus, even if the outcome was not what that group in-
itially sought, they were likely to have had at least enough 
input so that they were not completely swept aside.21 This 
compromise product of extensive bargaining is, to the plur-
alists, the closest that a democracy can come to addressing 
the public interest, if such a thing could be said to exist. 
5. The political system is self-regulating and thus 
corrects pronounced imbalances before any one interest can 
gain an excess of power and thereby seriously bias the pro-
cess. In a pluralist system, prolonged biases in what needs 
to be a fair and open arena of political competition are 
supposedly avoided through what Dahl terms "political slack" 
or what Truman calls the phenomenon of "potential groups."~ 
What both concepts convey is the notion that the mere exist-
ence of untapped power and influence and group mobilizing 
potential is often enough to deter existing interests from 
abusing their power. Truman clearly articulates this point: 
The power of unorganized interests lies in the possi-
bility that, if these wide, weak interests are too 
flagrantly ignored, they may be stimulated to organize 
for aggressive counteraction. In a society permitting 
a wide freedom of association, access to power is not 
confined to the organized groups in the population. 23 
Dahl confirms that this excess capacity or "slack" to check 
bias or excessive power exists and can be activated if ne-
cessary. Thus, the system exists in an equilibrium of sorts 
21 Ibid. chap. 5. 
22 oahl, Who Governs?, 310; Truman, 114. 23 Truman, 114. 
which, if disrupted, will quickly work to correct the 
imbalance. 24 
11 
Another major factor inhibiting the abuse of power in 
the pluralist system is the sheer diversity of groups and 
interests. Much like Madison, pluralists take comfort in the 
rivalry of more groups rather than less. When "one center of 
power is set against another," contends Dahl, "power itself 
will be tamed, civilized, controlled and limited to decent 
human purposes" while "coercion .... will be reduced to a 
minimum."~ The danger of excess power is further decreased, 
argue the pluralists, by the similarly divided and decen-
tralized government which is bound to the principles of fed-
eralism and checks and balances. 
6. In most policy areas, the role of the state is and 
ought to be primarily mediative. Pluralist theorists claim 
that because of the fragmentation of power in the political 
system, as well as the government's own internally divided 
nature, the power of all concerned parties, including gov-
ernment, is constrained. Government's chief and most appro-
priate role, therefore, is seen to be as facilitator of the 
give-and-take process, referee of group competition, and re-
concilor of disparate interests.26 This is as it should be, 
argue the pluralists, for if the government were to unilat-
erally act in a way that ignored the group dynamic and var-
24 Ibid. 2 6-33. 25 Dahl, Pluralistic Democracy, 24. 26 For a general discussion of this idea see Kelso, 15-16. 
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ious groups' concerns and demands, the entire equilibrium of 
interests might come unhinged. In the pluralist vision, the 
state's proper role, then, is as one participant, albeit a 
crucial and central one, among many in the process of group 
interaction. 21 
The Critics of Pluralism 
While pluralism at one time completely dominated poli-
tical science, it has never gone unchallenged. From the 
start, pluralism has faced counterarguments; some gleaned 
from pre-existing theories, others developed as a direct 
response and rebuttal. The critiques of pluralism fall 
roughly into one of two categories. The first includes the 
work of elite and critical theorists, such as C.Wright 
Mills, G. William Domhoff, or Ralph Miliband who fundamen-
tally reject pluralism's validity as descriptive model. 28 
Elite theory contends that power in the United States is 
dominated by a small, identifiable elite, while critical 
theorists deny the central role not only of interest groups, 
but the entire decisionmaking process itself. Instead, they 
see a system of elite symbol manipulation charading behind 
an empty democratic facade. 
27 Latham, 382. 
28 c. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1956); G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Ralph Miliband, 
The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic Books, 
1969). 
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Other critics of pluralism such as Theodore Lowi, 
Grant McConnell, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz or Robert 
Wolff, on the other hand, do not offer such a vigorous re-
jection of pluralism's empirical reality.29 While many of 
these critics do have very specific empirical doubts about 
aspects of the pluralist model, unlike elite or critical 
theorists, they do not reject wholesale the existence of 
pluralist structures and processes in American politics. 
Instead, these critics either raise doubts about pluralism's 
normative desirability as a form of democratic organization 
or else empirically question certain descriptive aspects and 
assumptions of pluralist theory. These empirical reserva-
tions, however, are never raised in a way which denies the 
overall pluralistic nature of American politics. 
For the purposes of this study, it will be assumed 
that, in the broadest conception of the term, the American 
political system is pluralistic, at least insofar as power 
is fragmented, political authority is divided, there exist 
numerous theoretical access points, and interest groups are 
involved, in varying degrees, in the policymaking process. 
Presuming this broadly defined pluralist nature of American 
politics is not to say that political reality perfectly fits 
29 Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism 2nd ed. (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1979); Grant McConnell, Private Power and Amer-
ican Democracy revised ed. (New York: Vintage, 1970); Peter 
Bachrach and Morton Baratz, Power and Poverty (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1970); Robert Wolff, The Poverty of 
Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968). 
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the pluralist model. Nor does this study's general accep-
tance of a pluralist political reality imply anything as to 
pluralism's normative desirability. Instead, it simply means 
that a broad understanding of pluralism as the American pol-
itical context will provide the framework for this study and 
its attempt to explore pluralism and the claims of its cri-
tics. As such, the arguments of the elite and critical 
theorists, although certainly noteworthy, shall be consid-
ered outside the scope of this study. 
The criticisms directed at pluralism have usually been 
voiced by detractors who advocate alternative forms of dem-
ocratic organization such as those distinguished by Kelso.~ 
Much of the disagreement between these competing alternative 
perspectives and pluralism revolves around the question of 
where the locus of power should lie in a democratic system. 
On one hand, critics such as Lowi, Joseph Schumpeter, 
Samuel Huntington, or Robert Crain call for a centralization 
of power into the hands of a more rational, capable, and 
less discretionary elite. 31 For these critics, elites who 
are insulated from the demands of special interests are best 
able to design and implement sound, innovative, and rational 
3° Kelso, 3-20. 
31 Lowi, The End of Liberalism; Joseph Schumpeter, Capi-
talism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1950); 
Samuel Huntington, American Politics: The Politics of Dis-
harmony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); 
Robert Crain, Elihu Katz, and Donald Rosenthal, The Politics 
of Community Conflict (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 
19 69) . 
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policies, resist the mass threats to civil liberties as 
Herbert Mcclosky suggests, and, according to Giovanni 
Sartori, otherwise act as a corrective to the mediocrity of 
the masses.32 To these elite-centralists, or polyarchal 
democrats, as Kelso terms them,33 the appropriate avenue for 
public participation in politics is through the maintenance 
of elite accountability through electoral means. 
Meanwhile, other critics of pluralism, such as Wolff, 
Bachrach and Baratz, Alan Altschuler, Milton Kotler, Richard 
Hamilton, and more recently Kirkpatrick Sale, Frank Bryan 
and John McClaughtry, and Murray Bookchin have all advocated 
quite the opposite--increased decentralization (beyond even 
pluralism's level) and dispersal of power to the community 
level.34 They seek, in other words, a system of grassroots 
32 Herbert Mcclosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American 
Politics" American Political Science Review 58:2 (June, 
1964), 361-382; Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (New 
York: Praeger, 1958), 96-124. 33 Kelso, xi. I have chosen the the term elite-centralists 
to designate those theorists typified by Lowi who advocate 
increased centralized rule guided by a rational elite. The 
terms elitists or elitist democrats might become confused 
with the elite theory of Mills or Domhoff, while the term 
polyarchal is clouded by Dahl's usage which more akin in 
certain ways to pluralism. 
~Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism; Bachrach and Baratz, 
Power and Poverty; Alan Altschuler, Community Control (New 
York: Pegasus, 1970); Milton Kolter, Neighborhood Government 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967); Richard Hamilton, Class 
and Politics in the United States (New York: Wiley & Sons, 
1972); Kirkpatrick Sale, Human Scale (New York: Coward, 
Mccann, and Geoghegan, 1980); Frank Bryan and John McClaugh-
try, The Vermont Papers: Recreating Democracy on a Human 
Scale (Post Mills, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Co.1 1989); 
Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom (Palo Alto, CA: 
Chesire, 1982). 
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participatory democracy. At a minimum, such a system must 
feature local control, decentralized jurisdictions, and 
extensive and meaningful opportunities for individual citi-
zen participation in the decisionmaking process. Besides ar-
guing that grassroots democracy is a logistically superior 
form of democratic organization,35 the participatory demo-
crats see political participation, as did their mentor Rous-
seau, as an end in and of itself. The actual act of partici-
pating, these critics argue, builds morality, virtue, and 
civic obligation rather than serving merely as a means by 
which to scramble for advantage.36 
The specific complaints about pluralism voiced by 
these diverse critics generally fall into one of two broad 
categories or what Kelso terms "perennial" aspects of demo-
cratic theory: issues relating to the process of decision-
making and the administration of those decisions and those 
regarding the nature of participation and the mobilization 
of the various interests involved.37 
It is the former aspect of pluralism, decisionmaking 
and administration, which tends to concern elite-centralist 
critics the most and leads them to question pluralism's ef-
35 Sale, Chap.a. 
36 For a discussion on the personal benefits which politi-
cal participation is alleged to bring see Terrence Cook and 
Patrick Morgan, Participatory Democracy (San Francisco: Can-
field Press, 1971); this theme is also echoed in Wolff, The 
Poverty of Liberalism and Carole Pateman, Participation and 
Democratic Theory (Cambridge, MA: At the University-Press, 
1970). 37 Kelso, 7. 
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ficacy as a policymaking process. Critics such as Lowi see 
pluralism as a haphazardly ineffective and inefficient man-
ner by which to make policy, especially in areas that are 
complex, multi-dimensional, or involve the long-term na-
tional interest.38 Such critics charge that pluralism so 
fragments power and leaves government so reluctant or unable 
to act decisively, that the entire policymaking process be-
comes paralyzed. Too often, what all the players can agree 
on rather than what is most sound and beneficial to the 
public interest becomes the criterion for such fragmented 
decisionmaking. 
At the root of this paralysis, argues Lowi, is the 
pluralist system's profound aversion to the formalized and 
authoritative exercise of governmental power. Instead, pub-
lie officials are alleged to be far more comfortable as a 
mere participant in the give-and-take of group bargaining; 
the state is thus reduced to being nothing more just than 
another interest. The costs of government's allergy to for-
mal power are high, according to Lowi, and lead to a very 
troubling "discontinuity between politics and government."~ 
The signs of this discontinuity include the inability of 
government to plan or determine independent goals, the 
withering of popularly controlled political institutions, 
and a stifling inertia which thwarts innovation and pre-
38 Lowi, chaps. 4-6. 
39 Ibid. 36 
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serves the status quo and all of the privilege bound up into 
it. Rather than taking the bull by the horns, so to speak, 
and pursuing sound, rational, long-term policies informed by 
notions of principle, morality, and justice, Lowi accuses 
pluralism's weakling government of "yielding" to conflict 
and merely being content to "redistribute power by the maxim 
of each according to his claim ... 40 Says Lowi: 
By rendering formalism impotent, [pluralism] impairs 
legitimacy by converting government from a moralistic 
to a mechanistic institution. It impairs the potential 
of positive law to correct itself by allowing the law 
to become anything that eventually bargains itself out 
as acceptable to the bargainers.~ 
Lowi and other critics, such as McConnell also warn 
that pluralism frequently leads to policymakers becoming 
unduly influenced by the private interests they must deal 
with and supposedly regulate. Because pluralism's fragrnen-
tation isolates and compartmentalizes policymaking agencies 
into disconnected little realms, they become increasingly 
vulnerable to interest group penetration and even capture. 
As a result, argues McConnell, pluralism allows private 
interests to seize large chunks of public authority and use 
it to their benefit: 
A large number of groups have achieved substantial au-
tonomy for themselves and the isolation of important 
segments of government and public policy. The result 
has been the establishment of varying degrees of con-
trol and exercise of public authority by the private 
40 Ibid. 297. 
41 Ibid. 63. 
groups within the public areas with which they are 
concerned. 42 
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In addition to indicting pluralism on the grounds that 
it is poor at policymaking, critics also focus upon the 
question of just how open and fair pluralism's battlefield 
of interests really is. Some critics, especially those of a 
populist or communitarian bent, charge that pluralism, des-
pite its supposedly self-regulating nature, contains an in-
herent bias against certain types of interests, namely those 
that are underprivileged, marginal, diffuse, or otherwise 
less robust. Bachrach and Baratz, Hamilton, Wolff, and 
others all point to pluralism's subtle and not-so-subtle 
biases which allow some groups to be heard while others are 
marginalized, shut out, or never get the chance to organize. 
As such, the critics maintain, pluralism in practice, des-
pite its theoretical equality of opportunity, acts to defend 
the status quo. "The flaw in the pluralist heaven," as E.E. 
Schattschneider states in his famous quote, "is that the 
heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent."~ 
Wolff affirms this as well: 
Pluralist theory functions ideologically by tending to 
deny new groups or interests access to the political 
plateau. It does this by ignoring their existence in 
practice, not by denying their claim in theory. The 
result is that pluralism has a braking effect on so-
cial change.44 
42 McConnell, 7. 
43 E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1960), 35. 44 Wolff, 156. 
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Even if pluralism is willing to recognize all comers 
on the political battlefield, critics contend that many 
interests cannot even make it onto the battlefield in the 
first place. Some either lack the resources, education, or 
inclination to organize or, as Mancur Olson demonstrates, 
have a stake in too diffuse or non-exclusive an interest to 
mobilize effectively, if at all.45 According to critics, 
then, large segments of the population (the vast majority, 
argues Schattschneider) cannot penetrate what Schattschneid-
er calls the "pressure system" and so because they exist in 
this group-oriented pluralist system, essentially go unrep-
resented.~ 
Is There a Public Interest? 
In reviewing the criticisms of pluralism from both a 
policymaking and participatory angle, it soon becomes clear 
that a fundamental bone of contention between pluralists and 
their opponents regards the notion of the public interest. 
The pluralists, influenced as they are by Lockean political 
philosophy, see society ultimately as a fragmented and di-
verse collection of self-interested individuals or groups of 
the similarly-interested locked in competition for advan-
tage. The notion of a true majority in the pluralist's un-
iverse is a myth; all that really exists are issue or atten-
45 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). 
~Schattschneider, 35. 
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tive publics, those groups and individuals for whom a given 
issue is relevant and involves their interests.47 The bene-
fit of issue publics, the pluralists maintain, is that they 
assure that a given policy area will be most heavily inf lu-
enced by those citizens who are more knowledgeable and con-
cerned about and impacted by that issue. Thus a pluralist 
system has the ability to discern what the pluralists call 
intensity.~ Also, pluralists argue that such fragmentation 
of interests, as Madison pointed out two centuries ago, 
helps to preserve liberty by preventing tyrannical mass 
movements. 
In such an atomized political environment, the notion 
of the public interest is, consequently, quite limited. Be-
cause there is no singular public to the pluralists, there 
is no real public interest if by that one means an over-
riding, obviously discernable mass interest. Rather than a 
singular interest, there are instead many diverse and equal-
ly valid interests locked in competition. If it can be said 
at all that there is anything approaching a pluralist public 
interest, then it is not based upon an obvious a priori pol-
itical good, but rather is the end result of the bargaining 
and accomodation of the political process. Since nearly 
every issue features diverse competing claims, what could 
more resemble the public interest, ask the pluralists, than 
47 Kelso, 62-63. 
~Ibid. 82-83. 
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the compromise between all these factions? Thus, the plur-
alist public interest is, as Garson puts it, "social ration-
ality emerging from group accornodation."~ 
In stark contrast to the pluralist conception of the 
public interest is that of pluralism's critics. To nearly 
all the critics, whether elite-centralists, rnajoritarians, 
or participatory democrats, the public interest is singular 
~nd readily identifiable, as Wolff or Lowi would argue, 
through the employment of either moral or legal principles 
and standards or else merely as a reflection of the public's 
collective will (as populists or some participatory demo-
crats would suggest). Just as pluralism betrays its liberal 
and Lockean roots on this issue, the critics' conception of 
the public interest exposes their theoretical heritage as 
well. Whether that heritage sterns from Plato, Aristotle, 
Rousseau, or Burke, most of pluralism's critics adhere to a 
vision of society that is far more unified and organic than 
that of the pluralists. Consequently, if one views the poli-
ty as a single and whole community, then common problems and 
needs and desires could readily be identified and addressed 
by an active government executing policy based upon a combi-
nation of public mandate and moral principle. 
In such a scenario, the wishes of interest groups (or 
special interests as they are called by their detractors) 
should account for little since they would not be the pri-
49 Garson, 94. 
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mary vehicle for the articulation of the public's needs and 
desires. Thus, critics argue, the public interest stands far 
above and apart from the lesser and more narrow conflict of 
self-interests which they claim is all the pluralists ever 
recognize. "The·genius of American politics," notes Wolff 
disapprovingly, "is its ability to treat even matters of 
principles as if they were conflicts of interest."~ To the 
pluralists, though, this sort of talk not only raises the 
question of whose principles Wolff finds so obviously and 
unquestioningly valid, but also the dreaded specter of Mad-
ison's tyrannical factions, each claiming the mantle of pub-
lic interest while riding roughshod over individual and es-
pecially minority rights. 
The academic struggle that has pitted pluralism 
against its critics peaked in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. Though certainly not resolved, this debate has 
quieted down considerably since then. But it has not been 
completely quiet. Without as shrill a tone, the debate has 
reemerged in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s as 
pluralist scholars have conducted numerous smaller scale, 
more specialized studies which have attempted to empirically 
test at least certain aspects of the pluralist argument. As 
part of what Andrew McFarland calls the "critical pluralism" 
of the 1980s, these studies and this revised perspective in 
general have been mindful of prior critiques and have, 
50 wolff, 137. 
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therefore, kept within more modest bounds than earlier, more 
theoretical works.51 While acceding to their opponents on 
certain of pluralism's more indefensible claims (such as 
Latham's portrayal of the passive state acting as just 
another interest with little autonomy), this revised plur-
alism has attempted to confirm the role of groups in the 
policymaking process, while asserting that equal opportunity 
amongst groups has grown as well.52 These groups are found 
to be operating as part of a very complex and fairly well-
functioning relationship with various government agencies.53 
Not only is this revised vision of pluralism found to be em-
pirically valid, contends Kelso, but a strong case could 
still be made for its normative superiority as well.54 
51 Andrew McFarland, "Why Interest Groups Organize: A 
Pluralist Reponse to Olson" from a paper delivered at the 
Western Political Science Association annual meeting, Seat-
tle, WA (April 1991). In general, such a perspective can be 
found in: James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation (New 
York: Basic Books, 1980); Paul Culhane, Public Lands Poli-
tics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Re-
sources for the Future, 1981); John Kingdon, Agenda, Alter-
natives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984); 
Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment" 
in Anthony King (editor), The New American Political System 
(Washington o.c.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978}; Wil-
liam Brown, Private Interests, Public Policy, and American 
Agriculture (Lawrence KS: University Press of Kansas, 1988). 52 see, for example, Culhane, Public Lands Politics; 
Mahood, Interest Group Politics in America; Browne, Private 
Interests, Public Policy, and American Agriculture; Chris-
topher Sosso, Pesticides and Politics, (Pittsburgh: Univer-
sit~ of Pittsburgh Press, 1987). 
See, for example, Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Execu-
tive Establishment." 54 Ke 1 so , 2 5- 3 4 • 
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Pluralism and Ecological Values55 
The Politics of Ecology 
As mentioned before, the debate over pluralism, 
whether on the level of broad theorizing or more specialized 
case studies, has concentrated on the questions of how ef-
f ectively and autonomously policymakers and their agencies 
function and whether the pluralist process discriminates 
against certain interests and their policy goals. There is a 
policy area from which to examine these questions and the 
arguments of the pluralists and their critics which, al-
though quite well-suited for this task, has been largely 
overlooked. The politics of ecological concern as Dean Mann 
complains, "scarcely receives mention" in the debate over 
pluralism, being "clearly subsidiary to the dominant issues 
of economic policy and social relations."~ And yet, ecolog-
ical politics provide the scholar with a unique opportunity 
to probe pluralist theory for several reasons. 
First of all, ecological matters, perhaps more so than 
just about any other policy area, feature incredibly com-
plex, interrelated and long-term issues. 57 As any biologist 
55 For a far more in-depth discussion of the nature of 
ecological values than this section provides, see appendix 
A. 
56 Dean Mann, "Democratic Politics and Environmental Pol-
icy" in Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael 
Clarke (editors), Controversies in Environmental Politics 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), 17. 
57 Ecological matters in this study will broadly be de-
fined as issues involving the aesthetic, spiritual, and 
biological dimensions of objects in the natural world. 
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can attest to, they involve principles whose intricacy hu-
mankind is only scarcely beginning to unravel and comprehend 
as well as systems which often proceed at a glacial pace and 
in quite subtle ways. In this way, then, ecological policy 
provides the perfect archetype for the complex and long-
range policies which Lowi accuses pluralist policymakers of 
so gravely mishandling. 
In addition to, and perhaps even more important than 
their complex nature is the fact that ecological concerns 
can be so intangible. Ecological values, especially those 
immediately divorced from human health or safety concerns 
tend to be far less tangible, quantifiable, and material 
than those of many other interests in pluralist competition. 
According to Daniel Henning and William Mangun: 
Many values and considerations found in environmental 
administration are of an intangible nature and conse-
quently are difficult or impossible to define or quan-
tify. It is extremely difficult if not impossible to 
assign economic values to living resources due to the 
complexities and ambiguities associated with their 
being given proper weight and consideration. 58 
In other words, ecological values involve concepts 
that go well beyond the standard who gets what, when, and 
how? of the give-and-take politics of pluralism. Ecological 
concerns depend upon measures of value which are often not 
commonly recognized or understood within the political pro-
cess. Rather than relying upon traditional and widely accep-
58 Daniel Henning and William Mangun, Managing the 
Environmental Crisis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1989), 4-5. 
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ted economic measures of worth, ecological values are usual-
ly measured in terms of fairly intangible emotional, aesthe-
tic, and biological justifications (see appendix A). To an 
ecologist, therefore, an immense ancient tree in an old 
growth forest is more than the board feet of timber which 
the policymaking realm has traditionally measured it by. 
The advocates of ecology complain that such subtle-
ties are easily lost in the more quantitatively-oriented 
pluralist process. The tendency of the pluralist process to 
perceive of political demands in terms of self-interest, es-
pecially materially quantifiable self-interest, might attest 
to the fact that it is the language of economics it is most 
comfortable speaking. If true, then ecological values might 
have an especially hard time competing as they risk oc~upy-
ing something of a pluralist no-man's-land where the lan-
guage of ecology is not reliably spoken nor understood. The 
early Forest Service wilderness advocate Bob Marshall noted 
this gap when he characterized the arguments of preservation 
as being "subtle and difficult to express" as opposed to the 
"concrete and direct" language of development.~ Naturalist 
Wallace Stegner puts this issue in more partisan terms: 
Being an intangible and spiritual resource, [the wil-
derness idea] will seem mystical to the practical-
59 Bob Marshall quoted in Roderick Nash, Wilderness and 
the American Mind revised ed.(New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press 1973), 20. 
minded--but then anything that cannot be moved by a 
bulldozer is likely to seem mystical to them.~ 
28 
Because they are often speaking in terms of such dis-
parate measures of value, ecologists and their opponents 
very often find themselves politically in zero-sum situa-
tions, and with no type of politics is pluralism more un-
comfortable. The problem for the pluralist process is that 
zero-sum situations tend to preclude, or at least make very 
difficult, much of the accomodation and bargaining that de-
fine pluralism. The essential question that arises then, is 
whether or not that discomfort translates into a bias 
against and marginalization of ecological interests and 
their initiatives just as critics charge pluralism does to 
other disadvantaged interests. Robert Paehlke suggests that 
this may be the case: 
In this context [that is, pluralism], environmental 
groups often seem foreign to the political decision-
making process. Environmental issues are treated as 
inconvenient, time-consuming add-ons.61 
Understanding just whose interests are identified with 
ecological values can be as complex as appreciating the val-
ues themselves. Although they definitely constitute a dis-
tinct political interest, ecologists, like other "collec-
tive" interests which Olson identifies, are, in many ways, a 
special case. This is because their interest is so broad, 
~Wallace Stegner quoted in Walter Rosenbaum, Environmen-
tal Politics and Policy (Washington o.c.: CQ Press, 1985), 
255. 61 Robert Paehlke, Environmentalism and the Future of Pro-
gressive Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1989), 210. 
diffuse, and immaterial. Any group which speaks to these 
sorts of large-scale, non-exclusive interests invariably 
terms themselves a public interest; that is, a supposedly 
aloof, selfless defender of what is in the whole public's 
best interest. 
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Such interests also commonly play to the fact that 
they themselves have no self-interest vested in the pursuit 
of their goals. In the case of ecological interests, aside 
from a few wilderness outfitters or kayak guides, this in-
deed may be true regarding materially quantifiable self-
interest, but in terms of the more intangible dimensions of 
self-interest, such individuals may actually have much at 
stake. Any group ideologically and emotionally invested in a 
cause cannot help but have at least some degree of personal, 
psychological self-interest in that cause. Ecologists would 
be the first to admit to the spiritual and emotional bene-
fits which the wilderness accrues for them. Still, they 
would argue that the protection of the planet's complex eco-
systems is hardly on the same level of interest as the mill 
owner trying to protect the steady flow of timber into his 
mill. Whether ecologists are a special type of public inte-
rest or just another self-interested faction fighting it out 
on the pluralist battlefield amongst all the other equally 
valid factions is a question that strikes at the heart of 
the debate between the pluralists and their critics. 
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Ecological matters are by no means the only policy 
area within pluralist politics which transcend distributive 
and/or easily quantifiable concerns or involve self-
proclaimed public interests. Political battles that have 
raged over school prayer, abortion, flag burning, and feder-
al funding for the arts are just a few examples of issues 
which also involve less tangible, non-quantifiable interests 
and very emotional, symbolically potent issues. In fact, it 
might be said that, to some extent, even the most seemingly 
tangible issues have their intangible aspects. Thus, even 
fairly standard distributive issues involving, for instance, 
taxes or various benefit programs could be said to have a 
strong emotional and symbolic dimension which also cannot be 
easily quantified. Still, ecological values and issues stand 
out. Despite a potential intangible dimension to practically 
any interest, ecological interests, along with a few others, 
have goals and values which are, for the most part, exclu-
sively non-economic. 
Ecological Values and the Case of the Siskiyou National 
Forest 
Because of this distinctness, ecological policymaking 
offers an especially good opportunity to determine how plur-
alism operates and its theoretical claims hold up when con-
fronted with challenging, often zero-sum, policy dilemmas 
and demands. Does the political system's fragmentation and 
numerous points of access provide, as pluralists like Dean 
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Mann might suggest, the guarantee that marginalized or frag-
ile (in our case ecological) values will gain a forum and a 
voice which otherwise, perhaps in another system of demo-
cratic organization, might be denied them?62 Or does the 
short-term economically-oriented policymaking patchwork of 
pluralism leave supposedly vulnerable ecological values 
skewered on what Rosenbaum calls the "pikes of the poli-
ticians"?~ These are the chief questions that this study 
will concern itself with. 
In order to address these questions, the broad-scale 
theoretical claims of the pluralist model and its critics 
must be empirically tested. One way to achieve this is to 
explore in-depth a specific case of political conflict in-
volving explicit ecological values and issues as we earlier 
defined them. 
The case which will be explored in this study involves 
the political battle over the Siskiyou National Forest in 
southwestern Oregon. Since the early 1980s, local groups 
have been trying to prevent the Siskiyou from being logged 
and having logging roads built into it. During the mid and 
late 1980s this issue heated up and merged with the larger 
regional, and later national effort to save the old growth 
forests of the Pacific Northwest and the threatened Northern 
spotted owl which inhabits the forests. 
62 Mann, "Democratic Poli tics and Environmental Policy." 63 walter Rosenbaum, The Politics of Ecological Concern 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), 93. 
I have chosen the Siskiyou case for a number of 
reasons. First, it involves very basic and explicit eco-
logical values which are, at least in the short-term, not 
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directly related to human health or safety. In other words, 
the readily identifiable and tangible human welfare inte-
rests that are evident in the pursuit of some ecologically 
informed policy demands such as, say, preventing ozone de-
pletion, the greenhouse effect, or toxic dumping are less 
obvious and more indirect in the case of the Siskiyou for-
est. Therefore, the values which foster a desire for the 
forest's protection can be less easily confused or diluted 
with matters of quantifiable self-interest or economic re-
wards. What is at stake here for the Siskiyou's defenders 
are the symbolic, spiritual, aesthetic, and ecological as-
pects of the forest. 64 The Siskiyou case is, in other words, 
a very straightforward example of fairly intangible values 
competing in a pluralist system against far more tangible, 
quantifiable, and (as far as pluralism goes) traditional 
interests and values. In the case of the Siskiyou, these 
opposing values have been largely, though not exclusively, 
64 Concerning that last, ecological, aspect, it must be 
said that environmentalists would make a very strong case 
that, in the long-run, human welfare is indeed very much 
tied up with the forest's fate. This is a central tenet of 
the ecologic perspective. In terming the ecological inte-
rests at stake as being not directly related to human health 
or safety, I do not intend to rule out this perspective. 
What I am trying to convey is that human health and safety 
interests in the forest's continued existence are usually 
long-term, indirect, and often subtle rather than obvious, 
direct, and immediate. 
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material and utilitarian in nature and involve the economic 
interests of those who make a livelihood from the logging of 
this national forest. 
In addition to the explicitness of its ecological val-
ues, the politics of the Siskiyou case closely mirror the 
pluralist process in that they provide sets of actors at 
various levels of jurisdiction (both horizontally and ver-
tically) and ultimately involve the pluralist system at many 
equally important points. 
Broadly, this case study attempts to address two 
major issues. First is the issue of how ecological values 
and initiatives fare in a pluralist political process. Is 
this process inherently hostile towards and biased against 
ecological concerns or is it the best system that could be 
hoped for at least in regards to allowing peripheral values 
the chance to be heard? Secondly (though this is really part 
of the previous issue), this study attempts to determine how 
valid the critics' major complaints against pluralist 
theory, both empirical and normative, are, at least in the 
context of ecological issues. In addition to examining their 
critiques of pluralism, the question of how the critics' 
specific prescriptions would affect ecological values and 
initiatives is considered as well: would these reforms real-
ly improve the success of ecological interests as many cri-
tics claim? 
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To address these issues, both the participatory and 
decisionmaking aspects of the pluralist process in the Sis-
kiyou National Forest must be considered. More specifically, 
such an analysis encompasses the following questions: 
1. Were there inherent biases or serious imbalances 
in interest group resources, organization, and mobilization 
capacity which seriously harmed or limited ecological inte-
rests? If there was a discrepancy in raw resources was there 
enough "political slack" to offset these inequalities? 
2. Were there biases amongst administrative or other 
decisionmakers which limited ecological interests' access to 
the policymaking process or prevented their demands and ini-
tiatives from being seriously considered? 
3. Were there structural biases in the political sys-
tem, especially in regards to levels of decentralization, 
which militate against the success of ecological values and 
initiatives? 
Other research has touched upon this issue of plur-
alism and environmental values and pondered some questions 
similar to those addressed in this study. They regard 
whether the structure of American goverment and its policy-
making process is well-disposed towards dealing with envi-
ronmental concerns or whether it is inherently hostile and 
biased against them. A number of scholars argue in favor of 
the latter scenario. While representing a variety of per-
spectives, these critics of pluralism would all agree with 
Rosenbaum's description of the perceived disadvantage of 
ecological values in a pluralist system: 
35 
Many [environmentalists] .... recognize they are operat-
ing in a milieu where the opposition has historically 
enjoyed the greater advantage and success. Under the 
most favorable of conditions, environmentalists expect 
a hard, uncertain battle in an unfriendly arena.65 
Kraft, writing in 1974, is even more forthright and specific 
about this "unfriendly arena": 
[T]he dominant political response to the ecological 
crisis has been characterized by marginal and super-
ficial attention to, understanding of, and concern for 
ecological problems; a weak and uncertain commitment 
to new environmental priorities .... ; timidity and mod-
eration at best in public policy developments .... ; the 
frequent use by politicians of rhetorical and symbolic 
gestures as a substitute for material, real accomp-
lishments; dedication to palliative measures .... In 
short, the political response has favored inertia and 
old priorities rather than rigorous and imaginative 
progress and new priorities.~ 
Harold and Margaret Sprout offer a similar critique of the 
pluralist system's piecemeal approach to ecological 
issues,67 while William Ophuls argues that the individual 
self-interest basis of pluralism is woefully inadequate for 
dealing with ecological matters.~ 
There are also those who see pluralism in a much more 
favorable light. Far from being inherently hostile, plural-
65 Rosenbaum, The Politics of Ecological Concern, 93. 
~ Michael Kraft, "Ecological Politics and American Gov-
ernment: A Review Essay" in Stuart Nagel (editor), Environ-
mental Politics (New York: Prager Publishers, 1974), 148. 67 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Context of En-
vironmental Politics (Lexington, KY: University Press of 
Kentucky, 1978). 
~William Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity 
(San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1977). 
36 
ism is seen by some as ecology's best, if not only, chance 
to influence policy. While admitting that pluralism may of-
fer some difficulties, these advocates of pluralism, inclu-
ding Mann, Petulla, Paehlke, Howard Mccurdy, and Norman Vig 
and Michael Kraft claim there is no better alternative.69 
Mccurdy def ends pluralism as being more democratic and bene-
ficial to the environment than more centralized alterna-
tives, while Kraft undergoes at least a partial change of 
heart from his earlier works as he and Vig proclaim that: 
Pluralism and flexibility in governance, as well as in 
economic activities, permit widespread experimentation 
and social change when challenges arise. Popular mo-
bilization that results from voluntary cooperation 
tends to outlast coerced obedience, as we have 
learned. 70 
The research into pluralism's treatment of ecological 
values is incomplete however. When attempts have been made 
to address broad theoretical questions about pluralism and 
environmental issues, such studies have often failed to ac-
company their claims with detailed empirical support. On the 
other hand, when such detailed empiricism is indeed applied 
to environmental policy issues, it usually takes the form of 
69 Mann, "Democratic Politics and Environmental Policy"; 
Joseph Petulla, American Environmentalism (College Station, 
TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); Robert Paehlke, "En-
vironmental Values and Democracy: The Challenge of the Next 
Century" in Norman Vig and Michael Kraft, Environmental 
Policy in the 1990s (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990); 
Howard Mccurdy, "Environmental Protection and the New Fe-
deralism: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Beyond" in Kamieniec-
ki, et al.; Norman Vig and Michael Kraft, "Conclusion: 
Toward a New Environmental Agenda" in Vig and Kraft. 
70 Vig and Kraft, 385. 
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a narrowly focused examination of some small aspect of the 
policymaking process, thereby failing to explore any larger 
theoretical implications. Michael Kraft disapprovingly notes 
the proliferation of such microanalysis in environmental 
policy studies: 
One of the major weaknesses of the social science lit-
erature on ecological matters, in fact, is a notable 
failure to come to grips with such questions (of 
whether or not pluralist institutions and structures 
are inherently incapable of addressing ecological 
problems] .... while deficient in attending to these 
tough and subversive questions, we have by comparison 
absolutely lavished attention on trivial descriptions 
of routine issues in contemporary environmental poli-
tics and administration, on microanalysis of largely 
inconsequential environmental behavior, and on the de-
velopment of methodological sophistication in policy 
analysis that seems greatly to exceed the marginal 
payoffs of the final product.n 
Although the more specific research relevant to this 
study probably does not deserve so harsh a criticism, Kraft 
touches on an important point regarding political science's 
treatment of the "big questions" of environmental policy 
wherein it sometimes cannot see the theoretical forest for 
the empirical trees. 
Plan of the Study 
In order to comprehensively explore the effect a plur-
alist political system has upon ecological policymaking and 
what this says about pluralism itself, it will be necessary 
in this study to approach the issue from several angles. 
First, though, an overview of the issues at hand and the 
n Kraft, "Ecological Politics," 146. 
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relevant political events that have thusfar occurred must be 
presented. Chapters two and three provide such an overview 
as they lay down the basic facts and history of this case. 
The next chapter focuses upon the manner in which the 
various interests involved in the Siskiyou case have articu-
lated demands, mobilized supporters and resources, and par-
ticipated in the process. Such an investigation will shed 
light upon those issues in the debate over pluralism which 
revolve around the nature of interest group activities and 
allegations of marginalization. How effectively, for exam-
ple, did the ecological interests organize and mobilize? Was 
there a great disparity between the resources available to 
the ecological interests and their opponents and if so, did 
this affect their ability to effectively participate? What 
role did the way in which demands were articulated and sym-
bols manipulated play in the competition between interests? 
Did this aspect of the interest group competition serve at 
all to compensate for any material inequality in group re-
sources or was it simply another function of resource advan-
tage? 
Chapter five turns to the issue of bureaucratic admin-
istration in the Siskiyou National Forest, concentrating 
primarily upon whether pluralist or critical models of ad-
ministration are most appropriate in this case. For in-
stance, did ecological interests gain sufficient access to 
the decisionmaking process? Were their values and policy 
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objectives taken seriously by policymakers? Were they 
weighed in a manner commensurate with the level and skill of 
organization behind them or was there a consistent bias pre-
venting this? If there was a bias, what was the nature of 
this bias; was it caused by internal agency norms and values 
or outside client pressures or, perhaps, various immutable 
principles of bureaucratic behavior? 
Still within the realm of the decisionmaking process, 
the following chapter will address the critics', especially 
Lowi's, allegations that the very structure of pluralism, 
most particularly its decentralization, is ill-designed for 
and inept at producing sound, rational policy. Both the ef-
fects of policy fragmentation in the Siskiyou and the alter-
native of centralization are considered. Critics put forth 
other alternatives to pluralism besides elite centraliza-
tion, specifically radical decentralization or majoritarian-
ism, and in chapter seven, this study speculates upon the 
validity of these other alternatives. Finally, the last 
chapter moves on to draw some conclusions about pluralism 
and ecology in the Siskiyou battle. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE BATTLE FOR THE SISKIYOU NATIONAL FOREST 
Americans .... may be said not to perceive the mighty 
forests that surround them till they fall beneath the 
hatchet. 
Alexis de Tocqueville 
.... the Forest Service has announced plans to begin 
clearcutting much of the remaining unprotected public 
forest in the Siskiyous. In the hamlets around the 
Rogue River, clusters of people say that they will die 
to prevent that from happening. Few people doubt them. 
Timothy Egan 
They just created Appalachia in the Northwest. 
President, Medford Timber Company 
Like a stranger who defies stereotype upon first 
acquaintance, the Siskiyous are hard to figure. A 
little incongruent, at times spooky. 
Timothy Egan 
This case study revolves around the political struggle 
over one particular national forest, the Siskiyou. Before 
any attempt is made to analyze how the politics of this for-
est relate to larger questions of ecological policymaking 
and pluralist democratic theory, though, the forest's story 
must be told. This chapter and the next, therefore, lay out 
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the political history of the Siskiyou National Forest and 
the larger old growth controversy that it was a part of for 
the period of 1983 to 1992. 
The Siskiyou Forest: The Natural Context 
In the northwest corner of this continent, from north-
ern California to southern Alaska, ocean currents and buck-
led jet streams conspire to produce a gush of moisture and 
mild air which the region's mountains wring dry. With annual 
precipitation in excess of two hundred inches in some areas, 
the Pacific Northwest is a place which for millenia has pro-
duced immense trees and vast forests. In fact, these trees, 
which often reach astonishing height, girth, and age, and 
the forests they are a part of, are estimated to comprise 
the greatest density and mass of living organic matter on 
the entire planet.1 The remnants of such forests are known 
today as old growth. 
To describe old growth is to use a good deal of super-
latives; tallest, heaviest, widest, oldest. The precise def-
inition of old growth, however, is as politically signifi-
cant and contentious as is the struggle over its future. 
Those who favor the continued logging of these forests use 
fairly liberal definitions that describe quite a bit more 
1 At four hundred tons per acre, an average old growth 
forest in the Pacific Northwest far outweighs its tropical 
rainforest counterpart which measures only 185 tons per 
acre. Catherine Caufield, "The Ancient Forest" New Yorker 
(14 May 1990), 46. 
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acreage than the far more stringent interpretations of old 
growth adhered to by environmentalists. 
Perhaps the closest thing to a standard definition has 
been established by Forest Service biologist and old growth 
expert Jerry Franklin who identifies specific criteria a 
forest must meet to be considered old growth. According to 
Franklin, old growth forests must contain trees of mixed age 
and species including a number of very large and very old 
trees. In addition, old growth forests must have a certain 
amount of standing and downed dead trees and organic mat-
ter. 2 
For decades, the conventional wisdom regarding old 
growth forests was that they were, as one Forest Service 
silviculturist termed them in 1952, a "biological desert," 3 
too dense and dark and static to harbor much flora or fauna. 
Moreover, since the biggest trees in these mature forests 
are slow-growing, not growing at all, or even dying, they 
have traditionally been seen by foresters as a monumental 
2 specifically, Franklin lays out five criteria: (1) there 
must occur two or more tree species with a wide range of 
ages and sizes amongst individual trees; (2) six to eight 
coniferous trees per acre must measure at least thirty inch-
es in diameter and be at least two hundred years old; (3) 
the forest must have a non-uniform, multi-layered canopy; 
(4) there must exist two to four standing dead trees (snags) 
per acre, measuring at least twenty inches in diameter and 
fifteen feet tall; and (5) on the ground must lie at least 
ten tons per acre of fallen logs, including at least two 
sections twenty-four inches in diameter and fifty feet long. 
These criteria are summed up in Herbert McLean, "Paying the 
Price for Old Growth" American Forests (October 1991), 25. 
3 caufield, 48. 
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waste. In the parlance of the logger they are ''overripe" or 
"decadent"; that is, just sitting there taking up land upon 
which rapidly growing young trees could be established in-
stead. 
It was not until Franklin's seminal 1981 study of old 
growth that myths regarding its biological impoverishment 
were dispelled. 4 Rather than being an "overmature desert," 
what Franklin found was that the ecologically mature or cli-
max stage known as old growth is the biologically richest 
and most complex in a Northwest forest's life. Franklin des-
cribes intricate ecological interrelationships and an eco-
system of almost mind-boggling complexity and diversity. 
Like the tropical rainforests, old growth forests play host 
to thousands of specialized plant, animal, and microbiotic 
species which perform, as former BLM biologist Chris Maser 
has termed it, "a ballet of interaction."5 
Towards the southern end of the historic range of the 
Pacific old growth forests, straddling the Oregon-California 
4 USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Forest and Range 
Experiment Station, Ecological Characteristics of Old Growth 
Douglas-fir Forests, by Jerry Franklin et al., General Tech-
nical Report PNW-118 (1981). 5chris Maser quoted in David Fishman, "America's Ancient 
Forests" E Magazine (October 1989). So precise and efficient 
are these interactions and processes that the old growth 
forest is a system in near-perfect balance, consuming pre-
cisely what it produces and therefore wasting practically no 
organic matter. Such a system, barring catacylism, could 
theoretically remain stable indefinitely. Yet as stable as 
it is, old growth is also extremely fragile; if any part of 
the system is removed, from mammals to the lowliest 
nitrogen-fixing root fungi, the entire process could un-
ravel. Caufield, 49. 
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border, lies a region of exceptional botanical and geologi-
cal interest. Where the northern edge of the Siskiyou moun-
tains meet and blend into the Coastal Range further to the 
west is found the Siskiyou National Forest. Within this na-
tional forest are perhaps the largest remaining unlogged and 
roadless blocks of old growth forest in the continental Uni-
ted States.6 
Unlike more typical old growth regions in northern 
Oregon and Washington, the Siskiyou area, which has what is 
classified as a Mediterranean climate, features very hot, 
dry summers, frequent fires, and less rainfall. 7 As a re-
sult, the old growth in the Siskiyou is, for the most part, 
not quite as immense or long-lived and the soils are thinner 
and more fragile than in the cool, dripping wet forests fur-
ther up the coast. In relation to most Pacific Northwest 
ecosystems, therefore, the Siskiyou is an anomaly; dry 
enough to spark fearsome fires and support sparse desert-
like habitats in some places and yet rainy enough to produce 
towering old growth forests including the northernmost 
stands of coast redwoods, the world's tallest tree.a 
6Timothy Egan, The Good Rain (New York: Knopf, 1990), 
164. 
7 The Siskiyou receive only 20-160 inches of rain compared 
to 100-200 inches further north. Robert Sterling, "In a 
Strikingly Different Ecological Overlap Zone" Medford Mail 
Tribune (25 June 1989). · 
8 Egan, 161; Jonathan Nicholas, "The Once and Future For-
est" (Portland) Oregonian (20 June 1988). 
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Because of its unique geological features, 9 the very 
ancient Siskiyou mountains have for millions of years served 
as an evolutionary crossroads, nursery, and gene pool for 
much of the continent west of the Mississippi.10 Not sur-
prisingly, such evolutionary continuity and centrality has 
led to the development of an unusual level of biological 
diversity and complexity in the Siskiyou's plant and animal 
communities as botanist Robert Whittaker points out: 
This [the Siskiyou) is an area of biological interest 
as great as that of the Southern Appalachians .... as 
dramatic an expression of relationships of natural 
communities to geological formation as is to be found 
anywhere in the world. 11 
In terms of both flora and fauna, this purported 
birthplace of the modern coniferous forest is home to the 
biologically uncommon and significant. Over 1,400 plant 
species, of which more than one hundred have been classified 
as either endangered, rare, or sensitive occur here,12 as 
does the Rogue River system, described by the Forest Service 
as "some of the most valuable salmon and steelhead habitat 
9 Unlike most all other mountain ranges on the continent, 
the Siskiyou and its parent Klamath mountains have an east-
west rather than north-south orientation. This unique orien-
tation is thought to have possibly been responsible for 
blocking the periodic advances of the glaciers which crushed 
the forests of the north-south ranges. As a result, scien-
tists believe that the Siskiyou region has been temperate 
and continuously vegetated for 40 million years. Caufield, 
72-73; Egan, 161. 10 Ibid. 11 Robert Whittaker, Vegetation of the Siskiyou Mountains, 
Oregon and California, Ecological Monographs Series, vol. 30 
(1960), 279-338. 12 Egan, 161; Caufield, 73. 
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in the United States." 13 In addition, rare or endangered 
fishers, wolverines, pileated woodpeckers, and the northern 
spotted owl are found in the Siskiyou. Rarest of all might 
be Bigfoot, Sasquatch, or the Hermit of the Siskiyous as he 
is locally called, whose elusive presence, real or imagined, 
has haunted this region for ages.14 
The Siskiyou Forest: The Human Context 
Covering 1,092,302 acres of land over parts of Curry, 
Josephine, and Coos Counties in southwestern Oregon and a 
very small portion of Del Norte County in extreme northern 
California, the Siskiyou National Forest is one of the 155 
national forests administered by the United States Forest 
Service15 (see figure 1) . The agency manages the fores ts un-
der what is called a multiple use mandate which includes 
authorization to harvest timber on the forest. 
The Forest Service, which is part of the Department of 
Agriculture, oversees from its Washington D.C. headquarters 
nine regional offices. 16 One of these, Region Six (Oregon 
and Washington), includes the Siskiyou National Forest. In-
dividual national forests are administered by a forest su-
13 USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest, Land and Resource Management Plan Final En-
vironmental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1989), sec. I, 
15. 14 Egan, 161. 15 There are nineteen national grasslands under its juris-
diction as well. 16 Several million acres of additional public forestlands 
in central and southern Oregon are administered by the De-
partment of Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM). 
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pervisor who reports to one of the nine regional foresters 
who in turn answers to the Chief of the Forest Service in 
Washington D.C. The Siskiyou National Forest, which is head-
quartered in the city of Grants Pass, OR, is further decen-
tralized into five ranger districts. 17 Each of these ranger 
districts, with headquarters in nearby towns, is adminis-
tered by a district ranger. 
The area surrounding the Siskiyou National Forest is 
a fairly rural region situated several hundred miles in any 
direction from a major metropolis. 18 The largest city in the 
region is Medford with a population of approximately forty 
thousand people. Unlike the increasingly diversified econo-
mies of the Portland area and a good deal of Washington 
state, the economy of southwestern Oregon is still heavily 
dependent upon timber production. Providing a little over 
17% of total employment in the four-county area, the lumber 
and wood products industry is the single largest employer in 
17 These ranger districts are Powers in the far northern 
portion of the forest, Gold Beach in the north-central, 
Galice in the east-central, Chetco in the southwest, and 
Illinois Valley in the southeast. 
18 The region around the Siskiyou, defined by the Forest 
Service as the "primary area of economic and social inf lu-
ence" consists of the three counties in which the forest 
lies as well as nearby Jackson County which includes the 
city of Medford. Land and Resource Management Plan FEIS, 
sec. III, 128. 
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the region. 19 Other major employers in the region include 
government, tourism, agriculture, and fisheries.20 
Communities within this four-county area having what 
the Forest Service calls, "close socioeconomic ties" to the 
forest include Medford, Grants Pass, Brookings, Gold Beach, 
Port Orford, Powers, and Cave Junction21 (see figure 1). Be-
sides the direct and indirect employment which the wood pro-
ducts industry provides, communities in this area also de-
pend upon the portion of timber receipts which the Forest 
Service pays to the counties. On most national forest land, 
counties earn a quarter of Forest Service receipts from tim-
ber sales and in the 17% of the Siskiyou's area that is spe-
cially classified as Oregon and California lands, counties 
are supplemented with an additional 25% of receipts.22 
19 Ibid. sec. III, 129. 20 Amongst the agricultural activities in this region is a 
great deal of illicit marijuana production which has become, 
in fact, the area's number one cash crop. Egan, 165. 21 USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest, Land and Resource Management Plan (Region 
10: GPO, 1989), sec. I, 4. 
22 Land and Forest Management FEIS, sec. II, 211. Counties 
are offered either seventy-five cents per federal acre or 
25% of receipts. In the high-yield national forests of the 
Northwest, the latter has always been far more lucrative. As 
for the so-called Oregon and California (O&C) lands, they 
were confiscated by the federal government in 1916 from the 
Oregon and California Railroad which had engaged in massive 
fraud with land granted to them. The O&C lands operate under 
a different charter which mandates a higher rate of payment 
to local governments. While most O&C lands are now under BLM 
jurisdiction, some acreage does occur in the National Forest 
system, including the Siskiyou. Kathie Durbin, "BLM Mandate 
Collides With Owl" from special report: "Forests in Dis-
tress" Oregonian (15 October 1990), 10. For full statistics 
regarding county receipts, see Land and Forest Management 
Plan FEIS, sec. III, 132. 
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Within this region's communities, a diversity of life-
styles exist. In addition to the socially conservative log-
gers, farmers, ranchers, and fishermen who have traditional-
ly populated this region, southwestern Oregon has for sever-
al decades served as a magnet for individuals who abide by 
alternative lifestyles. Drawn to the region's rural charac-
ter and scenic beauty, a good number of such individuals 
have settled in this region, a few living in communes, or 
more commonly, small communities such as Takilma.23 These 
less traditional residents of the area are most often em-
ployed or self-employed in small cottage industries or in 
the recreational sector.24 
That logging has traditionally been king in southwest-
ern Oregon is written all over the land in the patchwork of 
second growth forests and clearcuts and logging roads that 
are evident throughout the countryside. When the first log-
gers arrived in this region a century and a half ago, many 
coming from the completely spent timberlands of the upper 
Great Lakes, they settled in the best timber growing regions 
in the lowlands and coastal areas. 25 When the Siskiyou Na-
tional Forest was established around the turn of the cen-
23 Egan, 169. 24 This is not to imply that all individuals in the region 
with alternative values or lifestyles are migrants from 
elsewhere; there are also many native Oregonians amongst 
their ranks. Also, although many are environmental activ-
ists, I am in no way implying that such individuals are sy-
non~ous with the environmental community in this region. 
5 Caufield, 60. 
51 
tury, it was relegated to the steepest, most mountainous 
forestlands. 
While logging commenced soon after settlement, it was 
not until the 1920s that large-scale operations began. From 
that time until the 1950s, private lands were heavily log-
ged, to the point where today practically no significant 
acreage of old growth exists outside of the public domain.26 
In southwestern Oregon as well as the entire Pacific North-
west, the cutting reached its peak in 1952 when the annual 
cut for the whole region climbed to a record 9.8 billion 
board feet (bbf) of timber.27 
Such a rapid depletion of forestlands was made pos-
sible by the logging practices common to private lands 
where, according to Bernard Shanks's estimate, only one in 
ten acres of forest is managed properly.28 Not bound by any 
legal mandates to maintain the forests' long-term sustaina-
bility, much timber on private lands is harvested instead 
when the financial needs of the owner or market considera-
tions determine that a liquidation of assets is economically 
prudent. 
uFrom Section V, "Findings of Fact" in the opinion of 
Judge William Dwyer, Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans 771 F. 
Supp. 1081 (9th U.S. District, 1991). 27 Kathie Durbin and Paul Koberstein, introduction to 
special report: "Forests in Distress" Oregonian (15 October 
1990), 24. A board foot is a unit of measurement which cor-
responds to a piece of wood one foot square by one inch 
thick. 
~Bernard Shanks cited in Daniel Henning and William Man-
gun, Managing the Environmental Crisis (Durham, NC: Duke Un-
iversity Press, 1989), 109. 
52 
All throughout the first half of this century, while 
private timberlands were being exhausted all around them, 
the Forest Service held onto its trees, assuming a largely 
caretaker role. Part of the reason that national forests in 
the Pacific Northwest were left unexploited was due to the 
pressure which private logging concerns put upon the Forest 
Service to keep its timber off the market, thus keeping 
prices high.29 Obviously, though, the extremely high rates 
of timber production on private lands could not continue for 
long and indeed, after the peak 1952 harvest, a steep and 
steady decline in the productivity of such lands began. In 
Curry County alone, the 1952 harvest of approximately 
620,000 board feet (bf) plummeted to the point where in 
1988, volume stood at just 48,628 bf .30 
As the depletion of private timber stocks began to be-
come apparent by the 1950s and the post-war building boom 
increased demand, the timber industry's pressure on the For-
est Service reversed itself .31 Now what the industry sought 
was access to the vast stands of virgin old growth that lie 
on national forest lands. Not only did this land represent 
an immense untapped timber supply, but a good portion of it 
was in enormously profitable old growth. Just one giant old 
29 Caufield, 52. 
~Paul Koberstein, "Private Forests Face Critical Log 
Shortages" Oregonian special report, 4. 
31 Julie Norman, "Our Choices to Keep Overcutting" Head-
waters (September 1990), 15. 
growth Douglas Fir may contain enough timber to build an 
average single family house.~ 
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In short order, the Forest Service shifted course and 
geared itself for timber production. At the centerpiece of 
this new orientation was the goal of converting old growth 
to younger stands. Unlike private owners, the Forest Service 
is legally bound to the principles of sustained yield33 
which requires that the annual cut in a given forest not 
exceed annual growth, thereby maintaining the timber supply, 
at least in theory, indefinitely. Old growth presented a 
problem for the Forest Service in that because it was ma-
ture, it put on less annual growth than younger stands and 
thus, by its mere existence, kept down the harvest levels 
allowable under sustained yield. 
Not surprisingly, old growth began to disappear on 
public land just as it had on private land. Since the 1960s, 
the Forest Service is estimated to have liquidated 65% of 
all old growth on its lands.34 In fact, it has been this 
very liquidation of old growth stocks that has been the key 
to what little profitability the Forest Service has achieved 
in recent decades. Logging from the twelve very productive 
old growth forest units in Region Six provides, according to 
32 Caufield, 56. 33 The doctrine of sustained yield is laid out in the 
Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 and the National 
Forest Management Act of 1976. 
~ "Liquidation of the Public Forests Since 1960 L~ads 
Citizens to Court and Now Congress" Headwaters, (Late Summer 
1991), 2. 
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Catherine Caufield, 90% of the Forest Service's net re-
ceipts, while the other 143 units in the system provide the 
remaining 10% of receipts. These twelve forests also ac-
count for a full one-third of the total volume cut in the 
entire system. 35 
This conversion of old growth in particular, and the 
harvest of timber in general, further accelerated during the 
1980s under the influence of the Reagan administration and 
especially its Assistant Secretary of Agriculture (and for-
mer Vice President of Louisiana Pacific Corp.) John Crowell, 
Jr. Crowell, who referred to old growth as "decadent" ag-
gressively sought to boost timber output in the national 
forests by, in his words, "liquidating the existing inven-
tory and getting the forest into a fully managed condi-
tion."~ Throughout the 1980s, old growth in the Pacific 
Northwest was removed at a rate of 2% or approximately 
71,000 acres a year.37 At that pace, it is estimated that 
the last unprotected old growth would be harvested by the 
year 2020. 38 
Such estimates naturally bring up the question of 
exactly how much old growth is left from the twenty million 
acres or so that is believed to have existed in presettle-
35 Caufield, 69. 
~Crowell quoted in Kathie Durbin, "Politics Helped Delay 
Northwest Timber Management Plans" Oregonian special report, 
8; Egan, 1 7 O. 
~Durbin and Koberstein, introduction "Forests in Dis-
tress," 24. 
38 Fishman, "America's Ancient Forests." 
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ment Washington and Oregon. As mentioned before, the esti-
mates and even definitions of old growth can depend on one's 
political persuasion. The most comprehensive and scientifi-
cally reliable old growth inventories (based upon Franklin's 
standard definition of old growth) have been conducted in 
1990 by Peter Morrison for the Wilderness Society and in 
1991 by the Forest Service. 
Although both studies employ similar definitions of 
old growth and the same satellite computer mapping tech-
niques, they come to somewhat differing conclusions. The 
Forest Service, which surveyed thirteen national forests 
found 4.3 million acres of old growth of which 966,000 acres 
were protected in Wilderness areas. Morrison, on the other 
hand, found only 2.3 million acres or 12% of what he con-
sidered to be true old growth left in the twelve national 
forests he surveyed. In what is termed ancient forests 
(which display many, but not all of the characteristics of 
true old growth), Morrison found another 1.5 million acres 
bringing total ancient/old growth acreage to 3.8 million, of 
which 934,600 acres were protected.39 
39 For a summary of the findings of both studies, see Ger-
ald Gray and Anita Eng, "How Much Old Growth is Left?" Amer-
ican Forests (October 1991), 46-48. Far less rigorously ob-
tained estimates of remaining old growth acreage includes 
the claim of the Northwest Forest Resource Council that 8.2 
million acres of old growth still exist, and that of the Ev-
ergreen Foundation which puts the figure closer to 6.2 mil-
lion. Of this, timber interests claim that 4.2 million acres 
are already protected in national parks and Wilderness 
areas. McLean, 72. 
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Of the Siskiyou's million acres, Morrison identified 
132,000 acres of true old growth of which sixty thousand 
acres were protected, while the Forest Service using the 
much broader category of mature and old growth forests lists 
443,000 acres of which 99,000 are Wilderness~ (see figure 
2). Regardless of the estimate employed, 1989 Forest Service 
plans in the Siskiyou scheduled the eventual harvest of most 
of the currently unprotected acreage. 
Bald Mountain: The Opening Shot 
The decade-long struggle environmentalists have waged 
over the Siskiyou has involved, at different levels and at 
various times, a complex range of issues. Initially, howev-
er, it was the particular goal of preventing road construe-
tion on Bald Mountain in 1983, which furiously ignited the 
political and social conflict over the Siskiyou's future. 
The stage for the Bald Mountain Road protests was actually 
set several years earlier as local residents organized to 
protest the Forest Service's use of herbicides in the area. 
In order to control the weeds and brush that competed with 
tree seedlings on its newly replanted clearcuts, the Forest 
Service had long sprayed these areas with the herbicide 
2,4-D. In the late 1970s certain residents near the Siskiyou 
forest claimed to have become ill from water poisoned by 
~Morrison's findings are charted forest by forest in 
"Forests in Distress," 7; Land and Forest Management Plan 
FEIS, sec. I, 15. 
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herbicide runoff . 41 In response, a grassroots campaign began 
to pressure the Forest Service to switch to mechanical means 
of brush control. Although this effort eventually triumphed 
with a Forest Service moratorium on 2,4-D usage, the local 
organizational framework which these environmentalists had 
built remained and grew. 
In 1983, a number of these local anti-herbicide acti-
vists hooked up with some out-of-state members of Earth 
First, a new, fairly radical environmental group and initi-
ated a campaign to prevent the road on Bald Mountain from 
being built. 42 Bald Mountain lies roughly in the middle of 
the Siskiyou National Forest and straddles a ridge that 
forms the border between the Siskiyou's largest official 
Wilderness area, the 179,850 acre Kalmiopsis Wilderness and 
the similarly expansive, but unprotected, defacto wilderness 
to the north~ (see figure 3). This latter area, called the 
North Kalmiopsis, contained some of the largest blocks of 
old growth in the forest and perhaps the entire continental 
U.S. While other areas of the Siskiyou, especially in the 
periphery, were already heavily roaded and clearcut from 
41 Egan, 175. 
~Chant Thomas, "Return to Bald Mountain" Earth First! 
(20 March 1987), 1. 
43 Currently, 232,495 acres of the Siskiyou are part of 
the congressionally designated National Wilderness Preser-
vation System, most of which is under Forest Service juris-
diction but subject to very strict management regulations as 
outlined in the Wilderness Act of 1964. These guidelines are 
aimed at preserved the wild, roadless character of such 
areas. 
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many decades of high volume harvests, this interior portion 
remained a huge, virtually intact chunk of high-quality wil-
derness. Saving the North Kalmiopsis would become the cen-
tral goal and symbol of the environmentalists throughout 
this entire struggle. 
In 1936, the early Forest Service wilderness advocate 
Bob Marshall, recognizing the Siskiyou's unusual biodiversi-
ty, proposed an immense one million acre wilderness area en-
compassing most of the National Forest. Ten years later, the 
Forest Service responded with the much smaller 76,000 acre 
Kalmiopsis Wild Area. In 1964, this area was granted formal 
legal protection with the passing of the Wilderness Act in 
Congress. In a subsequent Wilderness bill passed in 1978, 
the Kalmiopsis was enlarged to its present size of 179,850 
acres, but in a compromise, the prime areas of old growth to 
the north of Bald Mountain were left out and released for 
development.44 
In 1979, the Forest Service began to plan a road along 
the ridge of Bald Mountain. While they claimed it was merely 
to facilitate future timber harvesting on lands released for 
such activities by Congress, environmentalists believed that 
the very costly road was being built specifically to destroy 
the roadless character of the North Kalmiopsis as quickly as 
possible. Severing it from the rest of the Kalmiopsis would 
44 
"Fires, Controversy Scorch Forest's Past" Eugene 
Register-Guard (13 March 1988). 
60 
Sources: ~~Y9\l, National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan, Sec. A, l; 
<MW"a- "FEIS, Sec. II, 34 
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prevent it from being considered in any future wilderness 
bills. 
The Forest Service's push to build the Bald Mountain 
Road took on new urgency after President Reagan took off ice 
in 1981. As part of the Reagan Administration's overall 
drive to open public lands in the West to resource develop-
ment, Crowell and Secretary of Interior James Watt attempted 
to shift the focus of the agencies under their charge 
towards increased commodity production.45 For the Forest 
Service, this meant a requirement to boost the annual cut. 
In 1982, actual construction of the Bald Mountain Road 
began. The Rogue River Sierra Club promptly brought suit 
charging that an adequate accounting of the environmental 
consequences of the road had not been conducted.~ After 
gaining an initial injunction on the road, the court eventu-
ally ruled against the environmentalists, finding that the 
Forest Service's environmental assessment (EA) was in or-
der . 47 
By early 1983, the North Kalmiopsis exploded with pro-
tests in what marked the symbolic opening shot not only in 
45 See C. Brant Short, Ronald Reagan and the Public Lands 
(College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press), 1989. 
~ Thomas, 1 . 
47 Under the guidelines of the National Environmental Pro-
tection Act of 1969 (NEPA) and the National Forest Manage-
ment Act of 1976 (NFMA), the Forest Service is required to 
complete an environmental assessment (EA) for potentially 
disruptive activities such as timber sales, roadbuilding, or 
mining. If that activity is expected to have an especially 
substantial impact, than a more extensive environmental im-
pact statement (EIS) must be completed. 
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the battle for the Siskiyou, but for old growth in the en-
tire Pacific Northwest. After the injunction on the road was 
lifted, local activists who had formed Earth First Siskiyou 
joined Earth Firsters from other states for a civil disobe-
dience campaign centered around a series of road blockades. 
In a total of seven blockades featuring over forty-four ar-
rests and some very tense confrontations,~ the political 
fight entered a new stage. 
Throughout the Siskiyou that summer, trees were found 
with spikes driven into them to discourage logging. When 
loggers began to use metal detectors on the trees, some 
spikers switched to ceramic spikes. Elsewhere there were 
scattered incidents of construction equipment being disabled 
at night as posters promising sabotage began to appear.49 
Although they never officially condoned such actions and 
since 1983 publically denounced tree spiking in the Siski-
you,so Earth First, nevertheless, came to be associated with 
such actions; an accusation they could never quite shake. 
The direct actions and arrests on Bald Mountain served 
to generate publicity and offers of legal aid for the very 
much ad hoc and resource-poor Earth First movement. Before 
long, a new lawsuit brought by Earth First and the Oregon 
~In fact, in the third blockade Earth First co-founder 
Dave Foreman was run over and injured by a logging truck. 
Thomas, 1. 49 Egan, 16 0-1 71 . 
~Robert Brothers, "Sensational Stories Fuel Already 
Tense Situation" letter to the editor, Medford Mail Tribune 
(20 August 1988) 
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Natural Resources Defense Council (ONRC) succeeded in stop-
ping the road after nine miles, or half its length, had 
already been built. With new evidence and testimony, the 
environmentalists convinced the court that the Forest Ser-
vice had not sufficiently considered the environmental im-
pact of the road which, because it penetrated wilderness, 
was substantial. 51 
On the summit of Bald Mountain, meanwhile, Lou Gold, a 
former University of Illinois political science professor-
turned-activist set up a summer camp to keep vigil on the 
divided mountain. In what was to become a yearly ritual, 
Gold would host scores of reporters, sympathizers and even 
congressional aides who would make the arduous trek through 
the wilderness to pay homage to the "man on the mountain."~ 
Bald Mountain Revisited 
In 1984, another Oregon Wilderness bill was passed, 
but Oregon's Senator and strong timber ally Mark Hatfield 
(R) managed to keep all of the North Kalmiopsis and its 
abundant old growth out of the bill. 53 Instead, four much 
smaller areas totalling 52,645 acres were added (see figure 
51 
"Radical Activists Join Battle for Forests" Oregonian 
(20 November 1987). A district court ruling in 1989, estab-
lished that any proposal to enter a roadless area was in and 
of itself significant and controversial enough to warrant an 
EIS rather than an EA. After 1989, therefore, all Siskiyou 
roadless entries required EISs. 
52 Kathie Durbin, "Lou Gold" Oregonian special report, 19. 
53 oouglas Murphy, "Earth First! and the North 
Kalmiopsis!" The Sneak Preview (Ashland, OR: 11 June 1987). 
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3). Thus, the North Kalmiopsis was once again released for 
development and, at least according to the Forest Service, 
the injunction on the Bald Mountain Road was thereby dis-
solved.54 Still, since the controversy over the adequacy of 
the initial EA was not yet resolved, the Forest Service 
promised not to complete the road until the master Forest 
Plan which required an extensive Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) was finalized sometime in the next several 
years. 55 
While they did not extend the road, the Forest Service 
did begin to resume timber sales and harvesting in the North 
Kalmiopsis in 1985 and 1986 with twenty-four planned or ac-
tive sales. 56 The environments reacted angrily to these 
sales claiming that they had an understanding with the For-
est Service that the sales, like the road, would be delayed 
until the release of the Forest Plan.57 
This resumption of timber harvesting in the North Kal-
miopsis could be attributed, in part, to the mounting poli-
54 USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest, Land and Forest Management Plan Final Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement Appendices Volume 1 (Region 10: 
GPo1 1989), sec. C, 113. 5 Robert Brothers, "Wildfire Adds New Twist to the Poli-
tics of Logging v. Wilderness" Forest Watch (April 1988), 
20. 56 The timber sale is the basic unit by which the Forest 
Service sells timber to the highest bidder who then does the 
actual cutting and removing of logs. In the Siskiyou, as in 
most Region Six forests, such contracts usually cover areas 
between forty and three hundred acres and most ofte~ stipu-
late clearcutting methods. 57 Thomas, 1; Murphy. 
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tical pressure from certain members of Congress and the ad-
ministration upon the Region Six forests to keep timber out-
put high. In 1986 and 1987, annual harvest levels in the 
Siskiyou neared a record two hundred million board feet 
(mmbf), a level which the supervisor of the forest warned 
could not be kept up for long without violating sustained 
yield requirements.~ 
Converting the North Kalmiopsis's old growth to young-
er plantations would satisfy the administration's and Con-
gress's demands for high output in two ways. Not only would 
immense old trees be cut, but also, once replanted, this 
would boost the annual growth figures for the entire forest. 
The counties were equally eager to open the North Kalmiopsis 
since by a quirk of fate this part of the Siskiyou National 
Forest has an especially high percentage of O&C lands in its 
acreage (it is roughly half O&C as compared to 17% for the 
forest as a whole) which by law nets twice as much county 
revenue as non-O&C lands (see footnote 22). 59 
In the several years since the first Bald Mountain 
protests, the bulk of the environmentalists' efforts in-
volved the appealing of individual timber sales. 60 It has 
been rare, however, for an administrative appeal to succeed 
~Paul Fattig, "Supervisor Says Forest Service Must Slow 
Down" Grants Pass Daily Courier (9 June 1987), 1. 
59 Headwaters Press Release (29 April 1988). 
60 The law requires that, in most cases, before a group 
can bring suit against the Forest Service, it must first 
file an administrative appeal. 
in turning back a sale. In fact, from 1986 to 1988, only 
three of the sixty-one sales appealed were withdrawn or 
modified.61 And if the paperwork was in order and the sale 
did not involve any controversial new roads, there was 
usually little legal recourse in the courts for these in-
66 
dividual sales. It soon became clear to the environmental-
ists, therefore, that this case-by-case appeals process was 
getting them nowhere in terms of halting the stepped-up log-
ging in the North Kalmiopsis. 
By 1987, frustration over the continued logging north 
of Bald Mountain spurred a new wave of protests and direct 
actions. Throughout the summer of 1987 tensions in the al-
ready polarized region heightened further as blockades and 
civil disobedience led mostly by Earth First Siskiyou flared 
up again as logging commenced on the Hobson Horn, South In-
digo, and Sapphire timber sales, all in prime old growth. On 
the Hobson Horn site, protesters buried themselves up to 
their necks on the logging road while at the Sapphire pro-
test, a number of individuals sat high up in trees slated 
for cutting as others chained themselves to the loggers' 
yarding unit.~ Meanwhile, protests and disruptions at the 
61 USDA Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Appeal 
Number Record 1986-1990, internal document. 
~ "Earth First Protests Hobson Horn Sale" Grants Pass 
Daily Courier (4 April 1987); David Barron, "CD Begins Anew 
in Kalmiopsis" Earth First! (1 May 1987), 1, 5; "Eighteen 
Arrested in 3 Actions in North Kalmiopsis" Earth First! (21 
June 1987), 6; Jericho Clearwater, "Kalmiopsis Shutdown!" 
Earth First! (1 August 1987), 1. 
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Siskiyou Headquarters in Grants Pass were becoming an almost 
commonplace occurrence. In all, twenty-seven protesters were 
arrested that spring and summer and the "Sapphire Six," as 
they came to be called, were fined $56,800 in damages.63 
Before long it became evident to the environmentalists 
that if they wanted to save the North Kalmiopsis and other 
unprotected roadless areas in the Siskiyou, then they would 
need a strategy beyond blocking roads or appealing individu-
al timber sales after they have already been sold. Not 
trusting the Forest Service to refrain anytime soon from 
cutting and roadbuilding and having all but exhausted their 
chances at securing congressional wilderness designation for 
the North Kalmiopsis, the environmentalists (specifically 
the ONRC) came up with a rather bold proposal; the creation 
of a Siskiyou National Park. 
Encompassing about 700,000 acres of the national for-
est, the proposed park would be off limits to logging and 
administered by the Department of Interior's more preserva-
tion oriented National Park Service. This change of juris-
diction, felt many environmentalists, offered the best hope 
for long-term protection for the Siskiyou. Several local 
environmental groups immediately endorsed this idea, while 
several new groups organized strictly to promote the plan.~ 
~Thomas, 1; Kathy Hands, "Protesters Get Jail Terms" 
Grants Pass Daily Courier (30 June 1987); Earth First!, In 
the Fight to Save the Earth ... Will Our Constitutional 
Rights Become Sawdust Too?, pamphlet, (1988). 
~Most notably, the Siskiyou National Park Campaign. 
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To the environmentalists, the Siskiyou's fantastic 
biodiversity, especially its unusual plant life, made it a 
natural for park designation, being on a par with the Ever-
glades or Yellowstone in its natural wonders. It was also 
argued that Oregon with only 183,000 acre Crater Lake, had 
far less national park acreage than most western states. 
Furthermore, advocates claimed that the park would be an 
economic boon to the region's tourist industry and help 
southwest Oregon make the inevitable transition away from 
dependence on a troubled timber industry. The argument here 
was that, tourist-wise, a national park geared towards rec-
reation and preservation would far outdraw the national for-
est, which is the case, for example, with Yellowstone or 
Yosemite and their national forest neighbors. 65 
With the park proposal's increasing publicity and mo-
mentum, those timber interests who did not already see what 
was coming finally began to perceive of the environmental-
ists as more than just a nuisance, but instead as an immedi-
ate and growing threat to their interests. With the park 
proposal, local timber interests began to mobilize in earn-
est, offering a furious counterattack. They labelled the 
park an economic disaster that would cost at least fifteen 
hundred jobs and lock-up resource-rich lands.~ As for the 
65 For a summary of the supposed benefits of the park 
plan, see Fishman, "America's Ancient Forests." 
~ "Unknowns Make Park a Gamble" (editorial) Grants Pass 
Daily Courier (l April 1989). 
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tourism jobs the park was to create, the timber interests 
scornfully dismissed them as minimum wage service-sector 
employment barely fit for teenagers. Some even questioned 
whether the park would create any additional tourism at all, 
pointing to the already existing abundance of recreational 
opportunities in the region. As evidence, they cited the ex-
perience of the costly Redwood National Park not far down 
the coast where a promised economic boom after its estab-
lishment in the late 1970s never materialized.67 
Not surprisingly, the Forest Service was just as 
forceful in its rejection of the park proposal, warning of 
lost jobs, lost county revenue, and less "balanced" 
management.~ The Forest Service, as any bureaucracy would, 
dreaded the possibility of losing jurisdiction to its his-
toric rival; a scenario not without precedent in the annals 
of Forest Service-Park Service history.69 Painfully aware of 
this precedent, the Siskiyou National Forest wasted no time 
in denouncing the plan. In uncharacteristically forthright 
language, the normally diplomatic Forest Service accused the 
~Jim Peterson, "In Search of Excellence: Lew Krauss" Ev-
ergreen (April 1987); "Perspective: Forest Service Opposes 
Park" Evergreen (April 1987). 
~USDA Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Press 
Release (24 March 1987). 69 The Sequoia, Olympic, and North Cascades National Parks 
are but a few more famous examples of national parks being 
carved out of national forest jurisdictions. For a case 
study of the Olympic transfer, see Ben Twight, Organization-
al Values and Political Power: The Forest Service Versus the 
Olympic National Park (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1983). 
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ONRC and other environmentalists of having ulterior motives 
in proposing the park. 70 The National Park Service, mean-
while, officially remained neutral on the park proposal 
while most all of the region's newspapers opposed it. Other 
than the environmentalists themselves, only the Oregon Coast 
Association and the Salem Statesman-Journal came out in sup-
port of the park plan. 
The Silver Fire 
As the national park campaign was getting underway and 
the Bald Mountain protests were winding down in the late 
summer, a sudden and unforeseen event dramatically altered 
the issues and raised the stakes. On the night on August 30, 
1987, lightning from a dry electrical storm struck the tin-
der dry forest in several places, igniting a monsterous 
blaze that would burn for ten weeks in what would become the 
largest forest fire in Oregon in the last half-century. 71 
Although the fires burned in several areas throughout the 
forest and in adjacent national forests across the border in 
California, the worst blaze was centered around Silver Creek 
in the North Kalmiopsis, not far from Bald Mountain. 72 The 
Silver Complex Fires, as they came to be called, burned over 
70 usoA Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Press 
Release (24 March 1987). 
71 Egan, 179 . 
72 In fact, Lou Gold barely made it off the mountain, es-
caping on foot one step ahead of the flames in a two-day or-
deal. T.A. Allen, "Lou Gold Escapes Bald Mt." Earth First/ 
(l November 1987), 11. 
71 
an area covering roughly 110,000 acres. Of this, 53,600 
acres burned in the Kalmiopsis Wilderness, while another 
42,900 affected acres were in the North Kalmiopsis.73 In 
other words, the fire could not have picked a more contro-
versial place to burn (see figure 4). 
For the newly invigorated local timber interests, the 
fire provided a golden opportunity to settle the North Kal-
miopsis controversy in their favor once and for all. It also 
served as a rhetorical club with which to beat the environ-
mentalists. Not missing a single angle, the timber interests 
went on the attack, demanding immediate salvage of the burn-
ed timber while blaming the fire itself on the environmen-
talists' efforts to keep the area roadless. The lack of 
roads, they claimed, seriously hampered firefighting efforts 
and thereby allowed the destruction of precious resources. 74 
While the burned area within the Kalmiopsis Wilderness 
was legally off-limits to salvage, the North Kalmiopsis was 
not. The Silver Fire, therefore represented a serious threat 
to the environmentalists' goals in that area; namely, keep-
ing the North Kalmiposis roadless and unlogged, and achiev-
ing park status for it and the larger forest. Any substan-
tial salvage of burned timber would require roadbuilding 
~USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest, Silver Fire Recovery Project Final Environ-
mental Impact Statement Record of Decision, (Region 10: GPO, 
1988), 1. 
nJim Peterson, "In Search of Excellence: The Firefight-
ers" Evergreen (October 1987). 
v 
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which, combined with the logging itself, would strike at the 
heart of the proposed park area and might very well leave it 
too developed for consideration as a national park. Increas-
ing the pressure on the North Kalmiopsis further was the 
time element, as fire-damaged timber has a useful life of 
only about two years before insects and rot leave it unusa-
ble. 75 Thus, any decisions made on the salvage would have to 
sped through. 
The stakes thus raised, both sides geared up for ac-
tion and launched all-out efforts. Locally, each stepped up 
their organizing and attempted to reach out beyond southwes-
tern Oregon with their message. Painting the environmental-
ists as irrational radicals beyond reasoning, and the North 
Kalmiopsis as a disaster area of "ash and ruin," the timber 
interests, led by the Southern Oregon Resource Alliance 
(SORA) pushed for a maximum salvage of the area and the 
full-scale roadbuilding necessary to carry this out. 76 If 
salvage and rehabilitation were not carried out, warned 
SORA, not only would valuable resources go to waste, but 
"priceless fish and wildlife habitat" would "be left to the 
ravages of wind, rain, erosion and time."n The salvage, 
therefore, would not only benefit a damaged land, but would 
provide an economic silver lining to an otherwise bad situa-
75 
"Forest Officials Expect Major Battles Over Salvage of 
Fire-Damaged Timber" Oregonian (2 October 1987). 
76 southern Oregon Resource Alliance advertisement in Med-
ford Mail Tribune (18 October 1987), sec A, 12. 
n Ibid. 
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tion. Drawn to such common-sense logic, the area's two major 
newspapers quickly joined the chorus for rapid salvage.78 
SORA, meanwhile, launched an all-out advertising campaign 
featuring pre-printed mail-in coupons to be sent to the 
Forest Service and members of Congress demanding immediate 
and extensive salvage.n 
The environmentalists found themselves facing an up-
hill battle as they tried to explain the subtleties of why 
leaving the North Kalmiopsis alone to heal itself in its own 
time was a good idea. They disputed the timber interests' 
campaign on several grounds. First, they rejected SORA's 
characterization of the Silver Fire burn area as a wasteland 
and the fire as a tragedy. On the contrary, they argued, 
fire was a natural and necessary ecological agent for main-
taining the long-term health of the forest and a force which 
the Siskiyou evolved with over many millenia.~ In their 
view, then, only those seeing the forest strictly as a com-
modity would see the fire as a tragedy. Moreover, forest 
fires, especially in old growth, the environmentalists 
claimed, burn in an irregular mosaic pattern, rarely bring-
ing complete destruction. Pointing to maps of burn intensi-
n "Roadless Area is No Excuse to Waste Wood" (editorial) 
Grants Pass Daily Courier (12 October 1987). 
n "Storm Brews Over Fate of Roadless Area" Grants Pass 
DaiiJ. Courier (25 September 1987). 
David Atkin, Fire Salvage Issue Not So Simple, Siskiyou 
National Park Campaign flier (Portland: 1987); "Kalmiopsis 
Fire: The Reality and the Politics" Earth First/ (2 February 
1988), 7. 
ty, the environmentalists claimed that in only 9% of the 
Silver Fire area had over 90% of the trees been killed, 
75 
while over 50% of the area had only a 10% mortality rate 
(see figure 5) and most of that did not include the biggest, 
most fire-resistant trees.~ 
The environmentalists also challenged the idea of sal-
vage bringing rehabilitation to the seriously burned areas. 
They argued that, far from restoring the North Kalmiopsis, 
the logging and roadbuilding of the salvage effort would 
bring further damage to already stressed areas; a situation 
akin, in the environmentalists' favorite analogy, to "mug-
ging a burn victim." Specifically, it was warned that sal-
vage activities would increase soil compaction, erosion, and 
landslides in areas denuded from the fire and seriously in-
crease sedimentation in salmon spawning areas.~ 
To either side, the other's position was really a 
front for more insidious goals. To the timber interests, all 
the environmentalists really wanted was to keep the North 
Kalmiopsis roadless at all costs in hopes of achieving their 
goal of a national park to keep out the loggers and shut 
down the industry. To environmentalists, on the other hand, 
the timber interests and the Forest Service were less inter-
ested in salvaging burnt logs of questionable value as they 
~Ibid.; Brothers, 19. 
~Paul Fattig, "Environmentalists Seek To Halt Silver 
Salvage" Grants Pass Daily Courier (9 September 1988); Head-
waters Press Release (6 May 1988); Atkin, SNPC Flyer. 
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77 
were in opening up the North Kalmiopsis to roads and tree 
farms once and for all. 
With both sides more polarized than ever, the ball was 
now in the Forest Service's court. While the agency was 
clearly inclined towards salvage from the start, it still 
had to conduct environment impact studies and determine the 
extent of the salvage before it could commence operations. 
With the burned timber's limited life span, the pressure to 
speed this process through was intense. Originally, the For-
est Service intended to prepare a full EIS only for the most 
controversial parts of the salvage area, such as around Bald 
Mountain, while other parts would be covered by the less 
comprehensive EA process.83 However, after an initial series 
of public meetings and thousands of letters made it clear 
just how controversial the entire project was, Supervisor 
Ron McCormick relented, and decided to prepare a single EIS 
for the entire Silver Fire area; a procedural victory for 
the environmentalists.~ Regarding roads, however, the For-
est Service announced that the fire had invalidated its mor-
atorium on North Kalmiopsis roadbuilding. While the road is-
sue was originally to be settled in the forthcoming Forest 
Plan, it would now be decided in the Silver Fire EIS. 85 
83 Regional Forester James Torrence to Supervisor Ron 
McCormick, Internal Forest Service document, (17 November 
1987). 
~ "Feds Order Study on All Kalmiopsis" Medford Mail Trib-
une (22 February 1988); Brothers, 20. 
~"Forest Officials Expect Major Battles .... " 
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Now committed to the more comprehensive and time-
consuming EIS process, the Siskiyou National Forest found 
itself under considerable pressure from timber interests and 
Washington headquarters to finish the process by early 
spring 1988. 86 After unsuccessfully appealing to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency for permission to shorten the 
length of the comment period on the draft EIS (DEIS), the 
Forest Service had no choice but to move as fast as it pos-
sibly could.87 By early in the new year, the Silver Fire 
Project EIS effort sped into full gear. Preparing a DEIS un-
der such massive time constraints necessitated an unprece-
dented effort on the Forest Service's part, as the Siskiyou 
found that it had to put practically all other national for-
est business on hold and bring in hundreds of personnel from 
other national forests. To house such a massive mobiliza-
tion, the Forest Service had to expand into a rented office 
building in Grants Pass, the new Silver Fire Recovery Center 
which quickly became one of the city's largest employers 
with its own $2.5 million budget and an ad hoc staff of 
120.88 
86 Brothers, 2 O. 87 originally the Forest Service sought to reduce the DEIS 
review period from the usual forty-five days to fifteen, but 
under pressure from one of the Siskiyou area's representa-
tives, Peter DeFazio (D-OR), it requested but was still 
denied a thirty-day review. "Forest Service to Decide on 
Silver Fire Study" Medford Mail Tribune Extra (28 January-3 
February 1988). 88 Barnes Ellis, "Back From the Dead" Oregonian (24 April 
1988). 
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Although the Forest Service held a series of public 
workshops in an effort to build consensus, environmentalists 
and the timber interests were less interested in negotiating 
with each other than in mobilizing their followers both lo-
cally and nationally, especially through massive mail cam-
paigns. According to the former supervisor, the Siskiyou 
elicited over twenty thousand mail responses (the highest 
inputs for any unit in the entire system) from all over the 
country on the Silver issue; with most of these urging the 
adoption in the DEIS of either the environmentalists' na-
tional park/no salvage or timber's maximum salvage alterna-
tives. "We were like a lightening rod," recalled the former 
supervisor. 
By late March 1988, after several months of frantic 
work, the Forest Service completed its draft and announced 
its tentative decision to harvest 146 mmbf of timber out of 
the 270 mmbf estimated to have been killed. Such an effort 
would necessitate the building of twenty-one miles of roads 
including the nine mile completion of the Bald Mountain 
Road, and would account for the bulk of that year's total 
harvest on the Siskiyou. Of the roughly twelve thousand acre 
harvest area, one-quarter was to be clearcut and accessed by 
roads, while the rest would be harvested by helicopter in an 
attempt to minimize damage to the land.~ 
~USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest, Silver Fire Recovery Project Draft Environ-
mental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1988). 
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Predictably, the draft plan elicited negative reaction 
from both sides. As the DEIS underwent its public comment 
period, the timber interests complained that the salvage 
volume and new road mileage was too low and depended too 
heavily on less profitable helicopter logging. The environ-
mentalists, one the other hand, dreaded the many miles of 
new roads and clearcutting on the North Kalmiopsis's ex-
tremely steep and unstable slopes.~ 
At this point, though, the environmentalists shifted 
their focus away from the park proposal and the area's frag-
ile ecosystem, and concentrated their strategy instead, upon 
the economics of the plan. Led by Headwaters, a well-
established local forest issues group, the environmentalists 
developed fairly sophisticated analyses showing the Silver 
Recovery Plan not to be economically feasible. To the envi-
ronmentalists, the Forest Service was "spending a dollar to 
save a penny."~ The costs of both roadbuilding and helicop-
ter salvage in the exceptionally steep and rugged terrain of 
the Silver Fire area would, according to environmentalists, 
exceed the retrieved logs' value. In addition, they argued, 
the salvaged timber volume by law would have to come out of 
the overall sustained yield. Thus, not logging the burned 
area would not cost any jobs since the annual sales quantity 
~Paul Fattig, "Silver Fire Plan Awaits Hatchet" Grants 
Pass Daily Courier (22 March 1988). 
~Paul Fattig, "Group Says Recovery Plan Uneconomical" 
Grants Pass Daily Courier (29 April 1988). 
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(ASQ) would be the same regardless of whether fire-killed 
timber or living "green" timber from elsewhere in the forest 
was cut. Finally, claimed the environmentalists, county gov-
ernment would receive less receipts from the costly and low-
er quality salvaged timber. 92 
As the comment period wound down and the Forest Ser-
vice went to work on the FEIS, the Silver Fire controversy 
began to catch the notice of Congress which, if it so chose, 
could render a decision on the matter that would take prece-
dence over the Forest Service. In late May, Rep. Doug Bosco 
(D-CA) proposed legislation designed to assure prompt sal-
vage without the expected court delay by barring judicial 
review of any of the salvage sales. One of the Siskiyou 
area's representatives, Peter DeFazio (D-OR), who opposed 
such a court ban, began working on alternative legislation 
in an attempt to forge a compromise between timber and envi-
ronmentalists. DeFazio suggested that the salvage go on, but 
at reduced level of 136 mmbf with far less roadbuilding and 
more helicopter logging. Although the timber interests 
promptly rejected DeFazio's plan, the environmentalists, 
alarmed by the Forest Service's rapid preparation of the 
92 Headwaters Press Release (29 April 1988); Cascades 
Holistic Economic Consultants to Supervisor Ron McCormick, 
CHEC photocopied transcripts, (28 April 1988); Fattig, 
"Recovery Plan Uneconomical." 
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salvage sales and on the defensive, grudgingly got behind it 
as a basis for negotiation.93 
On July 8, as local congressmen continued their nego-
tiations, the Forest Service announced its final decision on 
the salvage as they released the Silver Fire FEIS. In a mod-
if ication of the draft plan, the Forest Service boosted the 
salvage volume from 146 mmbf to 157 mmbf, but reduced the 
acres to be harvested to 9,500 in twenty separate timber 
sales. 94 To the environmentalists, this modification wor-
sened an already bad deal. The same day the final decision 
was announced, Headwaters and the ONRC joined by three prom-
inent national groups, filed a request for a federal court 
restraining order to halt the imminent sales on the grounds 
that the Forest Service did not adequately consider all of 
the EIS-mandated alternatives, especially the park proposal. 
They were granted a hearing in Portland scheduled for later 
in the month. 95 
In Congress, meanwhile, DeFazio, Hatfield, Rep. Les 
Aucoin (D-OR), and the Siskiyou area's other representative, 
Bob Smith (R-OR) reached a compromise which they attached to 
the Interior Appropriations. For the environmentalists, 
93 
"DeFazio Raps Timber Salvage Plan" Eugene Register-
Guard (20 May 1988); Robert Sterling, "DeFazio Seeks Pact on 
Log-ging" Medford Mail Tribune (9 June 1988). 
94 Silver Fire Recovery Project FEIS ROD, 23. 
~Fattig,"Environmentalists Seek To Halt Silver Salvage." 
The three national groups were the National Wildlif~ Federa-
tion, the National Audubon Society, and the Wilderness Soci-
ety. 
83 
DeFazio managed to delete the nine mile extension of the 
Bald Mountain Road, allowing for only a three-tenths mile 
extension to a flat ridgetop where helicopters could land. 
The elimination of the Bald Mountain extension would sacri-
fice about twenty mmbf from the total salvage volume. All 
other roads, though, would still be built. The price DeFazio 
paid for this, however, was a ban on court appeals of any of 
the salvage sales.% 
Although relieved by the halting of road they so 
hated, environmentalists reacted with outrage to such tam-
pering with their judicial access, deeming such restric-
tions, in words of a Headwaters activist, "the stuff of pet-
ty dictators, of banana republic politics ... 97 The timber in-
terests, meanwhile, though pleased with the ban on appeals, 
expressed dismay with the reduced harvest and the delay, 
once again, of the road they badly wanted built. One disap-
pointed mill owner characterized the legislation as a com-
promise of a compromise, while the Southern Oregon Timber 
% Alan Hayakawa, "Compromise Would Block Timber Salvage 
Appeals" Oregonian (24 June 1988). Rep. Smith, under pres-
sure from timber interests in his district, eventually re-
versed himself and withdrew his support for the compromise, 
pushing instead his own unsuccessful proposal to built the 
Bald Mountain extension. Robert Sterling and Bill Manny, 
"Bob Smith Proposal Opposed" Medford Mail Tribune (21 Sep-
tember 1988). 
97 
"Timber Salvage Plan is a Compromise No One Likes" 
Grants Pass Daily Courier (24 June 1988). 
Industries Association (SOTIA), angrily argued that there 
was clear public mandate to salvage 200 mmbf .98 
84 
In late July, a federal judge turned down the environ-
mentalists' request for an immediate injunction on the sal-
vage and several weeks later, an appellate court turned down 
an appeal of that ruling. Court relief was to become a moot 
point, however, as Congress soon thereafter passed the Hat-
field salvage rider. Although their plans were now modified 
by Congress, the Forest Service finally had a green light on 
the salvage operation. In July the timber sale auctions 
closed and the rush to harvest was on. In celebration, tim-
ber interests in Grants Pass organized the Silver Fire 
Roundup, a massive parade and demonstration featuring over a 
thousand logging trucks.~ 
Now that all the legal, administrative, and legisla-
tive avenues had been exhausted, Earth First stepped back 
into the spotlight announcing the start of a direct action 
campaign to stop the logging in their beloved North Kalmiop-
sis. Jittery about the prospect of anything delaying the 
salvage, the Forest Service braced itself for the protes-
ters. As Supervisor McCormick issued orders closing the sal-
vage area to the public, the Josephine County sheriff's po-
~Robert Sterling, "Both Sides Unhappy With Silver Sal-
vage" Medford Mail Tribune (24 June 1988); Ellis, "Logging 
Com~romise Kindles Anger." 
Evergreen (August 1988). 
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lice took special riot control courses and promised aggres-
s i ve action. 100 
In late July, after infiltrating the salvage zone near 
the Bald Mountain Road with climbing equipment, Earth First 
members in three different actions ascended onto platforms 
high up in the trees with supplies of food and water. In no 
mood for such protests, the Forest Service moved quickly to 
remove the treesitters who were gaining quite a bit of media 
attention. By early August, they were brought down by pro-
fessional climbers while a police sniper stood by. 101 As the 
long summer wound down so did the protests. The salvage, 
however, went on. 
The Spotted Owl and the Nationalization of the Old Growth 
Controversy 
As the controversy over the Silver Fire raged in the 
Siskiyou, similar issues and policy conflicts began to crop 
up all over the Pacific Northwest. The seed of dissent 
planted at the Bald Mountain Road protests back in 1983 had 
blossomed into a full-blown regional and, in many respects, 
national issue; quite possibly the most important environ-
mental policy debate of the decade. 
100 Paul Fattig, "Closure to Block Protests" Grants Pass 
Daily Courier (8 July 1988); Gail Bullen, "Sheriff Maps Out 
Strategy to Handle Forest Protests" Grants Pass Daily Cour-
ier ~12 July 1988). 
10 Paul Fattig, "Protesters Take to the Trees" Grants 
Pass Daily Courier (21 July 1988); Robert Sterling, "Sniper 
was Prepared to Shoot Sitter" Medford Mail Tribune (5 August 
1988). 
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Perhaps more than than anything else, what raised the 
stakes and catapulted the old growth issue beyond local pro-
tests and appeals was Strix occidentalis caurina, the north-
ern spotted owl. Native only to the Pacific Northwest, this 
unobtrusive little bird of prey has highly specific habitat 
needs. To feed and nest, each mating pair requires a sub-
stantial block of undisturbed old growth. Because the spot-
ted owl is so particular in its old growth habitat needs, it 
serves to scientists as what is called an indicator species 
for the larger old growth ecosystem. In other words, the owl 
is seen as a barometer which gives insight into the health 
of the larger ecosystem.102 
As the harvesting of old growth intensified in the 
1960s and 70s, scientists began to see the first signs of 
spotted owl decline. As early as 1972, biologists were warn-
ing that the owl was in big trouble, but the Forest Service 
and the BLM at that point opted to take no action. 1~ By 
1986 and 1987, as the rate of old growth felled on public 
land reached an estimated 170 acres a day, 104 it became 
1~ For example, the spotted owl feeds largely upon forest 
rodents who, in turn, feed upon the truffles of the 
nitrogen-fixing root fungi so essential to the big trees of 
the ancient forest. A decline in owls, therefore, could be 
linked to a decline in mychorrhizal fungi due to logging, 
erosion, or other major forest disturbances. Caufield, 52. 
103 Carrie Casey, "The Bird of Contention" American For-
ests (October 1991), 30. 
104 Steve Young, "Tree Slaughter: Your Taxes at Work" 
Washington Post (13 August 1989). 
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clear to biologists and environmentalists that the spotted 
owl was reaching the point of no return. 
In January, 1987, several national environmental 
groups filed a petition with the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) to list the northern spotted owl as a 
nationally endangered species. Such a listing would, accord-
ing to the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), require the 
federal government to design and implement a plan for the 
owl's recovery while taking no action in the interim to harm 
the owl or its essential habitat. Fish and Wildlife Service 
personnel, however, were under strict orders from the Reagan 
Administration, specifically Secretary of Interior Donald 
Hodel and their own chief Frank Dunkle, to not extend pro-
tection to the bird under any circumstances. Rolf Wallen-
strom, the FWS director for the Pacific Northwest region, 
later admitted to having been absolutely forbidden to list 
the ow1. 1os And so, by December, 1987, after drawing their 
inevitable decision out for almost a year's worth of heavy 
old growth harvesting, Fish and Wildlife denied the peti-
tion. 
Almost immediately a coalition of twenty-five environ-
mental groups brought suit against the agency out of concern 
for the owl itself, but perhaps more importantly, to broaden 
their arsenal in the fight to save the old growth forests. 
1~ As told to Ted Williams, "The Spotted Fish Under the 
Spotted Owls" Fly, Rod and Reel (January/February 1990), 20. 
88 
In November, 1988, federal Judge Thomas Zilly of the Seattle 
district, a Reagan appointee, ruled with the environmental-
ists, finding that the Fish and Wildlife Service had acted 
in a manner that was "arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to 
the law" in not listing the owl as threatened despite "ex-
pert opinion to the contrary. 001 06 Consequently, Zilly or-
dered FWS to reconsider its decision and base it upon scien-
tific criteria which, as all parties knew, meant near-
certain listing. Still, due to the low capacity of this 
chronically underfunded and understaffed agency as well as 
administrative pressure to go as slow as possible, formal 
protection for the owl was still a long way off. What this 
meant for the Forest Service's timber program in owl habi-
tat, aside from the agency's vague and voluntary promises of 
restraint, was a continued green light. 
One thing which this uproar over the owl served to ac-
complish was to gain increasing national exposure for the 
old growth issue. This previously obscure term, once the 
sole domain of foresters and ecologists, began to filter 
into the vocabulary of policymaking circles. To the media, 
106 Northern Spotted Owl (Strix occidentalis caurina) v. 
Donald Hodel 716 F. Supp. 479 (9th U.S. District, 1988). 
This was a finding later corroborated by a highly critical 
1989 GAO report of the Fish and Wildlife Service which ques-
tioned whether its "objectivity was maintained" and blasted 
the agency for having "substantially changed the body of 
scientific evidence" warning of the owl's demise. This dam-
aging report was one factor in Dunkle's sudden retirement. 
Government Accounting Office, Endangered Species: Spotted 
Owl Petition Evaluation Beset by Problems, GAO/RCED-89-79 
(Washington D.C.: GPO, 1989). 
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meanwhile, another dramatic snail darter-like endangered 
species case seemed to be shaping up. With the Region Six 
timber harvest at its all-time high of 5.5 bbf,107 both the 
timber interests and environmentalists began competing to 
define the controversy for the growing national audience. 
For the timber interests, the old growth issue boiled 
down to the prosperity and stability of timber dependent 
communities whose loggers and millworkers required a steady 
and reliable supply of timber. At the heart of the issue 
was, therefore, jobs. While the estimates of job loss re-
sulting from old growth protection varied wildly depended 
upon both the source of the statistics and the degree of 
forest preservation foreseen, practically all painted a grim 
picture of hardship and dislocation. The Bush Administration 
pegged the figure at 28,000 jobs lost if the spotted owl was 
protected, while Hatfield predicted 25,000-50,000 unemploy-
ed. Lower estimates of 13,000 and 19,000 were cited, respec-
tively, by Congress and Reuters. 108 The highest estimate was 
the American Forest Product Alliance's prediction of 102,757 
jobs wiped out over a decade in addition to the 44,500 they 
claimed were already lost to the environmentalists' "lock-
up" of federal lands in the Northwest. 1~ 
1m Philip Shabecoff, "The Battle for the National For-
ests" New York Times (13 August 1989), sec.4, 24. 108 John Mitchell, "Sour Times in Sweet Home" Audubon 
(March 1991), 89. 
1~ Ibid. 88. 
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In addition to lost jobs, less timber also meant re-
duced local government receipts which in many rural areas 
provided the bulk of funding for schools and services. To 
replace such funding in communities already smarting from 
high unemployment would be next to impossible claimed timber 
advocates. The result of such severe layoffs and reduced 
timber receipts, they argued, would be a gradual disinte-
gration of once stable and prosperous communities along with 
all the accompanying social disruption. 110 In the words of a 
joint Forest Service/SLM study, this expected unravelling of 
the social fabric of timber dependent communities would be 
marked by "increasing rates of domestic disputes, divorce, 
acts of violence, vandalism, suicide, alcoholism and other 
social problems. 11 111 Thus, to the timber interests, nothing 
less than the family and community life so deeply rooted in 
these small towns was at stake, as the owner of a small Ore-
gon logging operation makes clear: 
My son is twenty-eight. He will not leave this area. 
His great-grandfather was born here. Our roots are 
here. We don't want to go anywhere else. I was in 
Seattle a few weeks ago, and there was an editorial in 
the paper saying that the government should buy our 
homes from us, reeducate us, relocate us. But that's 
what they don't understand. We want to stay here. And 
what are they going to retrain us for? What? 11 2 
110 Michael Satchell, "The Endangered Logger" U.S. News 
and World Report (25 June 1990), 27-29. 
111 Report quoted in Ted Gup, "Owls vs. Man" Time (25 June 
1990~, 57. 
11 Quote in Mitchell, 94. 
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In addition to its economic necessity, timber inte-
rests also argued that the logging of old growth was smart 
forestry as well. Allowing conversion of old growth to vig-
orous stands of second growth would allow for optimal forest 
management and provide timber indefinitely, thereby averting 
future timber famines in a society whose seemingly insatia-
ble demand for wood products has been constantly growing. In 
addition, timber interests claimed that clearcutting vastly 
improved wildlife habitat for game species who preferred 
open habitat to old, dark forests.113 As for those who saw 
old growth as a unique and irreplaceable habitat, they main-
tained that plenty was already off limits to logging in wil-
derness areas and national parks.114 Finally, the timber in-
terests argued that the spotted owl, even if it was endan-
gered (which they claimed was not yet clear), should never 
come before human beings. If the issue boiled down to man 
versus owl, then man had to and ought to prevail. 
The environmentalists, on the other hand, saw the is-
sue in starkly different terms. Far from being a case of 
owls versus people, it was instead a case of the timber 
industry's greed and inflexibility. Lost jobs, they main-
113 A good summary of all these points from a pro-timber 
perspective can be found in Leila Kysar, "A Logger's Lament" 
Newsweek (22 October 1990), 10. 114 The environmentalists respond to this point by claim-
ing that most protected areas had the best old growth care-
fully left outside their boundaries when they were drawn es-
pecially in wilderness areas which consist of far greater 
acreage of high elevation rock, ice, and alpine meadow. For 
actual estimates of protected old growth, see pages 55-56. 
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tained, were due, for the most part, to the automation of 
the timber industry and the export of raw logs which denied 
local mills a massive supply of timber. They cited estimates 
that approximately 25% of all unfinished whole logs and 60% 
of all wholly or partially processed timber (chips, slabs, 
pulp, etc.) from the Pacific Northwest are exported annual-
ly. 115 While timber from national forests (which accounts 
for around 25% of the total harvest) cannot be exported, en-
vironmentalists charged that it was used to satisfy domestic 
demand in order to free up private timber for profitable 
export. 11 6 This arrangement, they argued, has increased 
pressure to keep public timber output high. As one of the 
world's only major timber producers to allow export, envi-
ronmentalists charged that the United States had become a 
massive resource colony for Japan at the expense of local 
mills and workers. 
To support these charges that timber industry prac-
tices were behind most of the job loss, environmentalists 
pointed to statistics showing an industry which produced 
roughly the same volume of wood products, consumed more pub-
lic timber, and enjoyed far greater profits in 1988 as it 
did in 1972, but with only two-thirds or twenty thousand 
115 These estimates, the former from the Forest Service, 
the latter from Rep. Peter DeFazio's office, are cited in 
"Log Exports Liquidating our Forests for Insatiable ·Inter-
national Demand" Forest Voice 2:2 (1990), 4. 
116 Ibid. 
93 
fewer workers and three-quarters of the mills. 117 To the 
environmentalists then, cutting the last remnants of old 
growth would not reverse these long-term economic trends, 
but instead would only briefly forestall the inevitable 
continuation of job loss and mill closures. Only through 
economic diversification and a restructuring of the timber 
industry, they claimed, would things turn around. 118 
For the environmentalists, therefore, to blame impend-
ing hardships on the preservation of the spotted owl was a 
cruel hoax based upon the false premise that prosperity and 
employment based upon a finite and rapidly dwindling re-
source (old growth) could continue indefinitely. An editori-
al in a Siskiyou area newspaper sums up this view: 
Comrnunities .... grew accustomed to a higher standard of 
public living than would have been possible had the 
resource [old growth] been properly stewarded to begin 
with .... unconscionable overcutting of a limited old 
growth forest made our towns and counties feel richer 
than they ever really were. 119 
Sacrificing the last scraps of irreplaceable old 
growth in exchange for a very short-term postponement of 
unemployment that, if nothing else changed, would occur re-
117 Shelby Scates, "Running Out of Trees" Seattle Post-
Intelligencer (19 November 1989); Egan, 173. 
118 Such reforms would include banning or taxing exports, 
retooling mill machinery for second-growth timber and hard-
woods, and stressing production of finished lumber products 
(such as furniture prehab housing, etc.). Brock Evans, We 
Can Protect our Remaining Ancient Forests and Maintain a 
Strong Timber Economy in the Pacific Northwest, memorandum 
(3 February 1989). 
119 Robert Staal, "Do They Really Care About Diversifica-
tion?" (editorial) Ashland Daily Tiding (23 May 1990). 
gardless (when the old growth ran out ten or twenty years 
down the road) was, to the environmentalists, senseless. 
"When you have a war between nations," suggested Lou Gold, 
"you don't refuse peace just because it might cause unem-
ployment among soldiers. 120 
The Forest Plan 
94 
Just as the old growth controversy in the Northwest 
was intensifying, the Siskiyou National Forest was working 
towards completion of its long-awaited Forest Plan. As man-
dated in the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NMFA) 
and the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning 
Act of 1974 (RPA), each national forest unit was to draw up 
a ten to fifteen year master plan. Such plans, which were to 
strive for both balanced usage and compliance with all major 
environmental laws, would serve as an overall blue-print for 
forest management for that period. Previously, most national 
forests were managed through a rather haphazard mix of de-
centralized area plans, regional plans, and the Forest Ser-
vice manual. Because the preparation of each plan for a 
given forest required an elaborate data-gathering and coor-
dination effort between all the ranger districts and the 
different areas of specialization, as well as a draft and 
final EIS, plans were often a decade or more in the making. 
1~ Lou Gold quoted in Caufield, 83. 
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The Siskiyou's Forest Plan, the initial stages of which were 
begun in the late 1970s, proved no exception to this rule. 
On August 28, 1987, two days before lightning ignited 
the Silver blaze, the DEIS for the Forest Plan was released 
and a lengthy 150-day public review period commenced. Re-
fleeting Supervisor McCormick's determination to get the cut 
down from what he felt were unsustainable levels, the draft 
plan featured a modest drop in the ASQ from the previous 
range of 168-200 mmbf to 150 mmbf. 121 Still, the plan kept 
the forest firmly on a commodity-producing path as it called 
for the eventual harvest of three-quarters of currently un-
protected mature forest (including old growth) and the pene-
tration of most roadless areas (including the North Kalmiop-
sis) outside of the congressionally designated wilderness 
with several hundred miles of new roads. 1~ 
As with the Silver Fire DEIS, the immediate reaction 
to the draft plan was criticism from both sides. For the 
timber interests, the plan did not maintain timber harvests 
at sufficient levels or manage the Siskiyou as intensively 
as it could have. In response, SOTIA lauched a massive let-
ter and pre-printed coupon campaign pushing its "Evergreen 
121 The DEIS preferred alternative is described in Land 
and Resource Management Plan FEIS, sec. II, 103-106. 
122 Land and Forest Management Plan FEIS, sec. I I, 154. 
Specifically regarding mature and old growth forest, the 
draft plan increased protected areas by eleven thousand 
acres over the Forest's current guidelines. Roughly 85,500 
acres of mature forest outside of wilderness areas was to be 
pre-served while the remaining 258,500 acres were slated for 
eventual harvest. FEIS, sec. II, 104. 
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Alternative" for the final version of the Forest Plan. 
SOTIA's plan would set the annual Siskiyou harvest at 188 
mmbf, increase roadbuilding, and reduce the normal 100-120 
year cutting rotations to eighty years.1n 
The environmentalists, meanwhile, were even less 
pleased by the draft. Their main critique of the plan, which 
Headwaters was especially instrumental in developing, cen-
tered around allegations that the Forest Service models used 
to calculate the forest's sustained yield, and hence the 
ASQ, were seriously flawed. According to Julie Norman, pres-
ident of Headwaters, the plan relied upon inaccurate compu-
ter model predictions of the growth rate of its second 
growth tree farms, thereby falsely boosting the whole for-
est's sustained yield and the current harvest levels set by 
that measure. These models' suspect long-term growth rate 
projections, claimed Norman, were based upon little more 
than sheer optimism and the liberal use of fertilizers and 
currently banned herbicides on the young stands. 1~ Accord-
ing to one environmentalist, this amounted to "voodoo fores-
try": 
Shorter rotations, better seeds--they conjure up all 
these intangibles that are supposed to enhance future 
growth. They don't care if it really works. The point 
is that it provides them with an excuse to cut more 
big old trees now.1~ 
1n Roger Morton, "Santa's List Won't Make Some Jolly" 
(editorial) Grants Pass Daily Courier (17 December 1987). 
1 ~ Norman, "Our Choices," 15. 
1~ Quote in Caufield, 68. 
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As such, argued environmentalists, these models served less 
to realistically predict forest growth and more as a con-
tinued justification for the "business as usual" of clear-
cutting, overcutting, and old growth harvesting.1u 
The truth of the matter regarding reforestation in the 
Siskiyou, claimed Headwaters, was something quite different. 
On certain parts of the forest (especially on the high, dry, 
and rocky slopes of the Illinois Valley Ranger District), 
where the Forest Service projected vigorous growth rates for 
reforested stands, it was charged that that many of the re-
planted trees were not thriving or even surviving. In fact, 
a few Illinois Valley sites had been unsuccessfully refores-
ted six times since 1961. 127 According to one environmental-
ist, the Forest Service had been growing "stealth trees."1~ 
Based upon their studies, Headwaters estimated that the For-
est Service would realize only 66% of their expected harvest 
1u Headwater's charges would be largely upheld three 
years later in a very critical House Interior Committee Re-
port on the adequacy and reliability of Forest Service tim-
ber yield models and reforestation practices. Specifically, 
the report found that Siskiyou National Forest's growth pro-
jections were totally unproven and purposefully blind to a 
number of limiting factors. In the national forests of the 
Northwest as a whole, the report found a pattern of over-
optimistic growth projections and inaccurate inventories of 
actual standing timber. The report also found actual growth 
rate to be only 64% of the volume cut--a clear violation of 
sustained yield. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, Management of Federal Timber Resources: 
The Loss of Accountability (Washington D.C.: 15 June 1992), 
1-3. 
1V Ibid. 
1~ Kathie Durbin, "Clearcut Logging Ravages Soil in Areas 
of Siskiyous" Oregonian special report, 16. 
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on replanted sites, 1~ some of which their own district sil-
viculturist deemed in 1973 as "questionable'' or "out of the 
question" for clearcutting in the first place. 130 Since NFMA 
prohibits cutting in areas not successfully reforested in 
five years, these were quite serious charges the environ-
mentalists were levelling.1~ 
Until the Silver Fire Project was wrapped up in the 
autumn of 1988, progress on the FEIS was slow. It was not 
until September that attention refocused on the Forest Plan 
as the state of Oregon jumped into the fray. Democratic Gov-
ernor Neil Goldschmidt's National Forest Planning Team had 
for some time been drawing up the state's own preferred 
long-term management plan for the Siskiyou and on September 
26 presented its "Oregon Alternative." The state plan called 
for an annual harvest of 160 mmbf (ten mmbf over the Forest 
Service's proposal), but kept the still substantial undis-
1~ Robert Sterling, "Headwaters Notes Flaw in Forest 
Plan" Medford Mail Tribune (22 January 1988). 
1~ Illinois Valley District Silviculturist Alan Wolfson 
quoted in House Interior Committee Report, 10. 
1~ Again, these charges were backed up in the 1992 In-
terior Committee Report. The report charged that the Siski-
you misleadingly claimed a 99% reforestation success rate 
"by using a biased, incomplete sample that ignored high-
elevation failures .... " In the strongest terms the report 
goes on to find that "the parallel with the savings and loan 
crisis is clear. Managers substituted junk bonds and poorly-
secured loans for reliable long-term home mortgages .... Like-
wise, the trustees for the public's forest trust, the Forest 
Service and BLM, have failed to adequately audit the conse-
quences of their actions and their investments. Thousands of 
acres of original forests have been cashed in by clearcut-
ting. The basic productivity of the land has been reinvested 
(loaned out) in a speculative system of clearcuts and mono-
culture tree farms." House Interior Report, 22. 
turbed portion of the North Kalmiopsis either roadless or 
off-limits to logging.1~ 
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Although it recommended a higher ASQ, the state plan 
was still quickly rejected by the timber interests who saw 
the North Kalmiopsis provision as needless pandering. Envi-
ronmentalists, especially Headwaters, though, saw the state 
plan as an improvement upon the federal plan in that it was 
more amenable overall to the goals of ecological protection 
and biodiversity.in The environmentalists' tentative faith 
in the state plan soon crumbled, though, after the state, 
under heavy pressure from the timber interests, pulled back 
from its proposal to keep the North Kalmiopsis roadless. 
Although it alone was responsible for the final deci-
sion, the Forest Service granted considerable weight to the 
state's view on this matter. According to the Supervisor, he 
considered it impossible to come up with a plan that the 
state did not sign-on to, primarily because Hatfield made 
the state's endorsement of the plan a condition for his own 
support. Consequently, the Forest Service went out of its 
way to coordinate with and accomodate the state, working 
closely with the governor's staff. Most local governments, 
taking a very hard line and endorsing SOTIA's Evergreen 
1 ~ Paul Fattig, "State Wants Siskiyou Harvest Increased" 
Grants Pass Daily Courier (26 September 1988). 
in "Environmental Groups Like State Alternative" Medford 
Mail Tribune (2 November 1988). 
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Alternative, found themselves largely outside this policy 
loop. 
The construction of the final plan featured some of 
the most pronounced and closely involved political interven-
tion Siskiyou personnel had yet faced as Supervisor McCor-
mick describes: 
There was some pretty heavy political influence and 
some give and take in the last minutes before that 
plan was born that was .... in some ways heavier than 
with the Silver Plan. 
By April, 1989, under heavy pressure from all sides, 
the Forest Service released the FEIS and the long-awaited 
final decision for the Forest Plan. The final plan featured 
several changes from the draft including a ten mmbf boost in 
the ASQ which put it in line with the state's goal of 160 
rnmbf and a 13,407 acre increase in mature/old growth 
protection. 1~ Although the Forest Service promised to 
switch a few high-altitude logging sites from clearcutting 
to selective logging,1~ environmentalists felt this did 
little to ameliorate their larger concerns about reforesta-
tion failure and inaccurate growth projections; how could it 
have, they asked, if the ASQ actually went up? The environ-
mentalists promptly appealed the plan and the appeal was 
just as promptly rejected. 
1~ Land and Forest Management Plan FEIS sec. II, 14, 104, 
116. 
1~ Unlike clearcutting which removes all the tree~ in a 
given area, selective cutting takes only certain individual 
trees of varying ages and leaves most of the rest. 
CHAPTER 3 
OLD GROWTH ON THE NATIONAL AGENDA 
The preservationists .... will soon have the blood of 
thousands of unemployed timber workers on their hands 
.... If we compromise, we let them off the hook. 
Yellow Ribbon Coalition 
We already cut the heck out of our forests and every 
damn stick of old growth left is significant. I for 
one am sick and tired of being considered unreasonable 
and uncompromising because I don't want to split the 
last five percent of the ancient forest with the tim-
ber industry. 
Tim Lillebo, ONRC 
The Pressure Builds 
As the Forest Plan was being hashed out in the Siski-
you, the larger old growth issue was expanding. In response 
to the court order of the previous year, the Fish and Wild-
life Service officially proposed to list the spotted owl as 
a threatened species in March 1989. A torturous fifteen 
month path of bureaucratic delay still lay ahead before the 
actual listing would occur, however, as the Bush Administra-
tion sought to stall the inevitable for as long as possible. 
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As old growth habitat continued to fall, the environ-
mentalists grew increasingly frustrated at the glacial pace 
at which the reluctant agencies were being forced by the 
courts to move to protect the owl. Subsequently, they 
brought separate suits against the Forest Service and BLM in 
early 1989 charging that both agencies failed to properly 
consider the impact of their old growth timber sales upon 
the owl. As a result, in March 1989, Seattle District Court 
Judge William Dwyer, another Reagan appointee, enjoined the 
Forest Service timber sales in question until the case could 
gain a full hearing. In all, approximately one billion board 
feet (bbf) of timber, or about one-quarter of Region Six 
sales were held up.1 
The injunction of a billion board feet of timber not 
only heightened already serious tensions, but lent the old 
growth issue increasingly high visibility. Both the timber 
interests and environmentalists were now involved in fully 
national efforts. Timber industry groups, enraged at the 
injunction, sponsored advertisements all over the country 
and lobbied heavily both regionally and in Washington D.C. 
Most all of the large public lands-oriented national envi-
ronmental groups, meanwhile, had signed onto the old growth/ 
spotted owl campaign. Even the Siskiyou's Lou Gold took to 
1This preliminary injunction order is described in the 
text of Judge Dwyer's 1991 opinion for Seattle Audubon Soci-
ety v. Evans 771 F. Supp. 1081 (9th U.S. District), section 
II. 
103 
the road in 1988, coming down from his Bald Mountain vigil 
each winter to travel around the country delivering lectures 
and slide shows promoting the Siskiyou National Park idea 
and old growth protection in general. Forest Service offi-
cials claimed that they could track his movement across the 
country each year by following the postmarks of the indig-
nant letters they received.2 
Although the Forest Service was bearing much of the 
brunt of the environmentalists' ire, the high volume har-
vests of the late 1980s were as much or more the responsi-
bility of Congress. Year after year, the Northwest's delega-
tion managed to boost the timber sales appropriations even 
further than the Forest Service was requesting.3 In 1987, 
for example, the Siskiyou was ordered by Congress to sell 
46.7% more timber than the forest had originally planned. 4 
Especially with so much timber being held up in court, the 
1990 appropriations were to prove no exception regarding 
congressional intervention. Senator Hatfield managed to 
attach a rider to the 1990 Interior Appropriations bill that 
freed up most of the billion bf being enjoined, while manda-
ting a 3.85 bbf Region Six harvest in 1990 and barring judi-
2Catherine Caufield, "The Ancient Forest" New Yorker (14 
May 1990), 72. 3congress increased the Region Six harvest by 700 mmbf in 
1986, 1 billion bf in 1987, 300 mmbf in 1988, and 200 mmbf 
in 1989. Kathie Durbin, "Politics Helped Delay Northwest 
Timber Management Plans" from special report: "Forests in 
Distress" Oregonian (15 October 1990), 11. 
4 caufield, 56. 
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cial review of any of 1990 sales.s Interior Appropriations 
Subcommittee Chairman Sidney Yates (D-IL), long a staunch 
friend of environmentalists, tried to keep the rider off the 
House version, but was outmanuevered by Aucoin. Previously, 
court-stripping amendments had been very case-specific such 
as the rider used in the Silver Fire salvage, but this 
rider, known as Section 318, was the broadest court ban ever 
attempted.6 
In order to get such a controversial measure through 
Congress, however, Hatfield had to sweeten the deal with 
several compromise measures. First, Section 318 issued a 
somewhat vague directive for the Forest Service to do its 
best not to fragment significant blocks of owl habitat. 
Given the extremely high 1990 quota, however, this goal 
would be hard not to violate. Second, it mandated the crea-
tion of citizen advisory boards for each Region Six "owl 
forest" to review timber sales as to their impact on the 
spotted owl and advise the Forest Service accordingly. 7 
Finally, Section 318 directed the Forest Service to develop 
5 Philip Shabecoff, "Senate Votes to Allow Cutting of 
Northwest's Virgin Forests" New York Times (27 July 1989), 
sec. A, 17 6In all there have been nine court-stripping riders added 
to appropriation bills. 
7 These advisory boards were to be composed of two timber 
industry representatives, two environmentalists, and two or 
three supposedly neutral members. 
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a spotted owl plan by September, 1990,s something the agency 
had already promised to do by the spring of 1989.9 
As might be expected, Section 318 raised howls of pro-
test from the environmentalists. Not only did it released 
163 timber sales in owl habitat before the courts could rule 
on their legality, but it also took from them their most ef-
fective weapon. The need for a court ban was obvious, fumed 
the environmentalists, because Section 318 violated NEPA, 
NFMA, the Endangered Species Act, the Migratory Bird Act, 
and the Clean Water Act, not to mention the rights of citi-
zens for redress. 10 
Around the same time Section 318 was passed, an inter-
agency panel of scientists from the Forest Service, BLM, 
FWS, National Park Service, and northwest states, headed by 
Forest Service biologist Jack Ward Thomas, convened to de-
vise a plan to save the spotted owl. Around six months la-
ter, in March 1990, this Interagency Scientific Committee 
(ISC) issued its findings and recommendations, commonly 
known as the Thomas Report.11 The committee came to the 
fairly obvious conclusion that the spotted owl was headed 
towards extinction if current logging practices did not 
8 Public Law #101-122, Section 318, 103 Stat. 701 (1989), 
745-750. 
9 Text of Dwyer opinion for Seattle Audubon Society v. 
Evans, section II. 10 
"Fundamental Rights Trampled" Forest Voice 2: 1 (_1990), 
4. 11 Interagency Scientific Committee, A Conservation Stra-
tegy for the Northern Spotted Owl (GPO region 10: 1990). 
106 
change. At the very least, according to the Thomas Report, a 
25-40% reduction in timber harvests and increased protection 
of significant stands of old growth were necessary to keep 
owl populations above the critical threshold. As a non-
binding recommendation towards that end, the ISC drew up its 
own fairly modest three million acre system of Habitat Con-
servation Areas (HCA) which attempted to identify areas of 
especially critical habitat or high dispersal potential. 
Adoption of the HCAs, however, would have to be accompanied 
by logging reductions outside the HCAs, including a 50% re-
duction in corridors linking one HCA to the next.12 Although 
they generally applauded it, environmentalists were never 
very comfortable with the ISC plan.13 Specifically, they 
feared that the committee's very measured, overly cautious 
response could not stand up to the owl's opponents. "They 
built in all the compromise already," claimed a spokesman 
12 It is important to note that the HCA system was design-
ed as the bare minimum needed to protect the owl, not old 
growth. In fact, HCAs leave out many significant areas of 
prime old growth and encompass some fairly marginal areas. 
The ISC plan was drawn up with wide consideration for econ-
omic and social factors and as such did not seek the protec-
tion of every single spotted owl, but rather attempted to 
keep owl populations above the point of no return. Thus, it 
did allow for and expect a certain degree of population de-
cline. 13 Nor, for that matter, were some scientists. In his 
lengthy 1991 court opinion on the spotted owl controversy, 
Judge Dwyer writes of the ISC report, "While it is endorsed 
by well-qualified scientists, it is criticized by others, 
equally well-qualified as over-optimistic and risky." Seat-
tle Audubon Society v. Evans, section V, finding 3lc. 
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for the Wilderness Society, "It's not a plan that could be 
further compromised and still protect the owl."14 
Following on the heels of the Thomas Report on June 22 
came the long awaited decision that Fish and Wildlife could 
delay no longer--the northern spotted owl was now officially 
listed as a threatened species. Although the Bush Adminis-
tration knew it was coming, the owl's listing put it in an 
extremely difficult position. While it was firmly opposed to 
any harvest reductions and warned of lost jobs as loudly as 
the timber industry, the government's own scientists were 
calling for less logging to save an owl that now had legal 
protection. Faced with such a tough decision, the adminis-
tration balked; only four days after the owl's listing, it 
delayed its decision on how to proceed until September. In 
the interim, announced the administration, it would ask Con-
gress to modify the ESA to allow for easier exemptions. 15 
Angry environmentalists charged that this failure to prompt-
ly implement legally mandated protection was a "throw-back 
to the Reagan-era. 11 16 
The Forest Service and FWS similarly stalled implemen-
tation of owl protection measures. Even after the owl's June 
listing, Fish and Wildlife did not oppose a single 1990 For-
est Service sale in owl habitat. In 1989 and 1990, in fact, 
14 Quote in Scott Somer, "Northwest's Old Growth Forests 
Shrink" Medford Mail Tribune (22 May 1990). 
15 Timothy Egan, "Softening Stand on Spotted Owl, Admini-
stration Delays Protection" New York Times (27 June 1990). 16 Quote in "No Peace for Owl," Time (9 July 1990), 63. 
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FWS issued 1,062 "no jeopardy" rulings for Region Six timber 
sales, 63,425 acres of which were located in Thomas Commit-
tee HCAs. 17 The Forest Service, meanwhile, continued their 
1990 harvest with little movement towards developing their 
own plan as mandated by the Hatfield rider. Moreover, nei-
ther agency showed any inclination to accept the Thomas Re-
port's HCA recommendations. 
The Thomas Report and the owl's listing led to a surge 
of national press in the summer of 1990 with long features 
and regular coverage in the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, 
Newsweek, and the Wall Street Journal, as well as a June 
cover story in Time. The longer the issue dragged on, the 
more nationalized it was becoming. The Wall Street Journal 
began to warn of the dire economic consequences of environ-
mental extremism, 18 while a June Washington Post editorial 
countered with strong support for old growth protection: 
The country isn't running out of jobs, but it is run-
ning out of ancient forest. This is an irreplaceable 
resource; these forests are special and majestic 
areas. The country doesn't need the lumber, and for 
the loggers and communities involved, cutting the for-
est down would be only a respite. Once it was done, 
there would be no forest (or owls) and still no 
jobs. 19 
17 These figures were taken from letters from Marvin 
Plenart, FWS regional director to John Butruille, Region Six 
Forester cited in "U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Credibil-
ity Hits New Low ... At Owl's Expense" Headwaters (September 
1990), 9-11. 
18 
"Owls are People Too" (editorial) Wall Street Journal 
(9 '\Pril 1990), sec. A, 1. · 
1 
"Forests, Jobs, and Owls" (editorial) Washington Post 
(29 June 1990). 
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Despite the fact that Section 318 was keeping harvest 
levels high and free of court interference, and despite the 
administration's unwillingness to act, timber interests 
where, nonetheless, quite jittery in the summer of 1990. In 
the past twenty-one months, thirty-five mills and 5,500 jobs 
in Oregon alone had been lost and the owl's listing only 
worsened the scenario.20 Calling for special action to off-
set or weaken the owl's ESA protection, timber interests 
began to ominously warn of complete economic disaster in the 
region. 
Not surprisingly, the Northwest turned, in the summer 
of 1990, into a powder keg of social tension. In this atmos-
phere, resentment, fear, and intimidation became increasing-
ly prevalent. Multilated spotted owls began showing up hang-
ing from trees or nailed to signs while bumperstickers read-
ing "Save a logger, kill a spotted owl" or "I love spotted 
owls .... well done" became commonplace .21 Also growing more 
frequent were pro-logging demonstrations including a 3,500 
person rally in Kelso, WA and a huge noisy demonstration in 
western Oregon involving hundreds of logging trucks flying 
the movement's ubiquitous yellow ribbons from their anten-
2
°Kathie Durbin and Paul Koberstein, introduction to 
"Forests in Distress" Oregonian special report, 24. 21 Timothy Egan, The Good Rain (New York: Knopf, 1990), 
172; Shawn Doherty, "Oregon's Not-So-Sweet Home" Newsweek 
(11 December 1989), 54. 
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nas. 22 Earth First, meanwhile, began planning for what it 
called its version of Freedom Summer, urging people from all 
over the country to descend on northern California for "Red-
wood Summer." The May car-bombing of two Earth First acti-
vists organizing this event, both of whom were seriously 
injured, was evidence of the new level the desperation in 
the region.23 
The Battle Widens in Congress 
By early September 1990, as its self-imposed deadline 
for coming up with an owl strategy had already passed, the 
administration found itself deeply divided and still without 
a plan.24 On September 21, the administration, announcing 
22 Herbert McLean, "Paying the Price for Old Growth" Amer-
ican Forests (October 1991), 73; "Loggers Protest Owl Deci-
sion" New York Times (25 June 1990), sec. A, 19. 23 
"2 in an 'Earth' Group Hurt as Car Explodes" New York 
Times, (25 May 1990), Al9. This incident soon developed into 
a bizarre controversy as the police immediately charged the 
activists, one of whom had previously been getting death 
threats, with transporting the bomb that blew up their car, 
but then withdrew their charges, admitting that they had no 
evidence. Not long after, an anonymous caller took responsi-
bility for the blast. The case remains unsolved. The old 
growth controversy began filtering down to other, very un-
likely places. For example, the Forest Service stopped send-
ing its Woodsy Owl mascot to grade schools in the communi-
ties around the Siuslaw National Forest in Oregon. Meanwhile 
parents in Laytonville, CA sparked a First Amendment battle 
when they demanded that their local school ban Dr. Seuss's 
tale of the Lorax, a creature endangered by the destruction 
of the Truffulla trees where it lived. "Woodsy Owl Still 
Gives a Hoot, But in Siuslaw He Gets a Boot" Oregonian (4 
April 1990); Ron Arias and Liz McNeil "A Boy Sides With Dr. 
Seuss's Lorax and Puts a Town at Loggerheads" People (3 Feb-
ruary 1990). 24 Reportedly, Secretary of Interior Lujan, OMB chief 
Richard Darman, and Council of Economic Advisors chief 
Michael Boskin all favored keeping harvest levels high and 
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that "no perfect solution exists," proposed a 3.2 bbf har-
vest, a modest decrease. Both sides immediately lambasted 
the plan as saving neither jobs nor owls and a waste of 
three months' time to decide what everyone already knew. 
"Congress and the Pacific Northwest carefully awaited the 
recommendations of this Delphic-like task force," claimed 
one congressional staffer, "only to find out later .... that 
these folks really have nothing to say."~ In addition to 
the modest reduction in logging, the administration called 
on Congress to insulate Region Six timber sales from NFMA 
and NEPA as well as invoke the so-called God Squad--a spe-
cial cabinet-level committee empowered to make exemptions to 
the Endangered Species Act. 26 The environmentalists claimed 
that this move only proved that the administration acknowl-
edged the illegality of their timber sales program.27 
The Forest Service, meanwhile, had to confront its own 
owl plan deadline imposed upon it by Congress in Section 
318. Having failed to meet that deadline, the Forest Service 
changing the ESA should legal challenges arise. The Forest 
Service and EPA chief William Reilly, on the other hand, 
pushed for acceptance of the ISC plan. Timothy Egan, "Split 
on How to Save Spotted Owl is Reported in Bush's Study 
Grou?," New York Times (8 September 1990), sec. I, 8. 2 Timothy Egan, "Administration Offers Plan to Limit 
Northwest Logging" New York Times (22 September 1990), sec. 
I, 7; quote in Alyson Pytte, "Bush's Modest Proposal" Con-
gressional Quarterly Weekly Report (29 September 1990), 
3105. 26 Egan, "Administration Offers Plan", sec. I, 8; Alyson 
Pytte, "Timber, Spotted Owl Interests Find Middle Ground 
Elusive" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (29 September 
1990)' 3104. 27 Egan, "Administration Offers Plan", sec. I, 8. 
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announced on September 28 its decision, made without hear-
ings or an EIS, that it would conduct its timber sales in a 
manner "not inconsistent with" the Thomas Report.~ 
The rush of events in late 1990 continued to unfold as 
the court-stripping provision of Section 318, two weeks be-
fore it was to expire, was ruled unconstitutional by a fed-
eral appellate court in San Francisco for violating the sep-
aration of powers doctrine.29 As a result, the environmen-
talists' previously banned lawsuits were reinstated and 
twelve Oregon timber sales not yet executed were halted by 
Judge Dwyer. 30 
In Congress, meanwhile, the 1991 Interior Appropria-
tions and with it the annual timber quota was being hashed 
out. Hatfield, as he did every year, pushed hard for high 
timber quotas; seeking for 1991 a 3.45 bbf Region Six har-
vest; substantially higher than the Forest Service's 2.6 bbf 
request. More significantly, Hatfield sought language in the 
appropriations bill which would require the final congres-
sionally designated ASQ to be a legal mandate rather than 
28 An overview of spotted owl management is provided in 
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest, Canyon Integrated Resource Project Draft 
Environmental Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1991), sec. B, 2. 29 Pytte, "Timber, Spotted Owl .... ", 3104. This ruling, 
however was itself overturned by the Supreme Court in March 
of 1992 as it ruled that Congress did indeed have the au-
thority to block judicial review in that instance, By this 
point, though, the ruling was largely academic. Linda Camp-
bell, "Endangered Owl Loses in High Court" Chicago Tribune 
( 2 6 March 1 9 9 2 ) , sec . l , 5 . 
30 The 18 December 1990 motion halting these sales is des-
cribed by Dwyer in Seattle Audubon v. Evans, section II. 
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the target which NFMA defines it to be.31 What concerned 
Hatfield was that the various national forests, hemmed in by 
their own Forest Plans, sustained yield, and now, perhaps, 
the ISC guidelines, were finding it impossible in some cases 
to satisfy their full congressionally mandated ASQ without 
violating these other requirements.32 
While the demands of Hatfield and others in the North-
west delegation regarding timber quotas had traditionally 
held sway, now for the first time, intense environmental 
lobbying was beginning to pay off. Eastern congressmen were 
becoming increasingly involved in timber matters and more 
willing to take an oppositional stance. As a result, the 
1991 appropriations package was rider-free for the first 
time in five years and cut levels, although still held by 
environmentalists as unsustainable and above ISC recommenda-
tions, were slowly beginning to come down.33 Hatfield's ASQ-
mandating language and Senator Robert Packwood's (R-OR) at-
31 Headwaters Press Release (22 October 1990). 32 Not fully meeting all the Section 318 quotas, in fact, 
was the same reason a coalition of timber industry groups 
brought an unsuccessful lawsuit against Region Six of the 
Forest Service. Interestingly, this suit saw Headwaters in-
tervening on the Forest Service's behalf. Although certainly 
not unknown, timberinitiated lawsuits against the Forest 
Service were far less common than environmentalist suits. 
~Industry Sues USFS; Headwaters Intervenes" Headwaters (Late 
Winter 1991), 9. 33 For entire Pacific Northwest harvest (Region Six and 
BLM) was sent at 3.2 mmbf, the same as the administration 
requested. Alyson Pytte, "The Timber Bureaucracy" Congres-
sional Quarterly Weekly Report (29 September 1990), 3106-
3107. For all 155 national forest units, the ASQ was· reduced 
to 9.3 bbf, down from 11.2 bbf in 1990. "Interior Appropria-
tions Hits and Misses" Wilderness (Winter 1990), 6. 
114 
tempt to add language to weaken the ESA were both turned 
back. Environmentalists, sensing that they had ridden out 
the worst of the spotted owl storm and had, perhaps, turned 
the corner on this issue, confidently declared that it was 
"time for law and order" in the forests.~ 
Both the timber interests and environmentalists were 
tiring of this annual spectacle of appropriations battles 
and court orders as each sought to settle the issue once and 
for all in their favor. The Congress, of course, was the 
only venue to achieve this, and thus, both sides began to 
focus upon a legislative strategy. The environmentalists had 
found a very sympathetic patron in the House: Rep. Jim Jontz 
(D-IN) who in April, 1990 introduced HR 4492, the Ancient 
Forest Protection Act (AFPA). The Jontz bill would create an 
Ancient Forest Reserve System designed to protect all "sig-
nificant stands" of old growth as well as the corridors be-
tween them.35 During the course of the year, the AFPA would 
pick up 125 co-sponsors. 
The Jontz bill incensed members of the Northwest dele-
gation who saw Jontz as a meddlesome outsider with no stake 
in the matter. At one point, in fact, the acrimony became 
bad enough to violate Congress's usual collegiality as an 
34 
"Hatfield Riders Fade; Owl Suits Come Alive" Headwaters 
(Late Winter 1991), 9. 35 This would be determined later by a special mapping and 
designation process 
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enraged Les AuCoin threw Jontz out of his office.36 Jontz 
defended himself by claiming ancient forests to be national 
treasures no different than the Grand Canyon whose fate, he 
argued, no one suggests only Arizonans should determine.37 
In July, Rep. Bruce Vento (D-MN) made a far more mod-
est bid for old growth protection, introducing the Ancient 
Forest Act (HR 5295), which would reduce Northwest harvests 
to three bbf and create a 6.3 million acre Ancient Forest 
Reserve.38 Unlike the more preservationist Jontz bill, Ven-
to's bill would only protect a little over half of unprotec-
ted old growth, although it would require such forest to be 
logged using non-clearcut methods.39 On September 13, Ven-
to's bill was approved nineteen to thirteen by the House In-
terior Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands, but 
could not get through the less friendly full Interior Com-
mittee.40 
36 Timothy Egan, "Fighting for Control of America's Hinter-
lands" New York Times (11 November 1990), sec. IV, 18. 37 Caufield, 83. 38 This reserve would be comprised of both mature and old 
growth forests. Like ancient forests, mature forests contain 
some, but not all characteristics of true old growth as de-
fined Franklin. 39 Gerald Gray, "The Politics of Old Growth" American For-
ests (October 1991), 18. While the national environmental 
groups welcomed both the Jontz and Vento bills, many of the 
more uncompromising grassroot groups, while backing the 
Jontz bill, most preferred the Native Forest Council's un-
sponsored proposal, the Native Forest Protection Act. The 
NFPA would mandate sweeping changes in the entire National 
Forest system including the protection of all ancient for-
est, an end to all clearcutting, and a ban on all timber 
exports. 40 Pytte, "The Timber Bureaucracy", 3106. Even if it 
passed Interior, it would also have to clear the even more 
116 
A number of legislative proposals were advanced by 
the timber interests' side as well. In spring, the Northwest 
Forest Resource Council (NFRC) proposed changes in Wilder-
ness and Wild and Scenic River boundaries to release new 
land for logging to offset any future limitations caused by 
owl protection measures. 41 At this point, the timber indus-
try was not willing to propose any specific old growth plan 
as to do so would, timber feared, would lend credence to the 
notion of old growth protection as a legitimate concept in 
the first place as well as call into question current fores-
try methods. 42 
Instead, timber interests threw their full weight be-
hind S 2762 and HR 5092, the National Forest Plan Implemen-
tation Act, simultaneously introduced into both houses by 
Hatfield, Aucoin, Smith, and Rep. Sid Morrison (R-WA). This 
bill, dubbed by environmentalists the "Timber Tantrum Act," 
sought what it called "community stability" by mandating for 
all 155 national forest units minimum timber quotas that 
would absolutely have to be met. In addition, the bill would 
limit court challenges and, as the NFRC sought, return por-
tions of Wilderness acreage to commercial use to off set any 
hostile Agriculture Committee, as this is a policy area with 
overlapping committee juridiction. 
41 Les Line, "Gambits and Skirmishes" Audubon (May 1990), 
4. Like Wilderness, Wild and Scenic River is a special con-
gressional designation which protects the natural and aes-
thetic character of river sections by prohibiting develop-
ment activities on the river or the adjacent land along its 
banks. 
42 Gray, "Poli tics of Old Growth", 1 7. 
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future owl or old growth protection. Despite this flurry of 
legislative activity, though, none of the various bills, 
whether pro-timber or environmental, had substantially moved 
forward in 1990. 
Section 318 and Siskiyou Logging 
Back on the Siskiyou, meanwhile, the dizzying national 
events of the old growth issue in 1989 and 1990 were threat-
ening to turn the new Forest Plan on its head. Judge Dwyer's 
March 1989 injunction blocked 79.4 mmbf of the Siskiyou Na-
tional Forest's 181 mmbf sales plan for 1989.43 In October, 
though, that timber was released by the Hatfield rider which 
also set an extremely high quota on the Siskiyou for 1990. 
Together the freed-up 1989 sales and the 1990 quota required 
the Siskiyou to meet an unprecedented 310 mmbf harvest in a 
single year. 44 As previously mentioned, Section 318 also re-
quired the Forest to minimize fragmentation of large blocks 
of old growth and set up a citizen advisory board to review 
sales. 
By December 1989, the Forest Service picked the Siski-
you advisory board which consisted of two local timber com-
pany officials, two moderate and uncontroversial local envi-
ronmentalists, a county commissioner, a port director, and a 
43 Robert Sterling, "Owl Reports Impact Studied" Medford 
Mail Tribune (5 April 1990). 
44 Gordon Gregory, "Siskiyou Falls Short of its Timber 
Target" Grants Pass Daily Courier (20 July 1990). 
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community college president.45 Noticeably absent from this 
board was anyone from Headwaters which, more so than any 
other local group, commanded technical expertise on Siskiyou 
issues and had clearly expressed an interest in participat-
ing. Despite its exclusion, Headwaters immediately set out 
mapping areas that the Forest Service could harvest without 
seriously fragmenting owl habitat and yet still try to meet 
Section 318's massive quota.~ 
As the 1990 sales began to take shape, however, envi-
ronmentalists found their recommendations largely ignored. 
They charged that the Forest Service was still engaging in 
"business as usual" proposing sales in roadless areas and 
large stands of old growth in direct violation of the Sec-
tion 318's provision to minimize fragmentation. Two such 
sales, Homestead Butte and Snail Creek particularly rankled 
environmentalists as they were in large roadless blocks of 
prime old growth surrounded by numerous fragmented little 
patches of forest in nearby roaded areas, the very places 
Headwaters was urging to cut first. 47 On the northwest side 
of the Siskiyou, meanwhile, the Forest Service announced 
plans for sales in the Elk River drainage despite the riv-
45 USDA Forest Service, Report to Congress on Implementa-
tion of Section 318 of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act for FY1990, 1st Report (l December 1989). 
~Headwaters Press Release (11 December 1989). 47 
"The Broken Promise of the Timber Compromise" Headwa-
ters (March 1990), 4. After the Forest Service's adoption of 
the Thomas Report guidelines, however, these two sales were 
withdrawn. 
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er's Wild and Scenic designation and its inclusion in Ven-
to's proposed Ancient Forest Reserve. 
The lifting of the Hatfield rider's court ban in Sep-
tember gave back to environmentalists their most potent 
weapon as they promptly reinstated suits against four old 
growth sales in the Siskiyou: Garden, Sugarloaf, China Left, 
and Briggs Secret. In two separate rulings, Judge Dwyer 
stopped all four sales, the last three of which were part of 
his larger twelve sale injunction (see p.112). In their de-
fense, the Forest Service had claimed such sales to neces-
sary for meeting Section 318's huge timber quota. Further-
more they pointed to the thirteen sales they had modified 
thusfar in response to citizen advisory board recommenda-
tions as evidence of their flexibility.~ 
The Siskiyou National Forest, therefore, found itself 
in a nearly impossible position, caught between directives 
to minimize fragmentation, ISC spotted owl regulations, the 
extremely high quotas of Section 318, and a very limited 
time frame to carry out almost two years of current and 
backlogged sales. Despite three-quarters of a million dol-
lars in overtime, by late summer the Siskiyou announced that 
it was not quite going to able to meet the quota in the time 
allotted. Said one Siskiyou official, "we understand the 
~Forest Service, Report to Congress on Implementation of 
Section 318, 9th Report (1 August 1990); "Siskiyou Sale Bor-
dering Wild Rogue Wilderness Blocked By Court" Headwaters 
(Late Winter 1991), 8. 
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consequences .... we don't like it .... But Congress gave us an 
impossible task."~ 
New Perpectives and the Drive for Forest Reform 
To most environmentalists, the root causes behind the 
destruction of old growth were located in the ill-advised 
practices and patterns of public land agencies. While timber 
sales appeals and court injunctions were seen as vital stra-
tegies, they were still just holding actions; no real, last-
ing change would ever be realized, argued the environmental-
ists, until the public land agencies, particularly the For-
est Service, were reformed. This represented, of course, a 
further expansion of the scope of this issue; from grass-
roots protests to save particular local forests to coordina-
ted regional efforts on behalf of old growth in general to, 
now, a national drive for bureaucratic reform. 
The environmentalists' critique of Forest Service for-
estry was grounded in both ecological and economic argu-
ments. Prior to the 1950s, the Forest Service most commonly 
employed uneven-aged selective harvesting methods (see chap-
ter 2, footnote 135). But such methods were not suitable for 
the type of highly mechanized, large volume harvesting which 
commenced in the post-war era. Consequently, clearcutting 
came to be adopted, in a radical departure of Forest Service 
~Quote in Gregory, "Siskiyou Falls Short." 
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practice, as the predominant management style.so While 
logistically and economically more efficient, clearcutting 
has long been challenged by environmentalists as an ecolog-
ical disaster. Besides the erosion and biological disruption 
the act of clearcutting itself has long been documented to 
cause, 51 its critics argue that the tree farms that are re-
planted in clearcuts are biologically impoverished croplands 
whose one or two species create a sterile, vastly simplified 
version of the complex ecosystem they have replaced.s2 
Environmentalists have also charged that Forest Ser-
vice practices are economically wrong-headed. While freely 
hurling labels such as "timber industry welfare" and "forest 
50 Michael Frome, The Forest Service, 2nd edit.(Boulder, 
CO: Westview, 1984), 108; Roy Keene, "'New Perspectives' to 
Limit Clearcutting" High Country News (19 November 1990). A 
typical clearcut involves the complete removal of trees from 
a area usually between forty to three hundred acres. Most 
often, the cut-over site is then burned to eliminate left-
over debris (called site preparation) and then replanted 
with one or two species of rapid growing hybrid seedlings. 
51 For a discussion of clearcutting and its ecological ef-
fects see Frome, 117. 
52 Growing in straight, dense, even-aged rows, typical 
Forest Service tree plantations do not let enough sunlight 
reach the forest floor for understory plants to grow. Also, 
because of the lack of organic matter on the forest floor 
and the destruction of essential nitrogen-fixing root fungi 
during site preparation, tree plantations rely upon heavy 
applications of artificial fertilizers to maintain produc-
tivity. While many of today's tree farms outgrow natural 
forests by 30-40%, biologist Chris Maser warns that there is 
no record anywhere on earth of any intensively managed for-
est maintaining full productivity beyond three rotations. 
The exhausted, insect-plagued tree plantations of Germany 
and Scandinavia, suggests Maser, ought to serve as evidence 
of modern forestry's unsustainability. Kathie Durbin and 
Paul Koberstein, "New Forestry: Trying Logging with a Light-
er Touch" Oregonian special report, 21; Caufield, 68-69. 
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socialism," environmentalists have long maintained that the 
three-quarters of the Forest Service budget that goes 
towards timber cutting-related activityS3 amounts to little 
more than a subsidy for timber companies. Such private con-
cerns, they argue, could never profitably log the mountain-
ous national forests without taxpayer-built roads, replant-
ings, and other services. As a result, the Forest Service, 
system-wide, operates at a loss for most timber sales with 
the costs of preparing a sale outweighing the value of the 
timber itself .S4 Even in Region Six, by far the most profit-
able of all Forest Service regions, one study has concluded 
that 20% of all sales lose money.ss The Siskiyou National 
Forest, meanwhile, was estimated by environmentalists to 
operate at a loss in 1989 of $2.3 million, or ten cents on 
the dollar.S6 
These sorts of charges were not only originating from 
environmental circles. Even from within the ranks of the 
53 This would include direct expenditures such as roads 
and sale preparation as well as indirect spending on things 
such as forestry research, firefighting, and local payments. 
For complete figures for the FY 1990 budget see, Timothy 
Egan, "Forest Service Abusing Role, Dissidents Say" New York 
Times (3 March 1990), sec. I, 26. 54 caufield, 69. This is assuming that the Forest gets 
fair price market value for the timber it sells, which is 
not always the case. On the Tongass National Forest in 
Alaska, for example, environmentalists claim that trees 
worth $700 on the open market are auctioned off for $1.48. 
"Your Taxes Pay for this Outrage" Forest Voice 2:2 (1990), 
5. 55 cascades Holistic Economic Consultants, Newsletter (Eu-
gene OR: 23 September 1988). 
~Robert Sterling, "Wilderness Group Claims Siskiyou For-
est Unprofitable" Medford Mail Tribune (4 October 1990). 
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Forest Service itself, dissent began to emerge. While the 
most severely dissatisfied formed an organization and a 
newspaper dedicated to reforming their agency,57 a number of 
mainstream rangers and supervisors also began to voice their 
concerns that Forest Service practices could not continue 
unchanged for long. In the fall of 1989, supervisors from 
all over the system began to warn Forest Service Chief Dale 
Robertson that the agency was "out of control." At their an-
nual conference in Las Vegas later that year, the supervis-
ors continued to press their case, even presenting Robertson 
with a videotape documenting their concerns.SS 
Under widespread criticism and facing growing turmoil 
within the ranks of his agency, Robertson in January 1990 
announced that the Forest Service would begin experimenting 
with a new forest management program called New Perspec-
tives. Employing concepts of New Forestry developed by For-
est Service biologist Jerry Franklin, the New Perspectives 
scheme officially represented an attempt to harvest forests 
without quite so much ecological disruption. New Forestry 
attempts to mimic nature by leaving harvest sites in a more 
natural condition. This is achieved by retaining some snags 
57 The organization that was formed was called the Associ-
ation of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics 
(AFSEEE) and their paper, Inner Voice, has a circulation of 
several thousand. 
~"Forest Managers Speak Out for the Forest" Headwaters 
(March 1990), 3; Timothy Egan, "Forest Supervisors Say Poli-
ticians are Asking Them to Cut Too Much" New York Times (19 
September 1991). 
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and large living trees for wildlife habitat and reseeding 
and leaving a certain amount of downed logs and other debris 
on the ground. In addition, New Forestry emphasizes stream-
side protection and encourages increased helicopter logging 
and the minimization of fragmentation where possible.59 All 
of this, although largely untested, has been alleged to al-
low harvest sites to more readily regenerate into a healthy 
natural forest cornrnunity.60 
For timber interests, New Forestry represented just 
one more threat to their timber supply to contend with. "It 
looks to us," claimed a lobbyist for the American Forest Re-
source Alliance, "like [New Forestry is] going to be an ex-
cuse to cut fewer trees. "61 The timber interests, still not 
willing to recognize the value of old growth or the ecolog-
ical problems associated with clearcutting, would not admit 
any need for these so-called ''reforms." Claimed one industry 
executive: 
There's no crisis in our woods and no reason to be 
rushing in and making changes when we don't have any 
problem replanting trees and regenerating forests.62 
59 ourbin and Koberstein, "New Forestry", 21-22; Jon 
Luoma, "New Logging Approach Tries to Mimic Nature" New York 
Times (6 June 1990), sec. C, 13. 60 oespite its increased ecological sensitivity, New For-
estry is not to be confused with selective uneven-age cut-
ting methods (see footnote 135, chapter two); more accur-
ately, it is a modified, environmentally friendlier version 
of clearcutting. Also, because its methods result in a re-
duced harvest volume, New Forestry require logging over a 
lar~er area to achieve the same overall volume. Ibid~ 
Quote in Luoma, 13. 
62 Ibid. 
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The environmentalists, on the other hand, were far 
less certain how to react towards New Perspectives. While, 
New Forestry methods clearly represented a genuine and wel-
corned improvement over traditional clearcutting practices, 
environmentalists worried that it might degenerate into a 
justification for the continuation of unsustainable harvest 
levels and old growth liquidation. A spokesman for ONRC sums 
up this ambivalence: 
New Forestry would be great if combined with a reduced 
cut. We're concerned that it not become a placebo for 
the real problem, which is, we're just cutting too 
fast in the national forests.~ 
Another activist had similar doubts: 
New Forestry is dangerous because it tells politicians 
that they can have their owls and their timber too. 
That's a great message if it's true, a risky one if it 
isn't. 64 
To the most uncompromising environmentalists, however, 
New Perspectives was a "kinder, gentler rape of the forest," 
a "bureaucratic response to a public relations problem," or 
simply, "New P.R."M The ONRC's Kerr charged that the Forest 
Service was manipulating the universally respected Jerry 
Franklin and using this "warmed over old forestry" to get at 
the last scraps of ancient forest.66 Others sarcastically 
noted that: 
63 Ibid. 
64 Quote in Seth Zuckerman, "New Forestry, New Hype?" 
Sierra (March/April 1992), 41. 
Mibid. 67; Andrew Kerr, "New (Age) Perspectives" Forest 
Watch (October 1990), 22-23. 66 Kerr also complained that without an accompanying re-
duction in the overall harvest volume, the practice of New 
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.... New Forestry and the rest of the New Perspectives 
program, including New Technology and New Alliances 
will likely be carried out with New Chainsaws, allow-
ing loggers to buy New Pickup Trucks.67 
The Forest Service was, therefore, stuck in the middle be-
tween two skeptical foes. "The industry" observed one agency 
official, "says 'That's not a clearcut,' and the environmen-
talists say 'That's not a forest'".~ 
Shasta Costa: True Reform or Trojan Horse? 
As was so often the case, the Siskiyou National Forest 
found itself once again at the front lines of the old growth 
controversy, as the Forest Service chose the Forest to debut 
its New Perpectives program. As a "test-run" of sorts, the 
Shasta Costa Integrated Resource Project had all eyes upon 
it as to whether New Perspectives was feasible or not. The 
Shasta Costa watershed in the north-central part of the Sis-
kiyou, north of the North Kalmiopsis, encompasses 23,419 
acres, a good deal of this roadless (see figure 6). Not only 
is the watershed prime spotted owl habitat, but it also pro-
vides an important wildlife corridor between the Kalmiopsis 
area and the Wild Rogue Wilderness to the north. In addi-
tion, it lies directly south of the only paved east-west 
Forestry might in some ways actually be worse for the for-
ests since the achievement of the normal ASQ using such low-
er yielding methods would require the cutting and roading of 
an even greater percentage of forest acreage. Kerr, "New 
(Age) Perspectives", 22, 25. 67 Zuckerman, 42. 
~Ibid. 
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route through the Siskiyou and thus, is an exceptionally 
scenic area of high visual sensitivity.69 
In 1987 the initial planning process for the timber 
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sales in the Shasta Costa area began, but was soon interrup-
ted by the Silver Fire. Although the Silver salvage was 
mostly seen as a defeat for environmentalists, it did, for 
the first time, force the Siskiyou National Forest to clear-
ly admit to the significance of fisheries, biodiversity, or-
ganic debris, erosion, and streamside vegetation--all issues 
it had previously avoided but was forced to confront in the 
extensive and closely scrutinized Silver Fire EIS process. 
By the time Shasta Costa planning resumed in 1989, rapidly 
changing events made such concepts politically impossible to 
ignore. 
To design the prototype New Perspectives project, the 
Siskiyou brought in some of the best talent from across the 
system and spent a half million dollars in preparation and 
marketing.ro "So goes Shasta Costa, so goes the USFS" was a 
phrase heard within the Siskiyou which attested to the im-
portance which was being placed on this project. 71 Besides 
69 USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest, Shasta Costa Timber Sales and Integrated 
Resource Projects Final Environmental Impact Statement Vol-
ume 1 (Region 10: GPO, 1990), sec. I, 20. 
roKathie Durbin, "Innovative Forestry Arrives in Siski-
you" Oregonian special report, 23. 
71 Quote cited in letter from Jim Neal, Helicopter.Loggers 
Association to Bonnie Wood, Gold Beach District Ranger (20 
September 1990) reproduced in Shasta Costa FEIS Volume 2, 
sec. F, 76. 
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incorporating New Forestry techniques, another feature of 
New Perspectives was to be increased public involvement and 
input in the planning process. All throughout the winter and 
spring of 1990, therefore, the Forest Service held an exten-
sive series of public workshops. 
Meanwhile, the Shasta Costa team closely studied the 
natural history of the Shasta Costa region, including its 
burn and regrowth patterns and tried to draw up a plan they 
claimed would imitate natural processes. The resulting DEIS, 
released on July 27, 1990, recommended a management plan for 
the three year life of the project which would harvest a 
total of 11.2 rnmbf, as opposed to the 17.5 rnmbf originally 
slated for that three year period under the 1989 Plan. More 
significantly, the draft's recommendation was for no tradi-
tional clearcutting to occur, requiring instead that New 
Forestry methods be used and very minimal old growth be har-
vested. 72 To achieve this, only 2.5 miles of roads (as op-
posed to the Plan's 6.2 miles) would have to be built as the 
project intended to rely more heavily upon helicopter 
logging. 73 
As the draft's comment period commenced, both sides 
struggled to comprehend the implications of this "new per-
nThe Shasta Costa DEIS called for a twenty tree per acre 
rate of live tree retention as well as no fragmentation of 
old growth stands. The Shasta Costa draft alternative is 
summarized in Shasta Costa FEIS Volume 1, sec. II, 14, 35-
40. 
73 Ibid. sec. II, 14. 
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spective." Although they welcomed the access to this road-
less region they had long coveted, most on the timber side 
were alarmed by the Shasta Costa plan's restraint. SOTIA 
protested Shasta Costa on the grounds that it deviated from 
the Forest Plan and they could not understand why it was 
suddenly so important to keep this area, previously slated 
for roads, roadless. Urging the Forest Service to stick to 
its Plan, SOTIA complained that it was unfair to local citi-
zens that Shasta Costa be chosen to conduct untried experi-
ments in forestry. 74 Boise Cascade, Douglas Timber Opera-
tors, and several county governments echoed these concerns 
in their responses to the draft. 75 
Most timber interests were very careful not to direct-
ly attack the broader goals of New Perspectives but instead, 
its specific manifestation as laid out in the draft. Some, 
though, were not nearly so timid or politic as evident in 
the scathing letter sent to the Shasta Costa planning team 
from an executive of the Northwest Timber Association: 
It is clear to me that the shift from alternative B 
[the 1989 Forest Plan guidelines] to C [the Shasta 
Costa draft plan] is no more than a political move to 
appease the preservationists and others in and outside 
of the agency who hope harvesting of timber will be 
ended on public lands in the near future. To those in 
the community who have trusted the agency and who de-
pend upon this timber .... this blatant disregard is a 
74 Gregory Miller, Executive Vice President, Southern Ore-
gon Timber Industries Association to Kurt Wiedenmann, Shasta 
Costa Project Leader (9 October 1990), reproduced in Shasta 
Costa FEIS Volume 2, sec. F, 116-117. 
75 Shasta Costa FEIS Volume 2, sec. F, 74-75, 113-116, 
121-122. 
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slap in the face .... You are discrediting the promises 
of both the Forest Plan and the hype of new perspec-
tives. U 
The environmentalists, meanwhile, faced their own 
dilemma regarding how to react to the Shasta Costa draft. 
The draft itself represented, to them, a far more enlight-
ened approach to logging and public involvement which they 
certainly wanted to encourage now and in the future. Head-
water's Norman expressed to Siskiyou officials the group's 
desire "to get in line with you" on Shasta Costa.n Still, 
there were many unanswered questions about the project which 
gave environmentalists some serious doubts. These doubts 
focused not so much upon the project itself, but where it 
fit into the larger scheme of things. 
The Forest Service was extremely vague as to what the 
future held for Shasta Costa after the three year life of 
the project. Because of its reduced yield, Shasta Costa 
would fall short of the Forest Plan's three year target for 
that area. If it would not amend the Forest Plan to reflect 
this lower volume brought on by New Forestry, then what, 
asked the environmentalists, was the Forest Service really 
up to? Would Shasta Costa's reduced quota simply be made up 
elsewhere on the forest or after 1993 within Shasta Costa 
itself? The Forest Service refused to rule out either of 
76 R. Dennis Hayword, North West Timber Association to 
Abel Camarena, Acting Supervisor (26 September 1990), repro-
duced in Shasta Costa FEIS Volume 2, sec. F, 126. 
nJulie Norman quoted in Gordon Gregory, "Future torestry 
Taking Root in Shasta Costa" Grants Pass Daily Courier (12 
July 1991). 
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these scenarios. The following exchange at a public workshop 
between Oregon State University biologist Chris Frissell, 
environmental activist Jim Brittell, and a Shasta Costa 
planner illustrates the Forest Service's ambiguity and 
evasiveness on this matter: 
Frissell: Why don't you make a 10 year decision on 
this EIS? 
Forest Service: we believe that this decision will be 
germane for three years. 
Brittell: Is the Forest willing to concede that New 
Perspectives will reduce the ASQ? 
Forest Service: No. For this drainage with this set of 
conditions and opportunities, volume harvested will 
probably be reduced. This may or may not be true in 
another planning area. 
Brittell: You need to clearly state that we don't want 
to get 32 rnmbf out of the [Shasta Costa] basin. 
Forest Service: We can only make a decision for 1991 
to 1993. Projecting a decision beyond 1993 is inap-
propriate. 78 
If the Forest Service really believed in New Forestry 
and it was not just a trojan horse designed to briefly ap-
pease critics in order to enter roadless areas, asked Kerr, 
then why did it not amend the Forest Plan's ASQ to reflect 
lower volumes.79 By the Forest Service's own estimates, a 
Forest-wide reduction of New Perspectives would lower the 
Plan's ASQ by 10-20%.~ And yet touting its bold new "light-
er touch on the land" on one hand, "the Forest Service went 
78 USDA Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, ~inutes 
from Shasta Costa Workshop, internal document, (June 1991). 
79 Kerr, 25. 
~Shasta Costa, FEIS Volume 2, sec. F, 34. 
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on to announce that it could "not preclude the future har-
vest of timber on Shasta Costa.81 Until the Siskiyou Nation-
al Forest admitted that Shasta Costa-style projects were in-
compatible with their own Plan and ended the ambiguity sur-
rounding the area's long-term future, many environmentalists 
doubted that Shasta Costa could not be said to reflect any 
meaningful change in Forest Service values.~ 
Timber on the Defensive 
Although the spotted owl had been officially listed as 
threatened since June 1990, the administration and the Fish 
and Wildlife Service had yet to implement any protective 
measures for the owl, not even the fairly modest ISC recom-
mendations. To force action, the environmentalists kept up a 
nearly continuous stream of lawsuits. One of these, against 
Fish and Wildlife, hit paydirt for them in early 1991. In a 
ruling on February 26, Judge Zilly chided Fish and Wildlife 
for having "abused its discretion when it declined to desig-
nate critical habitat for the northern spotted owl" and ac-
cused them of deliberately stalling in violation of their 
mandate.~ On March 15, Zilly gave FWS forty-five days to 
come up with a habitat protection plan. 
The court's order moved the agency to produce their 
own tentative proposal announced in late April. The FWS plan 
81 Ibid. 
~Durbin, "Innovative Forestry", 23. 
~Northern Spotted Owl (Strix occidentalis caurina) v. 
Manual Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, (9th U.S. District, 1991). 
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identified 11.6 million acres of public and private critical 
habitat; the largest habitat designation in the history of 
the ESA.~ What Fish and Wildlife's announcement served to 
do was to further confuse an already confusing situation. 
Nobody it seemed, least of all public officials, quite knew 
what this designation really meant or how to react to it. 
Hatfield, assuming the worst, quickly condemned the ruling 
as "biology run amok" while an AFRA spokesman warned of a 
"land lockup equivalent to the size of Massachusetts, Ver-
mont and Connecticut combined. 11 85 Fish and Wildlife was 
careful to point out, however, that this designation merely 
identified a broad zone of habitat which did not necessarily 
preclude timber harvesting and could, in the future be ad-
justed by the administration or Congress. With time, claimed 
Interior Secretary Lujan, the final version of the FWS plan 
"might be much, much different than it is now."~ 
Another court decision issued on May 23 by Judge Dwyer 
further complicated the increasingly byzantine politics of 
old growth.87 Dwyer, responding to one of the lawsuits re-
vived after the Section 318 court ban was overturned, ruled 
~"U.S. Proposes Giant Refuge in Northwest to Save Spot-
ted Owl" Chicago Tribune (27 April 1991). This figure was 
later reduced to 6 million acres as the private portion was 
exem?,ted. 8 Margaret Kriz, "Owl 1, Timber 0" National Journal (4 
May 1991), 1056; quotes in "U.S. Proposes Giant Refuge" 
Chicago Tribune. 
~Lujan quoted in Mike Mills, "Spotted Owl Gains Ground 
in Timber Controversy" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 
(4 May 1991), 1127. 87 seattle Audubon Society v. Evans. 
135 
that the Forest Service's actions regarding the spotted owl 
had violated NFMA. This violation, according to Dwyer stem-
med from the agency's failure to commit itself to a conser-
vation strategy to save the owl. The Forest Service's tenta-
tive and half-hearted adherence to the !SC guidelines, was 
not sufficient action for Dwyer who wrote in a strongly 
worded opinion: 
The problem here has not been any shortcomings in the 
laws, but simply a refusal of administrative agencies 
to comply with them. This invokes a public interest of 
the highest order: the interest in having government 
officials act in accordance with the law.~ 
Dwyer goes on to discuss the job losses which "will 
continue regardless of whether the spotted owl is protec-
ted": 
To bypass the environmental laws either briefly or 
permanently, would not fend off the changes trans-
forming the timber industry. The argument that the 
mightiest economy on earth cannot afford to preserve 
old growth forests for a short time, while it reaches 
an overdue decision on how to manage them, is not con-
vincing today. It would be even less so a year or a 
century from now.~ 
As a result, Dwyer announced a comprehensive injunc-
tion on all timber sales in owl habitat in seventeen "owl" 
forests in Region Six and northern California and gave the 
Forest Service until March 5, 1992 to design and implement a 
single plan to save the owl. This injunction virtually shut 
down the entire Region Six timber program in old growth for-
~Ibid. section VI. 
89 Ibid. 
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ests, freezing sales on 66,000 acres.~ While the Forest 
Service argued that these sales accounted for less than one 
percent of owl habitat, Dwyer was convinced that the loss of 
those acres "would constitute irreparable harm and would 
risk pushing the species beyond a threshold from which it 
could not recover."~ 
Environmentalists were delighted by this ruling which 
could have been mistaken for something they themselves might 
have written. Timber interests, on the other hand, were fur-
ious and predictably began to rage against what one official 
termed "court lockups" of public lands whose fate was now 
being decided by unelected judges with no expertise in for-
estry. More than ever before, the Dwyer ruling convinced the 
timber interests that their only salvation was to be found 
in a legislative solution, and so it was in this direction 
that they began to pour an increasing portion of their ener-
gy. This need for a legislation was, perhaps, the only thing 
that all parties could agree upon, as environmentalists, 
despite their legal successes, ultimately saw this strategy 
as a dead-end road. Either way, the Dwyer ruling's new in-
junction and the administration's intransigence placed ex-
treme pressure upon Congress to resolve the issue, especial-
ly amidst Forest Service warnings of a 1992 log shortage.~ 
~This injunction was on future sales only; sales already 
"in the pipeline" were not included. 
91 Ibid. 
~Gray, "Politics of Old Growth", 18. 
137 
In the summer of 1991, the environmentalists, both 
grassroots and national, launched a major lobbying campaign 
to preserve old growth and modify Forest Service logging 
practices. Early in the 1991 session, the Jontz and Vento 
bills (now numbered HR 842 and HR 1590 respectively) were 
reintroduced. Before long, Vento, reportedly impressed by 
committee testimony and Dwyer's ruling, began meeting with 
Jontz and the Interior Committee's new, pro-environmentalist 
chairman, George Miller (D-CA) to discuss possible changes 
in his bill that would bring it more in line with Jontz's. 93 
Rep. John Bryant (D-TX), meanwhile, introduced HR 1969, the 
Forest Biodiversity and Clearcutting Prohibition Act which, 
while having little chance to pass, represented the environ-
mentalists' broadest, most comprehensive goals.94 The big-
gest news for the environmentalists, though, was in the Sen-
ate where Brock Adam's (D-WA) Pacific Northwest Community 
Recovery and Ecosystem Conservation Act (S 1536) was the 
first old growth-friendly bill to be introduced in that 
house. S 1536 would create a fairly extensive Forest Reserve 
System, tax log exports, and fund economic transition and 
93 Mitch Friedman, "Ancient Forests: The Perpetual Crisis" 
Wild Earth (Summer 1991), 32. 94 HR 1969 would ban clearcutting on the national forests 
and would specifically require forest management to incorpo-
rate biodiversity goals. This bill was sweeping enough to 
cause some of the more moderate national environmental 
groups to withhold their support. Other bills relating to 
biodiversity (HR 2082 and HR 585) were also introduced by 
Reps. Gerry Studds (D-MA) and James Scheuer (D-NY). Fried-
man, 31; Phillip Davis, "From the Shade to the Spotlight" 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (l June 1991), 1439. 
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diversification programs. More significantly, this bill 
represented a major break from the heretofore solidly pro-
timber bipartisan ranks of the Northwest delegation.95 
The events of 1991 which allowed the environmentalists 
to ride what one Siskiyou ranger termed a "power wave," con-
versely put timber on the defensive. With unfavorable court 
rulings and injunctions, timber was forced to give some 
ground and, for the first time, conceded to the legitimacy 
of both the owl's threatened status and the concept of pre-
serving some old growth.96 Timber interests yielded on this 
point because, in the words of one congressional staffer, 
"it's not in the industry's interest to delay anymore. "97 
Thus, the strategy of fighting tooth-and-nail any and all 
change had now given way to compromising for the best deal 
possible. To timber, the best hope for this rested with a 
bill proposed by a joint industry-labor coalition. 98 
The bill, introduced in the House by Rep. Jerry Huck-
aby (D-LA) as the Forest and Families Protection Act (HR 
2463) and in the Senate by Packwood as the Federal Lands and 
~Other cracks in the delegation appeared as urban repre-
sentives such as Jim McDermott (D-WA) and newly elected ones 
such as Jolene Unsoeld (D-WA) began to stake out positions 
less friendly to timber. Phillip Davis, "Ruling Gives Lawma-
kers a Push To Resolve Spotted Owl Issue" Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (1 June 1990), 1439. 96 Gerald Gray, "Seeing Eye-to-Eye on Old Growth" American 
Forests, (October 1991), 20. 97 Quote in Kriz, 1056. 98 This coalition included the AFRA, the National _Forest 
Products Association, the Carpenter's Union, the Western 
Council of Industrial Workers, and the International Wood-
workers of America 
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Families Protection Act (S 1156), were the first timber-
supported bills to establish old growth reserves for the 
spotted owl, albeit far less than the Jontz bill. In return 
for allowing some old growth to stand, the bills would limit 
legal challenge to timber sales, amend NFMA to require 
guaranteed timber quotas, and ease ESA restrictions.99 This 
bill, which essentially replaced Hatfield's 1990 bill (S 
2767) as timber's main legislative vehicle, was immediately 
condemned by Chairman Miller who accused its sponsors of ig-
noring and complicating the old growth negotiations already 
occurring in the House.100 
In October the environmentalists' cause in the House 
was bolstered by very favorable testimony from a panel of 
old growth scientists including Franklin and Thomas who 
urged for reductions in logging and roadbuilding. Meanwhile 
the FY 1992 appropriation was passed again without any 
court-blocking riders or absolutely guaranteed quotas. Des-
pite considerable activity, however, by the end of 1991 
99 HR 2463 and S 1156 are described in Kriz, 1056. 100 Gray, "Politics of Old Growth", 19. It was hoped that 
using Vento's middle-of-the-road bill as a framework and 
starting point, both sides could negotiate a compromise from 
there. In addition to the Packwood/Huckaby bill, pro-timber 
legislators also proposed two other bills: Democrats in Ore-
gon's delegation, uncomfortable with court restrictions pro-
posed their own bill, HR 2807, which also created modest old 
growth reserves and maintained high timber outputs, but 
without the court-stripping provisions. Another pro-timber 
bill, HR 1309, was introduced by Rep. Smith. Davis, "Ruling 
Gives Lawmakers a Push", 1438. 
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there was still no movement of any bill out of committee, as 
the ongoing legislative stalemate could not be broken. 
The administration firmly rejected both the Vento and 
Jontz proposals, but declined to endorse outright any of the 
pro-timber bills. Instead, the only initiative that the ad-
ministration seemed interested in pursuing at this point was 
to try exempt old growth timber sales from ESA regulations 
through God Squad proceedings. It got its first chance to 
test-run this process when Fish and Wildlife rejected forty-
four BLM timber sales in owl habitat (claiming they would 
cause twelve percent mortality of all owls on BLM land). BLM 
chief Cy Jamison promptly appealed to Secretary Lujan to in-
voke the controversial panel. In October Lujan obliged and 
the long and cumbersome process commenced. 101 Thus, despite 
the changing political climate on this issue, the adminis-
tration was, nevertheless, showing no signs of fundamentally 
changing its commodity-oriented approach to resource 
management. 102 
101 Phillip Davis, "BLM Calls on God Squad to Let Timber 
Go" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report (14 September 
1991), 2611-2612; Phillip Davis, "'God Squad' Called on to 
Weigh Timber Interests, Spotted Owl" Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report (5 October 1991), 2854. While timber interests 
eagerly looked to this case as a welcome harbinger in their 
efforts to bypass spotted owl regulations, environmentalists 
argued that BLM had no legal grounds to seek an exemption 
since the God Squad clause requires that all "good faith" 
efforts to find alternatives to destroying habitat be ex-
hausted before an exemption could be granted. 
102 In fact, in Fall 1991, Jon Mumma, the head forester 
for Region One in the northern Rockies was forced to retire 
after he resisted pressure to meet a regional timber quota 
which he determined was unsustainable. Mumma and the former 
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In the Siskiyou, meanwhile, timber sales planning con-
tinued as if all were normal. As the Forest Service began 
work on the final version of the Shasta Costa plan, it came 
to be convinced that such an approach, employing mostly New 
Forestry techniques, rather than the standard individual 
clearcut sales, represented the wave of the future. Confi-
dent of its potential, the Siskiyou officials began to an-
nounce plans for more of such integrated resource projects 
in similarly controversial and largely roadless areas, in-
cluding the West Indigo drainage, a 13,500 acre section of 
the North Kalmiopsis (see figure 7) and a 23,550 acre par-
tially roadless area known as Canyon in the dry, steep 
southeast of the forest where Whittaker conducted his famous 
botanical study of the Siskiyou (see chapter 2, p.45 and 
figure 7). Because all such projects were slated for road-
less or partially roadless areas, a full EIS process would 
have to held for each. 
In July 1991, the Shasta Costa FEIS was completed. By 
boosting the cut by 2.2 mmbf and adding 2.5 more miles of 
regional director of the Park Service (who was demoted) tes-
tified at Civil Service Subcommittee hearings in September. 
Mumma revealed that he faced intense political pressure from 
the administration, especially Chief of Staff John Sununu, 
as well as certain western congressmen to keep timber out-
put, as in Region Six, at levels which violated sustained 
yield. The Mumma controversy, which caught quite a bit of 
attention in Washington only served to provide more ammu-
nition for a forest reform campaign that was now spreading 
to local national forests from coast to coast. "Park Service 
Aide Tells of Sununu Pressure" Chicago Tribune (25 September 
1991). 
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roads, the final recommendations pulled back quite a bit 
from the surprising moderation of the draft . New supervisor 
Mike Lunn, however, held off signing the final record of de-
cision until the Forest Service finalized its spotted owl 
plan as ordered by Dwyer. In fact, the Dwyer injunctions 
brought all new projects on the Siskiyou in the summer of 
1991 to a screeching halt as the DEIS target dates for West 
Indigo, Canyon, and several other projects were all pushed 
back due to the confusion and uncertainty over old growth 
and the spotted owl. With so many parallel streams of plan-
ning, negotiation, and litigation occurring simultaneously, 
the situation on the Siskiyou by late 1991 became, according 
to former Supervisor McCormick, "very, very confusing" and 
"hard to track," even for the people directly involved in 
it. "How in the world," asked McCormick "is this going to 
come out?" 
The Administration Counterattack 
In January 1992, the so-called God Squad began delib-
erations to decide whether to exempt the BLM sales that FWS 
had deemed to be in critical owl habitat from the require-
ments of the Endangered Species Act. 1~ Although the scope 
103 The Bush administration's God Squad was comprised of 
the Secretaries of Agriculture, Interior, and the Army, the 
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the heads of 
the EPA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, and a state representative from Oregon. Phillip Davis, 
"Logging Decision Set for May 14" Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Review (2 May 1992), 1154. 
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of this exemption would be limited (in terms of all pending 
old growth sales), it had the potential to set an enormously 
significant precedent. It also dispelled all doubts as to 
the thrust of the administration's strategy regarding old 
growth--it was clearly to attack and weaken the ESA. Envi-
ronmentalists, while clearly alarmed by this frontal assault 
on a key law, doubted, nonetheless, whether the God Squad's 
findings would stand in court (see footnote 101).104 
The Fish and Wildlife Service, meanwhile, continued to 
work on its long-overdue draft recovery plan for the spotted 
owl which was now scheduled to be released in spring. In 
January, however, the agency, under tremendous political 
pressure, announced that it was reducing the acreage of for-
est that would be considered critical habitat from the elev-
en million acres identified the previous April to 6.9 mil-
lion acres. Still, the as yet unreleased plan was branded by 
timber interests as "a legal lynching of an entire region by 
an out-of-control federal agency."1m 
104 Keith Schneider, "U.S. to Push for Logging in Owl's 
Forests" New York Times (21 February 1992), sec. A, 12. 
im "U.S. Sets Aside 6.9 Million Acres to Save Owl" Chi-
cago Tribune (10 January 1992), sec.1, 4. On February 20, 
1992, the timber interests' and the administration's woes 
further increased as Federal Judge Helen Frye, in response 
to an environmentalist lawsuit, issued an injunction on all 
old growth sales on BLM land on much the same grounds as 
Dwyer's injunction on the Forest Service--refusal to follow 
federal land management statutes. Although much of this for-
estland was currently listed by FWS as critical habitat, it 
was, in many cases, still being sold for logging. The in-
junction was to hold until until an adequate BLM owl plan 
was formulated. Schneider, "U.S. to Push Logging .... " 
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With the official release of the draft plan (and its 
projection of a loss of 33,000 jobs) still several months 
away, Secretary Lujan made a highly unusual preemptive 
strike on February 21. Seeking to bypass the anticipated re-
commendations of his own department's wildlife agency, Lujan 
announced the formation of yet another committee, this one 
to draw up a plan to merely "preserve" the owl at current 
levels rather than restore the species. Since any such plan 
would violate the ESA which requires that strategies be de-
veloped for endangered species recovery, Lujan conceded that 
this alternative plan would need congressional approval. 
Timber interests promptly applauded this move which they saw 
as a backup to God Squad proceedings in the event that the 
exemptions did not work out.106 
Soon thereafter, the administration unveiled the last 
element of their three-pronged attack on behalf of timber 
interests. On March 19, 1992, Secretary of Agriculture Ed-
ward Madigan announced a proposal to repeal the eighty-five 
year old Forest Service rule allowing for the written appeal 
of timber sales by the public.107 While the administration 
portrayed the appeal ban in terms of recession-fighting reg-
106 Keith Schneider, "To Save Jobs, U.S. Seeks to waive 
Rule on Saving Owl" New York Times (21 February 1992); 
Schneider, "U.S. to Push Logging .... " 1ITT Keith Schneider, "Forest Service May Alter Rule Block-
ing Logging" New York Times (28 April 1992), sec. A, 12. 
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ulatory relief, environmentalists howled in protest at what 
they saw as another blatant assault upon their rights. 108 
That same spring, while the administration pushed hard 
to weaken preservation laws, Congress attempted once more to 
craft a legislative solution to the old growth controversy. 
In the previous session, in 1991, as Congress was deadlocked 
over conflicting ancient forest bills, the House Agriculture 
Conunittee conunissioned a four-member scientific panel in 
Portland (officially, the Scientific Panel on Late Succes-
sional Forest Ecosystems) to provide the debate with the 
sort of hard numbers and indisputable data they felt was 
lacking. 
In the spring of 1992, while the Portland panel was 
still preparing their report, Interior Chairman George Mil-
ler introduced HR 4899, the Ancient Forest Act. This bill 
came to be the chief legislative vehicle for old growth 
preservation, since the Jontz bill (HR 842) had gotten no-
where in two years. Initially introduced without specifics, 
the bill's actual degree of protection was to be determined 
after the panel's report. When it was finally released, the 
Portland panel's report was developed into a fourteen-point 
rating system (with 14c representing the highest level of 
108 Environmentalists argued that filing lawsuits would 
become their only option, something which small groups with 
few resources cannot do. The administration, on the other 
hand, claimed that the appeal ban might actually induce 
citizens to become more involved in the planning process of 
sales. Schneider, Forest Service May Alter Rule .... " 
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protection) to be used to assess the risks of various levels 
of logging. 109 
By May, both of the subcommittees with jurisdiction 
(Interior's Public Lands and Agriculture's Forests), began 
an attempt to flesh out HR 4899. Interior Chairman Miller, 
fresh from an Easter recess flyover of the Siskiyou and ad-
jacent BLM lands, 11 0 expressed shock over the reforestation 
failure of many of the clearcuts he saw: 
Putting the best light on it, these tree plantations 
just didn't work out folks. Putting the worst light on 
it, it's one of the great frauds perpetrated on the 
American public, because most people believe the com-
mercials on TV about planting trees, and they're all 
coming back, and deer are running through it. That's 
not what's happening here. 111 
Miller, in fact, was sufficiently impressed by the evidence 
that Headwaters presented him regarding reforestation fail-
ures, inaccurate yield projections, and NFMA violations that 
he ordered his committee staff to prepare a full report on 
the matter (issued in June). Among this report's findings 
were that "the lack of monitoring and outdated inventories 
in the Pacific Northwest have prevented accurate determina-
tion of timber cutting levels, to the detriment of America's 
forest heritage ... 112 
109 
"Science and the Siskiyou" Siskiyou Project (December 
199f16'"M\·11er Gets Aerial Tour of Forest" Medford Mail Trib-
une ~20 April 1992). 
11 Miller quoted in "Chairman Miller Tours Southwest Ore-
gon" Headwaters Journal (Summer 1992), 16. 
112 u. s. Congress, House, Committee on Interior and Insu-
lar Affairs, Management of Federal Timber Resources: The 
Loss of Accountability (Washington D.C.: 15 June 1992), 1. 
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Not surprisingly, the Public Lands subcommittee, under 
Miller's ally Bruce Vento, had soon drafted and easily pas-
sed a version of HR 4899 that had a fairly strong 12c level 
of protection which would protect roughly nine million acres 
of forest and two-thirds of remaining unprotected old 
growth. In the more pro-timber Forests subcommittee, how-
ever, several days of intense debate in early May yielded a 
version with only an 8a level of protection (6.8 million 
acres) which just barely passed seven to six (over the 
strenuous objections of the Siskiyou area's Bob Smith). 113 
As HR 4899 went to the full Interior Committee, it ran 
into increased trouble as Representative DeFazio stalled the 
bill for a month. In May, the committee voted to reject both 
De-Fazio's 6a proposal as well as Jontz's full-protection 
14c amendment, finally settling upon, but not yet voting for 
a level of 12a, below which Miller refused to go.114 Mean-
while, in the Senate, the Adams/Leahy bill (S 2894), featur-
ing 12c protection and vigorous working retraining provi-
sions, 115 was moving far more slowly, not yet having been 
considered in committee. Also stalled in the Senate were 
113 Julie Norman, "Forest Protection Leg is lat ion is Mov-
ing" Headwaters Journal (Summer 1992), 3. In May, the For-
ests subcommittee also defeated three to six HR 3414 which 
would have prohibited below-cost timber sales. "Panel Fells 
Timber Sales Bill" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review (16 
May 1992), 1335. 114 
"House Speaker Tom Foley Crushes Ancient Forest Pro-
tection Bill" Save America's Forests D.C. Update (August 
1992), 6; "Ancient Forests Legislation Progress Report" Save 
America's Forests News, newsletter (no date). 115 Save America's Forests D.C. Update (August 1992), 11. 
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timber's bills. Packwood's S 1156 was the same bill as the 
previous year's (see pp. 138-139), while Senator Slade Gor-
ton's (R-WA) S 2762, "The Northern Spotted Owl Preservation 
and Northwest Economic Stabilization Act" which would allow 
about half of the owl's habitat to be logged, was newly 
introduced. 11 6 In the House, meanwhile, the Huckaby bill (HR 
2463, see page 138) was also reintroduced. 
On May 14, at the height of this congressional flurry 
of activity, the administration made three major announce-
ments. First, the God Squad had concluded their delibera-
tions and voted five to two to waive the ESA (for only the 
second time since the law's inception) on thirteen of the 
forty-four BLM sales covering 1, 700 acres .111 Despite its 
precedent-setting nature, this decision was only a partial 
victory (if at all) for the administration as the committee 
directed the BLM, as part of its limited exemption deal, to 
follow FWS recovery plans henceforth. 118 In addition, the 
thirteen sales were exempted only from FWS regulations; 
Judge Frye's BLM injunction still held. 
The administration's second announcement was that Fish 
and Wildlife had formally completely its draft recovery plan 
for the owl. Under continuing pressure, the agency further 
116 Ibid. 9. 
117 Keith Schneider, "White House on Conflicting Paths as 
it Agrees to Protection for Owl" New York Times (15 May 
1992), sec. A, 1. Only EPA's William Reilly and the Oregon 
state representative voted against the exemptions. 
118 
"Bush's God Squad Defeated Despite Face-Saving Ruling" 
Headwaters Journal (Summer 1992), 10. 
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reduced habitat protection from the 6.9 million acre level 
it had announced in January to 5. 4 million acres. 119 Whether 
by mere coincidence or with what environmentalists consider-
ed "Machiavellian" orchestration, Lujan had one more an-
nouncement to make that same day.1~ Calling his own agen-
cy's plan unacceptable, Lujan revealed that his hand-picked 
committee had designed its own alternative to the FWS plan. 
This alternative would protect only 2.8 million acres and 
supposedly cut the numbers of jobs lost in half. Admitting 
that this plan might cause the owl's extinction, the admin-
istration conceded that it would require a congressionally-
approved amendment to the ESA. 121 This amendment was to be 
introduced in their respective houses the following week by 
Senator Gorton and Representative Smith, the latter admit-
ting, "I don't think it has a chance." 122 
The reaction from environmentalists and their congres-
sional allies to this rather brazen proposal was one of dis-
belief and outrage. Vento claimed that Lujan's plan "doesn't 
save owls or timber workers--it's just a full employment 
bill for lawyers. 11 123 Environmentalists, meanwhile, were 
even more blunt referring to the entire episode as "owl-
119 Schneider, White House on Conflicting Paths .... " 120 
"Owl-Gate: Bush's Election Year Extinction Plan" Head-
waters Journal (Summer 1992), 10. 
1~ Schneider, "White House on Conflicting Paths .... "; 
Phillip Davis, "Critics Say Too Few Jobs, Owls Saved Under 
'God Squad' Plan" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review (16 
May 1992), 1335. 122 Rep. Smith quoted in Davis, "Critics Say .... ", 1334. 1n Rep. Vento quoted in Ibid. 1335. 
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gate. "124 Even some pro-timber congressmen were somewhat put 
off by the confusion and contradictoriness of the fairly 
bizarre three-ring spectacle of May 14.1~ 
The Forest Service on the Defensive 
As the summer approached, the politics of old growth 
continued to grow even more splintered and confused. In 
June, as the Interior Committee's damning report on Forest 
Service abuses began to circulate, Miller believed he had 
the votes to get HR 4899 out of committee. However, on the 
eve of the vote, with success closer at hand than ever be-
fore, Speaker of the House Torn Foley (a Democrat who repre-
sents a timber-rich district in eastern Washington) made 
phone calls to key committee members and succeeded in pres-
suring six to change their votes. 1U When Miller found this 
out the following morning, he called off the vote rather 
than have it defeated. 
In the meantime, the Forest Service had finally corn-
pleted its long-awaited spotted owl EIS that Judge Dwyer had 
ordered the previous year. As would be expected, the agency 
was eager to get the injunctions lifted and resume logging. 
The only problem was that their plan was largely a rehash of 
the now two-year old (and increasingly obsolete) ISC (Thorn-
124 
"Owl-Gate .... " Headwaters Journal, 10. 
125 Davis, "Critics Say .... ", 1334. 
126 
"House Panel Cancels Vote on Bill to Protect Fqrests" 
New York Times (18 June 1992), sec. B, 12; Julie Norman, 
"Legislative Stalemate in D.C." Headwaters Journal (Fall 
1992), 3. 
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as) Report. According to one bemused timber official, "it is 
the Jack Ward Thomas Report. They might as well have just 
taken the cover off." 
Immediately, environmentalists filed suit to maintain 
the injunction on old growth logging based on their allega-
tion that the Forest Service EIS was grossly inadequate giv-
en what information was currently available. On July 21, 
1992, Judge Dwyer ruled with the environmentalists in a de-
cision perhaps more far-reaching than the first. Dwyer re-
fused to lift the injunction on the grounds that the EIS did 
not incorporate the best and latest scientific information 
on the owl's decline (including the FWS's Anderson/Burnham 
Report which found a startling 7.5-10% rate of annual popu-
lation decrease). 121 "Highly qualified experts," said Dwyer, 
"including some in the employ of the Forest Service, believe 
[the Anderson/Burnham report] means the ISC strategy must be 
revised. 11 128 This time, however, Dwyer ordered the agency to 
consider the impact of their plans upon thiry-two other old 
growth species for whom the owl is an indicator species, 
thereby complicating the agency's task considerably. 1~ 
Noting their long history of non-compliance with wild-
life laws, Dwyer gave the agency an additional year to pre-
1v Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1494 
(9th U.S. District); Julie Norman, "Dwyer Shuts Down USFS 
Sales Again" Headwaters Journal (Summer 1992), 4. 
128 Judge Dwyer quoted in Norman, "Dwyer Shuts Down 
USFS .... II 
1 ~ Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley. 
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pare a new plan. For the court not to require such action, 
the Judge wrote, "would invite lawlessness; an agency could 
escape its statutory duties simply by procrastinating. 11 130 
The Forest Service promptly appealed this ruling, but was 
turned down by an appellate court in September. 131 All the 
exasperated agency could muster in reponse was a dire warn-
ing (considered mere scare tactics by critics) that such a 
plan could take two more years to develop, thus destroying 
the timber industry through delay. 132 
The public scoldings the Forest Service received at 
the hands of the Dwyer ruling, the Miller report, and vari-
ous editorial pages, 1~ only served to deepen the agency's 
ongoing public relations problem.134 Whether it represented 
1E Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, sec. 5. 131 
"Court Won't Lift Logging Ban in Northwest" New York 
Times (6 September 1992), sec. I, 29. Timber was also having 
scant legal success as a federal court ruled in June against 
their claims that FWS logging restrictions were illegal. 
"Timber Groups Lose Another Round to Owl" Chicago Tribune (2 
June 1992). 12 
"2-Year Logging Delay Forecast in Owl Habitat" New 
York Times (2 August 1992). 
1 ~ See, for example, "Mr. Bush's Political Environment" 
(editorial) New York Times (19 May 1992), sec. A, 22. 134 This was further exacerbated in June (during the 
height of the U.N. Earth Summit), as NASA scientists working 
on a satellite mapping project released widely publicized 
satellite photographs of the Northwest that show, according 
to Egan, "clearcutting .... that is so extensive that the land 
looks perforated by buckshot." Most embarrassing were reve-
lations that forest fragmentation in the Northwest was far 
worse than in the Amazon. Said project scientist Dr. Compton 
Tucker: "When you compare the situation in the Pacific 
Northwest to the Amazon of Brazil, the Northwest is much 
worse. The pictures show this amazing graphic situation--the 
severe fragmentation of the forest in the Northwest · .... It 
appears that much of the forest has been literally cut to 
pieces." Timothy Egan, "Forest Damage, North and South" New 
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a symbolic gesture or genuine change, the Forest Service re-
sponded to these pressures with an announcement in June that 
the agency's two-year old experiment with New Forestry (the 
New Perspectives program) was being adopted as standard pro-
cedure. This move to so-called "Ecosystem Management" was 
supposedly intended to implement ecological principles into 
forest planning and reduce traditional clearcutting by 70% 
from 1988 levels. 135 Sounding remarkably candid about past 
mistakes, Robertson admitted that the agency "must get away 
from practices that make our forests look like tree 
farms." 1~ To environmentalists, however, the past two years 
of New Perspectives did not really seem to change much as 
yields continued to be set at unsustainable levels. Timber 
interests, meanwhile, were also still quite wary of what 
they derisively called "politically correct silviculture" by 
an agency seen as caving in to political pressure and 
f add ism. 137 
The Siskiyou on Hold 
Back on the Siskiyou, the whirlwind of political and 
York Times (14 June 1992), sec. IV, 6; Dr. Compton quoted in 
Timothy Egan, "Photos Show Forests in Pacific Northwest Are 
in Peril, Scientists Say" New York Times (11 June 1992). 
135 Keith Schneider, "U.S. Forest Service Increases Pro-
tection of Public Timber" New York Times (9 June 1992), sec. 
B, 10; Julie Norman, "Ecosystem Management Directive is 
Here" Headwaters Journal (Winter 1992), 25. 
1 ~ Robertson quoted in Schneider, "U.S. Forest Service 
Increases Protection .... " 
1 ~ Jon Luoma, "New Government Plan for National Forest 
Generates a Debate" New York Times (30 June 1992), sec. C, 
4 . 
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legal activity on the national level brought old growth log-
ging projects on the Forest to a standstill. By early in the 
year, as the Forest Service readied its owl plan and antici-
pated the lifting of the injunction, the Siskiyou was poised 
with about 150 mmbf ready to be sold in various backlogged 
projects.BB But this was not to happen anytime in 1992. In-
stead, the local decisions and actions of the Siskiyou's ad-
ministrators (once fairly sovereign) were becoming increas-
ingly irrelevant in the light of the region-wide injunction, 
clashing legislative proposals, pending owl plans from a 
number of quarters, and the upcoming elections. 
By 1992, then, the Siskiyou came to be suspended in a 
sort of policy limbo. The confusion of national events com-
bined with increasingly severe budget constraints (occasion-
ed by the continuing recession) to throw the agency's sche-
dule way off from what was outlined in the Plan. Because the 
Forest relied so heavily upon old growth timber harvesting, 
most of its projects were frozen in their tracks. Yet this 
did not stop the Siskiyou from continuing (as in the previ-
ous year) to devise and prepare future sales in a business-
as-usual manner, even as their current ones gathered dust. 
All told, they had plans in the pipeline for eighteen multi-
sale projects in mostly roadless areas for 1992-1997 repre-
senting hundreds of millions of board feet of timber, much 
1~ Barbara Ullian, "Agencies Continue Plans for Massive 
Timber Cutting" Headwaters Journal (Spring 1992), 17. 
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of that in old growth or mature forest. Just for 1992 and 
1993, these timber projects included Shasta Costa (which was 
supposed to have begun in 1991), as well as West Indigo, Up-
per Silver, and Lawson in the North Kalmiopsis, Elk River 
and Sixes River in the northwest, Quosatana and Two Forks in 
the west, and Canyon and Kangaroo in the southeast. 1~ 
While their premier effort, the Shasta Costa project, 
remained enjoined, the Siskiyou's administrators began to 
focus their attention upon the next project in line. The 
Canyon FEIS was released in July 1992 and called for four 
miles of new roads to be built and nine mmbf to be removed 
with New Forestry techniques from a fairly steep, dry, and 
lightly forested area adjacent to the designated Kalmiopsis 
Wilderness. 140 While Canyon was not prime owl habitat, the 
project particularly irked environmentalists since they felt 
that the area was both extremely sensitive and had very mar-
ginal timber productivity. Furthermore, the New Forestry 
techniques would impact three times the acreage of the orig-
inal plan. 141 
Although increasingly distracted by national cam-
paigns, local Siskiyou environmentalists did manage to or-
ganize rather vigorously against Canyon, encouraging another 
139 Ibid.; Barbara Ul lian, 11 Roadless Area Timber Sales 11 
Headwaters Journal (Fall 1992), 7. 
140 USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siski-
you National Forest, Canyon Integrated Resource Project Fin-
al Environmental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1992). 
1~ Barbara Ullian, "Roads and Cuts Planned for the Heart 
of Canyon" Headwaters Journal (Fall 1992), 6. 
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very heavy mail load during the FEIS comment period. With 
West Indigo, Quosatana, Lawson and several other projects 
scheduled to be logged soon thereafter, environmentalists 
sought to publicize how the Siskiyou's plans were part of 
the same old discredited way of doing things. Projects such 
as Canyon were also seen to be a legacy of the agency's past 
failures as one environmentalist argues: 
Had [the agency] maintained prudent harvest levels and 
encouraged the inevitable transition to smaller renew-
able timber, there would be less pressure to go into 
these steep fragile drainages to remove old growth. 1~ 
For the time being, however, all of these sales, actual or 
proposed, were blocked by the injunctions. The most the For-
est Service could do was to consider taking a few individual 
sales in Canyon that were not owl habitat and try moving on 
those. 
While the agency's new "ecosystem management" was pre-
cisely the sort of more responsible logging the environmen-
talists had long sought, they felt it was now too late to 
use even the best forestry methods to enter the few remain-
ing roadless areas. One activist stressed this point as he 
toured the site of the proposed Lawson project: 
We wanted to applaud their significant movement 
towards a more sensitive, naturally-oriented approach 
and agreed that we could have heartily supported this 
direction twenty years ago. But given the tremendous 
impact on the watershed and the surrounded forest 
landscape, from the heavy logging of the past several 
decades, we questioned whether any further entry at 
1~ Roy Keene, "Forest Focus: The Siskiyou" Public Fores-
ter (Autumn 1991), 3. 
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this time would really enhance the desired recovery 
and health of the forest ecosystem, wildlife popula-
tions, rivers, and fish stocks. 1~ 
Old Growth Forests and the Elections 
After HR 4899's committee vote was called off in June, 
it did not move forward before the October recess that ended 
that session. Nor did any other ancient forest bills as the 
legislative stalemate was guaranteed to enter its fourth 
year. As usual, the only real congressional action came in 
the form of annual Interior appropriations. For FY 1993, the 
environmentalists came out better than usual as none of the 
guaranteed "hard" targets that timber once again pushed for 
were adopted, judicial review was maintained for another 
year, and no last minute pro-timber riders were added on. In 
fact, the only amendment that was added legislatively for-
malized the Forest Service appeal process that the adminis-
tration was trying to repea1.1~ 
By late summer, the nation's attention turned to the 
presidential campaign. Any doubt that the old growth contro-
versy had fully worked its way into the national political 
consciousness was dispelled as the spotted owl and the 
plight of loggers came up time and again on the campaign 
trail and the nightly news. The national press, in fact, 
kept up steady stream of coverage for the third consecutive 
143 John Stahmer "Gold Beach RD Planning Lawson Timber 
Sale" Headwaters Journal (Winter 1992), 23. 
1~ Julie Norman "Fresh Breezes in D.C." Headwaters Jour-
nal, 21; "F.S. Appeals Made Law" Headwaters Journal (Winter 
1992)' 33. 
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year; quite surprising in a venue not noted for encouraging 
long attention spans. 
In the midst of a grueling recession, President Bush 
(especially when addressing Western audiences) began to por-
tray the spotted owl as an extremist's luxury that no job-
loving society could afford. Speaking in September to a 
crowd in Washington state, Bush promised to veto any reauth-
orization of the ESA (due for renewal that year) unless it 
was subject to a sweeping rewrite that included cost-benefit 
analyses and provisions to guarantee annual timber har-
vests .1~ Calling the ESA a "broken" law that, reminiscent 
of his vow against Iraqi militarism, "will not stand," Bush 
claimed that it was "time to put people ahead of owls .... 
time to consider the human factor in the spotted owl equa-
tion." "There are a lot of trees around here," Bush told his 
supporters, "so don't listen to some of the critics." 1~ 
Although he tried to downplay the issue during the 
campaign, Bill Clinton was on record as strongly supporting 
the ESA, favoring the principle of old growth preservation, 
and backing worker retraining for unemployed loggers, posi-
tions no doubt influenced by his pro-environmental running 
1~ Michael Wines, "Bush, in Far West, Sides With Loggers" 
New York Times (15 September 1992), sec. A, 25; Timothy 
McNulty and Carol Jouzaitis, "Bush, Clinton Try to Balance 
Environment and Economy" Chicago Tribune, (15 September 
1992J, sec. 1, 4. 
1 The first two Bush quotes are in Wines, sec. A, 25, 
the last is in McNulty and Jouzaitis, sec. 1, 4. 
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mate, Sen. Al Gore (D-TN). 1Q Clinton's one foray into the 
issue came during a Western campaign swing during the summer 
in which he promised to convene a "timber summit" between 
all concerned parties in order to work out a consensus.1~ 
Nonetheless, his candidacy (as well as his running mate) was 
not well-received by timber interests who strongly supported 
Bush. 
While Bush took a jab at "the spotted owl crowd" dur-
ing one of the nationally televised debates in October, it 
was not until a week before the election, running behind in 
the polls, that he really let go. Mocking Gore with the tag 
"ozone man" in a Michigan speech, Bush went on to warn that 
in a Clinton administration, "we'll be up to our necks in 
owls and out of work for every American (sic). 11 149 According 
to one observer, Strix occidentalis caurina had thus become 
the Willie Horton of the 1992 campaign.1so 
As would be expected, forest activists cheered Clin-
ton's victory in November, eager to bid farewell to their 
various nemeses in the Bush administration (Quayle, Madigan, 
1Q Gore outlined these views on old growth forests on a 
Sunday morning television talk show. "I think the real ques-
tion," said Gore during the interview, "is whether [loggers] 
will get new jobs before the last 10% of the old growth for-
est is gone, or after the last old growth forest is gone." 
Al Gore quoted from This Week With David Brinkley, (12 July 
1992J, photocopied transcripts from Native Forest Council. 
1 McNulty and Jouzaitis, sec. 1, 4. 
1~ Bush quotes in Stevenson Swanson, "When in Office, 
Gore May Find it isn't so Easy Being Green" Chicago Tribune 
(8 November 1992), sec. 1, 8. 
1 ~ This was the observation of a caller to a talk show on 
public radio statio WBEZ Chicago, (November 1992). 
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Lujan, and so on) and anticipating new, more environmentally 
inclined officials to replace them.151 
Epilogue 
As 1992 drew to a close, a new chapter in the old 
growth/spotted owl controversy, and possibly even forest 
management in general, was about to open. While the issue as 
of early 1993 was still largely unresolved, it is quite pos-
sible that a substantially different policy course will be 
followed regarding endangered species and forest management. 
Even short of aggressive reform, it is safe to say that the 
high-level administrative effort to avoid or amend federal 
environmental legislation and push for extremely high levels 
of resource production is less likely. While the new admin-
istration may treat environmental values differently, the 
situation in Congress is less clear. On one hand, non-
151 All did not go perfectly well for environmentalists in 
the November elections, however, as a number of the forests' 
most ardent congressional defenders were swept from office, 
including Sen. Wyche Fowler (D-GA), and Reps. Peter Kostmay-
er (D-PA), Gerry Sikorski (D-MN), as well as the patron 
saint of old growth, Jim Jontz, who was defeated by four 
thousand votes in a very tight race. Considering him their 
enemy number one, timber interests targeted Jontz and spent 
$100,000 to help defeat him. A number of grassroots environ-
mental activists from southwest Oregon went as far as to 
travel to Indiana to help man Jontz's campaign staff. The 
def eat of these legislators offered timber interests their 
only consolation in an otherwise disasterous election. 
Searching for a silver lining, an AFRA spokesman claimed 
that "their [Jontz, Fowler, Kostmayer, and Sikorski] ab-
sence, combined with what I think will be a greater emphasis 
on the economy, suggests to me the prospect of a more con-
servative Congress on resource issues." Margaret Kriz, "A 
New Ball Game?" National Journal (2 January 1993), 23; Nor-
man, "Fresh Breezes in D.C.", 21. 
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Western members of Congress are growing increasingly asser-
tive in matters of public land management, traditionally 
left to local, development-oriented legislators. On the 
other hand, with the loss of several key forest advocates 
and an acute reluctance to cause any further unemployment, 
the future of ancient forest legislation (likely to be in-
troduced pending the results of the upcoming "forest sum-
mit"152 ) is still up for grabs. If no legislation can make 
it through soon (a distinct possibility if one recalls that 
an acid rain bill was stymied for over ten years) and the 
Forest Service and BLM ever come up with legally defensible 
owl plans, then it is in the realm of possibility that old 
growth logging projects (albeit with increased restrictions) 
could feasibly commence in a year or two.153 
Still, the environmentalists, at the end of 1992, were 
in a fairly strong legal and political position and thereby 
had the potential to eventually resolve this issue on fairly 
favorable terms. The movement to save old growth has cer-
152 It was renamed such after environmentalist complaints 
over the word timber. 153 The environmentalists, though, might soon have other 
legal avenues to pursue. In September 1992, another old 
growth-dependent bird, the marbled murrelet, was listed as 
threatened by the FWS (under court order, of course). This 
might action might have the potential to set off another 
round of recovery plans, injunctions, restrictions, etc. 
should any solution to the spotted owl controversy not be to 
the environmetalists' satisfaction. If anything, this list-
ing shows that the complex interdependence of the old growth 
ecosystem cannot be successfully dealt with through piece-
meal policies. "Another Bird Ma~ Curb Logging in the North-
west" Chicago Tribune (27 September 1992), sec. 1, 14. 
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tainly come a long was since the raggedy blockades and 
guerilla theatre on the Bald Mountain Road nearly a decade 
earlier. 
What exactly will happen in the Siskiyou National For-
est itself is far from clear. How increased national pro-
tection for the spotted owl and old growth ecosystems will 
relate to Forest Service plans to enter eighteen major road-
less areas (and eventually all such unprotected areas within 
fifty years) depends upon how Siskiyou administrators inter-
pret such restrictions and redesign their plans.154 If road-
less entries are still to be a priority in the next decade 
(rather than a fundamental shift to second growth harvest-
ing, tree farm thinning operations, controlled burning to 
restore fire-dependent ecosystems, and, of course, reduced 
yields), political activism on the Siskiyou will continue 
for some time to come. 
154 One legal avenue local environmentalists might pursue 
would be to legally challenge the validity of the 1989 For-
est Plan which they claim violates a host of environmental 
statutes. In 1989, they appealed the Plan administratively 
and were turned down. But due to the injunctions and pending 
spotted owl plans, they never took the Plan to cour~, some-
thing they might do if these roadless projects ever prog-
ress. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE DIMENSIONS OF INTEREST GROUP COMPETITION 
We will do anything that's legal, anything. 
Andrew Kerr, Oregon Natural Resources 
Defense Council. 
Tie your yellow ribbons, and keep •em flying for as 
long as it takes. 
Yellow Ribbon Coalition 
To know how interest groups are involved in environ-
mental policymaking is not to know all, or explain 
all; but an analysis of environmental policy devoid of 
attention to interest group activities would be art-
less and quite unsatisfactory. 
Walter Rosenbaum 
Interest Groups and Pluralist Theory 
Given pluralist thought's emphasis upon group activ-
ity, -it should be no surprise that the topic of interest 
groups occupies center stage in the debate between pluralist 
theorists and their detractors. "There is no point in the 
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policymaking process," Walter Rosenbaum reminds us, "at 
which group activity ceases to be significant. 11 1 Examining _) 
the role and nature of interest group activity is impera-
tive, therefore, in order to gain a useful understanding how 
the pluralist process influences politics in the Siskiyou 
and whether the assumptions of the pluralists or their cri-
tics prove valid. It is the task of this chapter, then, to 
consider the organization and mobilization of interests in 
the Siskiyou conflict and explore the various dimensions of 
their competition. 
Types of Interests 
In the simplest terms, an interest is, according to 
Zeigler and Peak, a "desire for, or concern over, either an 
abstract or material political object"; what they term a 
"political good."2 An interest group can be understood, 
then, as a social aggregate which forms to seek such goods 
which, because they are in the political realm, can only be 
secured by dealing at some level with the state. Interests 
and the goods they seek reflect the diversity of society at 
large. Some political goods, termed selective, are divisible 
and particular to given beneficiaries, while others, collec-
1 Walter Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental Concern 
(New York: Praeger, 1977), 21. 2L. Harmon Zeigler and G. Wayne Peak, Interest Groups in 
American Society (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1972), 1. 
166 
tive goods, cannot be divided and thus benefit all equally, 
even those who did nothing to gain them.3 
Mahood also makes the distinction between material, 
tangible goods and non-material, intangible ones such as 
status, symbolic reassurance, or ideological rewards. 4 In a 
similar vein, Peter Clark and James Q. Wilson see political 
incentives as being material, purposive, or solidary. Mater-
ial goods would have a clearly quantifiable value, while 
purposive goods, on the other hand, cannot be quantified or 
allocated in the same manner as they tend to reflect "supra-
personal goals." Solidary goods, while similarly non-
quantifiable, are goods intrinsic to the group itself, be-
stowing such rewards as the identification and personal 
fulfillment that come with group membership. 5 
Interest Groups and the Question of Bias 
In the debate between pluralists and their critics the 
issue of interest groups invariably leads to the question of 
whether all the interests in a given issue could initially 
form and effectively organize and compete or whether some 
bias in the pluralist process prevents this. 
Central to pluralist theorists' vision of the American 
political process is the notion that the field of competi-
3 Ibid. 66. 
4 H.R. Mahood, Interest Group Politics in America (Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990), 11. 
5 Peter Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A 
Theory of Organization" Administrative Science Quarterly VI 
(September 1961), 124-166. 
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tion among conflicting interests is, for the most part, 
open, fluid, and fairly well-representative of the disparate 
interests of society as a whole. To the pluralists, fluidity 
and openness do not necessarily imply perfect equality 
amongst interest groups at any one given time, but rather an 
overall balance of power whereby the fortunes of the many 
groups in competition wax and wane in a pattern which allows 
no one group to consistently dominate. 
Even if an interest is not currently manifest, argue 
pluralists such as Truman, the mere potential of its coales-
ence can often exert an influence upon the policymaking 
process. 6 Dahl, meanwhile, points to what he calls the "non-
cumulative" nature of group resources whereby inequalities 
in one facet of group resources, such as money, can be off-
set by other factors such as expertise, intensity of commit-
ment, or status. What this flexibility or "slack" in the 
system tends to do, according to Dahl, is level the playing 
field. What matters is not so much the amount of a group's 
resources, but instead the skill with which it uses them. 7 
Thus, a group's raw resources can only imply potential but 
not actual power. 
The critics of pluralism remain unimpressed with such 
notions of flexibility and openness. The central theme run-
6 oavid Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 
1951), 114. 
7 Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, CT: Yale Universi-
ty Press, 1961), 305-310. 
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ning through their work is that the pluralist process is in-
herently biased against the formation, maintenance, and ef-
fective operation of certain types of interests, namely 
those that represent the economically disadvantaged and 
politically disenfranchised or those that are very broad and 
diffuse, what some call "public interests." According to 
critics, pluralism responds far more favorably to groups 
representing narrow, well-endowed interests which can organ-
ize far more readily and effectively than cumbersome mass 
interests or the inherently weak and marginal interests of 
the disadvantaged. Without proper organization or resources, 
the critics argue, the interests of vast sectors of society 
go unrepresented.a The proof of this, suggest the critics, 
are the vastly unequal outcomes the American system clearly 
produces. 9 
To Wolff, the problem lies not so much with pluralist 
theory, but with pluralist practice: 
Thus pluralism is not explicitly a philosophy of pri-
vilege or injustice--it is a philosophy of equality 
and justice whose concrete application supports in-
equality by ignoring the existence of certain legiti-
mate groups. 10 
As Wolff sees it, pluralism guarantees inequality and injus-
tice by responding only to interests currently endowed with 
8 E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), 35. 
9 G. David Garson, Group Theories of Politics (Beverly 
Hills, CA: Sage, 1978), 126. 
10 Robert Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1968), 154. 
resources and privileges necessary to organize and effec-
tively operate. The gaping disparities in group resources, 
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Wolff contends, allow no meaningful bargaining and compro-
mise to take place and this essentially cripples fair compe-
tition. 11 As if gross inequities in group power were not bad 
enough, argues Wolff, the role of government works to rein-
force, rather than ameliorate the situation: 
It is as though an umpire were to come upon a baseball 
game in progress between big boys and little boys, in 
which the big boys cheated, broke the rules, claimed 
hits that were outs, and made the little boys accept 
the injustice by brute force. If the umpire undertakes 
to "regulate" the game by simply enforcing the "rules" 
actually being practiced he does not thereby make the 
game a fair one. Indeed, he may actually make matters 
worse because if the little boys get up their courage, 
band together, and decide to fight it out, the umpire 
will accuse them of breaking the rules and throw his 
weight against them! Precisely the same sort of thing 
happens in pluralist politics .... The net effect of 
government action is thus to weaken, rather than 
strengthen the play of conflicting interests in the 
society. 12 
To Hamilton, meanwhile, the whole notion of a diverse 
set of specific interests corresponding to specific publics, 
all in competion--a notion at the heart of pluralist thought 
--is fallacious. The majority of people, claims Hamilton, do 
not belong to any group at all,13 and thus, they and their 
interests, the mass public interest, are shut out of the 
11 Ibid. 156-158. 
12 Ibid. 157. 
13 Pluralists would dispute this. For example a 1972 study 
by Sidney Verba and Norman Nie finds that 62% of the public 
claims to belong to at least one association and 40% claim 
that their membership is active rather than nomina1.-sidney 
Verba and Norman Nie, Participation in America (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1972), 41-42. 
170 
process. Even when public interests are organized, maintains 
Hamilton among others, such groups are still seriously han-
dicapped since they attempt to secure diffuse, non-divisible 
public goods rather than private narrowly focused 
benefits. 14 
Zeigler and Peak make a similar observation regarding 
the easier time that groups oriented towards material or ec-
onomic goods have in organizing as compared to purposively-
oriented interests.15 Robert Paehlke concurs as he notes 
that "most political scientists would argue that without an 
economically interested attentive public, fewer political 
and organizational resources are available. 11 16 Participation 
by economic interests, according to Zeigler and Peak has 
more readily quantifiable results and can be seen by poten-
tial supporters as an investment of sorts. On the other 
hand, support for purposive interests because it "result[s] 
in benefits whose values cannot be fiscally counted" tends 
to be more fickle and less dependable. 17 Furthermore, claim 
Zeigler and Peak, members of material/economic interests 
tend to give greater per capita contributions to their 
14 Richard Hamilton, Class and Politics in the United 
States (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), 35-46; Among a 
number of theorists who also make this argument is Philip 
Foss, Politics and Grass (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1960). 15 zeigler and Peak, 76. 16 Robert Paehlke, "Environmental Values and Democracy: 
The Challenge of the Next Century" in Norman Vig and Michael 
Kraft (editors), Environmental Policy in the 1990s (Washing-
ton D.C.: CQ Press, 1990), 352. 17 Zeigler and Peak, 76. 
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groups than supporters of more intangible interests do, in 
part, they suggest, because of the higher socioeconomic 
strata and better-endowed resource base such groups tend to 
draw from.18 
As a result, argues Rosenbaum, "no interest has ex-
ploited this right to take part in the governmental process 
more pervasively or successfully than has business." He goes 
on to claim that business interests' "privileged status": 
.... ensure[s] that its views are represented early and 
forcefully ... ,its interests are pursued and protected 
carefully at all pollcy stages, and its forces are mo-
bilized effectively for long periods of time. These 
are formidable advantages, often enough to give a de-
cisive edge in competitive struggles with environmen-
tal or other interests that have not the political en-
durance, skill, or resources to be as resolute in 
bringing pressure on government when it counts.19 
Other critics of pluralism stress what they perceive 
as the built-in, systemic nature of the pluralist process's 
bias, the development of which Schattschneider calls the 
"mobilization of bias."20 According to Bachrach and Baratz, 
these are the predominant values, beliefs, political ritu-
als, and "rules of the game" which "operate systematically 
and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and 
groups at the expense of others."~ How this relates to in-
terest groups is that those which are well-organized, well-
18 Ibid. 7 7. 19 Walter Rosenbaum, Environmental Politics and Policy 
(Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1985), 38-39. 
20 Schattschneider, 71. 21 Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, Power and Poverty 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 43. 
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placed, and status quo-oriented find themselves in a posi-
tion to control the "context of political conflict" in such 
a way that public or reform interests are prevented from or-
ganizing effectively, if at a11.22 
Bachrach and Baratz have taken Schattschneider's mo-
bilization of bias a step further with their notion of non-
decisionmaking. They define a non-decision as: 
.... a decision that results in the suppression or 
thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the 
values or interest of the decisionmaker. To be more 
nearly explicit, non-decisionmaking is a me~ns by 
which demands for change in the existing allocation of 
benefits and privileges in the community can be suffo-
cated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or 
killed before they gain access to the relevant 
decision-making arena; or, failing all these things, 
maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage 
of the policy process.n 
In other words, by "mobilizing bias" within the system 
through the use and manipulation of dominant values, myths, 
and procedural and institutional practices, Bachrach and 
Baratz argue that the status quo forces in the pluralist 
process limit the scope of debate and the range of policy 
options considered. The effect of this is to stunt and re-
strict interests seeking to alter the status quo: 
Pluralism fails to consider the case where A devotes 
his energies to creating or reinforcing social and 
political values and institutional practices that 
limit the scope of the political process to public 
~Andrew McFarland, "Interest Groups and Theories of 
Power in America" British Journal of Politics 17 (April 
1987), 132. 23 Bachrach and Baratz (1970), 44. 
173 
consideration of only those issues which are compara-
tively innocuous to A.~ 
The pluralist process's tendency to gravitate to "safe 
issues" claim Bachrach and Baratz underscores the presence 
of what they consider to be the hidden "second face of pow-
er." While the process may seem open and decentralized, it 
is actually tightly defined and its boundaries clearly de-
lineated by this other face of power.25 
In pluralism's defense, Kelso claims that any status 
quo bias in the system may have more to do with American 
culture and society than pluralist theory. While he concedes 
that Bachrach and Baratz may be on target in their descrip-
tion of how biases in values and myths limit the scope of 
policy options, Kelso wonders if that would not occur in any 
political system.26 Kelso and his pluralist brethren contend 
that, in the biggest picture, pluralism still offers the 
best chance and most feasible method for marginal groups 
with little or no power to gain a forum and influence pol-
icy. The critics' vision of a system responding only to 
whomever has the most money is too simplistic, maintain the 
pluralists. The point, they argue, is not to achieve an es-
sentially unachievable equality of group resources, but in-
24 peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "Two Faces of Power" 
American Political Science Review 56 (1962), 948. 
25 Ibid. 952. 
26 william Kelso, American Democratic Theory (Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 107. 
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stead to develop adequate countervailing power by effective-
ly exploiting all manner of sources.27 
In addition, resource discrepancies can further be 
neutralized, argue the pluralists, if a group can reach the 
bargaining table and deal directly with policy elites rather 
than having to first win considerable mass support, since in 
this realm total raw resources matter less.28 From what Dahl 
and Truman have argued it can be implied that pluralism's 
openness and flexibility stern from an overall balance of 
power rather than a constant equality of all groups at all 
tirnes. 29 To look at group competition and resources at a 
given time in a given policy case is to look at a frozen 
snapshot which misses the overall long-term dynamic inherent 
in a balance of power in which groups' power is constantly 
in a state of flux. 
Individual Motivation and the Logic of Collective Action 
No work has so powerfully challenged pluralist thought 
(at least regarding interest groups) quite like Mancur 01-
son's seminal study, The Logic of Collective Action. 30 By 
suggesting that simple rational choice is the reason that so 
many latent interests do not form into active groups, Olson 
27 see, for example, Dahl, Who Governs?; Roger Cobb and 
Charles Elder, Participation in American Politics (Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972). 28 Kelso, 107-108. 
~Dahl, 305-310; Truman, 26-33. 
30 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). 
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calls into question two basic pluralist tenets: that indivi-
duals will band together with other like-minded individuals 
to secure their interests and that a group's resources or 
effectiveness is a reflection of its degree of support in 
society. 
Since participation in an interest group incurs a cost 
whether in time, money, or labor, Olson contends that no ra-
tional individual will assume these costs unless two condi-
tions are met: (1) the likely benefits resulting from parti-
cipation exceed benefits achieved without participation, and 
(2) benefits exceed the costs of membership and participa-
tion. The precise reason that these constraints prove insur-
mountable to many latent interests, Olson argues, is because 
of the so-called free-rider problem which occurs when a col-
lective good is sought. Because such goods are non-
divisible, they can be shared equally by all regardless of 
whether or not they participated. In addition, since collec-
tive goods appeal to such a potentially broad population, 
the perceived advantage added to a group by any one indivi-
dual's membership will likely be calculated as insignificant 
and so the costs of membership would most often be seen as 
outweighing benefits .31 
For interests seeking collective goods, therefore, 
neither of the aforementioned conditions for participation 
would likely be met. The only way in which a potential group 
31 Ibid. 1-52. 
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could get around this dilemma and attract members, maintains 
Olson, is if: (1) selective benefits are offered in addition 
to the group's collective goals (these benefits, available 
only to members, might include such incentives as magazines, 
discounts, travel, or insurance), (2) membership is made 
compulsory, or (3) the group is small enough to allow an in-
dividual's impact upon achievement of the group's objectives 
seem sufficiently noticeable so that the benefits of parti-
cipation would be seen to outweigh the costs.32 
These stringent criteria for successful organization 
would seem to put purposive or broad-scale (what some call 
"public") interests at a much greater disadvantage than 
those seeking more concentrated material benefits. First, as 
has been previously noted, the latter type of interest tends 
to have a much greater resource base with which to dispense 
selective incentives to lure members. Furthermore, since 
materially-oriented interests usually seek benefits which 
are more narrowly focused, they tend to better avoid the 
free-rider problem since they are appealing to a more re-
stricted audience to begin with. 
The pluralist response to Olson takes issue with sev-
eral aspects of his model.33 One problem, argues Kelso, is 
32 Ibid. 33 Ironically, argues McFarland, it was Olson's work, con-
sidered by so many to have been the most lethal blow to 
pluralist thought, that helped revive it by forcing _plur-
alists to develop well-thought out and empirically grounded 
defenses. Andrew McFarland, "Why Interest Groups Organize: A 
Pluralist Response to Olson" from a paper delivered at the 
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Olson's suspect portrait of the individual as a fully ra-
tional actor with perfect knowledge. A number of influential 
studies have long challenged this assumption in fields rang-
ing from voting behavior to bureaucratic behavior to public 
policy. 34 Rather than the fully rational minimizer of costs 
and maximizer of benefits, Kelso wonders if man the "social 
animal" of "limited rationality and limited knowledge" is a 
bit more prone to the influences of emotion, passion, ideol-
ogy, altruism, or obligation than Olson allows.35 
Even Terry Moe, who mostly stands behind Olson's thes-
is, admits that Olson's assumption of perfect information 
among potential group members is quite dubious. Moe's modi-
fication of Olson's model allows for the possibility that 
individuals may misjudge and overestimate the actual impact 
that their membership might have and thereby join a group on 
that basis alone. 36 Beyond this calculation of one's one ef-
ficacy, a number of pluralists find that an individual's es-
timation of a group's overall chances for success provide 
Western Political Science Association annual meeting, Seat-
tle WA (April 1991). ~See for example, Angus Campbell, et.al., The American 
Voter (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960); Herbert Simon and 
James March, Organization ((New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1958); Thomas Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 6th edition 
(En~lewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987). 
Kelso, 100. 36 Terry Moe, The Organization of Interests (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1980), 34. 
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another alternative incentive for membership which Olson ig-
no res. 37 
Moe attempts to bolster Olson's thesis that selective 
incentives are better than shared goals in explaining mem-
bership by broadening the notion of what constitutes a se-
lective interest. In trying to overcome Olson's one-
dimensional view of human values and drives, Moe allows for 
more "heterogenous value structures" which may include al-
truism, ideology, morals, status, or duty; items most com-
monly associated with purposive or solidary benefits.38 The 
key to Moe's revised model is that the personal satisfaction 
of these values can be considered a type of selective inte-
rest as well. According to Moe, therefore, "collective goods 
can actually generate their own selective incentives" and 
thus become incorporated into the individual's rational cal-
cul us. 39 
McFarland, nonetheless, finds any theory of selective 
incentives insufficient to explain the complexity of inte-
rest group organization as it exists today. Far from being 
the mere aggregations of coequal citizens that both Olson 
and early pluralists have considered them, interest groups 
groups are, according to McFarland, diverse, multi-
dimensional organizations that often do not fit neatly into 
37 see, for example, Brian Barry, Economists, Sociolo-
gists, and Democracy (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1910). 38 Moe, 113-118. 39 Ibid . 118 . 
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Olson's model.40 For instance, he notes the growing impor-
tance of patrons (such as foundations, wealthy individuals, 
and even government agencies) which often allow interest 
groups to reduce reliance upon, or even bypass individual 
member dues. Likewise, the existence of coalition interest 
groups with smaller organizations or businesses rather than 
individuals as members violates the traditional patterns of 
organization that Olson's theory is built upon. Finally, 
McFarland calls attention to the role of professional lob-
byists and lawyers, whom he terms "agents," in achieving in-
f luence or effective mobilization for the group. In many 
cases, McFarland argues, it is the skill of these agents 
rather than overall group numbers or resources which deter-
mines a group's success.~ 
Pluralists point to the massive proliferation of inte-
rest groups since the 1970s, what Mahood calls the "partici-
pation revolution," as the starkest empirical evidence of 
the deficiencies of Olson's model. 42 Much of this growth, 
pluralists stress, has occurred amongst "public interest" 
and reform groups, precisely the type alleged to be at the 
greatest disadvantage in forming.43 Some other set of moti-
vations besides selective incentives must be at work, they 
suggest. 
40 McFarland (1991), 10-18. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Mahood, 1 . 
~McFarland, "Why Interest Groups Organize", 1; Mahood, 
vii. 
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The Role of Symbolism and Communications 
It is argued that one of the reasons for the explosion 
in interest group activity in the past two decades has been 
the advances in technology and communication which make the 
activation of more latent interests possible. 44 If so, this 
might lend credence to Roger Cobb and Charles Elder's asser-
tion that the logic of collective action could be better un-
derstood in symbolic rather than economic terms. 45 
Symbols are described by Cobb and Elder as "any object 
used by human beings to index meanings that are not inherent 
in, nor discernable from, the object itself.~ "Symbolism, 
then, can be understood as a patterned and "socially shared 
coding system" used to process, simplify, and give meaning 
to the deluge of incoming stimuli and information every in-
dividual constantly confronts. 47 A number of scholars have 
turned to communications theory, political symbolism, and 
so-called "socio-emotional" variables to explain group or-
ganization and mobilization. 48 Critical and neo-Marxist 
44 Mahood, 19. 
45 charles Elder and Roger Cobb, The Political Uses of 
Syml?ols (New York: Longman, 1983), 1. 
~ Ibid. 28. 
47 Ibid. 55-56. Cobb and Elder distinguish between two ca-
tegories of symbols: referential symbols which have a factu-
al, rational base and condensational symbols which have an 
emotive base. Charles Elder and Roger Cobb, Participation in 
American Politics, 57. 
48 For an especially good example of a communicative anal-
ysis regarding public lands politics, see C. Brant S-hort, 
Ronald Reagan and :he Public Lands (College Station, TX: 
Texas A & M University Press, 1989). 
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theorists, for example, have long stressed the role of tech-
nology and communication as the key to a subtle and sophis-
ticated system of social control which elites use to legiti-
mate the political and economic process and keep potentially 
dissenting groups latent.49 
The way that this is achieved, argues Murray Edelman, 
is by the manipulation of emotionally powerful symbols in 
order to encourage quiesence or provoke anxiety as the needs 
arise. To Edelman, the political realm is not unlike the re-
ligious one in that it is characterized by irrationality and 
marked by activity that is fundamentally symbolic and ex-
pressive in nature.so Given such elite tampering with sym-
bolic meaning, Edelman finds little evidence that a truly 
open and competitive pluralist process could flourish. In-
stead, he finds a situation where highly organized elites 
capture scarce material benefits so that all that system can 
off er the vast remainder of the public are symbolic re-
wards. s1 
49 See, for example, Ralph Miliband, The State in Capital-
ist Society (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Herbert Marcuse, 
One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964); Jurgen 
Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Bos-
ton: Beacon Press, 1979). 
50 Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, 
IL: University of Illinois Press, 1967). Cobb and Elder ar-
gue that politics is neither rational or irrational, but 
arational, arising "from~ loosely structured process of 
interpreting fragmentary information and ambiguous cues in 
the light of prior expectation and changing, uncertain or 
conflicting political preferences. Cobb and Elder, Political 
Uses of Symbols, 1-2. 
51 Edelman, chap. 2. This whole process of political sym-
bolism could also be seen as a key factor in determining 
182 
Theorists like Cobb and Elder, however, see in poli-
tical symbolism not only the risk of manipulation and domi-
nation, but also the opportunity for increased organization. 
The opiate, therefore, can sometimes also serve as a stimu-
lant. Cobb and Elder have no quarrel with allegations of 
bias in the pluralist process, readily conceding that group 
influence and access is unequally distributed and that the 
scope of decisionmaking is truncated in a way that favors 
the status quo. 52 Still, the notion that the strongest group 
will automatically determine the agenda is, they suggest, 
simplistic and empirically questionable.53 
What matters most, Cobb and Elder argue, are not 
groups' raw resources or even how these are put to use, but 
rather the way in which groups articulate and present their 
demands. If groups can do this in a way that increases sup-
port, wins over allies, discredits opponents, and ultimately 
expands the arena of political conflict into increasingly 
broader and more diverse publics (or conversely, prevents 
this) they will succeed.54 Much of this process, according 
to Cobb and Elder, is largely a matter of the effective ma-
nipulation of symbols by the groups involved. More precise-
where the line is drawn between "acceptable" politics and 
off-limit non-decisions as Bachrach and Baratz describe 
them. Thus, their "second face of power" might be understood 
as one whose chief tool is the effective use of symbols. 52 Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics, 10-
11. 53 Ibid. 34. 
54 Ibid . 6 7 -110 . 
ly, their theory focuses upon how groups attempt to wrap 
themselves and their policy objectives in the symbols of 
legitimacy, 55 a point made previously by Richard Merelman: 
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Indeed, most major political conflicts within any pol-
ity may be seen as the attempt by partisans to attach 
the available legitimacy symbols to the policies they 
advocate and to sever the relationship between these 
symbols and the policies of their opponents.56 
Success in claiming the mantle of legitimacy and monopoliz-
ing those symbols associated with it, therefore, should 
translate into an improved ability of a group to enlist 
allies, restrict the flexibility of its opponents, and 
assure its policy alternatives a place on the agenda. 
To Cobb and Elder, therefore, a group's real power 
should be measured not by its financial superiority or in-
feriority but by its skill at defining and redefining an 
evolving issue to its advantage as circumstances warrant. 
The political system, they contend, is such that any group 
with communicative prowess and strategy-making skill can 
achieve at least some measure of success. They believe, 
therefore, that there is enough slack in the system to allow 
for more open, responsive, and flexible politics than most 
critics believe.~ 
55 Ibid. 60. 56 Richard Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy" American 
Political Science Review 60 (1966), 553. 57 cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics, 
164-165. 
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Interest Group Competition in the Siskiyou 
At the center of all the political activity swirling 
around the Siskiyou National Forest has been, of course, the 
clash of competing interest groups. Consequently, this case 
provides an excellent opportunity by which to apply theor-
etical questions raised by pluralists and their critics re-
garding interest group organization, specifically whether 
interest group competition is essentially fair and open or 
inherently lopsided and biased. 
Such assumptions are tested in this analysis by com-
paring quantifiable measures of group resources (such as 
membership, staff, budget) and reviewing how these relate to 
group tactics and effectiveness. Additionally, various 
harder-to-quantify aspects of group competition that are in 
some ways are at least partially independent of material 
resources (such as strategy, communication, the articulation 
of goals and values, the nature of the issue itself) are 
considered in light of how they might alter a simple calcu-
lation of raw group resources. 
Interest Groups and the Public Interest 
According to Rosenbaum, ecological objectives are a 
classic example of the type of broad, immaterial political 
goods which provide "diffuse benefits" to a "large and amor-
phous public";~ precisely the sort of benefits which cri-
58 Rosenbaum, Politics of Ecological Concern, 61. 
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distributed among a relatively small set of groups or eco-
nomic interests."~ Environmentalism is, according to 
Paehlke "an ideology distinct .... in its unwillingness to 
maximize economic advantages for its own adherents, or for 
any contemporary group .... it may be the least economically 
self-interested of all ideologies. 1160 Brock Evans of the 
Audubon Society is even more explicit: 
.... [there] is no economic gain for us in the policies 
and programs we advocate for the public lands. Crea-
tion of new parks, wilderness areas, wildlife refuges 
.... does not return any specific gain to our treas-
uries. We work on them, fight for them, care about 
these issues because we believe in them, and because 
we truly think it is best for the country that we 
love. 61 
Many other observers, however, see environmentalists 
as merely an interest seeking a subjective "good" like any 
other, and hence, not deserving of the halo of public 
interest.~ Petulla presents this line of reasoning as such: 
"You might like forests, but I prefer redwood panelling in 
my living room; let's not argue about tastes."~ Such logic 
59 Ibid. 104. 
60 Robert Paehlke, Environmentalism and the Future of Pro-
gressive Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1989), 7. 
61 Brock Evans quoted in Short, 127. 
~Zeigler and Peak anecdotally note that being identified 
as a public interest is something that most all groups seek: 
"A few years ago, a state university .... invited several 
people registered as lobbyists at the state capital to ex-
plain their work. Without exception, each began his remarks 
by explaining that his organization was not a pressure group 
since its goals were in the public interest." Zeigler and 
Peak, 38. 
63 Joseph Petulla, American Environmentalism (College Sta-
tion, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1980), 12. 
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"You might like forests, but I prefer redwood panelling in 
my living room; let's not argue about tastes."~ Such logic 
would, of course, topple ecological interests from the moral 
high ground which public interests seek to occupy. Ultimate-
ly, whether or not one views the environmental groups in the 
Siskiyou as public interests largely depends upon which con-
ception of the public and its needs and desires one adheres 
to. While the pluralist would tend to see environmentalists 
wishing to preserve old growth as just one diverse interest 
among many, critics of pluralism might be more inclined to 
associate the goals of preservation with the general and 
long-term interests of society as a whole. 
Despite the disagreement regarding their status as a 
public interest, environmentalists' goals in the Siskiyou 
clearly do stand out as an especially vivid example of fair-
ly intangible, purposive political goods. Conversely, it can 
be said that environmentalists' timber interest opponents 
have sought benefits that could be defined as primarily ec-
onomic and material, or what the former Siskiyou National 
Forest supervisor terms "corrunodity-oriented." 64 
people registered as lobbyists at the state capital to ex-
plain their work. Without exception, each began his remarks 
by explaining that his organization was not a pressure group 
since its goals were in the public interest." Zeigler and 
Peak, 38. 
63 Joseph Petulla, American Environmentalism (College Sta-
tion, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1980), 12. 
64 This is not to say that timber's goals are exclusively 
economic; there certainly has existed a secondary tier of 
less material, purposive goals as well. 
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This distinction gives rise to a number of questions 
which tie into larger issues of pluralist theory: (1) Did 
ecological interests in the Siskiyou, because of the less 
quantifiable and material nature of the goods they sought, 
face a more difficult time forming politically active groups 
and attracting members to these groups than their timber 
interest opponents? (2) For these same reasons, were eco-
logical interests, if they did organize, disadvantaged in 
terms of resources and capabilities in their competition 
with timber interests for support and influence? (3) Of the 
groups that did organize, could their existence be explained 
by Olson's theory in terms of his criteria for group forma-
tion (that is, compulsory membership, small group size, or 
selective incentives)? and (4) Does Olson's economic ration-
al actor or the pluralist's socio-political model best ex-
plain the motivations behind group organization? 
Levels of OrganizationM 
What is most striking about the political conflict 
over the Siskiyou National Forest is the sheer number and 
65 In comparing interest group organization and resources 
in the Siskiyou, this study has drawn upon a number of 
sources. Using in-depth participant interviews, telephone 
surveys of group participants, Forest Service documents (es-
pecially EISs), and the general case history as gleaned from 
from a variety of journalistic and official sources, a ros-
ter of the major interest groups involved between 1983 and 
1992 has been compiled. Specific information regarding vari-
ous measures of group resources as well as measures of in-
tensity was gained from telephone surveys and, to a lesser 
extent, written documentation. For a more detailed discus-
sion of the criteria used for each variable, see appendix D. 
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diversity of the groups involved on both sides of the issue. 
If the question is merely did ecological interests form or 
otherwise mobilize to protect the Siskiyou forest?, then the 
answer has to be a definitive yes. At all levels of the is-
sue--local, state, regional, and national--there was a good 
deal of interest group organization and activity. Including 
politically active local sawmills and logging operations, a 
survey of the groups directly involved in the politics of 
the Siskiyou as shown in tables 1 and 2 shows a rough equal-
ity the number of groups on each side. While a number of 
groups have faded or merged in the last decade,66 there has 
been a steadily increasing presence of environmental groups 
involved in the Siskiyou as latent environmental interests 
seem to have been readily organized. Thus, within the realm 
of the Siskiyou, this study's data suggest vigorous local 
organization. 
Nationally, the trend has been the same, as Robert 
Mitchell reports an average annual membership increase for 
several large national groups for 1980-1989 of between 20 to 
100%67 Concuring with this trend are Henning and Mangun who 
66 For example, in 1991 alone, the Kalmiopsis Alliance be-
came defunct, while the Siskiyou Environmental Council merg-
ed with the Siskiyou Regional Education/Action Project (as 
the Siskiyou National Park Campaign had done previously). 
Similarly, on the timber side the North West Timber Associa-
tion was absorbed into the Northwest Forestry Association in 
1991, while a number of politically active mills have since 
ceased operations. · 
~Robert Cameron Mitchell, "Public Opinion and the Green 
Lobby: Poised for the 1990s?" in Vig and Kraft, 92. The 
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estimate that there are now somewhere near forty-thousand 
environmental groups in the United States.68 A number of ex-
planations have been offered as to the cause for this growth 
ranging from reaction to the anti-environmental hostility of 
the Reagan-Watt years, 69 to a power deflation of established 
interests in the 1970s, 70 to an overall increase in partici-
pation and organization due to changes in demographics and 
communication. 71 Whatever the cause, Helen Ingram and Dean 
Mann contend that the decade's growth in environmental or-
ganization is best explained in pluralist terms.72 
The presence and persistence of ecological interests 
in the Siskiyou does not by any means imply that such groups 
or their timber interest opponents have been marked by uni-
formity. In actuality, interest group organization on either 
side has been characterized by a great diversity of groups 
of differing type, size, and scope. Regarding size and 
scope, three basic categories--local, regional, and national 
--are identifiable in the Siskiyou case. Smaller groups spe-
cific to southwest Oregon, the Siskiyou area, or even a sin-
groups Mitchell cites are the Sierra Club, the Wilderness 
Society, and Greenpeace. 68 Daniel Henning and William Mangun, Managing the Envi-
ronmental Crisis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 
30. Given the ad hoc and very local nature of many of these 
grouf.s, this estimate might actually be a bit low. 
6 Short, Ronald Reagan and the Public Lands. 70 Rosenbaum, Politics of Ecological Concern, 61. 
~Mahood, 18-20. 
nHelen Ingram and Dean Mann, "Interest Groups and Envi-
ronmental Policy" in James Lester (editor), Environmental 
Politics and Policy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1989), 136. 
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gle watershed or portion of the Siskiyou have been fairly 
common and have played a large role in the politics of the 
case. On the environmentalist side, examples of such groups, 
which typically have had memberships numbering in the tens, 
hundreds, or low thousands, include Headwaters, the Siskiyou 
Regional Education Project/Siskiyou Action Project,~ local 
Audubon chapters, or the watershed-focused Friends of Elk 
River. Amongst timber interests, grassroots political repre-
sentation on the Siskiyou was primarily achieved by indivi-
dual local mills such as Rough and Ready Lumber or Gregory 
Forest Products, although the Southern Oregon Timber Indus-
tries Association (SOTIA), the Southern Oregon Resource Al-
liance (SORA), and the Illinois Valley Resource Coalition 
all represent more "typical" interest groups at the local/ 
sublocal level. 
Groups of a state-wide or regional (Pacific Northwest) 
scope, with memberships usually in the thousands (if they 
were individual membership groups), also figured prominently 
in the Siskiyou case. Still, their efforts in the Siskiyou 
represented only a portion, often modest, of the group's 
overall efforts on behalf of old growth or logging issues. 
Examples of such state/regional groups would include the en-
vironmentalist Oregon Natural Resources Defense Council 
(ONRC) or the Public Forestry Foundation and the pro-timber 
~These are twin organizations, the former being tax-
exempt and the latter not. 
Northwest Forestry Association or large regional corpora-
tions like Boise Cascade.n 
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While such efforts usually represent only a small 
fraction of their overall activities, groups at the national 
level, such as the Wilderness Society or the National Wild-
life Federation, with memberships often in the hundreds of 
thousands or even millions, have also played a direct, 
though usually less intense role in the Siskiyou. Finally 
there have been groups both grassroots (but from other lo-
calities) as well as national which, although not directly 
participating in any of the politics of the Siskiyou, never-
theless played an indirect role through their participation 
in the larger old growth issue (see appendix C).75 
74 Although they were actors in the Siskiyou, big corpora-
tions have played a much larger role in the old growth bat-
tle further north, especially in Washington, according to 
one timber official. It is important to note, therefore, 
that the timber industry is really two industries in one. 
Large corporate entities, usually with huge private forest 
landholdings of their own, cut and mill mostly their own 
timber. Because the overseas market is so lucrative, they 
have in the past decade shut down many of their own mills 
and export much of their timber instead. These companies 
extract relatively little timber from national forests, but 
indirectly depend on public timber to supply the domestic 
market to keep political pressure off of their exports. In-
dependent sawmill operators, on the other hand, rarely own 
their own forests and tend to be much smaller and more lo-
calized than corporate timber concerns. Lacking their own 
supply and denied much private timber due to exports, such 
mills are almost exclusively dependent on timber from their 
local national forest. Keith Ervin, ''The Tree Fight" Seattle 
Post-Intelligencer (24 September 1989). 75 As we have seen in the previous chapters, events that 
are part of this larger issue, such as Judge Dwyer's_ 1991 
injunction, although out of the hands of Siskiyou adminis-
trators, still had a very profound impact upon events in the 
Siskiyou. 
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TABLE 1 
INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992 
Group/ 
Scope 
Level of 
Partic.l 
Group Type Paid Annual Funding 
& Meinbers2 Staff 3 Budget4 Source5 
Activ-
ities6 
Enviroruaentalists-
Headwaters 1 
local/SW OR 
Siskiyou 1 
Regional 
Educ:ati~n 
Pro)ect 
local/Sisk.N.F.8 
Siskiyou 1 
Audubon IO 
local/Sisk.N.F. 
Kalmiopsis 1 
Audubon 
local/NW Sisk. 
M/800 (90) 
CG/20 
M/20009 
(90) 
M/360 
M/150 
(90) 
5 
(90) 
4 
0 
0 
85,000 
(90) 
100,000 
(90) 
5,000 
2,000 
(90) 
1,2,3 m,lt,e, 
lb,r 
2,3,1 m,e,lb 
1,4 m,lt,e 
1,2,3 m,lt,e, 
lb,r 
11=high level of participation; 2=moderate or infrequent 
level of participation. 
2M=individual membership group; CG=coalition group or 
trade association. Either symbol is followed by the number 
of individual or group members. All figures are for 1991 
unless otherwise noted in parentheses. 
3part-time staff members are given a value of 0.5. All 
figures are for 1991 unless otherwise noted in parentheses. 
Figures with (*) are approximations. 
4All figures are in dollars and for 1991 unless otherwise 
noted in parentheses. Figures with (*) are approximations or 
the average of a range. 
51=member dues; 2=grants; 3=fundraising; 4=sales. sources 
are put in order of prominence. 
6i=monitoring/tracking; lt=litigation; e=public educa-
tion; lb=lobbying; r=research; p=PAC. 
7The SREP has a non-tax deductable spinoff, the Siskiyou 
Action Project. 
8Although it is also involved in the regional old growth 
iss~e, SREP's primary focus is the Siskiyou. 
9This is a mailing list network; contributions are volun-
tary 
IOLocal Audubon chapters are financially and politically 
autonomous from the National Aubudon Society. 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992 
Group/ Level of Group Type Paid Annual Funding Activ-
Scope Partic. & Members Staff Budget Source ities 
Friends of 1 M/80 0 18,000 2,1 m,lt,e, 
Elk River (90) (90) lb,r 
local/NW Sisk. 
Earth First 1 M/125* 0 500* 1,3 m,lt,e, 
Siskiyou r 
Local/Sisk.N.F. 
Siskiyou 1 M/75* 
Environ. 
2 1,200 2 m,e,lb 
Councilll 
local/SE Sisk. 
Klamath/ 213 M/50 
Siskiyou 
0 2,000 1,2 m,e,lb 
Coalition12 
local/SW OR, NW CA 
Rogue 2 M/1,100 0 3,ooo* 1,2 m,lt,e, 
Sierra Club14 lb 
local/SW OR 
Oregon 1 M/6,000 13.5 650,000 1,2 m,lt,e, 
Natural Res. CG/56 lb 
Defense 
Council 
state 
Audubon 1 M/7,000 8 1 mil. 1,2 m,e,lb 
Society of 
stateLreg. 
llThe SEC merged with the SREP in 1991. 
12This group is a 1991 incarnation of the Siskiyou Na-
tional Park Campaign which had previously merged into the 
SREP. 
13This is more due to the group's relative newness than 
to a current lack of involvement. 
14Unlike local Audubon groups, local Sierra Club chapters 
are closely affiliated with the national Sierra Club. 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992 
Group/ 
Scope 
Level of 
Partic. 
Public 1 
Forestry 
Foundation 
regional/NW 
Sierra 2 
Club 
Oregon Chap. 
state 
Oregon 
Rivers 
Council 
state 
2 
National 2 
Wildlife 
Federation 
national 
Wilderness 
Society 
national 
1 
Sierra 2 
Club Legal 
Defense Fund 15 
national 
Natural 
Resources 
Defense 
Council 
national 
National 
Audubon 
Society 
national 
2 
2 
Group Type Paid 
& Members Staff 
M/650* 
M/11,000 
M/3, 000 
M/5,800,000 
CG/n.a. 
M/372,000 
( 90) 
M/n.a. 
M/160,000 
M/550,000 
( 90) 
6.5 
1 
7 
700 
(90) 
130 
( 90) 
40 
151 
337 
(90) 
Annual 
Budget 
Funding 
Source 
100,000 1,2 
n.a. n.a. 
Activ-
ities 
m,e,lb, 
r 
m, e, lb 
389,000 1,2,3 m,lt,e, 
lb,r 
79 mil. 1,4,3, m,lt,e, 
2 lb,r 
14 mil. 1, 4, 3 
2 
4. 2 mil. n. a. 
16 mil. n.a. 
m,lt,e 
lb,r 
lt,e 
lt,e 
40 mil. 
(90) 
1,4,2, lt,e, 
3 lb 
15SCLDF is a distinct entity, independent from the Sierra 
Club with separate budgets, members, and even ideology. 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992 
Group/ Level of 
Scope Partic. 
Earth 1 
First16 
national 
Timber Interests-
Southern 1 
OR Timber 
Industries 
Association 
local/SW OR 
Southern 11 7 
Oregon 
Resource 
Alliance 
local/SW OR 
North West 1 
Timber 
Assoc.18 
regional/NW 
Northwest 1 
Forestry 
Association 
regional/NW 
Northwest 1 
Forest 
Resource 
Council 
regional/NW 
Group Type 
& Members 
M/15,ooo* 
CG/108 
M/5,5oo* 
CG/25 
{90) 
CG/80 
CG/1319 
Paid 
Staff 
n.a. 
2 
0 
5 
{90) 
12 
020 
Annual Funding 
Budget Source 
n.a. n.a. 
120,000 1 
n.a. 1,2 
Activ-
ities 
m,lt,e 
m,e,lt, 
lb,r 
m,e,lb, 
r 
300,000* 1 m,e,lt, 
lb,r 
736,000 1 m,e,lb 
n.a. n.a. e,lt,lb 
r 
16Earth First is not a typical interest group with off ic-
ial dues and membership. It does have, however, subscribers 
and a core of activists. 
17SORA is less active now than in the mid-to-late 80s. 
18NWTA merged in 1991 with the Northwest Forestry Assoc. 
19NFRC is made up of other trade associations rather than 
companies. 
20NFRC is closely affiliated with the Northwest Forestry 
Association and uses its staff and offices. 
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TABLE 1 (continued} 
INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992 
Group/ 
Scope 
Level of 
Partic. 
Douglas 
Timber 
Operators 
local/county 
2 
Associated 2 
Oregon Log-
gers state 
Western 2 
Forest 
Industries 
Association 
regional/West 
Helicopter 1 
Loggers 
Association 
regional 
Illinois 2 
Valley Re-
source Coalition 
local/SE Sisk. 
Western 2 
Wood Pro-
ducts Assoc. 
regional/West 
Group Type 
& Members 
CG/130 
CG/780 
CG/125 
(90) 
CG/6 
M/110 
CG/300 
Paid 
Staff 
5 
12 
10 
( 90} 
n.a. 
0 
100 
(90} 
Annual 
Budget 
250,ooo* 
Funding 
Source 
1 
250,000* 1 
(90} 
750,000 n.a. 
(90} 
60,000 n.a. 
1,000* 1,3 
>5 mil.21 n.a. 
Activ-
ities 
m,e,lb, 
r 
m,lt,e, 
lb,r,p 
n.a. 
m, e, lb 
lb 
n.a. 
21The only information available for WWPA's budget states 
that it is in the "above $5 million" range. 
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TABLE 2 
BUSINESSES INVOLVED IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992 
Company Employees1 Annual Annual Lumber Level of Activ-
Sales2 Production3 Partic.4 itiess 
Rogge Forest 
Products6 
Medford Corp. 
Spalding 
& Bros. 
Gregory 
Forest 
Products? 
Rough and 
Ready Lumber 
South Coast 
Lumber 
Murphy Creek 
Lumbers 
Croman Corp. 
Burrill 
Lumber 
Gold Beach 
Plywood9 
92 
700 
200 
448 
235 
(89) 
425 
150 
150 
n.a. 
n.a. 
(mm $) (mmbf) • 
40 
135 
26 
72 
n.a. 
100 
19 
51 
n.a. 
n.a. 
60 
(88) 
144 
51 
78 
70 
78 
96 
(88) 
70 
107 
n.a. 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
lAll figures are for 1990 unless otherwise noted in 
parentheses. 
2see above. 
3All figures are for 1987 unless otherwise noted in 
parentheses. 
m, lt 
lt,lb 
n.a. 
m, lb 
m, lb 
m, lb 
m, lb 
n.a. 
n.a. 
m, lb 
4l=high level of participation; 2=moderate or infrequent 
participation. 
Sm=monitoring; lt=litigation; lb=lobbying; p=PAC 
6Formerly Douglas Pacific (prior to 1988). 
7ceased operations in 1991. 
Bceased operations, date unknown. 
9ceased operations, date unknown. 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
BUSINESSES INVOLVED IN THE SISKIYOU 1983-1992 
Company Employees Annual Annual Lumber Level of Activ-
Sales Production Partic. ities 
(mm $) (mmbf) • 
Boise 19,810 4,186 920 1 m, lb, 
Cascade p 
Medford Div. 1,000 130 75 
Stone 32,600 5,360 536 2 m, lb 
Container 
Medford Forest 1,000 140 n.a. 
Industries Div. 
Weyerhaeuser 40,621 9,024 3,140 2 lb,p 
Corporation 
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Perhaps the most notable distinction regarding the 
scope of the different groups involved concerns the inten-
sity with which they participated in the politics of the 
Siskiyou. Looking at table 3, it becomes clear that the more 
localized a group's focus was, the more heavily that group 
tended to participate. Two-thirds of all the local groups 
measured versus 58% of the state/regional groups and less 
than a quarter of the national groups were in the heavy 
participation category. 
In addition to differences in scope and size, groups 
in the Siskiyou were also distinguished on the basis of 
their organization. Some groups, such as the Wilderness So-
ciety, the Siskiyou Audubon, or SORA were individual mem-
bership organizations. Other groups, though, had not indivi-
dual members, but smaller groups or companies as members. 
SOTIA and the Northwest Forestry Association were examples 
of this type of coalition organization. Other groups, such 
as Headwaters or the ONRC, were a mixture of individual mem-
bership and group coalition. These hybrids made for an inte-
rest group line-up that could be difficult to keep track of 
when groups operated both independently and as coalition 
members. For instance, in addition to eight hundred indivi-
dual members, Headwaters included under its fold twenty wa-
tershed groups including the Friends of Elk River. Headwat-
ers, in turn was a member group of the ONRC (althougp the 
two acted as very distinct entities). Both Headwaters and 
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TABLE 3 
PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY SCOPE ACCORDING TO 
LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION 
Group Scope 
Local Groups 
and Businesses (n=24) 
State/Regional Groups (n=l2) 
National Groups 
and Businesses <n=9) 
Level of Participation1 
1 
66.7 (16) 
58.3 (7) 
22.2 (2) 
2 
33.3 (8) 
41.6 (5) 
77.8 (7) 
1 For an explanation of this variable, see table 1 
or appendix D 
the ONRC, incidentally, were both part of the Western An-
cient Forest Campaign. Boise Cascade, meanwhile, itself a 
player in the Siskiyou, also belonged to SOTIA. 
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This overlap suggests two things. First, while inte-
rest group organization in the Siskiyou has been undeniably 
widespread and diverse, these somewhat incestuous patterns 
of membership suggest that what may seem like completely 
different sets of actors, may sometimes be the same players 
operating under several banners. Secondly, the existence of 
coalition groups and their intermixture with membership 
groups would seem to bypass elements of Olson's theory. 
Since coalition groups have other groups and not individuals 
as members, Olson's theory of selective incentives for indi-
viduals would not seem to apply. Individuals participating 
in such groups pay no costs since their parent group picks 
up the tab for their participation. The umbrella group, 
meanwhile, enjoys increased organizational capabilities as 
well as the enhanced clout that often comes with being an 
alliance. 
This overlap of group affiliations, as pluralists have 
long argued, also extends to individual members and group 
entreprenuers.76 For example, a key figure in the Friends of 
Elk River also featured prominently in the Kalmiopsis Audu-
bon, while the conservation chair of the Siskiyou Aubudon 
also simultaneously headed the Siskiyou Environmental Coun-
u Truman, 157-167. 
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cil (the former chair, incidentally, was also a past presi-
dent of Headwaters). Such was the case with the timber inte-
rests as well as the president of SOTIA also served as the 
past head of SORA, while another key SOTIA official was for-
merly a leader in the North West Timber Association. 
Besides coalition and membership interest groups, 
there have been a number of other types of organizations 
involved in the Siskiyou. As already mentioned, many active 
groups were private businesses, usually local mills or log-
ging operations and as such had no membership per se (al-
though many belonged to one or another interest group con-
sortium). Other partisan interest groups not directly envi-
ronmentalist or timber-related were, nevertheless active 
participants. Such groups included a number of local Cham-
bers of Commerce77 and, in the larger national issue, vari-
ous labor unions representing woodworkers and carpenters.n 
Finally there was very heavy involvement in the Siskiyou 
from various county and city governments, 79 at least one 
government association (the Association of O & C Counties), 
and various federal and state agencies besides those agen-
77 specifically, these were the Bay Area, Brookings, 
Grants Pass/Josephine County, Illinois Valley, Medford/ 
Jackson County, and Roseburg Chambers of Commerce. 
78 see previous chapter, note 98 for the unions involved. 
79 This would include the governments of Curry, Josephine, 
Coos, Jackson, and Del Norte counties as well as a number of 
school board districts and city governments such as Brook-
ings, Cave Junction, Glendale, Gold Beach, Grants Pass, Port 
Orford, Powers, and Bandon. 
cies with primary jurisdiction in the case.so Those latter 
primary agencies, according to pluralist theory ought to 
count as distinct interests as well (their influence and 
goals will be fully discussed in the next chapter). 
The Motivation to Organize 
It is clear from examining the roster of ecological 
interest groups involved in the Siskiyou that despite the 
purposive and less material nature of the goods they have 
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sought, these interests have made the transition from latent 
to manifest groups with little or no more difficulty than 
their timber interest opponents. This information, however, 
is not enough to fully test Olson's thesis. What needs to be 
understood beyond the mere fact of their organization and 
mobilization is the motivation underlying this behavior. 
If Olson's model was accurate in this case then we 
could expect to find that the ecologists' seemingly success-
ful effort to organize into manifest groups was due to 
either: (l) the granting of selective benefits, (2) small 
group size, or (3) some form of compulsion. It is clear that 
the last condition was not a factor for environmental groups 
in the Siskiyou as they, unlike labor or professional 
groups, have no legal basis for mandatory group membership. 
For a few very small grassroots environmental groups, 
group size may have been a relevant factor. Several groups 
80 Examples would include the U.S. EPA or the Oregon De-
partment of Fish and Wildlife. 
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such as the Siskiyou Environmental Council or the Friends of 
Elk River had memberships of between seventy to eighty. It 
is in the realm of possibility, therefore, that individual 
members of these very small groups (usually focused upon a 
specific watershed near which many of the members live) have 
felt that their support has had a noticeable effect upon the 
achievement of their goals.81 Still, this possibility, even 
if it were true, would not accouat for the formation of the 
majority of environmental groups involved in the Siskiyou 
which had memberships ranging from the high hundreds to 
several million. 
This leaves us then with selective incentives as the 
only remaining explanation for the· majority of environmental 
group organization according to Olson's theory. Yet for most 
of the small and mid-size groups in this case, all that was 
offered to members in terms of traditional selective bene-
fits was a newsletter and, perhaps, periodic "action 
alerts"; hardly the selective material enticements likely to 
make a twenty-five dollar contribution seem worthwhile. Only 
the larger national groups could offer greater, though still 
fairly modest, selective incentives; usually vivid, well-
produced magazines, travel packages, certain discounts, and, 
perhaps, a free patch or keychain. 
81 Although it could also be argued that such groups 
failed far more often than they succeeded in achieving these 
goals. 
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Although Culhane implies that this is precisely what 
maintains large· environmental group memberships, 82 other 
scholars, such as Ingram and Mann, strongly disagree, and 
find instead that offering selective benefits provides en-
vironmental groups with some spare income and little more. 
The real sources of formation, growth, and maintenance, they 
argue, are common perceptions of threats to one's personal 
or general environment as well as a shared ideological and 
emotional commitment to counteract these threats and thus 
achieve collective goods.83 This, of course, corresponds 
more closely with the traditional pluralist notion that 
groups form on the basis of common interests, goals, and 
attitudes. 
Kerry Smith's survey research supports this assertion 
by finding expressive values highly correlated to environ-
mental group membership. He characterizes a public that is 
fully aware of the fact that the collective goods they seek 
will be shared by all and yet is still willing to shoulder 
the costs in time or money. 84 Ingram and Mann, meanwhile, 
cite a survey of Sierra Club members in which 64% identify 
perceived threats and 42% express a purposive goal as rea-
sons for joining.as More importantly, they raise the point 
82 Paul Culhane, Public Lands Politics (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future, 1981), 25. 
83 Ingram and Mann, 138. 
84 Kerry Smith, "A Theoretical Analysis of the Green Lob-
by" American Political Science Review 79:1 (1984), 137-147, 
150. 85 Ingram and Mann, 139. 
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that membership for environmental groups has roughly paral-
leled changes in the popular perception of threats to the 
environment. 86 For example, Sierra Club membership growth 
was slow during the relatively friendly Carter Administra-
tion but skyrocketed after Reagan and his antagonistic ap-
pointee Watt took power. Finally, Smith reports a relatively 
high rate of environmental group members (ranging from 17 to 
49%) who give voluntary contributions in excess of the mini-
mum necessary to secure selective benefits.87 All of this, 
then, would seem to imply that public policy concerns and 
ideological and emotional commitment were the operative fac-
tors here. 
McFarland finds the theory of selective incentives to 
be an unconvincing explanation for other reasons; namely its 
failure to perceive of interest groups as anything other 
than spontaneous aggregations of equal members. As mentioned 
before, McFarland believes that the role of external patron-
age, the dominance and dedication of skillful entrepreneurs 
and/or agents, and the existence of non-individual member-
ship groups all render the notion of selective incentives 
obsolete.BB In the Siskiyou, this unconventionality of inte-
rest groups is made abundantly clear. Very few small and 
mid-sized groups did not receive at least some some form of 
patronage, either from foundations or larger national 
86 Ibid. 87 Smith, 137-147. 
88 McFarland, "Why Interests Organize", 10-18. 
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groups. 89 In fact, some smaller groups, relying exclusively 
upon patronage or other sources of funding, did not even re-
quire membership dues. Furthermore, many environmental 
groups, as previously mentioned, were comprised either part-
ly or wholly of other groups. Taken together, all these 
facts would seem to leave Olson's emphasis on individual mo-
tivations, cost-benefit calculations, and selective incen-
tives largely irrelevant. 
It would certainly be difficult to argue, therefore, 
that the chief impetus for group formation and maintenance 
in the case of the Siskiyou was selective incentives. Most 
of the environmental groups involved offered quite neglig-
able material inducements, if any. Even the more substantial 
incentives offered by the large nationals, were not adequate 
to explain the patterns and depth of support evident in this 
case. Other groups did not even consist of the individual 
members central to Olson's model nor did they rely exclu-
sively on the financial support which selective incentives 
are supposed to clinch. 
Only by using Moe's expansive interpretation of se-
lective benefits which includes the socio-emotional benefits 
of striving for a collective good, can one salvage any as-
pect of selective goods theory in regards to environmental 
~In some groups, patronage rather than membership dues 
accounted for the bulk of funding in a given year. For ex-
ample, in 1990 and 1991, respectively, seven-eighths·of the 
Friends of Elk River's and all of the Siskiyou Environmental 
Council's funding came from patron's grants. 
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organization in the Siskiyou. At least in this case, the key 
to understanding the motivations behind environmental group 
organization is to recognize the role of a shared ideologi-
cal and emotional commitment and a common perception of a 
specific threat or imminent loss (of, for instance, a par-
ticular roadless area or salmon stream or old growth in gen-
eral); all backed up by a fairly effective cultivation of 
external patronage. 
Why is Olson's celebrated model of such limited ap-
plicability in this particular case? First there are the 
obvious structural changes in interest group organization 
that Olson did not foresee such as agents, alliances, pat-
ronage, etc. Beyond that, though, it may be that the theory 
of selective incentives is far more useful in understanding 
only certain types of organization in certain situations, 
namely those which feature a clear free-rider problem such 
as union organizing on behalf of better wages (precisely the 
type of case from which Olson draws the bulk of his re-
search). Organizing on behalf of ecological goals, on the 
other hand, has far less divisible, quantifiable benefits. 
These goals and benefits are also seen by their advocates as 
being crucially important. As a result, the free-rider prob-
lem may not be much of a problem after all. What environmen-
talist would resent or hesitate sharing the benefits of 
clean air or old growth forests with those who did not con-
tribute towards that goal as well? Thus, the intangibility 
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and perceived overwhelming significance of such benefits are 
probably enough to convince concerned individuals that their 
small share on behalf of the cause is worth making. 
Grassroots and Nationals 
In the Siskiyou as well as in the larger old growth 
issue, the environmental movement has never been a single 
monolith that has spoken with one voice. In actuality, it 
has been a very diverse collection of groups with differing 
resources, goals, and tactics which has sometimes found it-
self deeply divided over various issues. Perhaps the most 
relevant distinction in this respect has been that of grass-
roots versus national groups. In the Siskiyou and elsewhere 
in the Northwest, grassroot groups have tended to be more 
confrontational, uncompromising, and resource-poor than 
their national counterparts. They also tend to have differ-
ent bases of membership support. While both types of groups 
usually to attract members who are white, well-educated, and 
politically left-of-center,90 grassroots membership has 
tended to be less affluent and more oriented towards politi-
cal activism.~ 
90 This characterization applies only to groups focused 
upon the old growth issue. Other grassroots environmental 
groups, especially ones active in pollution or toxic dump 
issues, tend to be more ethnically diverse, less educated 
and not necessarily left-of-center. 
~ I observed this in my own research and it is also dis-
cussed in Margaret Kriz, "Shades of Green" National Journal 
(28 July 1990), 1826. 
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Such differences in membership profile has led to a 
certain amount of friction and mistrust between the two. 
While grassroots groups see themselves on the front-line, 
"where the rubber meets the road," as one activist puts 
it, 92 the nationals' large size and professionalization are 
invariably seen by the grassroots as leaving them out of 
touch and far too eager to compromise and accomodate. "Na-
tional lobbyists think in terms of political reality and 
quiet sacrifice," observes one activist, while "grassroots 
exclaim ecological imperatives to the grave. 11 93 Thus, in the 
Siskiyou and the larger old growth issue the grassroots, 
with their more militant and confrontational brand of poli-
tics, have come to harbor a certain amount of resentment 
towards the national groups who, they fear, will eventually 
"sell them out" as a grassroots activist expresses: 
The model for conservation politics through the 1970s 
and 1980s was this: Grassroots mobilizes around an is-
sue which nationals won't touch; grassroots gets beat-
en to hell by agencies and media; nationals come in to 
gain members off controversy; nationals cut a deal in 
D.C. without grassroots input.94 
In some ways, though, the old growth issue broke this 
pattern in that the grassroots groups have remained an ac-
tive and potent force even after the national groups jumped 
aboard the issue in the mid-to-late 1980s. From Bald Moun-
tain to 1988, claims the same activist, "everything was 
92 Kriz, 1827. 93 Mitchell Friedman, "Ancient Forests: The Perpetual Cri-
sis" Wild Earth 1:2 (Summer 1991), 32. 94 Ibid. 31. 
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going as usual .... except the grassroots never let go."~ For 
example, when the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society 
tried to move the Vento bill out of committee, this so in-
censed grassroots groups that they formed the Western An-
cient Forest Campaign (WAFC) to establish their own D.C. of-
fice; a move that the Wilderness Society is reported to have 
strongly pressured potentially supportive foundations to 
prevent. 96 As a result of WAFC, the grassroots managed to 
offset some of the nationals' Washington D.C. influence by 
establishing close ties to a number of congressmen including 
Jontz and Miller. Thus, the nationals have found themselves 
having to share power within the environmental movement. 
The effects of this friction, though, are not all neg-
ative for mainstream national environmentalists. Grassroots 
expand the scope of the debate with their bolder policy de-
mands, thereby making the positions of the nationals seem 
more reasonable to policymakers by comparison. This expanded 
realm of possibility may even safely allow nationals to 
adopt the tougher stances which they truly favor but previ-
ously felt were politically unrealistic. This indirect level 
of grassroots influence is pointed out by Ingram and Mann: 
While such groups [militant grassroots] are small and 
outside the mainstream, their significance should not 
95 Ibid. 32. 
96 rbid. Grassroots activists accuse the Sierra Club and 
the Wilderness Society as being the groups most willing to 
accomodate and compromise. The National Audubon Soci-ety and 
the National Wildlife Federation usually get higher marks 
from the grassroots, at least on old growth. 
212 
be discounted. Through their actions, difficult issues 
may get placed on the environmental agenda that would 
be otherwise ignored. Further, their vocal criticisms 
of compromise probably restrain the leaders of main-
line groups from the appearance of excessive modera-
tion .w 
To paint a picture of grassroots-national relations in 
the Siskiyou as being strictly antagonistic, however, would 
be seriously misleading. Along with intergroup rivalry and 
conflict has been as much or more close cooperation and co-
ordination. In some instances, national groups, especially 
the National Audubon Society and the National Wildlife Fed-
eration, have outright sponsored grassroots efforts, provid-
ing technical assistance, airplane tickets (for grassroots 
activists to testify at D.C. hearings), and funding for 
local activities and projects.98 
Thus, despite their uncompromising battle cries, 
grassroots organizations, at least in the old growth issue, 
have inevitably found themselves drawn together with the 
nationals into a rough symbiosis of sorts with the nationals 
depending on the grassroots for local organizing and moni-
toring and the grassroots relying on the nationals for re-
sources. 
97 Ingram and Mann, 154. 98 one of the most successful of these was the National 
Audubon Society's Adopt-A-Forest program which provided 
funds for local groups to map their nearby national forest 
in detail and learn the ins and outs of the EIS process in 
order to allow the close tracking of sales and effective 
participation in the Forest Service's planning process. 
Group Resources 
Even if groups seeking diffuse, intangible goods do 
manage to organize, the critics of pluralism argue, they 
invariably find themselves seriously outspent and over-
213 
matched as their economically-focused opponent's resources 
will most often far exceed their own. Henning and Mangun 
argue that not only do economic interests tend to be well-
funded, well-staffed, and politically and legally represen-
ted by professionals, but they are also heavily favored by 
tax laws. 99 Even the pluralist Culhane admits in his study 
of various local public lands resource battles that, "envi-
ronmentalists .... had organizational resources that were sig-
nif icantly inferior to those of the consumptive user 
groups. "100 
To attempt such a comparison of group resources in the 
Siskiyou is more difficult than it may seem for two reasons. 
First, amongst many of the groups involved, there is a lack 
of directly comparable measures of resource strength. As 
mentioned before, many of the timber interest participants 
99 Henning and Mangun, 31-32. While businesses can deduct 
lobbying expenses from their taxes as a cost of doing busi-
ness, environmental groups risk losing their tax-exempt 
status if they use their income for certain types of lobby-
ing which the IRS deems "too political." 
100 Culhane, 168. Culhane suggests, however, that the more 
focused nature of the environmentalists' goals in his study 
may have offset some of this disadvantage. This argument, 
though, as we shall see, can work both ways. To measure 
group resources, or what he calls "power," Culhane employs 
four indicators: staff, budget, gross volume of business, 
and membership. 
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in the politics of the Siskiyou were individual mills or 
corporations rather than traditional interest groups with 
memberships and clearly focused operating budgets. While 
number of employees and total sales volume do provide some 
measure of each business's resources and capabilities, such 
figures are substantially different from and much less fo-
cused than the paid staff or annual budget of interest 
groups. 
The other problem standing in the way of a clear com-
parison of group resources involves groups whose focus and 
scope extend well beyond the Siskiyou. Groups such as the 
Northwest Forest Resource Council or Boise Cascade or the 
Wilderness Society, while directly involved in the politics 
of the Siskiyou, were also heavily involved in many other 
conflicts and issues throughout the Northwest or even the 
country. Thus, while these groups may possess substantial 
organizational resources, only a small fraction of that is 
likely to have been expended directly on the Siskiyou issue. 
On the other hand, groups like SOTIA or Headwaters that 
focused only on southwest Oregon would likely spend a much 
larger portion of their resources on the Siskiyou. Still 
more narrowly focused would be Siskiyou-wide or watershed 
groups which could be expected to target the entirety of 
their resources upon the Siskiyou. 
Despite these constraints it is still possible to gain 
some sense of the capacities of the groups involved. One way 
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around this methodological thicket, as Culhane demonstrates, 
is to restrict comparisons to like-sized groups. 101 Tables 4 
and 5 each compare mean resources based on staff, member-
ship, and budget for local and state/regional groups. What 
such comparisons show is that at both the local and state 
and regional 102 levels as well as a combination of the two 
(table 6), timber group staff size and budgets exceeded 
those of their environmental counterparts. 103 -·~\ 
Left out of this comparison have been the national en-
vironmental groups directly involved in the Siskiyou. The 
problem is that they have no direct timber counterpart since 
no national timber interest groups, despite being heavily 
and influentially involved in the larger old growth contra-
versy, met the criteria necessary to be considered direct 
participants in the Siskiyou conflict (see appendix D, p.l). 
With an average staff of 272, mean membership nearing two 
101 Culhane, 372. 
1m Regional in this respect refers to interstate such as 
the Pacific Northwest region rather than intrastate such the 
southwestern region of Oregon. 
1~ The one exception to this would be for the mean budget 
of state/regional groups if the Western Wood Products Asso-
ciation's budget is not factored in. As what may be consi-
dered a mega-regional group whose focus is the entire west-
ern United States rather than just the Pacific Northwest, 
WWPA's scope and size are considerably larger than any other 
state/regional group in the study. If one excludes the 
group's considerable budget, the state/regional timber group 
budget mean drops from $1,182,667 to $419,200 as compared to 
the environmentalists' $534,750. See table 5. It is also im-
portant to note that the individual membership mean for lo-
cal and state/regional timber groups was calculated with an 
N of only two, while for the local timber group budget mean, 
the N was only three. 
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million, and an average budget of over thirty million dol-
lars, these national groups, as shown in table 7, cannot be 
ignored. Still, it is necessary to keep these figures in 
perspective and note once again that only a fraction of 
these groups' resources went towards the old growth issue 
and an even smaller percentage of that went directly to the 
Siskiyou conflict. 
Within just the Siskiyou, perhaps the most comparable 
timber interest participants to the national environmental 
groups (in terms of size and scope) would be the three large 
national wood products corporations involved locally. Table 
8 shows their mean resources. Like the national environmen-
talists, these companies command substantial resources--
averaging 31,000 employees, annual production of 1.5 billion 
board feet of timber, and total sales of over six billion 
dollars (of which Weyerhauser and Boise Cascade drew profits 
of $601.4 million and $267.6 million, respectively, in 
19991~ ). Also like the national environmental groups, only 
a very small percentage of these figure could be said to 
have been applied to the Siskiyou controversy. 
Smaller mills were also major players in the Siskiyou, 
perhaps even more so than local timber interest groups. 
Their mean resources are also shown in table 8. Although 
they have no formal membership, staff, or operating budgets, 
1~ Figures from chart in "Forests in Distress" special 
report, Oregonian (16 September 1990). 
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their average workforce of 440 employees, $79 million in an-
nual sales, and 83 million board feet of lumber produc-
tion1~ (most of which emanating from public land) has as-
sured them a resource base and an overall capacity to parti-
cipate quite effectively. 
Regardless of which side they were on, local groups 
(excluding businesses) tended to be, not surprisingly, the 
most resource-poor, while the nationals were the most well-
endowed. As table 9 shows, all of the poorest groups were 
local and nearly 60% of the local groups measured were in 
this lowest budget category (<$10,000). On the other hand, 
five of the six groups in the highest category (>$1,000,000) 
were national (all the nationals measured fell into this ca-
tegory). State/regional groups, meanwhile, mostly populated 
the middle categories. The figures also show that environ-
mental groups accounted for the bulk of both the poorest and 
richest groups (the latter is partly attributable to the 
fact there were no national timber groups) while two-thirds 
of all timber groups fell in the mid-high range ($100,001-$1 
million). 
Regarding levels of participation, table 10 shows the 
groups more closely involved in the Siskiyou to be fairly 
evenly split between the low and mid-level budget categor-
105 These figure include the local divisions of Boise Cas-
cade and Stone Forest Industries. These mills are of· roughly 
equal size and operate similarly to the independents in the 
area. 
TABLE 4 
MEAN LOCAL INTEREST GROUP RESOURCES 
Paid Staff 
Individual Membership1 
Group Membership2 
Budget (in dollars)3 
Category N 
Environmentalists 
1. 2 
355'+ 
24,078 
gs 
1Rounded off to the nearest member. 
2see above. 
3Rounded off to nearest dollar. 
Timber 
3.5 
2,805 
119 
123,667 
46 
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4 Because the Siskiyou Regional Education Project/Action 
Project considers a large mailing list network and not for-
mal duespayers as its membership, they were not included in 
this calculation as it would skew the figures. If SREP/SAP 
is included, the mean individual membership would be 2,538. 
SFor individual membership, N=8. 
6For individual membership, N=2; group membership, N=2; 
budget, N=3. 
219 
TABLE 5 
MEAN STATE AND REGIONAL INTEREST GROUP RESOURCES 
Environmentalists Timber Timber 
without WWPA1 
Paid Staff 7.2 27.8 9.8 
Individual Membership 5530.0 
Group Membership 2192 203 
Budget (in dollars) 534,750 1,182,6673 419,200 
Category N 54 7 5 66 
1The Western Wood Products Association is a group that, 
while not national, is far larger in size and scope than any 
other state/regional group. Since it may be seen as skewing 
the statistics, this additional category is provided. 
2This figure does not include the Northwest Forest 
Resource Council which has other trade associations as 
members. 
3The only data available for WWPA is that their budget is 
in the "above $5 million" range. The mean budget is calcu-
lated using a budget figure of $5,000,000. In actuality, 
however, WWPA's budget might very likely be a good deal 
higher. 
4For budget, N=4. 
SFor staff, N=5; groups membership and budget, N=6. 
6For staff, N=4; group membership and budget, N=5. 
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TABLE 6 
MEAN LOCAL, STATE/REGIONAL INTEREST GROUP RESOURCES 
Environmentalists Timber Timber 
without WWPA1 
Paid Staff 3.4 16.2 5.8 
Individual Membership 2 f 3452 2,805 2,805 
Group Membership 38 194 179 
Budget (in dollars) 181,208 829,667 302,125 
Category N 143 114 10 5 
1See note 1, table 5. 
2 This does not include the SREP/SAP (see note 4, table 
4). If they are included, mean individual membership is 
3,606. 
3 For grp membership, N=2; indiv membership and budget, 
N=3. 
4 For indiv membership, N=2; grp membership, N=8; staff 
and budget, N=9. 
5 For indiv. membership, N=2; grp. membership, N=7; staff 
and budget, N=8. 
TABLE 7 
MEAN NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP RESOURCES 
Paid Staff 271.6 
Individual Membership 1,720,500 
Budget (in dollars) 30,640,000 
N 
1The national Earth First movement was deleted from this 
calculation since its membership is quite ad hoc and infor-
mal and its budget and staff information is missing. 
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TABLE 8 
MEAN EMPLOYEES, SALES, AND ANNUAL PRODUCTION OF FOREST 
PRODUCTS COMPANIES 
Local National 
Businesses1 Corporations 
Employees 440 31,010 
Annual Total Sales2 79 6,190 
(in millions of $) 
Annual Lumber Production3 83 1,532 
(in mmbf) 
Category N 114 3 
1 Includes two local mills which comprise divisions of 
large national corporations. 
2Rounded off to the nearest dollar. 
3Rounded off to the nearest dollar. 
4 For sales, N=9; employees and production, N=lO. 
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TABLE 9 
PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY TYPE/SCOPE ACCORDING TO 
BUDGET. 
Interest Group 
Type/Scope 
Local Interest 
Groups n=l2 
State Interest 
Groups n=lO 
Natl. Interest 
Groups n=5 
Total Enviro. 
Groups n=l8 
Total Timber 
Groups n=9 
under 
$10,000 
58.3 
( 7 ) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
33.3 
( 6) 
11.1 
( 1) 
Budget 
$10,000- $100,001- over 
100,000 l,000,000 $1,000,000 
25.0 16.7 0 
( 3 ) ( 2 ) 0 
20.0 70.0 10.0 
( 2) ( 7 ) ( 1) 
0 0 100.0 
0 0 ( 5 ) 
22.2 16.7 27.8 
( 4) ( 3 ) ( 5 ) 
11.1 66.7 11.1 
( 1 ) ( 6) ( 1 ) 
TABLE 10 
PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY LEVEL OF 
PARTICIPATION ACCORDING TO BUDGET 
Level of 
Participation, 
1 n=l5 
2 n=l2 
under 
$10,000 
26.7 
( 4 ) 
25.0 
( 3 ) 
Budget 
$10,000- $100,001- over 
100,000 $1,000,000 $1,000,000 
33.3 33.3 6.7 
( 5 ) ( 5 ) ( 1 ) 
0 33.3 41. 7 
0 ( 4 ) ( 5 ) 
,For an explanation of this variable, see table 1·or ap-
pendix D. 
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ies, while the wealthier groups were far less likely to be 
heavy participants. These findings, though, probably have 
far more to do with the nature of this specific case with 
its high levels of grassroots organization than with any 
general tendency of well-endowed groups to participate less. 
Taken as whole, a comparison of the resources of the 
groups involved in the Siskiyou case, however imperfect, 
does make two observations fairly clear. First, it can be 
said with some confidence that the timber interests could 
marshal superior resources, but not by an overwhelming mar-
gin. Both locally and state and regionally, timber groups 
maintained an edge and adding nearly a dozen local mills 
into the equation would probably only strengthen that edge. 
While not directly comparable, one has to wonder whether or 
not local companies averaging $79 million in sales could 
bring more resources to bear than local groups with a mean 
budget of less than $25,000. 
Although outside the scope of this study's quantita-
tive comparisons, one has to consider as well the influence 
of national timber groups and other large wood products cor-
porations106 upon the larger old growth issue. While the 
average annual budget of a national timber interest group is 
probably roughly similar to that of most national environ-
106 Corporations would include International Paper, Geor-
gia Pacific, Louisiana Pacific, and Plum Creek, to name a 
few. Some of the more noteworthy national timber interest 
groups are listed in appendix c. 
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mental groups, timber's cause nationally has been bolstered 
by the additional resources of large, politically active 
corporations. In addition, one must consider, once again, 
that most environmental groups' budgets are spread thin 
across a whole range of issues from air and water pollution 
to ozone depletion to public lands policy. Timber interests, 
on the other hand, can narrow in upon only one aspect of 
environmental policy--timber issues. One indicator of tim-
ber's advantage on a national level could be seen in PAC 
expenditures. Table 11 offers an overview of relevant PAC 
donations for the five election-year cycles from 1977 to 
1988. In the 1987-1988 election cycle, for instance, Forest 
and paper product industry PACs outspent environmental PACs 
by a ratio of nearly three to one. 1~ 
The second observation made evident from this study's 
examination of comparative resources is that environmental 
groups, although at some disadvantage, still have had access 
to resources adequate to make themselves an effective coun-
tervailing force in this policy conflict. At all levels of 
the old growth issue, environmental groups, even if strapped 
for cash, as local groups have certainly been, have usually 
had at least enough resources to make themselves a vocal and 
1~ In 1987-1988 Forestry and paper products industry PACs 
dispensed with a total of $1,308,318 as opposed to the three 
environmentalist PACs' combined $459,951 expenditure. Larry 
Makinson, Open Secrets: The Dollar Power of PACs in Congress 
(Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990). It should also be noted 
that the environmental PACs have a broader focus--all envi-
ronmental issues--than do the forest and paper PACs. 
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TABLE 11 
FOREST AND PAPER PRODUCTS INDUSTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
PAC EXPENDITURES IN THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS BY ELECTION 
YEAR 1977-1988. 1 
Boise Cascade 
Georgia-Pacific 
NFPA 2 
Weyerhaeuser I 
Weyerhaeuser I I 3 
Louisiana-Pacific 
Stone Container 
Internatl. Paper 
Westvaco 
Mead 
Potlatch 
Kimberly-Clark 
Scott 
Sierra Club 
87-88 85-86 83-84 81-82 79-80 77-78 
83.8 77.9 50.1 96.1 96.8 47.7 
99.1 83.9 93.0 104.2 107.2 86.3 
81. 4 74.6 64.8 91.4 81.1 60.3 
63.3 96.4 62.3 70.1 89.9 59.5 
36.2 24.5 29.4 31.0 32.1 18.2 
33.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
80.8 14.4 16.l 9.5 6.6 
139.2 106.6 98.4 141.5 163.8 173.1 
208.5 143.2 124.0 129.0 129.3 40.0 
68.3 59.2 57.9 70.4 60.6 37.9 
37.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
36.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
47.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
292.2 250.0 254.4 231.1 
Environmental Action 38.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
LCV 4 89.4 93.8 185.9 137.0 3.4 • 2 
1All figures rounded off to the nearest hundred. The 
sources for this table are: Edward Zuckerman, Almanac of 
Federal PACs: 1990 (Washington D.C.: Amward Publications, 
Inc., 1990); Larry Makinson, Open Secrets: The Dollar Power 
of PACs in Congress (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990). 
2National Forest Products Association. 
3weyerhaeuser Corporation has two separate political ac-
tion committees. 
4League of Conservation Voters. 
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relatively effective presence. Thus, even if they were out-
spent, the worst-case scenario painted by the critics of 
pluralism whereby marginal or purposively-oriented groups 
stay latent or completely ineffective due their resource in-
f er iori ty cannot be said to apply in the case of the Siski-
you. 
Group Tactics 
As important as how much money a group has is how they 
put it to use. In the Siskiyou, both the environmentalists 
and timber interests demonstrated quite a bit of flexibility 
regarding the tactics they employed which ran the gamut from 
dramatic direct action to careful behind-the-scenes re-
search. 
Direct action refers to an activity--usually highly 
symbolic, sometimes controversial, and occasionally illegal 
--which is outside the realm of standard participation (ac-
tivities such as voting, attending meetings, negotiating, 
litigating, and so on) Designed to dramatize and draw atten-
tion to a particular policy demand, direct action is usually 
characterized as the alternative of last resort, used when a 
group has exhausted all options or has been shut out of the 
process. In the Siskiyou, environmentalists, mostly affili-
ated in some way with Earth First, relied quite heavily upon 
direct action and civil disobedience, especially in the 
North Kalmiopsis from 1983-1987 and during the Silver sal-
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vage in 1988. Such confrontational strategies had mixed re-
sults. While direct actions alienated many people in the 
local community, they did gain considerable media attention 
which not only nudged certain issues towards the forefront, 
but also caught the attention (much of it sympathetic) of an 
wider urban audience across the region and even, to a lesser 
extent, the nation. With its guerrilla theatre and animal 
costumes and militant slogans, 108 Earth First was guaranteed 
controversy and as such became a media magnet. But the sen-
sationalism could cut both ways and Earth First was just as 
frequently hurt by the media's innuendos and relentless hype 
as it was helped by the attention. 
As might be expected, direct actions by environmental-
ists began to subside in the Siskiyou as their political 
hand strengthened by 1989 and 1990. With favorable court 
rulings standing behind them, they could now cite the rule 
of law rather than dire moral imperatives as their motiva-
tion. Not long after, it was, ironically, local timber inte-
rests, feeling increasingly desperate, who turned to direct 
actions including noisy logging truck protests and more fre-
quent demonstrations.109 
108 Earth First's offical slogan "No Compromise in the 
Defense of Mother Earth" was frequently augmented with the 
popular battle cry, "No Deal Assholes." In Earth First's 
lexicon, logging executives are known as timber beasts, ran-
gers as freddies, the Forest Service's philosophy of multi-
ple use as multiple abuse, and the Forest Service itself as 
either the Forest Circus or the Forest Disservice. 109 One incident in particular, as told by a district ran-
ger, showed how the tables had turned regarding direct ac-
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Ingram and Mann identify a basic distinction between 
environmental groups oriented towards confrontation and 
those dedicated to working within the system. 110 What is 
interesting about the Siskiyou case is that seemingly radi-
cal groups and individuals manned blockades one day and par-
ticipated in a Forest Service planning workshop or met with 
congressmen the next. At least at the local level, there was 
a curious integration of mainstream and radical tactics that 
blur Ingram and Mann's dichotomy. 
One strategy which the entire spectrum of groups on 
either side were sure to rely heavily upon was to engage in 
campaigns to boost publicity, or what interest groups prefer 
to call "public education." In fact, for some of the smaller 
groups without legal staff or lobbyists this was the main 
focus of their efforts. Larger regional and national groups 
engaged in their own slicker, better-funded campaigns as 
well. Both timber and environmental interests produced a 
deluge of press releases, news conferences, fliers, pamph-
lets, newsletters, letters to the editor, press kits, news-
paper advertisements, and, among more well-endowed groups, 
even television commercials. 111 
tion. After the children's newsletter of the Target depart-
ment store in Medford featured an interview with Lou Gold in 
which he exhorted them to save the forests, a number of pro-
timber protestors filled up shopping carts at the store and 
then left them in the aisles. 
110 Ingram and Mann, 143. . 
111 Commercials up to this point have mostly been timber 
company ads trying to advance a positive image of their in-
dustry in general. Although, they have not yet aired their 
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One element of these public education strategies that 
has been especially widespread in the Siskiyou conflict has 
been letter-writing campaigns. Despite the fact that letter-
writing, especially form letters, is of "doubtful im-
pact, "11 2 it figured very prominently in the overall strate-
gies of a number of groups including SOTIA, SORA, and the 
Siskiyou Regional Education Project. According to Zeigler 
and Peak, adoption of letter-writing strategies is a good 
indication that a group is working with limited re-
sources. 113 Nevertheless, most of these groups clung to the 
notion that that letter-writing was crucial to the success 
of their objectives. A timber industry newsletter states, 
"The power of your voice [regarding phone calls] and your 
pen is a thousand times greater than the power of a logging 
truck. 1111 4 Headwaters, meanwhile, as sured members that "your 
phones, letters, suggestions, and votes will make a differ-
ence! 11 115 As a result, the Siskiyou National Forest was de!-
uged with an unprecendented tens of thousands of letters 
concerning major issues such as the Forest Plan and the Sil-
ver salvage. These proved, according to the former supervis-
own television commercials, environmentalists have gotten 
their anti-logging message across through episodes of vari-
ous television series including L.A. Law, the Simpsons, and 
HarrJ" and the Hendersons. 
1 See Zeigler and Peak, 153. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Yellow Ribbon Express ( 5 June 1989), 4. 
115 Headwaters (Late Summer 1991), 8. 
230 
or, to be the highest rates of mail comments ever registered 
for a unit in the National Forest system. 
A more low key strategy, employed mostly by local and 
a few state/regional environmental groups, involved closely 
tracking and monitoring Forest Service activities, especial-
ly timber sales and roadbuilding. Given Forest Service pro-
cedure as well as the sheer size of the Siskiyou and its 
timber program, this could prove to be an amazingly complex 
and tedious task. Although it is, for the most part, unglam-
orous drudgery, close and accurate tracking and monitoring 
have proven to be absolutely essential in providing groups 
their "eyes and ears" on the ground; without it partici-
pants, including legislators and sometimes even the bureau-
crats themselves would essentially be blind as to what is 
actually transpiring in the forests. This, in turn, allows 
for far more effective participation, litigation, and lob-
bying efforts. For environmentalists, this has been, there-
fore, a very wise investment of resources. 116 
While lobbying has also been a widely employed tactic, 
the opportunity to effectively engage in it has been far 
from universal. Many groups in the Siskiyou have lobbied in 
some way or another, but only certain groups have been well-
placed enough to be able to reach key decisionmakers, espe-
116 This is a fact not lost on the National Audubon Soci-
ety whose old growth effort centers, in part, around· its am-
bitious "Adopt-A-Forest" program of local tracking and map-
ping. 
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cially at higher administrative levels. Local groups have 
tended to lobby local bureaucratic officials and, perhaps, 
local congressmen or state officials. Local timber interests 
also lobbied county and municipal governments in search of 
support and alliances. Only through their affiliations with 
larger groups such as the Western Ancient Forest Campaign or 
the Western Forest Industries Association, did local groups 
get a chance to lobby in Washington D.C .. National environ-
mental and timber groups, on the other hand, had much more 
well-developed and professional lobbying operations with 
established lines of access to various congressional and 
administrative sources. Timber interests have been especial-
ly successful in this respect, gaining the close and consis-
tent support of a number of key congressmen, Bush Adminis-
tration personnel, and Agriculture Department officials. 
Another very crucial strategy in the Siskiyou has been 
the use of litigation. While this tactic in general has 
been, according to Ingram and Mann, of highly variable ef-
fectiveness for environmentalists, in the Siskiyou and the 
larger old growth issue, it has been the central pillar of 
their campaign. Although it has the potential to be a very 
costly course to pursue, in the old growth issue it has ac-
tually been used quite cost-effectively, at least given the 
results. Much of the legal work has been done by highly 
skilled, low paid staff attorneys who have managed to win 
major, pivotal victories. These legal victories and the 
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various policy crises they have provoked, according to one 
activist, are the only things that have forced policymakers 
to respond to the environmentalists. No amount of lobbying 
or educational efforts have come close to the results gained 
from litigation. Conversely, timber, while also attempting 
to use the legal weapon, has met with little success. 
One of the reasons for the environmentalists' legal 
success has been a technical mastery of public lands and 
forestry issues gained by an effective research strategy. 
Ingram and Mann suggest that another basic distinction be-
tween environmental groups is based upon whether they engage 
in science or activism. 117 Once again, many groups in the 
Siskiyou completely blurred this distinction. Groups like 
Headwaters, while in the thick of the political action, also 
conducted extensive research and developed enough technical 
expertise in forestry issues to prompt the House Agriculture 
Committee to request research of theirs. They and other 
groups such as the Public Forestry Foundation gained a great 
deal of respect for this technical mastery. National groups 
also conducted or underwrote much research as well. Even 
Earth First would send out press releases that were often 
filled with detailed facts, figures, and quantitative anal-
yses. 
For environmentalists, the payoffs from this research 
have been enormous. Active research has provided a great 
117 Ingram and Mann, 143. 
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deal of information that otherwise would be unavailable 
whether due to purposeful neglect or bureaucratic budget 
constraints. For example, environmentalists in the Siskiyou 
and elsewhere have provided courts and congressmen with pre-
viously undisclosed or unknown information, much of it very 
damning to the Forest Service, regarding reforestation fail-
ures, the actual extent of old growth loss, and the breeding 
locations and condition of spotted owl populations. Effec-
tive research, therefore, has not only led to a certain leg-
al and scientific edge, but also to increased credibility 
within policy circles. 
Tables 12, 13, and 14 break down individual activities 
according to a number of variables. According to table 12, 
what is found is that amongst all groups, lobbying is the 
most common activity closely followed by monitoring and 
education/public relations. A little over half of the parti-
cipants engaged in litigation, two-fifths conducted re-
search, and only a few had PACs. Businesses were more likely 
than interest groups to have PACS, while interest groups en-
gaged in far more education. Both types of groups monitored 
and lobbied in roughly similar proportions. In terms of po-
litical orientation, environmental groups had a slightly 
greater tendency than timber to do research, were twice as 
likely to litigate, and were equally disposed towards moni-
toring. On the other hand, nearly all timber groups (94.4%) 
lobbied as opposed to three-quarters of environmental 
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TABLE 12 
PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY TYPE/SCOPE ENGAGED IN 
SELECTED ACTIVITIES 
Activities, 
m lt e lb r p 
Type/Scope 
Total n=38 78.9 52.6 73.7 84.2 39.5 7.9 
(30) (20) (28) (32) (15) ( 3 ) 
Local Interest 92.3 53.8 92.3 84.6 53.8 0 
Groups n=13 ( 12) ( 7 ) ( 12) ( 1 1 ) ( 7 ) 0 
State Interest 90.0 60.0 100.0 100.0 60.0 10.0 
Groups n=lO ( 9 ) ( 6 ) (10) (10) ( 6 ) ( 1) 
Natl. Interest 33.3 83.3 100.0 50.0 33.3 0 
Groups n=6 ( 2 ) ( 5) ( 6 ) ( 3 ) ( 2) 0 
Total Enviro. 80.0 70.0 100.0 75.0 45.0 0 
Groups n=20 ( 16) (14) (20) (15) ( 9 ) 0 
Total Timber 77.8 33.3 44.4 94.4 33.3 16.7 
Groups2 n=18 (14) ( 6) ( 8) (17) ( 6) ( 3 ) 
Total Interest 79.3 62.1 96.6 82.8 51. 7 3.4 
Groups n=29 (23) ( 18) (28) (24) (15) ( 1 ) 
Total Business 77.8 22.2 0 88.9 0 22.2 
Groups n=9 ( 7 ) ( 2 ) 0 ( 8) 0 ( 2 ) 
1 For an explanation of this variable, see table 1 or ap-
pendix D. 
2Excludes businesses. 
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TABLE 13 
PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY LEVEL OF PARTICIPA-
TION ENGAGED IN SELECTED ACTIVITIES 
m lt 
Level of 
Participation2 
1 n=l7 94.1 64.7 
(16) (11) 
2 n=l2 58.3 58.3 
( 7 ) ( 7 ) 
e 
100.0 
(17) 
91. 7 
(11) 
Activities1 
lb 
88.2 
(15) 
75.5 
( 9 ) 
r p 
64.7 0 
(11) 0 
33.3 8.3 
(4) (1) 
1For an explanation of this variable, see table 1 
or appendix D 
2Excludes businesses. For an explanation of this 
variable, see table 1 or appendix D. 
TABLE 14 
PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS BY BUDGET ENGAGED IN 
SELECTED ACTIVITIES 
Acti vi ties1 
Budget2 m lt e lb r 
<$10,000 n=7 85.7 57.l 85.7 57.1 28.6 
( 6 ) ( 4) ( 6 ) ( 4 ) ( 2 ) 
$10,000- 100.0 40.0 100.0 100.0 60.0 
$100,000 n=S ( 5 ) ( 2 ) ( 5 ) ( 5 ) ( 3) 
p 
0 
0 
0 
0 
$100,001- 100.0 75.0 100.0 100.0 75.0 12.5 
$1,000,000 n=8 ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 8 ) ( 8 ) ( 6 ) ( 1 ) 
>$1,000,000 n=5 40.0 100.0 100.0 60.0 40.0 0 
( 2 ) ( 5 ) ( 5 ) ( 3) ( 2 ) 0 
1For an explanation of this variable, see t~ble 1 
or appendix D. 
2Annual budget, see table 1. 
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groups. 118 Meanwhile, if one looks at activities in light of 
levels of participation, as is shown in table 13, what is 
found is that monitoring and research are the hallmarks of a 
heavily involved group, while both categories are equally 
likely to engage in lobbying, education, and litigation. 
Looking at the differences according to groups' scope 
(excluding businesses) in table 12, one finds local and 
state/regional groups extremely likely to be engaged in the 
essentially localized activity of monitoring whereas only a 
third of national groups monitored in this case. Likewise, 
all state/regional and 85% of local groups lobbied on behalf 
of Siskiyou issues as compared to only half of the nation-
als. Nationals were also less likely to conduct research. 
What the national groups were more likely to be doing was to 
be involved in litigation (83.3%), although more than half 
of the local and state/regional groups did as well. All 
groups, meanwhile, were heavily involved in education/public 
relations efforts. Regarding national groups, it is impor-
tant to note that some of these differences may be due less 
to the nature of national groups themselves than to the fact 
that in this particular case, they tended to be less heavily 
118 Some of the differences between environmentalists and 
timber interests might be attributable to the fact that bus-
inesses, all of which were in the timber camp, are by nature 
less all-purpose than interest groups when it comes to poli-
tical activity and thus the figures for timber's activities 
may be skewed a bit towards a narrower range. 
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involved and hence engaged in a narrower range of activities 
than they might otherwise have been. 
Finally, the question of how resources affected acti-
vities must be considered. According to table 14, the poor-
est groups engaged in a good deal less litigation, lobbying, 
and research than other groups, concentrating more frequent-
ly upon education and monitoring, activities which, if ne-
cessary, can be conducted on a shoestring. Groups with an-
nual budgets in the low-middle range (10,001-100,000), on 
the other hand, engaged in more costly activities nearly as 
frequently as wealthier groups, a fact which suggests that 
some sort of minimum threshold may exist for broad-scale 
participation. 
The Less-Quantifiable Aspects of Group Competition 
Truman bases his study of interest group influence on 
the assumption that the variables of group power are, in 
fact, identifiable and quantifiably measurable. 119 Many 
years earlier, however, Bentley warned students of interest 
groups that group influence resulted from activities that 
could not always be precisely defined or measured. 120 This 
study works from the assumption that there is some value in 
Bentley's characterization. While a group's material 
resources and the personnel, publicity, research, 
119 Culhane discusses this in Public Lands Politics, 311. 
120 Arthur Bentley, The Process of Government (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1908), 214-215. 
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or litigation these resources can appropriate are certainly 
crucial factors and demanding of close attention, they nev-
ertheless have their limitations. There are other, less tan-
gible and more difficult to quantify, but no less important 
variables which Truman's or Culhane's measures cannot cap-
ture. Such factors as communication strategies, the dynamics 
of public opinion, the role of culture and values, group in-
tensity, and the peculiar quality of the case itself all can 
influence the outcome just as surely. 
One way to examine the impact that at least some of 
these variables have had upon the Siskiyou conflict and 
thereby achieve a fuller analysis of group organization and 
competition would be to employ Cobb and Elder's framework. 
Such an analysis would serve not as an alternative, but in-
stead as a complement to the previous analysis in this chap-
ter. Central to Cobb and Elder's model of agenda-building is 
the question of how effectively a group either expands or 
contains a policy conflict. 1~ When an issue expands, ac-
cording to Cobb and Elder, it moves beyond the original dis-
putants involved in the first manifestation of the conflict 
(such as Earth First, the ONRC, or SORA) to encompass other, 
broader sectors of the public. 1~ Specifically, an issue is 
121 Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics, 
105-111. 
1~ More specifically, Cobb and Elder identify five cate-
gories of the public arrayed like concentric circles. First 
are the original disputants. Their earliest support·will 
tend to come from identification groups which are very sym-
pathetic and fairly close natural allies (i.e. other envi-
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expanded when people in one of these broader publics become 
aware of the issue and subsequently develop either a posi-
tive or negative disposition regarding it.1~ The opposite 
of expansion, containment, would occur when a group re-
stricts an issue so that it cannot break outside of its 
original boundaries. 
Whether an issue expands or is contained, according to 
Cobb and Elder, depends upon a number of factors which are 
related to the characteristics of that particular issue. The 
role of an interest group is to maximize or minimize the im-
pact of these various factors by defining and redefining the 
policy conflict to their advantage. This is primarily 
achieved, they argue, through effective symbolic communica-
tion and skillful strategizing. 
Issue Breadth 
The first characteristic determining issue expansion 
that Cobb and Elder identify is issue breadth and concrete-
ness. Issues that are broad and fairly ambiguous, rather 
than narrow and concrete, they argue, are more likely to 
ronmental groups, timber workers, etc.) The next realm an 
issue expands into is that of the issue public, individuals 
or groups who tend to pay attention to the particular sphere 
of concern in question or have related concerns. The atten-
tive public is that tenth or so of the public that keeps 
closely abreast of and is interested in public affairs. Fin-
ally, there is the general public which only the most gener-
alized and symbolic issues can penetrate. Cobb and Elder, 
Participation in American Politics, 105-108. 123 Ibid. 111. Awareness, in this case, does not necessar-
ily imply detailed knowledge, something only the mostly 
closely involved participants will have. 
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expand. 1~ This is because such issues have the slack and 
flexibility to be defined and redefined in a number of ways 
to a number of audiences as the need arises. Conversely, 
narrow, concrete issues are more easily typecast as being of 
no concern except to a small, specialized audience. 
Naturally, it was the environmentalists' strategy to 
try to expand the issue at every turn since they were the 
group seeking to change the status quo and to do so required 
intervention by a broader public. The local timber inte-
rests, on the other hand, sought to maintain the status quo 
and continue having, as a Siskiyou district ranger put it, 
"what they've had in the past." They asked, in the words of 
the former supervisor, "why should it [Siskiyou forest pol-
icy] change? It's fine, it works good, it pays people, we're 
doing great. Who are these latecomers who want to make it 
something else?" 
Accordingly, timber sought to assure the public that, 
despite the environmentalists' hysterics, everything was 
fine down in the woods. Using the scientific methods and 
technology of modern forestry, claimed timber, healthy for-
ests were being managed into perpetuity. 1~ Focusing on the 
fact that many seedlings are planted for each tree harves-
ted, they tried to reassure the public that there was noth-
124 Ibid . 112 -116 . 
125 one industry magazine used the phrase Star Wars Fores-
try to refer to this marriage of modern technology and for-
estry. "Star wars Forestry" Evergreen (February 1989), 4. 
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ing to worry about. While this message aimed at defusing en-
vironmentalist charges has never wavered, the timber inte-
rests, nonetheless, found themselves increasingly unable to 
keep the issue from expanding. They had no choice, there-
fore, but to play the expansion game themselves, turning to 
wider audiences to plead their case and try to gain the edge 
in defining the issues. 
The central goal of either side's efforts toward issue 
expansion has been to gain as many allies and sympathizers 
as possible. Not surprisingly, what initially began as an 
focused conflict over various roads and timber sales in lim-
ited area came to be continually redefined with ever-broader 
stokes: family and free enterprise or bureaucratic accounta-
bility and reform or the prevention of global environmental 
upheaval. Justifications based solely upon local mills' ac-
cess to a commodity or the vulnerability of a particular 
salmon spawning stream or the beauty and biodiversity of the 
North Kalmiopsis, while of intense concern to closely in-
volved groups, could not alone be expected to propel an is-
sue outside its original limits. Figures 8 and 9 show just 
how each sides' initial demands mushroomed over time as the 
issues came to be redefined in a way which widened their 
boundaries. 
The environmentalists' case proved broad and flexible 
enough to allow the expansion and merger of the battle over 
roadless areas in the Siskiyou into a wide range of auxil-
Figure 8 
Expansion of Issues and Demands 
Timber Interests -
Protecting local accessl 
to cornmodity -------------
1983-1987 
Preservation of family, 
----community, way of life 
Maintaining local funding 
----and services/ preventing 
higher local taxes 
1988-1992 
Halting threat to free 
----enterprise, property 
rights, progress 
Unlocking public lands/ 
----amending overrestrictive 
environmental laws 
Timber famine/ housing 
----shortage 
Expansion of Issues and Demands 
Environmentalist -
Preventing herbicidel Protecting roadless 
spraying I--------- areas in the Siskiyou---
1979-1983 1983-1985 
___ Preserving old 
growth forests 
___ Creating national 
park 
___ Saving spotted-------
owl 
___ Protecting salmon 
streams 
1985-1988 
----- Water quality/ 
erosion 
---- Citizen rights to 
judicial review 
Forest Service 
---- reform/ forest 
economics 
---- Global warming/ 
global deforestation 
Prese1ving genetic 
----biodiversity/potential 
medicines, products 
1989-1992 
iary issues including old growth, salmon streams, water 
quality, erosion, the spotted owl, the Siskiyou National 
Park proposal, rights to judicial review, Forest Service 
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reform, forest resource economics, biodiversity, and global 
warming. As the issues diversified, they also began to reach 
larger audiences, whether through Lou Gold's coast-to-coast 
lecture circuit, coordination with national groups, or the 
increased media coverage that both resulted from and fed 
further issue expansion.1u 
The timber interests likewise began to redefine what 
originally for them had been the protection of their access 
to a local timber supply. Again, through coordination with 
regional and national groups, increased media coverage, and 
aggressive public outreach, timber's approach to the issue 
enlarged to include campaigns to protect family and commun-
ity and assure adequate funding for local governments. More 
broadly (and nationally), their efforts soon evolved into 
campaigns to avert a nationwide timber famine and turn back 
iu Evidence of this successful issue expansion could be 
seen by the fact that the state of Illinois, rather than 
neighboring Washington or California accounted for the 
second-highest number of comments to the Siskiyou Forest 
Plan. There was also the 1990 case of a Long Island, NY Au-
dubon chapter appealing the Homestead timber sale in the 
northern Siskiyou. USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest 
Region, Siskiyou National Forest, Land and Resource Manage-
ment Plan Final Environmental Impact Statement Appendices 
Volume II (Region 10: GPO, 1989), sec. KA, 3; Paul Fattig, 
"New Yorkers Hope to Stop Siskiyou Sale" Grants Pass Daily 
Courier (19 May 1990). 
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the anti-property rights, anti-progress threat of preserva-
tionism and the laws which bolster it. 
Thus, timber's new strategy was to actively reach out 
to a wider audience with its expanded message rather than 
merely react to environmentalist charges. During the thick 
of the Silver Fire controversy, for instance, an activist 
with the North West Timber Association walked the 150 miles 
from Eugene to Grants Pass to call attention to what he saw 
as the role of preservationism in creating the homeless 
problem. The theme "Salvaging Timber to Salvage Lives" was 
used to argue that the timber salvaged from the fire could 
build 100,000 starter homes. Referring to the efforts of the 
environmentalists' congressional ally Sidney Yates (D-IL) to 
prevent Silver roadbuilding, the activist wondered "what 
homeless people in Chicago would say about this."1V 
In their efforts to achieve issue expansion both sides 
also strived to enlist allies amongst groups representing 
other sectors of society. For instance, environmentalists in 
the Elk River watershed, warning of certain damage to ex-
tremely productive salmon fisheries, aligned themselves with 
groups representing commercial fishermen and processors. 128 
The timber industry, meanwhile, not only sought alliances 
with fellow public lands commodity-users such as mining, 
ranching, and oil interests, but with labor as well. 
1ll Evergreen (August 1988). 
1 ~ Jeff Muiderman and Carolyn Moran, "Part of the Solu-
tion" Talking Leaves (Eugene, OR: September 1991), 12. 
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Consequently, it was a much-touted labor-industry coalition 
formed by several carpenter/woodworkers unions with the AFL-
CIO' s blessing, which sponsored the major pro-logging legis-
lation in the 1991 session of Congress. Recognizing the sig-
nificance of labor's pro-timber stance, environmentalists, 
mostly at the grassroots, have long attempted to counteract 
it by endorsing various retraining, worker compensation, and 
economic development programs as well as export bans to off-
set job losses.129 
Allies were also found in other, sometimes unlikely 
places. When the Section 318 rider banning judicial review 
was passed, the civil liberties group People For the Ameri-
can Way jumped into the fray issuing a press release denoun-
cing what they saw as an obstruction of citizens' rights to 
judicial access. Meanwhile, when the drug Taxol, which at 
the time could only be extracted from the bark of the old 
growth-specific Pacific Yew, was found to have powerful 
cancer-fighting properties, the American Cancer Society 
promptly issued a statement decrying the destruction of old 
growth forests. 
Issue Significance 
In addition to being broad and ambiguous enough, is-
sues in Cobb and Elder's model must also be perceived by 
129 Earth First activists in northern California (the same 
activists whose car was bombed) went as far in their attempt 
to gain labor allies as to jointly form an IWW chapter with 
a number of local loggers. 
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their target public as significant and salient if they are 
to expand. 130 Despite whatever objective importance they may 
have, issues such as water quality in the Shasta Costa basin 
or a steady timber supply for the mills in the Illinois Val-
ley would simply not prompt much concern outside of a mostly 
local audience. Consequently, making the old growth conflict 
salient to a wider public required the groups involved to 
present their cases in the boldest, most dire, and most per-
sonal terms possible. 
For the timber interests, this meant characterizing 
the environmentalist challenge as a threat to economic 
growth, free enterprise, and even human progress. This 
"lockup" of resources, it was argued, would eventually im-
pact upon all Americans' lives through housing shortages, 
far more expensive wood and paper products, and a general 
decline in the standard of living. "We have to be a pro-
ductive nation," implored one Grants Pass mill executive. 
The environmentalists' campaign also attempted to make 
the issue more salient by linking the health of the forest 
to the well-being of all people. The strategy was to make 
the issue as personally threatening as possible, warning of 
a bleak future if the logging, which was repeatedly compared 
to (and described as progressing faster than) the devasta-
ting deforestation of the Amazon, continued. "Deforestation 
1~ Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics, 
116-117. 
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and global warming start here" warned a Headwaters adver-
tisement with an accompanying photograph of a Siskiyou 
clearcut in progress. 131 Other appeals described the imper-
tance of the forest's genetic biodiversity as a storehouse 
of potential medicines and other useful products, a point no 
doubt bolstered by the discovery of the old growth-derived 
drug Taxol. "Saving this ancestral forest," as one group put 
it "is a step towards saving ourselves."1~ 
Environmentalists also tried to frame the issue in 
politically and economically relevant terms as well. By 
focusing on the cost of taxpayer "subsidies" to the timber 
industry while the rest of the country suffered through 
deficit-induced fiscal sacrifice, environmentalists attempt-
ed to portray current public forest management policy as one 
which taxpayers could ill afford. Showing rare confidence in 
market forces, environmentalists delighted in urging timber 
interests to embrace the free market and go it alone by log-
ging without government-built roads and other assistance. 1n 
The Time Factor 
The factor which Cobb and Elder call temporal rele-
vance simply means that issues seen as having more profound 
long-term implications will tend to expand more readily than 
131 Headwaters (March 1990), 16. 132 
"Saving an American Original" Audubon Activist Special 
Report, (no date, circa winter 1988), 1. 
1n An example of this sort of argument can be found in 
"The U.S. Government Subsidize~ Logging on the National For-
ests" Forest Voice 4 (Spring 1991), 5. 
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those which do not. This commonly engenders the use by inte-
rest groups of words like "byproduct" or "fallout"; what 
Cobb and Elder refer to as spill-over terms. 134 Furthermore, 
this strategy of calling attention to long-term implications 
is usually accompanied by reminders that the time to avert 
such problems is rapidly running out. 
According to timber, the chief fallout down the road, 
besides a hundred thousand unemployed workers and dozens of 
ghost towns, were tighter and more costly lumber supplies 
leading eventually to an all-out "famine. "135 Environmental-
ists, meanwhile, had their own warnings for the future in-
eluding the greenhouse effect, imminent extinctions, and an 
Oregon with neither jobs nor forests. Environmentalists es-
pecially exploited the image of dwindling virgin forests 
falling faster and faster, day after day, month after month 
until the fateful day when none would be left. Not surpris-
ingly, the image of leaving a legacy for future generations 
was a powerful theme in environmental rhetoric as evidenced 
by their frequent use of words such as "heritage," "treas-
ure," and "inheritance." Headwaters proclaimed that "these 
forests belong to you, your children, and your great-
grandchildren, "1~ while Lou Gold promised to "keep talking 
1 ~ Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics, 
119. 
135 Such warnings about the supply of lumber are discussed 
in Stanley Ziemba, "Owl Dispute Helped Lift Lumber Cost" 
Chicago Tribune (27 June 1991), sec. 1, 1, 18. 
1~Headwaters (Late Summer 1991), 8. 
so that your kids never have to hear a story that begins, 
'Once upon a time there used to be big trees .... ' .. 137 "My 
vision of the good life," he wrote in a pamphlet, "is a 
peaceful forest full of happy children and big old 
trees ... 13a 
Issue Complexity 
While it is advantageous for an issue to be broadly 
defined, it still must be kept fairly simple if it is to 
expand. In the battle for the public's hearts and minds, 
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overly complex and subtle messages tend to be forgotten or 
ignored far more readily. 1~ Not surprisingly, in the old 
growth issue, groups struggled to turn what, in reality, was 
an extremely complex policy conflict into a simple bipolar 
case of owls versus man or trees versus jobs or greed versus 
virtue. If the environmentalists were "tree huggers," then 
the loggers had to be "tree-muggers." 1~ 
An especially vivid example of the advantage of keep-
ing issues stark and simple could be seen in the Silver Fire 
episode. The timber interests effectively simplified the is-
sue as being one of burnt timber about to go to waste be-
137 Lou Gold quoted in David Fishman, "America's Ancient 
Forests" E Magazine (October 1989). 
1 ~ Lou Gold, untitled pamphlet, Native Forest Action 
Council (no date, circa winter 1990). 
139 Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics, 
120-122. 
1 ~ Tree hugger is a very common derisive term in .the 
Northwest for an environmentalist trying to preserve for-
ests. "Tree mugger" is attributable to Andrew Kerr, "ONRC's 
Legislative Vision" Wild Oregon (Summer 1990), 10. 
cause of stubborn and selfish radicals with ulterior mo-
tives. The environmentalists, on the other hand, for all 
their effort, could not succeed in similarly simplifying 
their case which seemingly violated the average person's 
notion of thrift and common sense. After all, salvaging 
burnt logs and preventing waste do seem, at least on the 
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surface, very prudent and reasonable things to do. Ecologi-
cal arguments, whatever their ultimate virtue, were just too 
complex and subtle, requiring burn intensity charts and 
stream sedimentation estimates and detailed cost-benefit 
analyses. All timber had to do, on the other hand, was show 
photographs of blackened snags and scream "waste!" Similar-
ly, on the national level, timber cut away all the messy 
layers of multiple factors leading to job-loss such as au-
tomation and log exports and proclaimed that the problem was 
due to nothing other than an owl-caused lockup of timber. 
Environmentalists were not always prisoners of issue 
complexity, though, as they have shown that sometimes they 
could indeed cut through the intricacies of ecological prin-
ciples and public lands policy and analyze the issue, as 
does one activist, in starkly simple terms: "When a four-
hundred-year-old tree ends up on some baby's ass, it's an 
insult to all that's good and right with the world." 1~ En-
vironmentalists were especially adept at portraying the Sis-
1~ Quote in Catherine Caufield, "The Ancient Forest" New 
Yorker (14 May 1990), 79. 
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kiyou conflict as a David and Goliath struggle with impover-
ished grassroots citizen-activists defending the public in-
terest against the monolithic timber industry; a special in-
terest which, due to its financial might, could keep corrupt 
politicians in its vest pocket. Rarely acknowledged in such 
portrayals was the heterogenous nature of the timber indus-
try or its grassroots support. The Forest Service and the 
Administration were similarly characterized in fairly black-
and-white terms; beholden to timber and ever willing to per-
vert and break the law to accomodate them. 
The Emotional Element 
One route to very quick issue expansion is for that 
issue to be emotionalized in such a way as to elicit power-
ful affective responses from an audience previously unen-
gaged. The environmentalists have had a number of ready-made 
symbols to serve in this capacity. Making widespread use of 
photography, they have taken great advantage of the gruesome 
visual ugliness inherent to clearcuts. 1~ By widely distri-
buting pictures of the jagged, smoking, stump-filled wreck-
age of a clearcut, often juxataposed with a photo of a beau-
iQ "There is an old political maxim," said Andy Kerr of 
the ONRC, "that one should witness neither laws nor sausages 
from being made, lest one loses their taste for them. The 
same could be said of wood products." In fact, one district 
ranger on a Northwest forest has compared the visual impact 
of clearcuts to an atomic blast: "It looks like Alamagordo, 
as if it's been nuked." Andrew Kerr, "New (Age) Pers~ec­
tives" Forest Watch (October 1990), 23; second quote in Ted 
Gup "Owls vs. Man" Time (25 June 1990), 59. 
253 
tifully intact forest, the environmentalists exploited what 
had to be their most potent symbol for all it was worth. 143 
Timber interests fully recognized their disadvantage in this 
respect: 
In travelling through Oregon, you most likely will see 
forest land where the timber has been completely re-
moved. This is clearcutting which, although unsightly, 
represents a scientifically sound technique of Douglas 
fir tree management .... Many people are not exactly 
happy about the shaggy appearance of a cut over area 
for the first five to ten years. Even some Oregonians 
question the desirability of this practice until they 
become better informed as to the reasons why .... 144 
Ironically, the timber interests got to turn the ta-
bles on the environmentalists in the Silver Fire by exploit-
ing emotionally arousing photographs of the fire's destruc-
tion to encourage the salvage operation. Their dramatic pie-
tures of Silver, which showed a charred moonscape of "ash 
and ruin" were featured in newspaper advertisements and 
warned of the "radical preservationists'" plans to block any 
attempt to regenerate the dead and blackened forest. 1~ 
The little spotted owl with its large eyes and almost 
comically big head also served effectively as a visual sym-
bol capable of evoking widespread sympathy, a fact timber 
1 ~ Another widely used variation was aerial and even 
satellite photographs of the perfectly geometric checker-
board fragmentation of vast acreages of forestland. 
144 Oregon State Forestry Department produced in coopera-
tion with the Western Wood Products Association, et~ al., 
Ore~on Trees and Forests, pamphlet (no date). 
~ Southern Oregon Resource Alliance advertisement in 
Medford Mail Tribune (18 October 1987), sec. A, 12. 
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also recognized as it offered the following advice to log-
gers so as not to invite any public relations disasters: 
Please don't take your frustrations out on the owl .... 
messages that degrade the owl .... "If it's hootin', I'm 
shootin'" .... make us look like the rapers [sic] and 
pillagers the preservationists say we are. Remember, 
the general public has not made up its mind yet con-
cerning the crisis we face. Owl bashing lowers us to 
the same level as tree spikers.146 
The old growth forest itself, visually the very em-
bodiment of the word majestic, was another common visual 
image in the environmentalists' arsenal. Often shown with 
near-divine shafts of sunlight pouring down from above and a 
dwarfed, barely noticeable figure in the foreground for per-
spective amongst the giant ferns and immense trunks, the 
ancient forest provided an irresistably powerful and moving 
image. The language which accompanied such images was also 
quite emotionally evocative: "priceless," "irreplaceable," 
"treasured," "magnificent." Attention was also called to the 
ancient forest's incredible age through references to great 
historical figures such as Chaucer, King Richard II, or 
Columbus as having walked the earth as the seedlings of 
these giants took root. 147 
To disrupt such a sacred place, the environmentalists 
seemed to imply, would simply be blasphemy. Logging the Sis-
kiyou for a few hundred jobs, argued Lou Gold, "would be no 
146 Yellow Ribbon Express (5 June 1989), 2. 
iu David Kelly, "The Grove" (excerpt) Wild Oregon (Winter 
1988-1989, 11; "Saving an American Original" Audubon Activ-
ist Special Report, (no date, circa winter 1988). 
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different than trashing a cathedral to get at the candle 
wax .148 In order to maintain this image of sacredness, en-
vironmentalist language sought to invoke emotionally charged 
images of wholeness and purity counterposed by that of viol-
ence and even rape. The wilderness, in the environmental-
ists' vocabulary was "virgin," "untrammelled," and "pris-
tine" while logging and roadbuilding would "violate" and 
"penetrate" the forest leaving it shattered and fragmented. 
The timber interests just as readily exploited emo-
tional symbols. Rallying behind their yellow ribbon of soli-
darity, timber forces focused heavily on the gravely threat-
ened sanctity and continuity of family and community. Under 
the caption, "Who's endangered?," one pamphlet featured a 
photograph of a logger, his wife, and his five small daugh-
ters. Their heartbreaking vulnerability comes across quite 
clearly as the pamphlet goes on to warn of rural Oregon be-
coming another western Appalachia. 149 In terms of eliciting 
strong emotions, timber's strategy of reducing the conflict 
to one of people versus owls was another heavily relied-upon 
device. To prefer the well-being of a bird over human beings 
was, according to timber, a sure sign of moral decay. "I get 
real uptight," said one millowner, "when I think they gave 
1~ Lou Gold quoted in Timothy Egan, The Good Rain (New 
York: Knopf, 1990), 171. 
149 Oregon Project, Who's Endangered, pamphlet (no date) . 
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my ancestors 160 acres for homesteading and they're giving 
the owl 2, 200 acres. 11 150 
Group Legitimacy 
Perhaps even more important than how a group presents 
an issue, argue Cobb and Elder, is whether that group can 
create an aura of legitimacy around itself while simultane-
ously discrediting its opponents. 151 Success at achieving 
this, they suggest, can go a long towards expanding or con-
taining an issue. Helping the timber interests' efforts in 
this respect was the early prominence of Earth First in the 
Siskiyou conflict. While Earth First's direct actions did 
attract much-needed attention outside the Siskiyou, their 
confrontational behavior, countercultural lifestyles, and 
general irreverence left them, and by association all envi-
ronmentalists, quite vulnerable to attack at the local lev-
el. While passing themselves off as a "cross-section of 
Americana," as one official put it, timber interests in the 
Siskiyou, with rhetoric that strongly resembled the Vietnam 
debate two decades prior, sought to portray their adver-
saries as jobless, ill-washed, marijuana-smoking hippies who 
lived on communes. Such characterizations, coupled with 
Earth First's own militant tendencies, were quite successful 
1 ~ Quoted in Gup, 61. The quote refers to the minimum 
amount of territory which the !SC determined that each 
breeding pair of spotted owls requires. 
151 Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Poli tics, 
125-127. 
in alienating a substantial sector of the local community 
from the environmentalists. 
As the conflict in the Siskiyou intensified, so did 
the timber interests' assault on the environmentalists' 
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character. "Radical preservationists" (the standard timber 
term) soon degenerated in pro-timber rhetoric from hippy 
throwbacks into people-hating fanatics and even terrorists. 
After a 1987 incident in which a logger in the North Kalmi-
opsis broke his chainsaw on a tree spike (not long after the 
serious spike-related injury of a California millworker), 
timber interests had just the ammunition they needed to 
brandish environmentalists as terrorists. 1~ If not guilty 
of outright terrorism, then environmentalists were in the 
least accused of practicing "a brand of mental terrorism" 153 
in pursuit of their "hidden agenda. 11 154 
Part of this hidden agenda, timber revealed, were 
plans to halt progress in America. This desire to impose a 
new primitivism upon the land was born, argued timber inte-
rests, out of a distinctly anti-humanistic streak in the en-
152 Phil Manzano, "Old Growth Timber Auctioned Off as Pro-
testers Chant, Beat Drums" Oregonian (24 June 1987). Al-
though Earth First had publically renounced tree-spiking, 
timber nevertheless blamed them for the North Kalmiopsis in-
cident. In retaliation, someone cut a tree occupied by an 
Earth First tree-sitter at the Lazy Bluff sale one-third of 
the way through. Although environmentalists were more suc-
cessfully cast as terroristic, acts of violence or intimida-
tion perpetrated by environmental foes, although mostly 
scattered and unorganized, were not uncommon. 
153 Quote in Michael Lemonick, "Showdown in the Treetops" 
Time (28 August 1989). 
154 Yellow Ribbon Express (1 May 1989), 1. 
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vironmentalists. "I do not understand," pondered one Illi-
nois Valley mill executive, "how people who say they care 
deeply about life and living things could display so little 
regard for their fellow man. "155 Others in the timber camp, 
meanwhile, tried to link preservationism and its supposedly 
collectivist ideology with socialism.156 
In tight-knit local communities, another very effec-
tive strategy was to unfailingly characterize environmental-
ists as meddling outsiders, usually from the dreaded East 
Coast. According to one logging business owner: 
There is a deep resentment of the fact that we are 
controlled by people on the East Coast; ninety-nine-
point-nine percent of them have never been out here, 
and they're sitting back there and telling us how 
to live. 157 
In the Siskiyou, which saw a huge influx of newcomers since 
the 1960s, this notion of local matters being interfered 
with by latecomers or "lawyers from the city"158 became 
155 Quote in Jim Petersen, "In Search of Excellence: Lew 
Krauss" Evergreen (April 1987). 
1 ~ Baden cited in Short, 92. Perhaps the climax of the 
timber interests' campaign to discredit Siskiyou environmen-
talists occurred when SOTIA ran newspaper advertisements 
(Grants Pass Daily Courier 1 October 1987) featuring a re-
print of an article by conservative writer Thomas Sowell en-
titled, "Green Bigots." This wide-ranging and quite vitrolic 
attack on environmentalism warned of federally protected 
predators killing small children, accused wetlands of caus-
ing disease, and characterized public television nature pro-
grams as a "steady diet of propaganda." The ad proved so 
controversial that the normally pro-timber Grants Pass Daily 
Courier roundly criticized SOTIA in a full-length editorial 
(6 October 1987). In subsequent ads, even SOTIA tried to 
distance itself from its own reprint of "Green Bigots." 157 Quoted in John Mitchell, "Sour Times in Sweet Home" 
Audubon (March 1991), 94. 158 Egan, 1 71 . 
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quite a source of resentment for some. It ignored the fact, 
however, that many environmentalists had roots that went 
just as deep into. the region: 
In rural Oregon, preservationists are invariably per-
ceived as urban, white-collared, ignorant of where 
toilet paper comes from, and eastern. There are no 
exceptions to the geographical slur, not even for pre-
servationists born, bred, and housebroken in Portland 
Oregon. 159 
A final method of discrediting environmentalists in-
volved portraying them as a small, wealthy, and elite spe-
cial interest. Such a strategy borrowed heavily from earlier 
critiques of environmentalism as being primarily an upper-
middle class movement to preserve the status quo and prevent 
the formation of new wealth (that would supposedly benefit 
the poor).160 Consequently, timber interests cast environ-
mentalists as a very narrow, but highly organized group 
which gets their way by playing "tricks with the law." 1~ 
"There are a lot more of 'us' than there are of 'them'," 
claimed one timber official, "But they are well-organized 
and we are not."1~ By warning of "enemies who want to des-
troy you" 163 timber goaded the "sleeping giant" to awak-
159 Quoted in Mitchel 1, 91. For instance, the ONRC' s Andy 
Kerr, a fairly militant environmentalist, was born and 
raised in a small Oregon timber town. 160 See, for example, William Tucker, Progress and Privi-
lege: America in the Age of Environmentalism (Garden City, 
NY: Anchor Press, 1982). 161 Letter to the Editor, Grants Pass Daily Courie_r ( 3 
October 1987). 
1~ Evergreen (August 1988). 
163 Gup, 61. 
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en. 164 If it did not, timber warned, then the silent major-
ity would continue to be overwhelmed by a noisy radical mi-
nority with no real stake in the matter. "It's a living to 
me"; protested one small mill owner, "it's a hobby to 
them. "165 This small-time grassroots image served timber 
interests well in maintaining their legitimacy. Not sur-
prisingly, timber interests all the way up to the largest 
mega-corporations actively and quite vigorously cultivated 
such a "down-home" image. 
If timber's strategy was to be seen as a broad grass-
roots front, the environmentalists' goal was to paint them 
as either greedy, big business interests or else grassroots 
dupes blinded by these giant corporate concerns into ignor-
ing the real sources of their problems. The environmental-
ists' main efforts to bolster their own legitmacy, mean-
while, revolved around wrapping themselves in the cloak of 
good science and good government. In their effort to uphold 
"law and order" 1~ and "stand up and patriotically defend 
the forest",~ environmentalists tried to be seen as fight-
ing an arbitrary and lawless abuse of public land management 
164 Yellow Ribbon Express (1 May 1989), 1. 
1M Quoted in Caufield, 76. 
1 ~ "Hatfield Riders Fade; Owl Suits Come Alive" 
Headwaters (Late Winter 1991), 9. 
167 
"The Crisis Mounts" Save America's Forests D.C. Update 
(March 1992), 2. Save America's Forests played up this pat-
riotric "apple pie" theme quite vigorously adopting as their 
logo three trees superimposed upon a waving American flag. 
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guidelines as well as defending the public's right to re-
dress: 
Watch out folks! Before you know it, our only handles 
on Forest Service and other government abuses may be 
taken from us as ultra-conservatives push us toward 
authoritarian "democracy." We must insist that our 
rights as citizens be protected.168 
Far from being the radical and unreasonable militants, then, 
the environmentalists argued that they represented scienti-
fie reason, the rule of law, democratic accountability, and 
fiscal responsibility regarding taxpayers' money. 
Containment Strategies 
Cobb and Elder identify a number of ways to contain an 
issue besides simply working to reverse the expansionary 
factors previously mentioned. Symbol co-optation is an exam-
ple of one such containment strategy. By co-opting an oppo-
nent's symbols, a group can effectively defuse those syrn-
bols' potency. 169 Timber interests, for instance, made such 
an attempt with their frequent terming of themselves as "en-
vironmentalists" as well as their association with the syrn-
bols of environmentalism such as abundant wildlife, healthy 
forests, and wise stewardship. It is noteworthy that they, 
almost without exception, referred to their opponents as 
preservationists rather than environmentalists. 
168 
"Timber Congressmen and Bush Administration Attack 
Citizen Rights" Save America's Forests D. C. Update (_March 
1992~, 4. 16 Cobb and Elder, Participation in American Politics, 
128. 
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While interest groups are of ten the source of such 
containment strategies, it is also something that government 
agencies with their own active interests (in this case the 
Forest Service) engage in. This is especially true regarding 
strategies such as tokenism (offering small insubstantial 
benefits), the offering of symbolic rather than substantive 
rewards, and the creation of delay and/or additional admin-
istrative processes1ro (Forest Service behavior in this re-
spect will be discussed in far more depth in the next chap-
ter). 
The Role of Media 
One last factor relating to issue expansion/contain-
ment is the role of the mass media. As the main vehicle for 
the dissemination of symbolic information, the media play a 
significant part in determining if or how readily an issue 
can enlarge its boundaries. By zeroing in on or sensational-
izing some aspect of an issue, the media can create rapidly 
heightened interest and subsequently force groups to tailor 
their activities accordingly. In the Siskiyou, for example, 
the question of tree-spiking, because of its dramatic na-
ture, dominated news accounts of forest issues for quite 
some time, often at the expense of more far substantive, 
though less splashy issues. While controversial groups such 
as Earth First were often penalized by such sensationaliza-
1ro Ibid. 127-129. 
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tion, it had the potential to allow them to profit as well. 
This same attraction of the media to flash and drama inevi-
tably led to widespread coverage of bold direct actions. 
Such actions were, in turn, planned and coordinated with the 
media in mind as news coverage and political action became 
somewhat co-generating. What is better news from both a 
ratings-conscious editor's and a publicity-hungry activist's 
point of view: critiques of Forest Service timber yield mod-
els or tree-sitters and road blockades? Rather than merely 
being a neutral vehicle to pass along information, the me-
dia, especially television, by its very nature became a 
heavy influence upon and determinant of the manner by which 
groups chose to present their demands.in 
The Limits of a Communications Approach 
While Cobb and Elder's framework is quite useful in 
capturing some of the subtleties left out of traditional, 
more easily quantifiable indicators of group competition, it 
is not without limitations of its own. The important thing 
that Cobb and Elder fail to consider, or at least greatly 
downplay, is the likelihood that there is at least some re-
lationship between a group's quantifiable material resources 
and its effectiveness at interest articulation and symbolic 
communication. They see mastery at formulating a winning 
171 For a more detailed discussion of the media's role in 
this respect see, w. Lance Bennett, News: The Politics of 
Illusion (New York: Longman, 1988). 
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communicative strategy to be the "great equalizer," and this 
is true to the extent that it can prove invaluable at get-
ting issues on the agenda. But Cobb and Elder would be naive 
to deny the high probability that more money will buy more 
and better media coverage, greater staff to formulate effec-
tive communication strategies, marketing experts, consul-
tants, advertisements, a greater ability to secure allies, 
and so on. Who, for example, has access to superior tools to 
fine-tune and transmit the sort of sophisticated communica-
tion that will win support and expand or contain the issues, 
Friends of Elk River or Weyerhaeuser? Who is in a better po-
sition to research public opinion in order to ingeniously 
manipulate symbols or employ a wider and more effective 
variety of media, the National Wildlife Federation or the 
Illinois Valley Resource Coalition? 
Cobb and Elder are right in that competition between 
groups cannot simply be seen as a crude match of resources. 
The more brilliant and crafty a group's strategy is and the 
more "bang" it gets out of each "buck" it has, the further a 
group can close the gap between itself and its more wealthy 
opponents. Still, it is dangerous to carry this notion too 
far and sever all connections between a group's material en-
dowment and its capacity to effectively engage in the more 
subtle, communicative aspects of competition. If this shows 
anything, then, it is that quantitive and communicative 
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analyses are essentially complementary as neither alone can 
capture the full dynamic of interest group competition. 
Conclusion 
There exists a large body of literature, critical of 
pluralism, which predicts trouble for interests seeking 
broad, diffuse, or what.critics term "public" goods. As part 
of this broad category, ecological interests, according to 
pluralism's critics, could be expected to face an organiza-
tional disadvantage. 
What the evidence from the Siskiyou conflict shows is 
that contrary to what some might predict, ecological inte-
rests did organize into manifest groups or take on the is-
sues of the Siskiyou (if the group was pre-existing) quite 
readily. Furthermore, the underlying motivation for this 
behavior is not well-explained by any of Olson's criteria 
for group formation. Rather, shared goals and values and a 
common perception of threat seem to better explain environ-
mental organization in this case. In addition, the groups 
involved in the Siskiyou have consisted of more complex net-
works of individuals, patrons, agents, and groups than 01-
son' s model allows. 
Critics of pluralism also argue that purposively ori-
ented and/or broad-scale interests, even when manifest as 
groups, face an inevitable disadvantage in resources as the 
pluralist process tends to favor economic and materially 
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oriented interests. In the Siskiyou, timber interests, as 
predicted, did seem to have a superiority in resources, but 
not by quite as large a margin as critics might expect. Al-
though, outspent, the environmentalists were not necessarily 
out-matched as their resource base seemed at least adequate 
to provide the effective countervailing presence which plur-
alists claim is necessary to keep the balance of power in-
tact. 
Whatever the relative financial and organizational 
strength of the groups involved has been, the full dynamic 
of group competition cannot be completely captured by quan-
titative comparisons of group resources alone. By applying 
Cobb and Elder's agenda-setting framework to the Siskiyou 
case, it becomes clear how important a group's skill and 
cleverness in presenting its demands are. In the Siskiyou, 
both sides attempted, through a variety of strategies, to 
expand the issue on their terms while simultaneously trying 
to contain their opponent's efforts to do the same. It was 
partly in this way that environmentalists nationalized their 
issue and assured it a place on the agenda, while timber 
kept up a steady level of doubts and fears amongst the same 
public. Overall, the relationship between a group's re-
sources and their capacities in this respect is probably 
less than the critics but more than Cobb and Elder and other 
pluralists might acknowledge. 
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Examining the history of this case from 1983 on is a 
very useful way to test some of the claims of the pluralists 
and their critics. This is a period when a number of signif-
icant issues came to light and major group organization coa-
lesced. Still, it must be warned that the scope of this 
study offers only a snapshot or perhaps a series of snap-
shots. If this study was done for the decade proceeding 1972 
or 1966, for example, the findings might have been very dif-
ferent. In fact, some of the critics' claims would probably 
have been brilliantly confirmed. We would have seen a Sis-
kiyou forest being rapidly clearcut for the benefit of well-
organized commodity-using interests with virtually no oppo-
sition, interference, or dissent. Ecological interests, if 
even conceived of, would have been almost entirely latent. 
Bachrach and Baratz's second face of power, backed force-
fully by the attitudes towards logging and nature dominant 
at the time, would, therefore, have rigidly enforced the 
status quo through the process of nondecisionmaking. By 
truncating the scope of possibilities --forests as being 
only for forest products--status quo forces would have suc-
ceeded in preventing issues and organized interests from 
even arising; that is, until 1983. 
The point here is that this study's examination of the 
organization of interests in the Siskiyou, and what this 
says about pluralism, is essentially timebound to one 
decade-long phase of land management in the forest's eight 
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CHAPTER 5 
BUREAUCRATIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE SISKIYOU 
NATIONAL FOREST 
The Forest Service .... has been notorious for its 
alignment with lumber companies. 
Justice William 0. Douglas 
Given the demonstrable impact on public lands policies 
of the various opposing groups, the service .... seem(s] 
to be striking a valid political balance, which would 
satisfy the pluralist notion .... 
Paul Culhane 
What shall we say to that management that halts be-
tween two courses--does neither this nor that, but 
botches both? 
Henry David Thoreau 
Political Theory and Bureaucratic Administration 
An adequate discussion of pluralist theory requires an 
understanding not only of the role and nature of interest 
groups, but of issues of administration as well. The admin-
istrative half of the pluralist equation is crucial to con-
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sider because it is where the authority to implement and en-
force public policy is located. Although the earliest con-
ceptions of administration (what is usually referred to as 
the traditional or Weberian model) envisioned a precise and 
automatic enactment of pre-determined legislative mandates, 
it is clear that administration involves quite a bit more. 
In actuality, bureaucratic agencies exercise a good deal of 
independent power and initiative. 
Because administration represents, as Rosenbaum puts 
it, "the point where (policy) is interpreted and applied," 1 
it often equals, or in some cases, supercedes the legisla-
ture as the primary battleground of interest group competi-
tion: 
.... policy is not effective until it is administered; 
how it is administered will determine how effective it 
will be. This political maxim is lost least of all on 
the interests affected by public policy. The adminis-
trative apparatus .... is the focus of an intense inter-
play of group pressures on agency officials leading to 
a complex pattern of political understandings and 
relations among administrators and pressure groups. 2 
This is especially true in this particular case study 
where an administrative unit of a larger bureau has provided 
the main forum for competing interests to participate in the 
decisionmaking process. While relevant decisionmakers cer-
tainly existed at many other administrative, executive, leg-
islative, and judicial levels, the chief day-to-day respon-
1 Walter Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental Concern 
(New York: Praeger, 1977), 103. 
2 Ibid. 102. 
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sibility for the development and execution of policy on the 
Siskiyou National Forest lie with the specific administra-
tion of that forest. 
The examination of the literature on administrative 
theory in general and Forest Service administration in par-
ticular provides a basis by which to analyze the case of the 
Siskiyou regarding questions of bureaucratic decisionmaking. 
Specifically, this chapter seeks to address the question of 
whether the administrative unit in charge, the Siskiyou Na-
tional Forest, conformed with pluralist theory when con-
fronting ecological issues. 
This is attempted through a three-part test of: (1) 
the extent and influence of the participation process, (2) 
the nature of the agency's value system and (3) the agency's 
organizational flexibility. This will rely upon data from 
in-depth interviews of participants and agency personnel as 
well as a comparative analysis of Siskiyou policy outputs. 
Pluralism and Bureaucratic Administration 
Pluralist theory has never had a unanimous vision of 
bureaucratic administration. If the various strains of plur-
alist administrative theory share anything in common, it is 
the view that bureaucratic administration in a pluralist 
system has the overall effect of encouraging and adequately 
responding to the participatory input of a wide variety of 
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interests. 3 As a result, the process leading to the formula-
tion and execution of public policy ought to reflect a fair 
degree of openness and equity. Beyond this broad point, how-
ever, there exists quite a bit of difference between the two 
major pluralist orientations towards towards bureaucratic 
administration. 
The first tradition, best represented by Dahl, Herbert 
Kaufman, Charles Davis and Sandra Davis, or Paul Culhane 
suggests that government agencies engage in the delicate 
task of mediating interest group competition within the 
framework of the agencies' professional goals and standards 
as well as their legislative mandate. 4 The agency, in the 
3 Although pluralists may disagree about what precise bal-
ance of agency autonomy and responsiveness to interests is 
ideal, pluralists of all stripes place great emphasis upon 
participation since access to decisionmakers is the ultimate 
precondition for all pluralist policymaking. Accordingly, 
pluralistic conceptions of bureaucratic administration 
stress the role and legitimacy of the participation from 
which policy outputs must depend. Traditional or neo-
traditional theories of administration, on the other hand, 
frown upon the intrusion of interests into the administra-
tive realm finding that they ultimately interfere with rath-
er than facilitate meaningful public participation. With 
bureaucrats properly isolated from the "politics" of inte-
rest group competition, traditionalists argue that it is the 
legislature and not the implementing branch of government 
that is the proper and more democratic forum for participa-
tion. 
4 Robert Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); Herbert Kaufman, The Forest 
Ranger (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Re-
sources for the Future, 1960); Charles Davis and Sandra 
Davis, "Analyzing Change in Public Lands Policymaking: From 
Subsystems to Advocacy Coalitions" Policy Studies Journal 
17:1 (Fall 1988); Paul Culhane, Public Lands Politics (Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins University Press for Resources for the 
Future, 1981). Although it shares with traditional public 
administration theory an emphasis on professionalism, this 
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course of implementing legislation, must act, therefore, as 
a referee of sorts while simultaneously pursuing its own 
agenda as well. 5 According to pluralists who abide by this 
view of bureaucracy, the challenge of mediating and balan-
cing conflicting group demands while maintaining profession-
al integrity is best met by agencies which possess a mixture 
of competence, flexibility, and responsiveness. While an 
agency can never be perfectly neutral (due to both its man-
date and its own independent goals), this model of adminis-
tration suggests that a pluralist agency can still be open 
enough to serve as an honest broker between squabbling in-
terests and help, in Culhane's words, in "striking a valid 
political balance."6 
Other pluralists, however, dispute this view of the 
balanced and competent agency and find the fairness and 
balance of pluralism to reside instead in the larger plur-
particular model of pluralist administration differs with 
the traditional view in one important respect. In the tra-
ditional model the only forum for interests to try to influ-
ence the system is in the legislature; after a law is passed 
all that is left is for the apolitical bureaucracy to 
strictly implement the law as Congress intended. The plural-
ist variant, however, sees political competition between in-
terests as occurring both inside and outside the administra-
tive process. Fighting for or against the passage of a par-
ticular piece of legislation is, to pluralists, only half 
the story; the administrative realm offers a whole new set 
of opportunities and potential strategies for influencing 
policy. 
5 This degree of autonomy is in contrast to characteriza-
tions of the state made by earlier pluralists such as Tru-
man, Latham, or Bentley which conceived of policy outputs as 
strictly the sum of interest group pressure. 
6 Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 341. 
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alist process's decentralization. This view, held by such 
pluralists as Cobb and Elder or Kelso, firmly rejects all 
traces of traditional administrative theory which holds 
bureaucrats up to be apolitical and highly rational imple-
mentors of legislative mandates. 7 Instead, bureaucratic be-
havior is primarily seen to be driven by internal agency 
norms rather than external directives. Far from being 
strictly neutral and professional, then, agencies are 
characterized as being self-interested, often irrational 
(even pathologically so), and highly political.a 
Agencies are seen, therefore, as each having different 
and often conflicting styles, biases, interests, goals, and 
constituencies. Thus, any given agency cannot necessarily be 
relied upon to act as an impartial arbiter of conflicting 
group claims. The system's fairness, argue proponents of 
this model, lies not in the behavior of the agencies them-
selves, but in the multiple points of access with which the 
pluralist process offers interests. They argue that this 
messy and often inefficient jurisdictional overlap of agen-
cies nevertheless affords interests a number of options and 
inevitably breeds a competition among bureaus that is as 
healthy to administration as it is to interest group inter-
7 Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, Participation in American 
Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); 
William Kelso, American Democratic Theory (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1978). 
8 For an example of this argument, see Kelso, 231-262. 
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action. 9 Out of this "creative disorder" as Kelso terms it, 
comes a system that through its very fragmentation guaran-
tees group access and participation which, in turn, provides 
a forum for all manner of demands to be heard.10 
Agencies and Their Clientele 
Traditional administrative theory, as has just been 
shown, has come under strong attack from a number of cri-
tics. This rejection of Weberian assumptions of rational and 
neutral administration guided by statutory law began with 
Herbert Simon's groundbreaking work. Simon identified the 
primary influences upon a bureaucratic organization to be 
its customers and suppliers. The former refers to those who 
use the agency's products, 11 while the latter are those 
whose support the agency needs in order to produce its pro-
ducts. 12 
The theory of clientelism which eventually evolved 
from Simon's work takes this idea a step further. Rather 
than customers and suppliers, though, it speaks of the agen-
9 For a particularly illustrative case study of this ad-
ministrative overlap in action, Kelso cites Arthur Schles-
inger, The Age of Roosevelt vol.II: The Coming of the New 
Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958). 1
°Kelso, 263. 11 Such "products" may be of a material, distributive na-
ture (such as national forest timber) or of a regulatory 
nature. Bureaucratic rule-making process and the interpreta-
tion of legislation (for example, how the Forest Service 
chooses to deal with the spotted owl and thus, NFMA and the 
ESA) may allow or prevent an interest from obtaining what it 
desires. 12 Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Mac-
millan, 1947), 16-17. 
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cy and its clientele, the latter defined as those groups 
whose interests are heavily dependent upon an agency's ac-
tivities. As articulated by such students of bureaucracy as 
Norton Long or Phillip Selznick, the clientelist thesis 
states that agencies, if they are to survive in the highly 
competitive and fragmented political realm, must maintain a 
satisfied clientele in order to secure the support necessary 
for self-preservation. Accordingly, agencies and their cli-
entele tend to develop a mutually supportive relationship 
which affords clients the products they need in exchange for 
the support an agency requires. 13 
Ideally, a successful agency will be able to coopt its 
clients in the course of their political exchanges. Unfor-
tunately though, argue the critics of pluralism, it is often 
the agency that gets coopted by its clients. It is this 
charge of agency capture which is the main pillar of the 
critics' attack upon pluralist models of bureaucratic ad-
ministration. First presented by Marver Bernstein in the 
1950s, capture theory represents a degenerate form of clien-
telism in which the regulated comes to dominate the regula-
tor. According to Bernstein, agencies go through various 
stages which inevitably transform them from aggressive 
13 Norton Long, "Power and Administration" Public Adminis-
tration Review 9 (Autumn 1949), 257-264; Phillip Selznick, 
TVA and the Grassroots (Berkley, CA: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1949). 
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watchdog over the industries they were created to oversee 
into sympathetic allies: 
Left largely to its own resources .... a commission will 
probably be guided by dominant interests in the regu-
lated industry in its formation of the public inte-
rest. Thus the public interest may become more private 
than public. 14 
He goes on to describe how an agency: 
becomes a protector of the status quo and uses its 
public powers to maintain the interest of the regula-
ted .... Al though an agency in this situation stresses 
its role of mediator and judge among conflicting inte-
rests, its actual role is that of advocate and parti-
san. 15 
A variation on the capture theory involves what is 
termed iron triangles. 16 According to the critics, situa-
tions of undue client influence often lead to the develop-
ment of rather durable and inpenetrable little triumvirates 
or subgovernments in which an administrative agency, the 
interests they are to oversee, and the congressional sub-
committee which funds and oversees the agency can all be 
found locked in a fairly cozy and sympathetic embrace. 17 
While capture or iron triangle theories have been em-
ployed by a number of theorists, it is the work of two of 
14 Marver Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent 
Commission, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1955), 154. 
15 Bernstein, 270-271. 
16 For a good summary of the iron triangle thesis, see 
Randall Ripley and Grace Franklin, Congress, the Bureauc-
racr7 and Public Policy (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1984). 
Whereas Kelso the pluralist would counsel an interest 
locked outside of the triangle to turn elsewhere in order to 
be heard, critics would likely argue that for most interests 
in most cases an iron triangle offers no where to turn at 
least for tangible results. 
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pluralism's most prominent critics, McConnell and Lowi, that 
has proven to be particularly noteworthy in this respect. 
According to McConnell, the chief fault of pluralism is that 
it allows private interests to exercise undue and quite un-
democratic levels of influence; a situation that comes about 
when vulnerable agencies are captured by "those very inte-
rests they had been established to regulate." 18 Consequent-
ly, the line between state authority and private demands be-
comes blurred and policy, therefore, becomes perverted to 
enhance private rather than the public's interests. By al-
lowing this "conquest of segments of formal state power, "19 
McConnell argues that the pluralist ideal of balance and 
compromise becomes impossible to achieve: 
Often it is assumed that the role of government is 
that of arbiter or mediator among the many interests 
that exist within society. Neither role is possible 
where the distinction between public and private is 
lost. 20 
McConnell places the blame for agencies' vulnerability 
to capture squarely upon decentralization, that same feature 
of pluralism that supposedly guarantees open access. To 
McConnell, political fragmentation leads less to open access 
than to the development of isolated and fairly autonomous 
fiefdoms of policymaking authority. At this local level 
where the "lonely judicial grandeur of agencies isolated 
18 McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, revis-
ed edition (New York: Vintage, 1970), 360. 
19 Ibid. 162. 
20 Ibid. 362. 
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from the influence of 'politics'" can prevail, McConnell 
contends that it is all too easy for client groups, with the 
help of their congressional friends, to dominate at the pub-
lic's expense.21 
Like McConnell, Lowi bemoans the political fragmenta-
tion which allows clientele to exert control over bureau-
cratic behavior. To Lowi, the main problem with the insula-
ted, almost self-governing entities of pluralist administra-
tion is their hostility to rational planning or legal stan-
dards. "Interest group liberalism," argues Lowi harkening 
back to traditionalist models of administration, "has little 
place for law because laws interfere with the political pro-
cess. "ll In other words, a clear, detailed legal mandate 
precludes the possibility to deal, bargain, or compromise; 
all of which are central to pluralist politics. According to 
Lowi, the pluralist system's aversion to law along with its 
fractured, special-interests dominated policymaking apparat-
us can only lead to decisionmaking paralysis and an arbi-
trary, ineffective, and democratically illegitimate system 
of privilege. The most that can be expected in the way of 
decisionmaking, therefore, would be poorly conceived, ad hoc 
policy responses.n 
21 Ibid. 360. 22 Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 2nd edition (New 
York, W.W. Norton, 1979), 92. 
23 Ibid., 93, 297. Interestingly, Lowi employs elements of 
the capture and iron triangle theses which developed out of 
earlier critiques of the traditional model of administration 
(as competent and apolitical) and yet he is one of the tra-
279 
Rather than offering clear and authoritative laws rep-
resenting rationally derived social goals and priorities, 
argues Lowi, pluralism features broad delegations of legis-
lative power to the bureaucratic fiefdoms and their clien-
tele. By constructing purposefully broad and ambiguous man-
dates, legislators grant agencies the authority, wide dis-
cretion, and resources needed to maintain their semi-
autonmous subgovernments.24 In return, argues Morris Fior-
ina, legislators gain bureaucratic cooperation on matters of 
constituent benefits.a This political "pork," consequently, 
goes a long way towards bolstering legislators' reelection 
chances. The problem with this mutually beneficial scenario, 
maintains Lowi, is twofold. First, broad discretion "makes a 
politician out of a bureaucrat" by giving agency officials 
too much interpretive leeway, thereby increasing the oppor-
ditional model's staunchest modern advocates. His prescrip-
tion for overcoming what he sees as the political disaster 
wrought by pluralism involves a return to traditional prin-
ciples of administration such as clear, detailed mandates, 
rational planning, politically insulated bureaucracies, etc. 
24 Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 281-297.In another famous, 
earlier work Lowi draws a distinction between distributive, 
redistributive, and regulatory policies and argues that dis-
tributive policy areas are most likely to develop into iron 
triangles. In The End of Liberalism, Lowi argues that this 
distributive style of politics is the one that the pluralist 
system naturally gravitates towards and consequently, this 
form of politics has proliferated to the point where it of-
ten transforms or pushes out the other two. Theodore Lowi, 
"American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Poli-
tical Theory" World Politics 16:4 (July 1964), 677-715. 
25 Morris Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington 
Establishment, 2nd edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1989), 37-47. 
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tunity for client mischief .26 Secondly, this voluntary sur-
render of legislative power to the executive branch is al-
leged by Lowi to be of questionable constitutionality.27 
The Pluralist Response 
In the face of such serious charges of agency capture, 
collusion, and impotence, pluralists respond by arguing that 
capture theory grossly simplifies the often complex reali-
ties of administrative politics. While pluralists concede 
that isolated incidents of agency capture have occurred, 
they (and for that matter, most political scientists) con-
tend that one would be hard-pressed to find a clear case of 
capture today as significant developments in American poli-
tics have now made capture in the classic sense practically 
impossible. Wilson, for example, points out that the massive 
proliferation of competing interests in the past several 
decades (many of them "public" or at least purposively-
oriented) has tended to neutralize the potential for mis-
chief by entrenched clientele.28 In fact, argue both Wilson 
and McFarland, a diverse and competitive multiple clientele 
may actually have the effect of bolstering an agency's au-
tonomy since the interests tend to cancel out each others' 
influence leaving bureaucrats with a freer hand. 29 And as 
26 Lowi, The End of Liberalism, 304. 27 Ibid. chapter 5. 28 James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation (New York: 
Basic Books, 1980), chapter 10. 
~Ibid.; Andrew McFarland, "Why Interest Groups Organize: 
A Pluralist Response to Olson" conference paper, Western 
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long as an agency can exercise any meaningful degree of au-
tonomy, maintains McFarland, capture can be ruled out.30 
In today's political world of multiple clientele, 
pluralists argue, the traditional iron triangle or "dominant 
subgovernment" model of administration needs to be re-
vised. 31 One such revision involves Hugh Heclo's theory of 
issue networks. Rather than existing as a rigid and closed 
triangle, Hecla finds subgovernments operating within a lar-
ger network of communications revolving around a particular 
policy area. These networks involve a multitude of govern-
ment and non-government actors including congressmen, a wide 
range of interest group representatives (including interests 
other than those being directly regulated), personnel from 
other government agencies, various other public officials, 
academic experts, journalists, lawyers, and assorted 
others. 32 According to pluralists, the existence of such 
issue networks and their interest in and scrutiny of a par-
ticular policy area makes the insular business of iron tri-
angles and agency capture all but impossible. 
Political Science Association annual meeting, Seattle, WA 
(April 1991), 23. 
30 Ibid. 22. 31 See, for example, Thomas Gais, Mark Peterson, and Jack 
Walker, "Interest Groups, Iron Triangles, and Representative 
Institutions in American National Government" British Jour-
nal of Political Science 14 (1984), 185. 
~Hugh Hecla, "Issue Networks and the Executive Estab-
lishment" in Anthony King (editor), The New American Poli-
tical System (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Insti-
tute, 1978). 
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Similar to the idea of issue networks is Paul Saba-
tier's notion of advocacy coalitions. Such coalitions fea-
ture a mix of government and non-government actors broadly 
advocating a particular interest. Unlike the dominant sub-
government (iron triangle) structure, subgovernments in this 
model operate within a much larger context which includes 
advocacy coalitions and thus features more varied and active 
participants, wider access, and greatly increased competi-
tion and conflict among interests.33 In addition, the pres-
ence of advocacy coalitions, according to Sabatier, assures 
that policy change will not always originate strictly from 
the subgovernment.34 In other words, external pressures such 
as particular events or crises, socioeconomic conditions, or 
interest group participation also exert influence; a situa-
tion which leads, therefore, to a more flexible and media-
tive role for those bureaucrats in charge. In this new pol-
icymaking context, such officials function as "policy bro-
kers."~ Finally, because of this "opening up" of the poli-
cymaking process, Sabatier contends that subgovernments are 
no longer solely focused upon the distribution of benefits 
as Lowi charges they are.~ 
nPaul Sabatier, "Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning, 
and Policy Change" Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utiliza-
tion 8 (1987), 649-692. 34 Ibid. 35 Davis and Davis, 5. 36 Sabatier, 649-692. 
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Biased or Balanced?: Models of Forest Service Administration 
Broadly, this chapter examines how pluralist and cri-
tical theories of bureaucratic administration relate to the 
United States Forest Service and its role in the politics of 
the Siskiyou conflict. To achieve this, it is necessary to 
review the various models of Forest Service behavior and ob-
serve what these say about the role and nature of public 
participation, agency norms and values, agency responsive-
ness and flexibility (and from this determine the implica-
tions regarding the pluralist process in general). Such a 
review creates a framework upon which to specifically ana-
lyze the agency's behavior in the Siskiyou. 
As the agency with the legal authority and responsi-
bility to administer the national forest system, the Forest 
Service, and particularly its local administration in the 
Siskiyou, are clearly the primary source of policy outputs 
on the Siskiyou National Forest.37 The United States Forest 
37 As has been shown in previous chapters, the Siskiyou 
conflict has involved at one level or another a multitude of 
governmental actors besides the Forest Service including the 
Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Land Management, 
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Departments of In-
terior and Agriculture, various state agencies, and an as-
sortment of congressmen, judges, and administration offi-
cials. Each of these groups or individual actors has un-
doubtedly had an impact, sometimes quite substantial, upon 
the Forest Service and the politics of the Siskiyou. Because 
they do not have the day-to-day responsibility to administer 
the national forests, though, these other actors will essen-
tially be considered external influences upon the Forest 
Service, which because of its direct jurisdiction, is this 
study's main focus regarding issues in administration. The 
other governmental actors will be considered in depth in the 
next chapter. 
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Service was officially created in 1905 to administer the 
Forest Reserve System (later to become the national for-
ests). These public forests were established fourteen years 
earlier in reaction to the disastrous exploitation of the 
nation's woodlands by private loggers in the 19th century. 
Given its idealistic objectives, it is not surprising that 
the agency and its establishment figured prominently in the 
growing Progressive Movement.38 
The Forest Service, which oversees approximately 189 
million acres of land on 155 far-flung units, is located in 
the Department of Agriculture. The agency operates under a 
host of statutes (a good portion of them enacted in the 
1960s and 70s) that are supposed to define and authorize its 
activities. Most prominent among these are: (1) the Multiple 
Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960 which directs the Forest 
Service to manage the national forests for a multitude of 
uses in a manner that perpetuates the outputs of forest re-
sources; (2) the National Forest Management Act of 1976 
which among other things mandates land management planning 
and public participation; and (3) the National Environmental 
Protection Act of 1969 which establishes the process mandat-
ing environmental impact statements. (For a more complete 
list of major laws, see appendix E). 
38 For a discussion of the link between the Forest Service 
and the larger Progressive Movement, see Samuel Hays, Con-
servation and the Gospel of Efficiency (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 1959). 
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In addition to its legislative mandate, the agency re-
lies heavily upon the Forest Service Manual, a huge and con-
tinuously evolving guidebook of internally derived regula-
tions, guidelines, and operating procedures. All together, 
the Forest Service mandate might be summarized as follows: 
to manage the national forests for a multitude of values and 
purposes in a way that involves and best suits the public, 
does not impair the land, assures a perpetual flow of re-
sources, and does not violate federal environmental laws. 
As one the more closely studied bureaucracies in the 
United States, 39 the Forest Service has been the object of 
quite a bit of administrative theorizing. From this long and 
varied history of research, one can identify four major mod-
els of Forest Service administration; each with a unique set 
of implications regarding democratic theory. 
Clientelism and Capture 
Beginning with important critiques by McConnell, 
Philip Foss, and Wesley Calef in the early 1960s, a per-
sistent theme has developed in the literature of public 
lands politics alleging that administrative agencies have 
come under the sway of their resource-using clients to the 
point where they have become co-opted by those clients.~ 
39 catherine McCarthy, Paul Sabatier, and John Loomis, 
"Attitudinal Change in the Forest Service: 1960-1990" con-
ference paper, Western Political Science Association annual 
meeting, Seattle, WA (April 1991), 1. · 
~Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, 
Philip Foss, Politics and Grass (Seattle: University of 
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According to critics, public lands politics take the form of 
a classic iron triangle which features: 
the distribution of tangible benefits to a relatively 
small number of individuals and groups (such as ranch-
ers or mining firms) and the inability of agency ad-
ministrators to exercise independent judgement in the 
face of political pressures generated by resource user 
groups and their allies in the Interior Committees of 
Congress.~ 
Specifically regarding the Forest Service, capture 
theorists suggest that as the agency's dominant client, the 
timber industry, has managed, with the help of its congres-
sional allies, to keep the agency pliant and supportive. 
McConnell asserts that it is the agency's decentralization 
which makes its isolated and vulnerable to local resource-
using interests. The Forest Service, he maintains, has al-
ways "wandered before the pressures of all the winds that 
In the 1970s, a number of very critical non-academic 
studies reiterated this notion of Forest Service capture. 
Ralph Nader associate Daniel Barney characterizes "hapless" 
Washington Press, 1960), Wesley Calef, Private Grazing and 
the Public Lands (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1960). Foss and Calef focused their studies upon the BLM and 
its predecessor the Grazing Service while McConnell examined 
a number of agencies including the Forest Service, the BLM 
and its predecessors, and the Soil Conservation Service, the 
Army Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of Reclamation. The 
fact that the bulk of case studies used by McConnell to il-
lustrate localism and capture in Private Power and American 
Democracy come from the realm of public lands administration 
points to the central role that early public lands research 
has played in the development of broader theories of capture 
and clientelism. 
41 Davis and Davis, 3. 
42 McConnell, 360. 
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Forest Service personnel as being "easy prey for the timber 
lobbyist and his political friends" and finds that "the For-
est Service has succumbed increasingly to industry schemes 
to convert much of the National Forests to timber 
factories."~ Jack Shepherd, meanwhile, comes to largely the 
same conclusion in The Forest Killers, a book whose title 
clearly sums up his perspective.~ 
In addition to these journalistic accounts, academic 
observers besides McConnell, such as Rosenbaum or Charles 
Reich have basically concurred, though in a far less stri-
dent way, with this notion of timber interest dominance over 
the Forest Service.45 Reich in particular echoes Lowi's cri-
tique of pluralism by finding that the Forest Service can 
maintain its timber industry bias because of the vague and 
overly broad mandates which Congress grants it. This vast 
discretionary power, according to Reich, is used by the For-
est Service to reinterpret legislation in ways which clearly 
favor the timber industry and shut out environmentalists.~ 
Not surprisingly, the Forest Service capture thesis is 
most enthusiastically advanced by interest group partisans. 
One does not have to search far through environmentalist 
43 Daniel Barney, The Last Stand (New York: Grossman, 
19 7 4 ) I 7 Q I Xiii • 
~Jack Shepherd, The Forest Killers (New York: Weybright 
and Talley, 1975). 45 Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental Concern, 107; 
Charles Reich, Bureaucracy and the National Forests (Santa 
Barbara, CA: Center for the Study of Democratic Institu-
tions, 1962). 
~Reich, Bureaucracy and the National Forests. 
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literature to find the capture thesis applied to a Forest 
Service that supposedly follows "marching orders planned by 
the timber lobby" 47 as shown by this passage in the Sierra 
Club's magazine: 
.... over the years the agencies have strayed from 
their missions. Two in particular, the Forest Service 
and the BLM .... [have] developed cozy relationships 
with the very commercial interests they were designed 
to keep at bay .... the general culture of these bureau-
cracies is prodevelopment .... ~ 
In a letter to Forest Service Chief Robertson, former Wil-
lamette National Forest planner Jeff DeBonis notes how this 
perception of Forest Service capture has gained popular cur-
rency: 
Our basic problem right now is that we are too much 
biased toward the resource-extraction industries, 
particularly the timber industry .... we support their 
narrowly focused, shortsighted agenda to the point 
that we are perceived by much of the public as being 
dupes of the resource-extraction industries.49 
The Forest Service as a captured agency is a characteriza-
tion that has, according to Culhane, "become accepted theory 
among journalists, political activists, and popular wri-
ters. 1150 
Budget Expansion 
Not all observers who notice a pro-timber bias in the 
47 
"America's Forests in Crisis" Save America's Forests 
Citizen Action Guide (January 1992), 7. 
~Bruce Hamilton, "Unfinished Business" Sierra (Septem-
ber£0ctober 1989), 50. 9 Jeff DeBonis quoted in Timothy Egan, The Good Rain (New 
York: Knopf, 1990), 163-164. 
50 culhane, Public Lands Politics, 338. 
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Forest Service attribute it to outright capture. Some cri-
tics, such as forest economist Randall O'Toole reflect the 
work of earlier public administration theorists like Long or 
Selznick by emphasizing that the main determinant of bureau-
cratic behavior is the desire of organizations to survive 
and expand. According to O'Toole, the Forest Service is sim-
ply a large bureaucracy seeking to maximize its budget and 
beca~se of various political realities, it finds the best 
way to achieve this by cutting massive quantities of tim-
ber. 51 
The reasons for this are twofold. First, according to 
one critic, is the fact that timber sales represent a form 
of political "pork" for congressmen who find it a far more 
lucrative constituent benefit than any other forest use. As 
such, timber sale activity is rewarded by Congress with high 
budgets.52 Often, Congress even imposes yearly timber quotas 
(ASQs) higher than Forest Service plans call for, but the 
agency rarely complains since this translates into higher 
budgets. Given this politically valuable product it pro-
duces, it is little wonder, argue critics, that the Forest 
Service with its roughly $2 billion appropriation is funded 
at sustantially higher levels than just about any other pub-
51 Randall O'Toole, Reforming the Forest Service (Washing-
ton D.C.: Island Press, 1988). 52 Tom Ribe, "Pork Barrelling Our National Forests" Inner 
Voice 3:2 (Spring 1991), 1, 5. 
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lie lands agency. 53 Table 15 details this massive budget. 
The Forest Service roadbuilding budget alone has made it the 
world's largest roadbuilder, having constructed 340,000 
miles, or eight times the entire U.S. interstate system in 
the last fifty years.~ 
Another factor which provides incentives for the For-
est Service to overcut, according to O'Toole, is the nature 
of the laws it operates under. The chief culprit in this 
respect is alleged to be the Knutson-Vandenburg Act of 1930 
which allows local managers to keep a certain percentage of 
timber sale receipts (the rest of which go to the U.S. Trea-
sury) .55 The effect of this and other similar legislation~ 
(which together account for more than a fifth of the Forest 
Service budget), O'Toole argues, is to provide an irresis-
53 The Forest Service with a 1991 appropriations of $2.33 
billion is nearly a billion dollars ahead of its closest ri-
val, the National Park Service whose '91 appropriations to-
talled $1.36 billion. Lagging far behind were the Bureau of 
Land Management ($906 million) which administers nearly a 
third more land than the Forest Service and the Fish and 
Wildlife Service ($698 million). Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report (3 November 1990). Figures have been rounded 
off. 
54 Timothy Egan, "Forest Service Abusing Role, Dissidents 
Say" New York Times (4 March 1990), 1; Catherine Caufield, 
"The Ancient Forest" New Yorker (14 May 1990), 61. 
55 Randall O'Toole, "Incentives to Mismanage" Inner Voice 
3:2 (Spring 1991), 6. Ostentibly, these funds are to be 
spent for improvement of the cut-over area, but in reality, 
according to O'Toole, their expenditure is left largely to 
the rangers' discretion. 
56 In addition to Knutson-Vandenburg (K-V), there is the 
Brush Disposal Act of 1916, the National Forest Roads and 
Trails Act of 1964, and provisions in NFMA which all allow 
district rangers to keep receipts from various timber-
related Forest Service operations. Including K-V, these laws 
add about $600 million a year to the Forest Service budget. 
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tible temptation for district rangers to make as many timber 
sales as possible, even if they are money-losing, below-cost 
sales (since the ranger is granted a budget to make those 
sales anyway and gets a reward in addition).57 According to 
proponents of this theory of budget-driven administration, 
the timber industry, though it benefits mightily, is clearly 
not the chief motivator of Forest Service policy. Instead, 
it all boils down to a simple formula: increased timber 
sales equal increased budgets, decreased sales equal de-
creased budgets. 
Naturally, claim critics, such a process of national 
forest administration becomes "almost entirely divorced from 
biological reality" and at odds with environmental laws 
passed by Congress. 58 Forest Service management becomes in-
stead a desperate scramble to squeeze out every last budget-
expanding timber sale possible in a style of incentives, 
penalties, and quotas which, according to O'Toole: 
most clearly resemble the Soviet system of management 
where a central committee determines production tar-
gets and the local mangers are required to meet those 
targets at any cost. n59 
57 Ibid. 58 Ribe, 5. 59 0'Toole quoted in Ribe, 5. Critics maintain that a 
large part of Forest Service personnel's annual performance 
rating depends upon how well they met their timber output 
target. Neither environmentally-based reluctance or legal 
tie-ups help to reach this target. According to O'Toole, 
rangers of-ten find themselves "walking on a tightrope. If 
they don't meet their target, they won't get promoted. If 
they get sued for breaking environmental laws, they won't 
get promoted either." O'Toole quoted in Kathie Durbin, 
TABLE 15 
FOREST SERVICE FY 1990 BUDGET1 
(in millions of dollars) 
Timber Sales ................ $921 
Firefighting ................ 551 
Payments to Local Govt ...... 363 
Research.................... 131 
State and Private Forestry .. 104 
Roads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6 
Other Construction.......... 88 
Fish and Wildlife........... 71 
Land Acquisition............ 63 
Soil, Air, and Water Mgmt... 41 
Trails. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392 
Timber-related Subtota12 .... 2,166 
Total3 ••••••••••••••••••• . 2,845 
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1 These figures represent official budgets. Unofficially, 
however, the Forest Service has been widely accused of 
spending non-timber related funds on timber-related activ-
ity. A GAO investigation, in fact, found that 60% of the 
funds earmarked by Congress for wilderness management were 
diverted to other activities, mostly timber-related. GAO 
report cited in "Forest Service Illegally Diverted Wilder-
ness Funds" Inner Voice 3:2 (Spring 1991), 3. 2This figure is a subtotal of the timber sale budget and 
those accounts indirectly related to timber activity (fire-
fighting, research, payments to local government, state and 
private forestry and roads) . This conservatively assumes 
that none of the other construction budget or the huge other 
account goes towards any timber-related activity. This 
timber-related category accounts for 76% of the total budget 
3 This figure represents total Forest expenditures, some 
of which comes from timber sales and related revenue rather 
than direct congressional appropriations which are roughly 
$2 billion. 
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Organizational Values 
Another school of thought critical of Forest Service 
management stresses internally-derived organizational values 
as the source of what it sees as the agency's stubborn tim-
ber production bias. Drawing from Simon's seminal work, a 
number of observers, including Ashley Schiff, Ben Twight, 
Twight and Fremont Lyden, and Connie Bullis and James Ken-
nedy, all work from the assumption that administrators are 
heavily influenced by their own and their agency's values.W 
In the case of the Forest Service, these values are alleged 
to have an especially firm grip. 
As the agency that many claim spearheaded the twenti-
eth century Progressive Movement, the Forest Service was 
created, in the words of Samuel Hays, according to "the gos-
pel of efficiency."~ Accordingly, this gospel accurately 
reflected the values of the larger Progressive crusade; 
elite technical expertise, rational planning, and apolitical 
administration all coupled with an almost religious moral 
"Rangers Scramble to Meet Timber Quotas" special report: 
"Forests in Distress" Oregonian (15 October 1990). 
wAshley Schiff, Fire and Water (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1962); Ben Twight, Organizational Values 
and Political Power: The Forest Service Versus the Olympic 
National Park (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity Press, 1983); Ben Twight and Fremont Lyden, "Multi-
ple Use vs. Organizational Commitment" Forest Science (June 
1988); Connie Bullis and James Kennedy, "Value Conflicts and 
Policy Interpretation: Change in the Cases of Fisheries and 
Wildlife Managers" Policy Studies Journal 19:3-4 (1991). 
61 Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency. 
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certainty and confidence that what the agency was doing was 
"intrinsically right. 11 62 
More specifically, Twight identifies the organization-
al values of the Forest Service as being based in a utili-
tarian theory which includes: (1) an emphasis upon timber 
and other resource production as the primary purpose of the 
national forests, (2) a faith in planned forestry to achieve 
social ends such as the stability of the nation's wood sup-
ply, local wood products industries, and the communities 
that depend on them, and (3) a faith in technical rational-
ity as guidance in forest management. This technical orien-
tation is closely tied to what Twight calls "scientific 
elitism"; the idea that professional foresters and not the 
public or politicians are best equipped to know what the 
proper course of forest management ought to be.63 
~Hal Rothman, "A Regular Ding-Dong Fight: Agency Culture 
and Evolution in the NPS-USFS Dispute 1916-1934" Western 
Historical Quarterly xx:2 (May 1989), 146. 63 Twight, 23-25. There is much debate over whether the 
multiple use doctrine is part of the Forest Service's basic 
value system. Culhane, for example, sees multiple use as a 
primary Forest Service value, adopted and enthusiastically 
followed since the 1930s. Twight, on the other hand, argues 
that the concept of multiple use violates the agency's util-
itarian founding values which strongly emphasize a single 
dominant timber-oriented course of forest management. Multi-
ple use, claims Twight, was a gradually developed strategic 
response to political pressure and especially Park Service 
competition over jurisdiction, the true meaning of which the 
Forest Service has never internalized. Henning and Mangun 
concur, finding multiple use to be merely a "convenient slo-
gan covering a 'dominant use' decision that really fails to 
take into consideration other uses and values. In this case 
multiple use can be considered a devious ploy .... " Daniel 
Henning and William Mangun, Managing the Environmental Cri-
sis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 109. 
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According to organizational values theorists, this 
value orientation automatically biases the Forest Service in 
favor of timber production and against all other non-
consumptive uses64 as the words of the agency's founder, 
Gifford Pinchot can be presumed to show: 
the object of our forest policy is not to preserve the 
forests because they are beautiful .... or because they 
are refuges for the wild creatures of the wilderness 
.... but the making of prosperous homes .... Every other 
consideration comes as secondary.65 
In another pronouncement, Pinchot confirms that "a 
forest is a crop, and forestry is uniformly classed as a 
branch of agriculture."~ This confident utilitarian/techno-
logical tone has not changed much since Pinchot's turn-of-
the-century proclamations: "We know what nature can do," 
states the contemporary Deputy Chief George Leonard, "and 
we're relatively certain that we can do better than na-
ture."~ 
The structural characteristics of the Forest Service 
which values theorists claim have so strongly bound person-
nel to such orthodoxy were first identified in Herbert Kauf-
man's groundbreaking 1960 study of the agency. Although 
Kaufman himself was a great admirer of the Forest Service, 
64 Twight and Lyden's 1981 data finds Forest Service per-
sonnel to hold values very closely in synch with members of 
commodity user groups. Ben Twight and Fremont Lyden, "Meas-
uring Forest Service Bias" Journal of Forestry 87:5 (May 
1989), 35-41. 65 Pinchot quoted in Davis and Davis, 5-6. 
~Pinchot quoted in Twight, 111. 67 Leonard quoted in Caufield, 61. 
296 
his work has been extensively cited by outspoken critics 
such as Twight. What Kaufman found in his examination of the 
Forest Service were various internal mechanisms at work 
building loyalty and commitment to the agency and its values 
and ideology, while simultaneously discouraging non-
conformity. According to Kaufman, it is no small task to 
homogenize so highly decentralized an agency with such na-
turally strong centrifugal tendencies.68 
The specific mechanisms aimed at achieving this, Kauf-
man found, included selective recruitment and staffing 
(which not only heavily favored foresters, but those from 
certain schools of forestry), an elaborate system of incen-
tives, promotions, transfers, inspections, ratings and sane-
tions (to discourage disobedience and reward conformity), 
rigorous training and socialization techniques, and the 
strategic use of agency symbols. 69 As a result, Kaufman con-
tends that the agency has achieved a high degree of integra-
tion: 
Much that happens to a professional forester in the 
Forest Service thus tends to tighten the links binding 
him to the organization. His experiences and his envi-
ronment gradually infuse into him a view of the world 
and a hierarchy of preferences coninciding with those 
of his colleagues. They tie him to his fellows, to the 
agency .... They practically merge the individual's 
identity with the identity of the organization. 70 
68 Kaufman, 66-87. 
69 Ibid. 126-197. 
70 Ibid. 197. 
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By internalizing and adhering to a definitive set of 
organizational values, then, geographically scattered agency 
personnel operate within what is actually a "mythology of 
decentralization"n in which they can always be counted on 
to voluntarily conform. Kaufman states that the various 
tech-niques of integration: 
.... actually infuse into Forest officers the desired 
patterns of action in the management of the districts, 
so that the Rangers handle most situations precisely 
as their superiors would direct them to if their su-
periors stood looking over their shoulders, supervis-
ing every detail. To overstate the case, their deci-
sions are predetermined.n 
Although it certainly prevents capture, such a cohe-
sive value system in the Forest Service is argued by some to 
have quite negative consequences as well. Critics such as 
Schiff or Twight describe an agency so blinded by its own 
ideology that it becomes isolated, inflexible, and unres-
ponsive to public demands or other external pressures or 
even, in some cases, principles of sound scientific manage-
ment. According to Twight, the Forest Service is so strongly 
influenced by its ideology that it will stubbornly stick to 
decisions even if they cost the agency dearly as Twight's 
case study of the Forest Service's loss of jurisdiction over 
n Terence Tipple and J. Douglas Wellman, "Herbert Kauf-
man's Forest Ranger Thirty Years Later: From Simplicity and 
Homogeneity to Complexity and Diversity" Public Administra-
tion Review 51:5 (September/October 1991), 422. 
72 Kaufman, 222. 
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a nearly one million acre chunk of the Olympic National For-
est suggests.n 
Twight and Lyden argue, therefore, that the Forest 
Service tries to control change rather than accomodate it. 
If faced with political pressure that is counter to its val-
ues, Twight contends that rather than engage in the "poli-
tics" it abhors, the agency will usually try to explain to 
the public its values and why these are correct, often em-
ploying costly public relations campaigns. If that fails, 
the last resort, according to Twight, is to attempt to fit 
the new directive or program into its existing framework of 
values as well as possible. 74 In sum, the proponents of or-
ganizational values theory argue that the Forest Service 
represents a closed system of organization which makes deci-
sions that are "pre-conceived," is resistant to change or 
innovation, and hostile to or at least uninterested in out-
side, especially public, input. 
The Pluralist View: Balance and Professionalism 
A final and quite influential school of thought re-
garding the Forest Service portrays the agency in a largely 
positive light; as professional, competent, and balanced. 
nTwight, Organizational Values and Political Power. 
74 For example, the Forest Service approaches the manage-
ment of wilderness areas (which they vigorously oppose, for 
the most part, but have been mandated to protect) not in 
terms of the intrisinic value of wilderness (which would vi-
olate its own values), but as one of many "multiple uses" to 
which the forest can be subjected. 
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Defenders of the Forest Service firmly reject the notion of 
the agency as captured. Some observers, beginning with Kauf-
man, emphasize the agency's professionalism and internal co-
hesion, alleging that not only do these qualities encourage 
operational efficiency, but also the autonomy necessary to 
thwart domination by clientele. Citing its widespread repu-
tation as one of the most effective and well-managed agen-
cies in the entire federal government, 75 the Forest Service 
is cast by its scholarly admirers as a "bureaucratic 
superstar"n with personnel "in charge of the national 
forests and in control of their destinies."" 
Other scholars who reject the capture thesis argue 
that Forest Service policymaking "meets the pluralist cri-
terion" because the agency acts through decentralized au-
thority to balance interests within a strongly pluralistic 
and competitive political environment.78 In his 1981 study, 
Public Lands Politics, Culhane offers strong support for 
this pluralist view of the Forest Service. He argues that 
the Forest Service is a consensus-seeking, conflict-avoiding 
75 Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 29. In fact, a 1981 
study by Penn State and the Off ice of Personnel Management 
rated the Forest Service as among the ten most successful 
organizations in the United States. Study cited in Michael 
Frome, The Forest Service (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1984), 32. 76 Jeanne Nienaber Clarke and Daniel McCool, Staking Out 
the Terrain (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
1985), 33-47. 
"This quote is used to describe Kaufman's position. Tip-
ple and Wellman, 422. 78 Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 341. 
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agency that is responsive to a broad range of competing in-
terests. 79 Unlike what capture theory would imply, Culhane 
finds that local land management constituencies are not com-
pletely dominated by resource-using interests. To Culhane, 
this multiple clientele, which reflects the agency's multi-
ple use mission assures that the Forest Service almost al-
ways occupies the middle ground and fulfills the broker's 
role.80 Discontent on all sides, claims a former chief of 
the Forest Service, is a sign of the multiple use concept in 
action.~ 
This characterization of the Forest Service as an es-
sentially pluralist organization is reinforced by a number 
of other studies. Charles Davis and Sandra Davis, for exam-
ple, find in their Wyoming case study that a pluralist advo-
cacy coalition model with its multiple actors and access 
points offers a much better explanation of local Forest Ser-
vice and BLM administration than the traditional iron trian-
gle model.~ Although their focus is a bit broader, William 
Klay and James McElveen come to a similar conclusion in 
their Florida case study of wildlife management. In this 
79 Ibid. 280. According to Rosenbaum, pleasing as many 
parties and making as few enemies as possible by bringing as 
many interests into the fold as it can, is the overriding 
desire of all agencies. In many ways it is simply a function 
of organizations' inherent desire to expand. Walter Rosen-
baum, Environmental Politics and Policies (Washington D.C.: 
CQ Press, 1985), 35. 
80 culhane, Public Lands Politics, 332-339. 
81 Former Forest Service Chief Richard McArdle cited in 
Henning and Mangun, 194. 
~Davis and Davis, 18-19. 
301 
case, the authors find Heclo's issue network model more ap-
propriate than the iron triangle due in part to the unco-
optable zero-sum nature of the policy demands of the compet-
ing interests involved.83 
Although it certainly increases political conflict, a 
multiple clientele, pluralist theorists suggest, presents 
certain important advantages to the Forest Service as well. 
Besides preventing capture, a fragmented and competitive 
constituency, as mentioned previously, inevitably strength-
ens an agency's autonomy.~ In the case of the Forest Ser-
vice, Culhane reports that agency personnel routinely use 
interests as buffers to off set the pressures of other inte-
rests.as Such a situation, pluralists argue, actually has 
the fortuitous effect of integrating pluralistic administra-
tion with agency values and expertise. "Political bargain-
ing" claim Simmons and Dennis, "is supposed to establish the 
parameters within which scientific management can be used by 
trained land managers."U According to Culhane, this inte-
gration is due to a rare coincidence of agency mandate and 
83 William Klay and James McElveen, "Planning as a Vehicle 
for Policy Formulation and Accomodation in an Evolving Sub-
government" Policy Studies Journal 19:3-4 (1991), 527-533. 
~McFarland, 23; Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 227. 
85 Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 228. 
u William Dennis and Randy Simmons "From Illusion to Res-
ponsibility: Rethinking Regulation of Federal Public Lands" 
in Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clarke 
(editors), Controversies in Environmental Politics (Albany 
NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), 68. ·rt is im-
portant to note that the authors are actually critical of 
this model they describe. 
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the political environment. Both the Forest Service and the 
BLM: 
.... have so arranged matters that the political neces-
sity of responding to their multiple clienteles rein-
forces the dictates of their professional experience 
and statutory mandates [i.e. multiple use laws]. Most 
agencies in the federal bureaucracy are not so f ortun-
ate.~ 
This resulting hybrid of professional values and plur-
alist mediation differs somewhat from classic pluralism, ac-
cording to Davis and Davis, in that the Forest Service's 
role as a broker: 
.... is less a process of bargaining between PLMs [pro-
fessional land managers] and interest groups than a 
relatively open decisionmaking process guided by ad-
ministrators who rely heavily upon professional values 
to justify their actions.~ 
What this balance of professionalism and responsive-
ness brings, according to the Forest Service's defenders, 
are enhanced opportunities for the agency to be flexible, 
innovative, and open enough to encompass changing clients, 
87 Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 341. It is important to 
note that this pluralist model of Forest Service administra-
tion is at odds with Kelso's or Cobb and Elder's vision of 
non-rationalist pluralist agencies from which only respon-
siveness and not rational, impartial implementation can be 
hoped for. Proponents of Forest Service pluralism, on the 
other hand, tend to argue that the agency can "have its cake 
and eat it too" so to speak by being responsive and balanced 
while also maintaining it professional competence and integ-
rity. It is equally important to note that the ideology of 
the Progressive reform movement from which the Forest Ser-
vice sprang relied heavily upon the traditional model of 
professional, apolitical administration. This may, there-
fore, account for the agency's traditionally close associa-
tion with elite, professional administration. 
~Davis and Davis, 18-19. 
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demands, and policy challenges; precisely the opposite qual-
ities attributed to the agency by its critics. 
Participation and the Forest Service 
One of the most important indicators of how open 
Forest Service administration is would be the role which 
participation plays in the agency's decisionmaking 
process. 89 The institutionalization of public participation 
in Forest Service policymaking has come about through both 
externally imposed mandates and internal agency directives. 
Legislatively, public participation has been established, 
expanded, and/or specified by a number of statutes including 
the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, RPA, FLPMA, NFMA, 
and NEPA. 90 NEPA especially has been a cornerstone of the 
participation process. By requiring an environmental impact 
statement with mandatory public input for any federal action 
89 Public participation is defined by Henning and Mangun 
as "that part of the decisionmaking process which provides 
opportunity and encouragement for the public to express its 
views. It assures that proper attention will be given to 
public concerns and preferences when decisions are made. 
Such participation includes involvement or consultation in 
planning, decisionmaking, and management activities dealing 
with environmental affairs .... Effective participation re-
quires the availability of adequate non-technical informa-
tion, public encouragement, and opportunities to use that 
information." Henning and Mangun, 61. With the Forest Ser-
vice, participation usually takes a number of forms includ-
ing written comment, public meetings, field trips, public 
workshops as well as informal interaction and negotiation. 
90 The Administrative Procedure Act established the ini-
tial basis for public participation in administrative pol-
icymaking; RPA, FLPMA, and NFMA all established specific 
guidelines and mechanisms for participation in the Forest 
Service policymaking process. 
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with potentially significant environmental effects, NEPA 
provides the framework for most of the formal participation 
that occurs in the Forest Service's policymaking process. 
Besides these legally mandated participatory require-
ments, there have been a number of internal Forest Service 
directives and initiatives (New Perspectives being the most 
recent) which over the past several decades have supposedly 
established and reaffirmed the role of public participation 
and the agency's commitment to incorporating it. As a res-
ult, there are very few observers today who would deny the 
institutionalization of at least some degree of participa-
tion into the Forest Service policymaking process.91 
It is not, therefore, the existence of opportunities 
to participate that is at the center of most academic de-
bate. What the debate focuses on is whether this participa-
tion is substantive and truly influences and is incorporated 
into Forest Service policymaking or whether it is an elabor-
ate and highly symbolic facade aimed at achieving a veneer 
of legitimacy for essentially pre-determined policy outputs. 
91 0ne notable exceptation to this would be Nickolas 
Facaros, who takes a very strict legal view. He argues that 
the Forest Service does not live up to even the most basic 
requirements of NFMA and CEQ regulations. In his case study 
of the Willamette National Forest, he finds that the Forest 
Service "did little to affirmatively encourage and facili-
tate .... involvement in the planning process" and "next to 
nothing to bring .... the general U.S. population into the 
planning process." Nickolas Facaros, "Public Involvement in 
National Forest Planning: What the Council on Environmental 
Quality Requires and the Forest Service Neglects" Journal of 
Environmental Law and Litigation 4 (1989), 34. 
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The pluralist position, of course, clearly supports 
the notion that participation is a major and meaningful com-
ponent of Forest Service policymaking and that the agency is 
very much responsive to public and interest group input. 
Culhane states that: 
Public participation is not a passive public relations 
exercise. It is so thoroughly intertwined in the agen-
cies' formal decisionmaking sequences that it is an 
integral part of public lands policymaking.92 
The main conclusion of Culhane's detailed analysis in 
Public Lands Politics is that a great deal of variance in 
local public lands policies can be explained by the makeup 
of local administrators'constituencies. In other words, in-
terest groups were found to have a significant influence on 
Forest Service policymaking (though in a manner far differ-
ent than a capture or iron triangle situation).93 In a fol-
lowup test of Culhane's findings which examined mail com-
ments, Paul Mohai also found public input to be influential 
in the policymaking process, although he left open the pos-
sibility that this responsiveness may be shaded by some de-
gree of agency subjectivity.94 Later research by Culhane, 
meanwhile, finds the Forest Service as firmly committed as 
ever to participation but somewhat overwhelmed by the rising 
92 Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 333. 93 Ibid. 
~Paul Mohai, "Public Participation and Natural ~esource 
Decision-Making: The Case of the RARE II Decisions" Natural 
Resources Journal 27 (1987), 153-155. 
volume of written comments it receives.95 He claims that 
this has prevented meaningful responses to much written 
input and suggests that the agency reduce its reliance on 
coding and analyzing mail and emphasize instead workshops 
and public meetings.% 
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Critics of the Forest Service, on the other hand, take 
a far dimmer view of the true role and nature of participa-
tioa. Although most will concede that the opportunities to 
participate are fairly plentiful, they argue that participa-
tion as it occurs today is essentially an exercise in public 
relations; a formality to satisfy legal requirements and 
lend an air of legitimacy to internally (or worse, timber 
industry) derived policies. Twight, for example, finds the 
Forest Service, regardless of mandated requirements, to be 
hostile towards and suspicious of public input: 
.... despite massive public involvement efforts, feed-
back from clients and supportive groups is treated 
perfunctorily or has little apparent effect on organi-
zational decisions .... structural characteristics of 
the Forest Ser~ice appear to preclude adaptive nego-
tiations or decisions made through citizen participa-
tion. 97 
This "anti-political" attitude, contends Twight, has 
its roots in the agency's elitist rationalist origins which 
emphasize the agency's technical expertise and distrusts any 
~Paul Culhane "Public Participation in National Forest 
Planning: Is it Different or Just More?" conference paper, 
Western Political Science Association, annual meeting, Seat-
tle% WA (April 1991), 1-11. 
Ibid. 10-12. 
97 Twight, 27. 
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alternative source of policymaking.98 If the increased re-
quirements for participation (in NFMA or NEPA) have achieved 
anything, argue Twight and Lyden, it is that agency values 
have entrenched and hardened further as an adaptation to 
guarantee cohesion in the face of new demands and increased 
scrutiny. 99 
Jim Britell, an environmental activist and veteran of 
numerous Forest Service meetings and workshops on the Sis-
kiyou, strongly supports this view of Forest Service partic-
ipation as being less than authentic.100 Regarding public 
input in the formulation of ten-year forest plans, he claims 
that: 
In theory, forest planning is a rational sifting and 
evaluation of facts and observations which produces 
possible courses of action that logically flow from 
the facts. In reality, most government planning is the 
systematic collection of evidence to justify predeter-
mined conclusions. The important outcomes of most 
planning processes are decided before planning begins 
.... Information is gathered so the agency can proceed 
with what it intended to do all along. Agencies seek 
your input not to act on it, but to document for the 
file the fact that they made an honest attempt to ob-
tain it. Thus, agencies collect data to file it and 
thus satisfy NEPA requirements .... From an agency's 
point of view it is perfectly logical to aggressively 
seek your input, then just as aggressively ignore 
it. 101 
In order to maintain its masquerade as an agency truly 
concerned with public input while still getting what it 
98 Ibid. 111. 
99 Twight and Lyden, "Multiple Use vs. Organizational Com-
mitment," 481. 100 Jim Britell, "When You Must Negotiate .... Negotiate to 
Win" Forest Watch (May 1991), 17-24. 101 Ibid. 18. 
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wants, Britell argues that the Forest Service has become ex-
tremely sophisticated in its orchestration of public meet-
ings and negotiations. By employing principles of group psy-
chology, conflict management, and other persuasive tech-
niques, Britell finds that: 
managers or facilitators choreograph meetings so that 
peer group pressure smothers substance. Even people 
who strongly disapprove of deforestation are often 
carried along into acquiescing to things they know are 
wrong. 102 
According to Britell, their never-ending quest for the 
appearance of consensus leads the Forest Service to "class-
ify public reaction in two categories: 'yes' and 'maybe' .... 
nonresponse is as good as a positive and enthusiastic 'yes'. 
Silence is endorsement." 1~ 
Other critics point to the entire EIS process as being 
of questionable substantive value. While it has led to sub-
stantial changes in administrative procedure, argues Rosen-
baum, NEPA has yet to translate into real changes in policy. 
This is because the courts have thus far interpreted the act 
to require an agency to merely list impacts, however damag-
ing, rather than actually alter its policies. 104 According 
to critics, this reduces the EIS to nothing more than a pro-
102 Ibid. 21. 
103 Ibid. 19. 
104 Walter Rosenbaum, The End of Illusion: NEPA and the 
Limits of Judicial Review" in Stuart Nagel (editor), Envi-
ronmental Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), 
261-268. The courts' interpretations notwithstanding, the 
truest original intentions of NEPA are, to this day, unclear 
to scholars. 
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cedural requirement. "Virtually nobody," claims Lynton Cald-
well, "seems to read and make use of environmental impact 
statements, particularly the decisionmakers who must act on 
the projects for which the statements are prepared.",~ 
Can the Forest Service Change? 
An issue that has long concerned students of bureau-
cracy involves whether agencies are flexible enough to 
change or whether principles of bureaucratic structure or 
behavior prevent this. Most critics of the Forest Service 
tend to discount the possibility for any meaningful change 
in the agency. While capture theorists would implicate 
single-client domination106 , organizational values theorists 
argue that rigid socialization breeds a stubborn adherence 
to agency norms and values which resists change at all 
costs. Budget driven models, meanwhile, would stress the 
constraints placed upon the agency's policy outputs by bud-
getary realities. In any of these scenarios, the most that 
can be expected are superficial and highly symbolic gestures 
which attempt to put a new face on business as usual. 
There are other theorists, though, most notably Daniel 
Mazmanian and Jeanne Nienaber, who suggest quite the oppo-
1~ Caldwell quoted in Walter Rosenbaum, "The Bureaucracy 
and Environmental Policy" in James Lester (editor), Environ-
mental Politics and Policies (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press), 218. 
106 Capture theorists would have to admit, though, that a 
captured agency did change from its earlier "watchdog" phase 
into being captured. Still, they tend to stress the persis-
tence of this situation once it develops. 
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site; any agency interested in maintaining itself as a via-
ble organization can and will adapt to a changing political 
environment. 1~ In fact, Clarke and McCool consider this 
adaptability to be one of the primary reasons for the Forest 
Service's "superstar" status.1~ 
The issue of whether the Forest Service can change has 
become especially important in the last several decades be-
cause of profound changes in the political context within 
which the agency must operate. There is near-universal con-
sensus among scholars that the Forest Service began as a 
strongly utilitarian and elitist agency. For a good deal of 
its history, it operated with little outside interference, 
fulfilling its preferred role as technical expert. In the 
last several decades, however, the agency's mandate has been 
expanded to embrace what Culhane considers two fundamentally 
contradictory elements: rational, comprehensive planning as 
well as a high degree of responsiveness to public input. 1~ 
The primary question, then, revolves around whether the For-
est Service will successfully make the transition and adopt 
roles and attitudes traditionally anathemic to it or respond 
with hostility, reluctance and symbolic gestures? 
107 Daniel Mazmanian and Jeanne Nienaber, Can Organiza-
tions Change? (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 
1979cJ. 
1 Clarke and McCool, 38. 
1~ Culhane, "Public Participation in Forest Service Plan-
ning," 1. 
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As we have seen, most agency critics dispute the pos-
sibility for real change in the Forest Service. As recently 
as 1988, Twight and Lyden found commodity production to 
still clearly be the primary value of the agency despite all 
of the changes that were supposed to have taken place. 110 A 
growing body of evidence, however, comes to the opposite 
conclusion. Those who characterize the Forest Service as 
flexible see it as a dynamic agency with a diverse personnel 
from which to draw new ideas. Even a half-century ago Aldo 
Leopold recognized a diversity of values in his agency where 
one group was "quite content to grow trees like cabbages" 
with "no inhibition regarding violent manipulation of na-
ture," while another group "worries on biotic as well as 
economic grounds . "111 
According to a number of researchers, trends in the 
Forest Service indicate that the dominant "cabbage-growers" 
of Leopold's dichotomy are steadily losing influence to the 
latter group. Attitudinal studies by Catherine McCarthy, 
Paul Sabatier, and John Loomis, Connie Bullis and James Ken-
nedy, and Kennedy and Thomas Quigley all show values among 
Forest Service personnel during the last decade to be shift-
ing away from a strict commodity orientation and more favor-
110 Twight and Lyden, "Multiple Use vs. Organizational 
Commitment." 
111 Leopold quoted in Frome, 4. 
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ably inclined towards public input. 112 According to Bullis, 
the agency's role is thus shifting from expert to servant 
while its culture is transforming accordingly.113 No longer 
just aloof technicians, rangers are now alleged to see their 
proper role to be as facilitators and mediators. The Forest 
Service, then, has come to be seen by change model advocates 
as less strictly aligned with a single set of traditional 
agency values. One reason, according to Bullis and Kennedy 
and Culhane, is that it has internalized the multiple use 
values foisted upon it by Congress long ago.114 
One reason put forth for this supposedly greater di-
versity of values is a growing trend in the agency towards 
the inclusion of specialists besides foresters within the 
ranks. It is argued that this new breed which includes wild-
life biologists, landscape architects, hydrologists, and 
soil scientists (as well as more women and minorities) have 
brought new perspectives and values to the agency. 11 5 
112 McCarthy, Sabatier, and Loomis, 12; Bullis and Ken-
nedy, 550-551; Kennedy and Quigley study cited in McCarthy 
and Loomis, 8. 113 Bullis cited in Tipple and Wellman, 424. 114 Bullis and Kennedy, 542; Culhane, Public Lands Poli-
tics 125-129. 11 ~ Tipple and Wellman, 424. Christopher Leman claims that 
non-foresters now outnumber foresters among Forest Service 
personnel. Even Bullis, generally an advocate of the change 
model, admits, however, that many of these newer specialists 
are not well-integrated and cannot break into the "old-boy 
network" of foresters who still constitute the real power 
structure in the agency. Leman and Bullis cited in Tipple 
and Wellman, 425 
~ 
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Tipple and Wellman argue that along with increased 
agency heterogeneity has come more internal contention. 116 A 
letter written by disgruntled Region One supervisors to 
Chief Robertson in early 1990 vividly illustrates the grow-
ing dissatisfaction within the ranks in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s: 
Many people, internally as well externally, believe 
the current emphasis of national forest programs does 
not reflect the land stewardship values reflected in 
our forest plan .... we have become a dysfunctional 
Forest Service family. 117 
The agency's legendary esprit de corps has been fur-
ther undermined recently by highly controversial whistle-
blower allegations and forced resignations of a number of 
employees, most notably Region One Forester Mumma who re-
fused to meet what he felt were unsustainably high timber 
quotas for his region. 118 Perhaps the clearest indication of 
this growing dissent has been the formation of the Associa-
tion of Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics 
(AFSEEE). The organization, to which several thousand For-
est Service employees belong, advocates strong measures for 
environmental protection and represents a dramatic schism in 
agency values. 119 
116 Tipple and Wellman, 424. 
117 Letter quoted in Egan, "Forest Service Abusing 
Role ... , " 2 6. 
118 For a summary of recent whistleblower controversies, 
see Paul Schneider, "When a Whistle Blows in the Forest .... " 
Audubon (January/February 1992), 42-49; "Forest Service 
Chor,s Whistleblowers" Environment 34 (April 1992), 23-24. 
19 A University of Idaho survey found that 93% of AFSEEE 
members vs. 45% of line officers (rangers and supervisors) 
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Tipple and Wellman attribute recent changes in the 
Forest Service to a number of factors that did not exist in 
Kaufman's day when he portrayed the agency. First, there has 
been a slew of land management legislation in the 1960s and 
70s which imposed a host of new regulatory requirements upon 
the agency. Kaufman's rangers, for example, would have never 
heard of forest plans, EISs, federally endangered species, 
or designated wilderness to name but a few. These same laws 
also mandated that the decisionmaking process be opened up 
to public input and in many cases specified how that was to 
be achieved. 120 A good argument could certainly be made that 
the Forest Service would never have embraced public partici-
pation on such a scale on its own. Finally, changes in the 
larger sociopolitical context, such as the growth of the en-
vironmental movement, changes in social values, or the in-
creased incidence of litigation and citizen monitoring, are 
alleged to have generated monumental pressures upon the 
agency. 121 
and 58% of all employees favor increased preservation of old 
growth while 21% of AFSEEE employees vs. 84% of line offi-
cers and 62% of general staff believe the agency has main-
tained environmental laws to the letter and spirit. Survey 
cited in "Studies Probe Bias in Forest Service" Inner Voice 
(Spring 19 91) , 8. 
120 Tipple and Wellman, 423. 
121 Ibid. 
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Bureaucratic Administration in the Siskiyou Rational 
Forest 
As previously mentioned, it is the ultimate aim of 
this chapter to test whether or not bureaucratic administra-
tion in the Siskiyou has conformed to pluralist principles, 
at least for the period of 1983 to 1992. Specifically, this 
is achieved through an analysis of the Siskiyou case within 
the context of the models of Forest Service behavior we have 
just reviewed. For the most part, the capture, organization-
al values, and budget-driven models are critical of the For-
est Service. For different reasons, each model finds the 
agency biased towards the interests of timber producers and 
thereby in violation of a number of criteria for pluralist 
administration. Only the pluralist/professional model, 
therefore, finds the Forest Service to be behaving in a bal-
anced, responsive and flexible manner. Table 16 sums up the 
main points of these four models. 
If the administrators of the Siskiyou National Forest 
are to be characterized as balanced, responsive, and open to 
ecological values, one would expect their behavior regarding 
the formulation and implementation of the major policy out-
puts in the Siskiyou from 1983 to 1992 to conform more 
closely to the pluralist/professional model. On the other 
hand, if the administrators' behavior more closely resembles 
any one critical model or combination thereof, it could be 
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TABLE 16 
SUMMARY OF FOUR MODELS OF FOREST SERVICE 
ADMINISTRATION1 
Nature of 
Clientele 
Access to 
Agency 
Influence 
of Partic. 
Chief 
Determinant 
of Policy 
Overall 
Competence 
Flexibility/ 
Innovation 
Balance of 
Interests 
Captured 
single/ 
dominant 
only for 
dominant 
client 
high only 
for domin-
ant client 
dominant 
client's 
demands 
low 
low 
poor 
Budget 
Driven 
irrelevant 
low/ 
closed 
low 
expansion 
of budget 
low 
low 
poor 
Organizational Pluralist 
Values-Driven 
irrelevant 
low/ 
closed 
low 
utilitar-
ian values 
low 
low 
poor 
multiple 
high/open 
to all 
clients 
high 
public 
input/ 
profession-
al values 
high 
high 
good 
1Kaufman's work falls somewhere between the organization-
al values and pluralist/professional categories. While he 
stresses the role of internal norms and values and charac-
terized the agency as a closed system, he still found the 
Forest Service to be extremely competent and fairly flex-
ible. 
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said that the Siskiyou National Forest did not operate as a 
pluralist agency.1~ 
In order to determine whether the Siskiyou National 
Forest has been as open, flexible, and responsive as plural-
ists might predict, the following questions must be consid-
ered: 
1. Did Forest Service administrators recognize and in-
teract in good faith with a multiple set of clients includ-
ing ecological interests? While a pluralist agency would be 
expected to identify as clients and cultivate good working 
relations with any and all interested parties, administra-
tors in a closed or captured agency would probably only re-
cognize one interest--the timber industry--as its client or 
at least treat that client in a clearly preferential way. 
2. Did the Siskiyou National Forest provide adequate 
opportunities for public participation and were these op-
portunities sufficiently advertised and carried out in a 
fair and balanced manner? A pluralist agency could be expec-
1~ Keep in mind, however, that this chapter's analysis 
tests only that variant of pluralist theory which charac-
terizes agencies as balanced and administrators as policy 
brokers. None of the critical Forest Service models are 
necessarily incompatible with Kelso's or Cobb and Elder's 
less idealistic vision of bureaucracies in a pluralist sys-
tem--that agencies may indeed be biased, but the system's 
overall fragmentation overcomes this. Also, it is important 
to note that technically, this chapter's analysis will not 
specifically test in any systematic way all aspects of all 
the critical models, but instead, whether the pluralist or 
critical models, broadly conceived, are more accurate. This 
does not rule out, however, speculation as to which critical 
model might be most appropriate in a given instance. 
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ted to hold numerous and varied forums as well as keep all 
potentially interested sectors of the public adequately in-
formed as to both the issues facing the Forest and upcoming 
opportunities to participate. A non-pluralistic agency, on 
the other hand, might be expected to act in a purposefully 
lax, negligent, and/or biased manner regarding both opportu-
nities :o participate and the dissemination of information 
to the public. For example, key individuals or groups may be 
left out of participatory forums, certain types of forums 
might be avoided, or crucial information regarding Forest 
Service policies and intentions might be withheld. 
3. Did the various participatory forums represent 
meaningful opportunities for public input as pluralists 
would suggest or were they merely pro forma exercises de-
signed to appease critics and technically satisfy mandated 
participation requirements? 
4. Did Siskiyou officials' values seem to be closer to 
utilitarianism and a strict timber production orientation as 
critics would charge or did they conform more to principles 
of multiple use and agency responsiveness? Was there evi-
dence that any of these values were a primary determinant of 
agency decisions? 
5. Did the Siskiyou National Forest display evidence 
of flexibility and an authentic willingness to change or did 
the agency resist accomodation and try to co-opt change 
through skillful public relations? 
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The Siskiyou National Forest and Its Clientele 
A multiple set of clients is a prerequisite for any 
agency to act as a policy broker. The previous chapter has 
made it clear that the politics of the Siskiyou have in-
volved two very well-organized interests locked in competi-
tion. To some pluralists, this fact alone rules out any po-
tential for capture. This study, however, holds out the pos-
sibility that an agency may not recognize as clients or in-
teract with all manifest interests, thus the mere existence 
of multiple interests is not enough to rule out capture. The 
real question, then, is whether ecological interests were 
fully recognized and dealt with by Siskiyou personnel. 
Amongst most all the participants interviewed, whether 
agency, timber, or environmentalist, there seemed to be a 
consensus that, at least after 1983, the Forest Service has 
recognized and granted access to a multiple clientele. That 
environmentalists were recognized as a legitimate interest 
seems to be a fact pretty much taken for granted by all con-
cerned parties. The articulate, well-organized ecological 
interests that have sprung up in the 1980s have become poli-
tically impossible to ignore. 
It was not always this way on the Siskiyou, however. 
According to the former supervisor, environmentalists had 
"been shut out on this forest for some time. I opened my 
doors .... unfortunately my predecessor hadn't." Thus, McCor-
mick had made a point to consider environmentalists as well 
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as timber interests as clients of the agency. "I saw both of 
them," states McCormick, "as valid parts of the south Oregon 
community." Even members of Earth First Siskiyou, a source 
of unending grief for the Forest Service were considered by 
McCormick, at least, as legitimate constituents of his agen-
cy. 123 
While Siskiyou environmentalists do not deny that the 
Forest Service has recogized them and granted them access, 
many have characterized their interaction with the agency as 
strained and, as one activist put it, "adversarial." One 
common complaint of the environmentalists has been a lack of 
informal access, something which all Siskiyou personnel in-
terviewed claimed they granted to all clients. More than 
anything else, this discrepancy seems to be a case of dif-
fering interpretations of what constitutes informality. To 
the Forest Service, informal access is any contact outside 
of the formal participation process (meetings, workshops, 
field trips, etc.). Environmentalists, on the other hand, 
tend to perceive of informal access as their being closely 
confided in rather than merely heard or sounded out. While 
the door to the supervisor's office was, for the most part, 
literally and figuratively open to environmentalists, the 
1n To their credit, even the most radical environmental 
groups, such as Earth First, did their homework regarding 
forest policy; a fact that the Siskiyou National Forest 
could not help but respect. This knowledgability and articu-
lateness, despite all their militance and drama, won certain 
members of radical groups a place at the table. 
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timber interests did seem privileged to more informal ac-
cess, even using the Forest Service's broader definition of 
such access. The majority of impromptu phone calls, office 
visits, and social meetings (such as SOTIA's weekly break-
fasts or dinners to which the supervisor was routinely in-
vited) tended to be between Forest Service personnel and the 
timber interests. 124 "We get to see all fifty-two cards," 
claimed one timber official who reported a great deal of in-
formal contact with the Siskiyou, especially at the lower 
ranger district level. 
While their access to the policymaking process in-
creased dramatically after McCormick's arrival in 1983, en-
vironmentalists feel that McCormick's replacement has been 
somewhat less open to them. Not surprisingly, timber offi-
cials report a much improved relationship with the supervi-
sor's office since McCormick's departure in 1990. According 
to the former supervisor, timber interests were suspicious 
of him from the start due to his background in recreational 
management rather than forestry. McCormick claims that he 
arrived at the Siskiyou "with a cloud over me. I wasn't a 
traditional timber-oriented forest supervisor." 
Timber's coolness towards McCormick did not necessari-
ly translate into close relations between the supervisor and 
1 ~ This seems to confirm Henning and Mangun's observation 
that environmentalists concerned with noneconomic land uses 
tend to have more fleeting contact with field personnel than 
do commodity interests. Henning and Mangun, 57. 
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environmentalists. Although his office was open and he pro-
fessed to have a good working relationship with both nation-
al and local environmental groups, McCormick expressed his 
exasperation at what he perceived as environmentalist in-
transigence: 
In some ways, environmental folks were getting more 
militant in spite of as much as I had invited them to 
the decisionmaking table .... I was getting frustrated 
.... it could never be good enough .... No matter what I 
cid or we did together, it was never enough .... it was 
always more they wanted. 
Under the new supervisor, though, this relationship 
has strained further. The supervisor himself characterizes 
it as "frank and candid." While there is no turning back on 
the environmentalists' hard-won access, they have now come 
to look back on McCormick's tenure far more fondly. Whether 
the new supervisor's more distant style has been a function 
of personal style, deep-seated conviction, or orders from 
above remains to be seen. 
Formal Participation: Opportunity and Conduct 
As mentioned before, a pluralist agency would be ex-
pected to offer sufficient opportunities, conducted in a 
fair and balance manner, for all interests to participate. 
While it can be said that the Siskiyou National Forest re-
cognized environmentalists as legitimate interests, the 
question remains as to precisely what opportunities for par-
ticipation were extended to them and whether these satisfied 
the criteria for pluralist administration. 
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The opportunities for formal participation required on 
the Siskiyou, as with all national forests, are spelled out 
in a variety of statutes including NEPA, NFMA, RPA, and 
FLPMA as well as the Forest Service's own Manual. While 
there are opportunities for participation on the Siskiyou 
for a whole range of decisions down to the most local and 
mundane, the most widespread and important of this partici-
pation corresponds with NEPA's EIS process. NEPA provides 
for comment periods and public meetings to accompany various 
stages of the process (see appendix F for a detailed des-
cription of these stages). Since this study concentrates on 
a series of major policy decisions, most of which required 
an EIS, the participation that is focused on here has 
largely revolved around the EIS process. 
The first step in any meaningful participation program 
is for the administrating agency to provide information on 
its plans and intentions as well as adequately announce in 
advance opportunities for participation to all potentially 
interested groups and individuals. Especially vigorous forms 
of participation may require even more detailed information 
on Forest Service activities. 
For the most part, the Siskiyou National Forest has 
strictly followed NEPA regulations and has been fairly scru-
pulous in announcing upcoming opportunities to participate, 
notifying potential participants, and keeping the public in-
formed of its general intentions. After issuing a notice of 
324 
intent (usually in major local newspapers) regarding a tim-
ber sale, or a group of sales, or other such projects, the 
Forest would rely on fairly extensive mailing and phone 
lists of potentially interested groups and individuals in 
order to solicit participants and identify key issues re-
garding the specific sale or project. Such issues are then 
developed into the various alternatives to be considered in 
the EIS. This initial process is known as scoping. 
Specific public meetings and workshops were usually 
advertised (often with full-page spreads) in a number of 
daily newspapers and radio stations in the area. In addi-
tion, the Forest Service has sometimes even produced and 
distributed their own brochures describing a proposed action 
and (when the process has proceeded to that point) listing 
and explaining the various alternatives to be considered. 
One major opportunity for public participation on the 
Siskiyou has been via the comment periods that follow the 
release of the draft and final EISs. Much of this input 
takes the form of comments sent through the mail to the For-
est Service. As discussed in chapter two, the Siskiyou has 
seen some of the highest rates of mail response in the en-
tire national forest system. 125 Mail comments, therefore, 
1a The Silver Fire Project elicted 28,000 post-draft res-
ponses, while the Forest Plan got 16,983 (compared to two to 
three thousand for an average plan). The Shasta Costa and 
Canyon Projects, for their size, also prompted extremely 
large amounts of mail; six hundred and eight hundred respec-
tively. Much of this volume might be attributed to the high 
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have clearly been the most widespread form of participation 
in terms of total number of people involved. Letters have 
ranged in length from the very brief and to the near-epic, 
while their content has run the gamut from completely unin-
formed to extremely technical and/or articulate. Many other 
letters were of a mass-produced, interest group-sponsored 
"fill-in-the-blanks" variety (such as SORA's Silver Fire 
salvage campaign). 
The Forest Service's official line regarding mail is 
that it is an integral part of its decisionmaking process 
and that each letter is thoroughly reviewed and fully con-
sidered. 126 A number of participants, though, have their 
doubts about the agency's sincerity as well as the ultimate 
usefulness of what Culhane derisively terms "mailbag-
stuffing games. "127 The most generous assessment of mail 
comment would be that it helps the agency take the public's 
pulse and identify and define issues and areas of concern. 
Even Siskiyou personnel, however, agree that it is not much 
of a factor in shaping or changing actual decisions. Al-
though the Forest did categorize and conduct content anal-
yses of the mail it received, out-and-out "vote-counting," 
according to one official was never done. Participation, 
levels of interest group organization in the Siskiyou as 
well as its high national profile. 
126 Culhane, "Public Participation .... ," 11. 
127 Ibid. 12. 
r 
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claims the supervisor, is not a "contest."1~ As a result of 
this attitude, complains one timber interest participant, 
the Forest Service is always free to implement whatever 
course it chooses regardless of a clear trend in the pub-
lic's response (which timber felt favored them): "If com-
ments go their way, they claim support; if comments go 
against them they claim they're not substantive." 
Siskiyou personnel seem to agree with Culhane's 1991 
study which finds meetings and workshops to be a far super-
ior forum for participation than mail comments.129 Although 
they involve far fewer individuals, such face-to-face meet-
ings tend to bring together key local actors and facilitate 
the sort of political interaction that is more influential 
than merely mailing in one's opinion. Face-to-face inter-
action on the Siskiyou has largely taken the following 
forms: (1) formal informational gatherings (public meetings, 
field trips, or small group briefings) in which Forest Ser-
vice officials give a presentation on their tentative plans 
128 In terms of raw numbers, timber interests, with their 
well-organized campaign of mail-in forms outnumbered envi-
ronmental responses in the Silver Fire and the Forest Plan. 
In Silver, for example, environmentalists sent only 38% of 
the responses of timber. In some of the smaller projects, 
however, environmental responses were in the majority. For 
instance, support for the environmentally preferrable al-
ternative in the Canyon DEIS outnumbered that for timber's 
alternative 69% to 18%. Siskiyou National Forest. Also, ac-
cording to the Forest Service's content analysis, longer and 
more detailed letters tended to favor environmental posi-
tions. USDA Forest Service, Siskiyou National Forest, Con-
tent Analysis Report for Silver Fire Recovery Project DEIS, 
internal document, (May 1988). 
1~ Culhane, "Public Participation .... ," 11-12. 
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and proposals and then answer questions or (2) workshops 
which have been designed as more open and informal "give-
and-take" sessions between all parties. Such workshops have 
most commonly been held in the planning periods preceeding 
the draft EIS.1~ 
Under McCormick, the Siskiyou began to rely upon work-
shops more heavily than formal public meetings, keeping the 
latter jown to the minimum required by NEPA. Applying the 
philosophy that it is "better to have [interests] on the 
front end than the back end," McCormick contended that work-
shops were the best way to encourage issue resolution and 
creative solutions and break out of the old patterns of 
"business as usual." McCormick clearly expressed his faith 
in the unabashedly pluralist notion that "creative solutions 
can come out of mixed groups with different values .... just 
sort of fightin' it out." He further reinforces this notion 
of administrator as mediator when he explains that: 
I just didn't have the idea were the balance was. I 
wanted to put the responsibility there .... with those 
1 ~Whereas the vast majority of mail comment is sent to 
the Forest in response to a DEIS or FEIS after it has been 
released, interactive participation on the Siskiyou has 
tended to occur before these decisions were made (in other 
words, before and after the DEIS). According to many parti-
cipants, the most meaningful negotiations took place before 
the draft EIS. Post-DEIS participation, both mailed and in-
teractive (usually formal meetings), has tended to focus 
more upon the draft's alternatives (especially the Forest 
Service's preferred alternative) and why a given alternative 
is opposed or supported. Post-FEIS participation, meanwhile, 
is usually by mail and most often is a last-ditch critique 
or appeal to the administrators to reconsider their decision 
before the Record of Decision is released. 
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folks [the various interests) and help them decide 
with us where the appropriate balance was as best we 
could on a local basis .... The only way I knew how to 
do that was to bring folks to the table. 
This new emphasis on less formal, more interactive 
workshops was first implemented in the Silver Fire Project. 
It reached its peak, however, during planning for Shasta 
Costa in which interests were intensely involved and kept 
closely informed. Whether workshops are truly the wave of 
the future on the Siskiyou is still not quite clear, though, 
as a number of district-level projects since Shasta Costa 
(including Canyon, Quosatana/Bradford, Two Forks, and West 
Indigo) have backed away from workshop-style 
participation. 1~ The reasons for the Forest Service's 
retreat are not certain. Time constraints, these projects' 
smaller-scale, changes in the supervisor's management style, 
exter-nal pressure from upper levels of the agency or the 
Depart-ment of Agriculture, and severe budget problems1~ 
have all been offered as possible explanations. 
Some environmentalists take this as evidence that the 
Siskiyou is still not truly committed to workshops or parti-
cipatory decisionmaking in general. While they generally ap-
plaud the planning process for the Silver Fire and Shasta 
Costa, environmentalists worry that the dearth of workshops 
and emphasis on presentational public meetings in succeeding 
131 The Canyon project did, however, permit a few environ-
mentalists to sit in on a several project planning sessions 
as observers. 
1 ~ Workshops are expensive and labor-intensive; the plan-
ning process for Shasta Costa alone cost nearly $1 million. 
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projects may be the shape of things to come. One activist 
complained that environmentalists even had to go to the ex-
tent of filing Freedom of Information Act requests for in-
formation on the recent Canyon decision. Environmentalists 
allege that the Siskiyou has not always been forthcoming 
with more detailed records and data that have been requested 
at other times (especially concerning sensitive isues such 
as refcrestation failure rates or sustained yield models). 
According to one environmentalist, the Siskiyou would 
like to have everyone believe that it is on the cutting edge 
regarding workshop participation. Perhaps in the late 1980s 
it was, but other forests have certainly surpassed it. The 
activist, who once considered the Siskiyou as the vanguard, 
has since been exposed to the participation processes on 
other national forests (some of which regularly hold nego-
tiating workshops all the way up to the release of the FEIS) 
and now characterizes the Forest as "extremely behind the 
times." 
While these complaints and doubts cannot be brushed 
aside, it is still probably fair to say that, overall, the 
trend in the Siskiyou, at least for most of the time frame 
of this study, has been towards the increased sharing of 
information and opportunities to participate. "Generally 
there's more [meetings] than you could keep up with," ad-
mitted one environmental activist. What is less clear is how 
meaningful these meetings and workshops, however plentiful, 
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have been. Timber industry participants, for example, tend 
to be skeptical about the value of sitting everyone down at 
the same table. One timber official acknowledged the neces-
sity of speaking up and being counted, but doubted the prob-
ability of finding consensus in such a polarized environ-
ment: 
They get you together and we're supposed to all hold 
hands and go home happy .... it doesn't work that way. 
If we move off our polarized position and they move 
off theirs, then they've given up ground or we've 
given up ground. That's what it amounts to. So you 
can't--you have to go in there and say "we want max 
timber" and they go in and say "we want max environ-
mental protection" and try to let the Forest Service 
sort it out .... 
The Forest Service, according to the timber official, 
is thus plagued with indecision; by trying to "make everyone 
happy" and not "raise a red flag" to anyone, it remains par-
alyzed. Another timber official, meanwhile, had a different 
complaint in that he found workshops to be just a big sales 
pitch: "It reminds me of going to an Amway meeting .... They 
just try to sell you on how wonderful it is." 
Not surprisingly, the former supervisor reports that, 
at least initially, he met quite a bit of resistance from 
timber interests, especially the head of SORA at the time, 
who "just didn't like to sit around a table and work things 
out with [Earth First members]." The workshops, says McCor-
mick, "caused some people some heartburn." 
Although McCormick reports that the environmentalists 
have generally been far more willing and eager to sit down 
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with the enemy and negotiate, 1~ they too have had serious 
misgivings about the workshop process. Environmentalists in 
the Siskiyou have tended to have a fairly low sense of eff i-
cacy regarding their participation. They seem to perceive of 
workshops and even the whole EIS process as a combination of 
public relations and a minor regulatory obligation that the 
agency must attend to before doing what it plans to do any-
way. As a result, they come to see themselves on a workshop 
panel as "sacrificial lambs ... 134 
Siskiyou environmentalists, therefore, tend to believe 
that the EIS process has forced the Forest Service to make 
only procedural rather than substantive changes in its pol-
icy. One activist argued that "planners must collect envi-
ronmental information before they can legally off er timber 
sales, but if they acted on the information they collect 
they would often have to abandon the sales."1~ Similarly, 
another environmentalist complained that regarding NEPA, the 
Siskiyou was "following the letter of the law, but not ne-
cessarily the intent of the law." 
A Siskiyou official, however, disputes this, arguing 
that NEPA requires policymakers merely to look at all an-
gles. It does not, he offers candidly, legally require the 
1~ One district ranger, however, has noticed that the en-
vironmentalist's interest in coming to the bargaining table 
has waned somewhat since their hand has been strengthened by 
successful lawsuits. 134 Britell, 18. 135 Ibid. 18-19. 
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agency to be more democratic or even make better deci-
sions .1~ Not all Siskiyou officials see the purpose of par-
ticipation to be the achievement of consensus as the former 
supervisor had. Instead, the current supervisor describes a 
successful program of participation as that which minimizes 
objections rather than maximizes support. The supervisor's 
rationale is that the high level of political conflict in 
the Siskiyou makes consensus impossible. 
Ironically, the supervisor's perception of the goal of 
workshops and participation as the minimization of objection 
is not all that far removed from the environmentalists' 
claim that workshops are designed to manage dissent. Accord-
ing to a veteran participant of Siskiyou workshops, the main 
use of such public forums is for the Siskiyou's planners to 
promote the appearance of approval as they scramble to meet 
unsustainable quotas on a rapidly depleting forest base.137 
Because they are "planning timber sales that are worse and 
worse"138 in roadless areas, steep inclines, owl habitat, 
and similarly controversial areas, it is argued that they 
desperately need environmentalist acquiesence to avoid 
lengthy appeals and lawsuits. Using the workshop process and 
136 A number of court rulings on NEPA suggest that at 
least in terms of judicial interpretation thus far, the For-
est Service official is right. What Congress truly intended 
this somewhat ambiguous mandate to be is another question. 
It does seem to defeat the law's purpose to just identify 
harmful impacts and then carry them out anyway. See Rosen-
baumf "The End of Illusion .... ," 261-268. 13 Britell, 17-18. 138 Ibid. 1 7. 
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highly skilled facilitators, the Siskiyou, more than ever 
before, has sought to tame the environmentalist threat by 
letting them in on the process, and, as any normal bureau-
cratic agency would would be expected to do, co-opt the 
client. Says the activist: 
Agencies are willing to give activists an endless sup-
ply of elk viewing areas, maps, rides in helicopters, 
new trails and schmoozing. Anything and everything ex-
cept trees. 139 
Unfortunately for the Forest Service, though, it is 
this last item that the environmentalists want most. As 
pointed out earlier, Klay and McElveen identify zero-sum 
interests as the hardest of all to co-opt, hence the con-
f lict and sense of inefficacy and dissatisfaction on the 
part of the environmentalists. 
How Influential Was Participation? 
The ultimate question regarding participation, then, 
is: did it really matter? Was public input truly incorpo-
rated into the agency's decisionmaking process and did this 
input really have the power to influence or change the agen-
cy's decisions? As might be expected, the Siskiyou's admin-
istrators were confident that participation on their forest 
really did matter and accounted for "a lot of decisionmak-
ing." They characterized it as "very important," and having 
a "major influence." 
139 Ibid. 20. 
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Interest group participants, however, have tended to 
be far less convinced of their influence and efficacy as we 
have previously seen. Both timber interests and environmen-
talists have generally felt that participation has been ef-
fective only when it concerns minor issues. "The big picture 
issues," complains one timber official, "don't change at 
all." Only in rare cases when the stakes are low enough, re-
ports one environmentalist, has she seen workshop participa-
tion have a direct effect in swaying or altering a decision. 
Otherwise, she claims, the Siskiyou just goes through "lock-
step NEPA." According to another activist, it is usually a 
matter of "justifying a decision already made." 
Some of the interest group participants' characteriza-
tions, though, were a bit more charitable. One activist, for 
instance, conceded that the Siskiyou's administrators "do 
change some of their decisions if we put enough pressure on 
them," but, she was careful to add, "I don't feel that they 
significantly change them." Another interviewee admitted 
that participation was at least partially effective at en-
couraging New Forestry techniques. According to one environ-
mentalist, the Siskiyou's administrators do occasionally "do 
some things in response to the public." To timber, mean-
while, the importance of just getting in there around the 
table to off set the demands of the environmentalists was 
justification enough to participate. 
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Still, real change, environmentalists argue, has come 
thus far only from lawsuits. Because of this fear of law-
suits, environmentalists maintain that the Siskiyou tends to 
use the participatory process "to write litigation-proof 
documents" by using environmentalist objections to point out 
to the agency their own legal weak spots. While the activist 
meant this as a criticism, others might construe some posi-
tive effects in such influence if, in fact, it leads to less 
violations of environmental laws. 
Actually measuring the influence of participation upon 
policymaking in a systematic way is an incredibly difficult 
task. One problem is there is a certain amount of subjectiv-
ity inherent in any such analysis. While a well-designed an-
alysis will eliminate some of this, in the end, the nature, 
motives, and intent of Forest Service actions as well as 
where these decisions fall on a political spectrum are still 
largely subjective matters. For example, Culhane, who sees 
the Sierra Club as "radical" and "extremist" 1~ could be 
criticized by some as seeing even the slightest policy crumb 
thrown to environmentalists (an elk viewing area, perhaps?) 
as sufficient evidence of Forest Service balance and res-
ponsiveness to input. Another analyst with a different set 
of expectations as to what constitutes fair and balanced, on 
the other hand, might abide by far more rigorous criteria 
for evidence of responsiveness. 
1 ~ Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 154, 167. 
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Is it, for instance, the sign of a balanced compromise 
or just "policy crumbs" to plan to log only 65% of old 
growth instead of 75% or enter roadless areas from the edges 
rather than through the center? How can one precisely iden-
tify so relative a concept as compromise when dealing with 
so non-quantifiable a concept as ecological values and de-
mands? Likewise, what precisely distinguishes a meaningful 
response from a f radulent or symbolic one? Which was Shasta 
Costa? A strong case could certainly be made for either 
characterization. 
Another problem in trying to determine the true in-
fluence of participation is the unavoidable subtlety and 
multi-dimensionality of the relationship between participa-
tion and Forest Service behavior. While it would certainly 
be analytically more tidy if the former led directly to the 
latter, reality is a much messier situation as a multitude 
of other variables make the politics of the Siskiyou far 
more complex. What portion of a policy decision, for exam-
ple, could be accounted for by agency goals and values, per-
sonal values, external political pressures, internal budget-
ary constraints, or legislative directives? 
Proving the influence of participation becomes even 
more difficult when there are two interests of roughly equal 
power pulling in different directions. The thesis of Cul-
hane's study is that a local manager's policy outputs will 
roughly reflect the makeup of his or her constituency; if 
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the environmentalists are better organized in one area, then 
policies could be expected to be more favorable to them than 
in an area where mining or timber interests hold an edge.141 
As clearly shown in chapter four, competing interests in the 
Siskiyou were in a rough balance of power. Should we then 
expect a corresponding middle-of-the-road balance of Forest 
Service outputs or does this, as Culhane admits happens 
someti~es, lead to both interests cancelling each other out 
so that the agency "could effectively ignore public 
participation input" and act autonomously?1~ 
Despite all the difficulties, limitations, and impre-
cisions inherent in such an analysis, it is still clearly 
worth trying to systematically determine as well as possible 
to what extent participation on the Siskiyou has had a real 
influence. This shall be attempted by examining all of the 
post-1983 policy initiatives on the Siskiyou which required 
environmental impact statements and the formal participation 
process that accompanies it up until the end of 1992. Of 
these, four were final EISs 1~ , while three other projects 
had reached only the draft EIS stage by the end of this 
1 ~ Ibid. 333. 
1~ Ibid. 240. 
1~ Technically, the FEIS merely states the final pre-
ferred alternative for policy action. The true final deci-
sion after which policy can actually be implemented is the 
Record of Decision (ROD). The ROD, though, almost always 
formally chooses and authorizes the FEIS-preferred alter-
native. As of the end of 1992, only the Silver Fire project 
and the Forest Plan had had formal RODs issued. 
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study's time frame. 1~ In addition to these EIS decisions, 
one non-EIS policy output is considered here as well. This 
decision, involving roadbuilding and timber sales in the 
North Kalmiopsis was made prior to the point in late 1980s 
when roadless entry automatically required an EIS. In all, 
these eight policy initiatives account for the overwhelming 
portion of political conflict and interest group activity on 
the Siskiyou from 1983-1992. 
As we have seen in this chapter and the last, interest 
group participation in the Siskiyou has involved in roughly 
equal proportions both timber interests and environmental-
ists. However, one also needs to consider the historic domi-
nance of timber interests in the Siskiyou's participatory 
process all the way up until the point when environmental-
ists began to seriously organize and challenge the Forest 
Service in the early to mid-1980s. If one assumes that par-
ticipation really matters, then it could be said that prior 
to 1983, the Siskiyou's administrators were being influenced 
by the participation, largely informal, 1~ of predominantly 
one interest--the local timber industry. Presuming then that 
1~ While the final decision is sometimes quite a bit dif-
ferent from the draft, the preferred alternative identified 
in the draft usually serves as a starting point from which 
Forest Service decisionmakers can then modify or fine-tune 
their final decision. As such, the draft stage policy deci-
sions represented by these three cases, though they may 
eventually be altered, still provide a fairly useful indica-
tor of the substance and direction of Siskiyou policymaking. 
1~ It was not until the EIS process was establish~d by 
NEPA that there was much of a formal participation process, 
besides the written appeals of timber sales. 
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timber voices were essentially the only ones being heard by 
the Forest Service before 1983, any increase after that 
point in bipartisan participation might be expected to lead 
to more ecologically sound outputs than had been generated 
before, even if that participation also included a fairly 
equal presence of timber interests. 
The assumption that this study works from, then, is 
that timber's participation has in one form or another been 
there all along and thus it tends to merely reinforce pres-
sure that is already there. Environmental participation, on 
the other hand, presents a whole new set of demands that 
have never before been confronted or addressed. Thus, if 
participation is truly influential on the Siskiyou, we could 
expect increased formal participation in general to lead to 
more environmental outputs. Less formal participation, on 
the other hand should lead to an increased reliance upon the 
agency's own timber production goals and the informal con-
tacts and previous patterns of influence that have histori-
cally favored timber interests. 
Among the eight Siskiyou policy decisions this study 
compares, distinctions can be made as to the degree of for-
mal participation (high, medium, or low) which occurred pri-
or to the decision as well as the decision's relative posi-
tion on a timber-environmental continuum in which 0 = the 
timber position and 1.0 = the environmental position. A de-
cision's overall value on the scale is determined by where 
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it fell relative to the timber industry's and the environ-
mentalist's preferred alternatives in regards to four vari-
ables: timber harvest volume, road construction, roadless 
areas, and old growth. 1~ If increased participation truly 
helped environmentalists' to better achieve their goals, 
then index values should be higher in those decisions fea-
turing increased participation and lower in decisions made 
with lowers levels of participation (for details regarding 
how categories were determined and what the participant's 
pre-draft positions and concerns were, see appendices G and 
H). 
Table 17 shows that there seems to be at least some 
correlation between the level of formal participation and 
how strictly timber-oriented a decision was. For example, 
the two most clearly timber-oriented decisions, the Two 
Forks draft and the North Kalmiopsis timber sales of 1982-
1987 both featured the least formal participation. The North 
Kalmiopsis sales, for which EISs were not prepared, featured 
no real formal participation at all, while the Two Forks 
project held no public meetings in the crucial period before 
the draft when issues are identified and alternatives drawn 
1 ~ The position of the North Kalmiopsis decision, because 
no EIS was prepared for it, does not have an exact value on 
this scale, so its position is less quantitatively precise. 
I have placed it where I have on the low end towards timber 
due to its aggressive harvest targets (employing standard 
clearcut methods), high road mileage, including the extreme-
ly controversial Bald Mountain road, and entry into a frag-
ile roadless area with the largest stands of old growth in 
the Forest. 
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TABLE 17 
SISKIYOU NATIONAL FOREST POLICY OUTPUTS 1983-1992: 
LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION BY TIMBER-ENVIRONMENTAL INDEX VALUE1 
Timber 
o I 
Environmental 
I I 2 
Formal 
Participation 
High 
Moderate 
Low 
/*-FPF 
FPD 
*-TFD 
*-NK 
*-SCF 
**-SFD 
SFF/ 
CF-* *-CD 
**-WID QD/ 
*-SCD 
CD = Canyon project DEIS (T-E index value=.49) 
CF= Canyon project FEIS (.42) 
FPO= Forest Plan DEIS (.17) 
FPF =Forest Plan FEIS (.20) 
NK = North Kalmiopsis timber sales2 
QD = Quosatana/Bradford project DEIS (.48) 
SCD =Shasta Costa project DEIS (.62) 
SCF =Shasta Costa project FEIS (.41) 
SFD =Silver Fire Recovery Project DEIS (.43) 
SFF =Silver Fire Recovery Project FEIS (.41) 
TFD =Two Forks timber sales DEIS (.08) 
WID =West Indigo project DEIS (.50) 
1 In the timber-environmental index, O =the timber posi-
tion and 1.0 = the environmental position. For details as to 
how this index was calculated as well as how levels of par-
ticipation were determined see appendix G. 2The North Kalmiopsis timber sales do not have a specific 
index value. See page 340, footnote 146. 
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up. The only meeting held for Two Forks was to announce and 
explain the DEIS after it was produced. As for outcomes, the 
preliminary Two Forks decision features a substantial timber 
harvest that consumes old growth and roadless areas to a de-
gree higher than even the maximum harvest alternative. The 
agency's preferred alternative will have, in their own 
words, a "moderate to high impact" on interior forest-
dependent species. 1U The North Kalmiopsis sales were also 
extremely timber production-oriented; they opened up parts 
of the largest roadless area outside the wilderness to 
clearcut sales and mandated the construction of the very 
controversial eighteen mile Bald Mountain Road to sever the 
North Kalmiopsis from the Kalmiopsis Wilderness. 
Those decisions featuring moderate levels of formal 
participation (mail comment and pre-draft public meetings, 
but no workshops) scored higher on the timber-environmental 
scale. Though still quite timber production-oriented, they 
made some environmental modifications and concessions. Like 
the previous decisions, these too entered roadless and old 
growth areas, but most of these decisions were somewhat 
scaled down from the timber volume and road construction 
targets found in the Forest Plan or the projects' original 
1u USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siski-
you National Forest, Two Forks .Timber Sales and Other Pro-
jects Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Siskiyou Nation-
al Forest, 1992), sec. II, 17. 
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proposed action. 148 They also tended, to one extent or 
another, to incorporate more environmentally sound logging 
practices regarding both silvicultural techniques, stream 
protection, and the minimization of fragmentation. 
Those decisions in which there was heavy formal parti-
cipation (mail comment, pre-draft public meetings, and work-
shops) tended to cluster around the same position on the 
scale as the moderate participation decisions. The Shasta 
Costa FEIS and Silver Fire decisions featured considerable 
logging but also at least some features for environmental 
protection. Only the Shasta Costa draft clearly conformed to 
the expectations of high participation/high environmental 
protection. The draft of this project, which featured per-
haps the most intense participation of any decision on the 
Siskiyou went pretty far not only in instituting fairly far-
reaching changes in forestry practices, but also in reducing 
timber harvests, roads, and intrusions into old growth and 
roadless areas from the levels suggested in the Plan and the 
proposed action.10 
148 The proposed action (PA) is the original tentative 
proposal to commence activities in a given area according to 
the Forest Plan. It serves as a starting point from which 
the scoping process takes place and alternatives to this 
action are drawn up. On rare occasions, the draft EIS will 
stick to the PA as its preferred alternative. 
16 The reason the draft and final EISs are considered 
separately in this analysis is because FEISs are usually 
subject to more outside political pressures. For example the 
Forest Plan and Shasta Costa drafts were released af~er some 
fairly heavy public participation only to be altered in the 
final stage by external political pressures coming from Con-
gress, the state, or the upper levels of the agency. Consi-
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In sharp contrast to the Shasta Costa draft was the 
Forest Plan decision which, although it included some fairly 
heavy levels of participation, was strongly timber-oriented. 
The fact that only the Shasta Costa draft among the high 
participation decisions also had a high environmental score 
may suggest that some sort of threshold exists whereby par-
ticipation beyond a certain level often hits the brick wall 
of othe~ decisionmaking factors such as agency goals, exter-
nal political pressures, and so on. Still, the Siskiyou's 
policy decisions do show at least some support for the no-
tion of low participation leading to more pro-timber out-
comes and vice versa. Overall, then, the layout of points in 
table 17 is configured in such a way as to suggest that par-
ticipation is necessary to achieve greater balance in Forest 
Service decisionmaking, but not sufficient by itself to do 
so. 
If participation on the Siskiyou truly mattered and 
the Forest Service did indeed meet the pluralist ideal of 
responsiveness, we could theoretically expect one of two 
things to occur in this polarized political realm: (1) the 
agency's decisions would consistently feature a blend of 
ecological and timber-oriented provisions or (2) looking 
back over time, some policy outputs would be primarily 
timber-oriented while others would be predominantly disposed 
dering the draft separately can thus provide an additional, 
perhaps even more authentic measure of the impact of parti-
cipation. 
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towards ecological principles. In either scenario a certain 
overall balance between commodity production and preserva-
tion could be expected. 
Judging from the actual policy decisions issued in the 
Siskiyou from 1983 to 1992, it seems that the second scen-
ario could safely be ruled out. All major policy outputs 
during that time involved substantial commodity production 
activities; no decision rejected in any significant way the 
opportunity for timber production in favor of wildlife or 
ecosystem preservation. Perhaps this should be no great sur-
prise; after all, the agency's self-proclaimed business is 
to produce timber (more on values later) and most of these 
decisions revolved around mandatory EISs required to com-
mence logging activities in environmentally sensitive areas. 
If the agency did not occasionally support the ecolog-
ists' position wholeheartedly in the various major deci-
sions, then the question must shift to whether ecological 
values were at least partially incorporated somehow into the 
agency's decisions. This is a much harder and more subjec-
tive judgement to make. To the fairly neutral observer, how-
ever, the answer would have to be yes, but not to a very 
great extent. And certainly not anywhere near to the extent 
that commodity production goals are currently stressed. En-
vironmental participation has, nevertheless, had at least 
some impact. Most timber projects on the Forest today employ 
some sort of New Forestry techniques and the agency is far 
346 
less likely to engage in the full-blown, at-all-costs clear-
cutting of the 1960s, 70s, and early to mid-'80s. The Forest 
Service has been forced to at least slow down and consider 
stream quality, wildlife, roadless areas, and old growth, 
all of which were of no real concern to the forester of 
thirty or forty years ago. To be sure, the agency is still 
as eager as ever to cut timber, but environmentalist parti-
cipation has, in the very least, forced them to seriously 
confront these issues. 
The effect of participation found in this study, then, 
is not unlike that found by Mohai in his study: participa-
tion can have some real influence even if that influence is 
realized in ways that are not always equitable, balanced, or 
what the participants really wanted. The mere fact that en-
vironmentalists still insist on participating despite that 
act's alleged uselessness shows that they are probably un-
derestimating, to some extent, their effect. All things be-
ing equal, most interests, timber or environmental, tend to 
feel inefficacious anyway, and given the Forest Service's 
performance in the last forty years, environmentalists might 
especially be excused for this perception. Participation's 
effects, though, can be quite subtle. While Siskiyou offi-
cials are not about to recommend wilderness area additions 
or a significant long-term reduction in harvest rates, they 
do now behave differently than when did before environmen-
talists took up the cause. 
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While much of what the critics of participation say 
rings true to some degree, to say participation is complete-
ly useless and a total fraud is simply inaccurate. The ef-
fect of participation could be summed up, then, as limited, 
but real. There is no direct line between the articulation 
of interest group or public demands in the participation 
process and the Forest Service's response. In the Siskiyou, 
participation matters more as a way to construct very broad 
boundaries for actions to occur within, rather than as a 
direct and absolute influence. It is probably true, as cri-
tics claim, that much participation is used to formally sa-
tisfy EIS requirements and justify pre-determined decisions. 
But how those broad decisions which perhaps cannot be 
changed are actually designed and executed is where partici-
patory input can be influential. 
For environmentalists, then, the most useful part of 
participation is to try to offset timber's influence and 
constantly remind the agency of its obligations to protect 
non-commodity forest values, not to convince the Forest Ser-
vice to actually implement their policy desires. While such 
a modest payoff does little to boost a group's sense of ef-
ficacy and faith in the process, it still minimally satis-
fies pluralist requirements. Thus, the administrators of the 
Siskiyou are not the ideally responsive servants that some 
pluralists might claim nor are they the cynical and closed-
off manipulators of participation that some critics suggest. 
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The Role of Values in the Siskiyou 
The role of values in the decisionmaking process must 
also be considered if one is to test the various models of 
Forest Service administration we have identified. A plural-
istic Forest Service, it should be remembered, would be ex-
pected to maintain a fairly open, diverse and non-
deterministic value-set rooted in multiple use principles. 
In trying to pinpoint the exact amount of influence that 
agency values command, however, one runs into the same dif-
ficulty that arises when trying to gauge the influence of 
participation--it is impossible to completely isolate and 
measure in any precise, quantifiable way. Still, the evi-
dence from this case can tell us a lot about values; what 
they are and how important a part they play. 
If the organizational values model of Twight and 
others is to be found valid in this case, one would expect 
to find evidence that local officials strongly hold a cer-
tain set of values and that these have the potential to 
overrule alternative sources of influence such as public 
participation or interest group lobbying. As was discussed 
earlier in this chapter, these allegedly rigid organization-
al values of the Forest Service would include a strong util-
itarianism which stresses commodity production above all 
other forest values, a strong faith in supposedly rational 
and highly technical methods of forest management, and an 
overall belief in planned forestry to achieve social ends. 
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Pluralist conceptions of the Forest Service, on the 
other hand, see managers as holding far more diverse and 
open-ended sets of values. If these sets of values share 
anything in common in the pluralist view, it is a strong 
commitment to the principles of multiple use (which is, in 
many ways, the forest management analogy to pluralist 
thought itself). Unlike Twight's strictly utilitarian timber 
production orientation, which would tend to pre-determine 
policy decisions, multiple use values can essentially be 
reconciled to just about any type of policy output. Another 
type of overarching value that one would expect to find in a 
pluralistic Forest Service is an understanding of and dedi-
cation to its role as public servant and facilitator of pub-
lie participation as opposed to the scientific-elitist char-
acterization advanced by organizational values theorists. 
The data from the Siskiyou case1~ finds fairly wide-
spread evidence that both types of value-sets occur amongst 
Siskiyou officials. As far as utilitiarian values are con-
cerned, these managers seemed very comfortable speaking in 
terms of "outputs and services" "commodity production," 
"ASQs," "MMBF"--all the language of timber production. In 
fact, the current supervisor was quite blunt as to what he 
saw the Forest Service's job to be: " .... our objective, 
1 ~ This data was gathered mostly from in-depth interviews 
with various Siskiyou National Forest administrators and, to 
a lesser extent, various written decisions and opinions of 
the Forest Service. 
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we're very clear, we're going to harvest timber from the 
national forest--that's what it's all about." He minced no 
words in expressing that the agency's primary objective is 
to "produce things and opportunities." Although he claims it 
has since changed, the former supervisor admits that the 
pre-1983 Siskiyou National Forest was "just a commodity pro-
duction forest" which operated under a fairly narrow set of 
values and objectives; a characterization that closely cor-
responds to pre-1983 management priorities and policy out-
puts. 
This commodity production orientation was often accom-
panied by a great deal of confidence in technical solutions. 
A Siskiyou National Forest press release eagerly reflects 
this technological faith as it optimistically assures that 
"with fertilization and other intensive timber management 
techniques, we can sell an average of 160 million board feet 
annually, forever." 151 Another sign of this highly technical 
orientation was the scientific jargon such as "resource en-
hancement mitigation," "integrated resource analysis," "par-
tial retention viewsheds," or "culmination of mean annual 
increments" that the agency commonly employed. 
Siskiyou administrators also paid heed to the tradi-
tional concept of using forestry to promote other social and 
economic ends. The agency's obligation to both local econo-
151 Siskiyou National Forest press release (10 March 
1989). 
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mies and the nation's timber supply were constant themes 
sounded by most agency interviewees. "While recognizing and 
protecting the special places on the Forest," claims a Sis-
kiyou press release, "we need also recognize the Nation's 
timber needs and the role timber plays in community 
stability. "152 
Although they mostly spoke glowingly of the role of 
public participation, Siskiyou personnel occasionally dis-
played the irritation with outside interference and siege 
mentality that Twight claims is a result of their value bias 
and self-imposed isolation. One district ranger, for exam-
ple, spoke testily of "a movement out there to try to have 
the Forest Service grind to a halt and any way is OK." 
Others echoed his beleagured attitude complaining of acti-
vists who wanted to shut them down and did not know when to 
stop pushing. One official, meanwhile, supported the Forest 
Service's very controversial proposal to ban administrative 
timber sale appeals (several other interviewees, however, 
opposed this move) on the grounds that they were a "bureau-
cratic nightmare to deal with." 
The interviews seemed to confirm the great tension and 
uneasiness between the Forest Service roles of expert and 
servant. An example of this ambivalence could be seen re-
garding the subject of judicial review. Some personnel wel-
comed it as a legitimate form of citizen participation, 
152 Ibid. 
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while others saw litigation strictly as a burdensome nui-
sance. While many personnel spoke as if they truly valued 
and respected public input, sometimes a certain elitist con-
descension would surface as when a district ranger explained 
that part of their job was to "help" congressmen who some-
times "get confused over their role .... with better under-
standing." Statements such as this might be interpreted as a 
reflection of Twight's allegation that when confronted with 
challenges, the agency will circle its wagons and reaffirm 
its values rather than adapt or negotiate. 
Siskiyou officials often conformed to Twight's model, 
but at other times though, they seemed authentically com-
mitted to multiple use principles. While Twight argues that 
the Forest Service abides by multiple use only in a reluc-
tant and disingenuous way (under legal duress, so to speak), 
pluralists claim that the agency, having operated so many 
decades under this mandate, has truly internalized its val-
ues. The former supervisor, for example, seemed to invest 
the concept with great importance, describing how he worked 
"hard to place additional values on the (forest's] other 
resources." These other values that a number of officials 
professed to be crucial included fish and wildlife, recrea-
tion, and biological diversity, the last of which McCormick 
argued was "so important that our decision .... was to make 
sure it was fully recognized in any management decision we 
took." Fish habitat, meanwhile, was asserted to be "co-
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equal" to timber. In a similar vein, the current supervisor 
spoke frequently of "balance" and described the Siskiyou as 
a multiple use agency whose goal is to implement the Forest 
Plan "in a sustainable way without affecting the diversity 
and values we have here on this national forest." A number 
of other personnel strongly reiterated this multiple use 
ideal with its diverse goals and emphasis on balance. 
As we have seen, Twight draws a sharp distinction be-
tween utilitari~nism and multiple use values and announces 
them to be incompatible. 1n In reality, however, the latter 
concept, as currently interpreted, is so vague and relative 
that it can mean just about anything and still be abided by 
in seemingly good faith. True multiple use to an environmen-
talist might mean setting aside 500,000 acres of a million 
acre forest for old growth, spotted owls, and recreation, 
while a Forest Service official might believe with equal 
sincerity that the creation of a 5,000 acre botanical re-
serve or a narrow visual impact corridor along a highway 
truly constitutes multiple use. With so diffuse and amor-
phous a concept, it may well be very possible, therefore, 
that a strong utilitarian bent and some sort of sincere 
commitment to multiple use principles can co-exist simul-
taneously within both the agency as a whole and its indivi-
dual personnel. Unless multiple use is defined in a very 
specific or formulaic sense (which it usually is not), the 
153 Twight, 111. 
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two values may not, therefore, be as mutually exclusive as 
Twight presumes. 
In their article detailing how the Forest Service has 
changed, McCarthy, Sabatier, and Loomis describe the agency 
circa 1960 as a "multiple use agency with a strong emphasis 
on timber production ... 154 At least in terms of values, this 
study would argue that that basic description still holds; 
the agency's value set seems to be a fusion of Twight's 
utilitarianism and Culhane's pluralistic/ multiple use or-
ientation. We can, therefore, characterize the value system 
of the Siskiyou National Forest as being one dedicated to 
multiple use principles within the larger context of a tra-
ditional commodity production-oriented utilitarianism and 
technical rationalism. This larger context, of course, de-
fines and limits the scope of multiple use decisionmaking 
possibilities. A similar dedication to multiple use princi-
ples but within the larger context of an ecological rather 
than timber orientation, for instance, might entail an en-
tirely different range of values, priorities, and policy 
preferences. 
The identification of a particular value orientation 
on the Siskiyou still leaves unanswered one critical ques-
tion: was the value bias, in this case towards timber pro-
duction, strong enough to determine policy outputs? To have 
a set of values is one thing, to allow those values to be 
1 ~ McCarthy, Sabatier, and Loomis, 1. 
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the chief determinant of one's decisionmaking is quite 
another. While the discussion of this question must remain 
largely speculative, it seems nearly inconceivable that For-
est Service values did not play at least some role in deter-
mining policy outcomes. Given the long history and deep hold 
utilitarian values have been shown to have, and the psychol-
ogy of organizational values in general, 155 the ideal of a 
Forest Service official as a neutral "empty vessel" (within 
the bounds of discretion) waiting to be filled with the pub-
lic's desires seems rather dubious.1~ 
The most likely scenario in this case is that values 
played a very prominent, though not entirely absolute role 
in decisionmaking. The role values probably served was to 
set broad-scale priorities as well as limit, to some extent, 
the scope of policy consideration (in a way similar to what 
Bachrach and Baratz would suggest; see chapter four). Within 
that scope, however, a number of other factors, such as bur-
eaucratic structure, participation, and external political 
forces, were probably also quite influential. This chapter, 
then, can offer only partial support for Twight; the agency 
does have a distinct and noticeable and probably very inf lu-
ential utilitarian values bias (though one tempered somewhat 
by a simultaneous commitment to multiple use). Whether this 
155 See Twight's discussion of values, 16-17, 137-139. 
1 ~ To be fair, however, one should note that the plural-
ist model does not strip the land manager of his or, her val-
ues. Indeed, what the pluralists call "professional values" 
play a large role in this model. 
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bias controls every aspect of the agency's decisionmaking as 
Twight implies, however, is far less likely. Even the par-
tial, limited influence of participation this study has 
found would seem to dispute this notion of the complete om-
nipotence of organizational values. While values are crucial 
to understanding policymaking in the Siskiyou, it should be 
clear that Siskiyou personnel are not values-driven robots 
impervious to all forces save their own values. 
Is the Siskiyou National Forest Changing? 
Any discussion of Forest Service values is destined to 
raise the issue of whether or not those values can change. 
The centerpiece of the pluralist model is a characterization 
of the agency as dynamic, flexible, and responsive to 
changes in the political environment. Thus, the question to 
consider is whether the values, priorities, and actions of 
the Siskiyou National Forest have indeed shown signs of 
changing during the time frame of this study. While plural-
ists would assume that it has, Twight would probably predict 
that the agency has responded to opportunities for change 
with only symbolic, non-substantive words and measures, 
clinging all the time to its unshakeable core beliefs. 
Regardless of their value orientation, Siskiyou offi-
cials seemed to share a consensus regarding change on three 
points: (1) things have been changing on the Forest in very 
substantial ways, (2) this particular period in time marked 
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a watershed of sorts in the entire agency's evolution, and 
(3) the Siskiyou was in the vanguard of this larger trend. 
Those agency personnel interviewed all claimed to welcome 
such changes and expressed confidence that the agency would 
be better for it. "This is a real good time to change the 
way the Forest Service does things" the supervisor told a 
newspaper upon entering his job in 1990. The former super-
visor also heavily stressed the theme of change recalling 
his tenure as a sharp departure from business as usual. By 
opening doors to the previously shut-out environmental com-
munity, he told of how he incurred the wrath of formerly 
contented timber interests: "I had an industry person tell 
me that 'we used to have supervisors who were supporters of 
industry; we're not so sure you are.'" 
McCormick, a recreation specialist who came from Cali-
fornia's Inyo National Forest, in and of himself represented 
what many observers have noticed as a changing trend--the 
increased prominence of non-foresters in the agency: 
The timber industry folks, I felt, were always a lit-
tle suspicious of me, I attributed that to the fact 
that I had a strong recreational management back-
ground. 
Another interviewee, a female district ranger who was 
a wildlife biologist and of Asian descent perfectly embodied 
the agency's move away from the traditional white male for-
esters' club. Given time, argue many students of the Forest 
Service, this trend in staffing alone would be enough to 
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shift priorities and infuse new values. Even one fairly un-
compromising environmentalist admitted that within the ranks 
of the archfoe Forest Service were "some of the only allies 
we have." There was, for instance, one Siskiyou employee in 
particular, a soil scientist, who was quite sympathetic to 
the environmentalists' concerns and could be counted on to 
plead their case within the agency.1~ 
Perhaps the truest test of change is accomplished by 
examining manifestations of change that are more concrete 
than a policymaker's opinions on the subject. The changing 
agency demographics just discussed is one such measure, but 
perhaps the most concrete evidence might be gained by re-
viewing actual trends in policy outcomes. Was the Siskiyou 
National Forest churning out qualitatively different poli-
cies in 1992 than it did in 1983? 
The evidence is certainly mixed, but the overall con-
clusion would have to be that there has been at least some 
change in the overall direction and tenor of Siskiyou pol-
icy. In those nine years, for example, traditional clear-
cutting has gone from a much-heralded and ubiquitously prac-
ticed silvicultural method to a biologically disruptive con-
157 While the existence of such individuals represents to 
many clear evidence of a new pluralism in the agency, others 
might argue that the Forest Service has long tolerated a few 
ecologically impassioned dissenters within their ranks--Aldo 
Leopold in the 1920s and Bob Marshall in the 1930s to name 
but two--but has never allowed any of them to assume posi-
tions of real power or influence, a realm still dominated by 
utilitarian foresters. 
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fessed error of the past. Nearly all proposed timber sales 
on the Siskiyou today employ some variation of New Forestry 
techniques. 1~ In response to environmentalists' concerns, 
timber sales are frequently adjusted to move further from 
stream banks or to avoid certain crucial wildlife corridors. 
Terms such as biodiversity, stream temperature, sedimenta-
tion delivery rates, riparian zones, or large woody debris, 
if not truly taken to heart, have at least gone from being 
alien and ignored concepts to powerful buzzwords the agency 
cannot avoid confronting. Similarly, EISs and workshops now 
grapple with issues of roadlessness and fragmentation once 
rejected out of hand. 
Perhaps the single biggest change on the Siskiyou, 
though, has involved the Forest's participation style. The 
decisions of the early 1980s and before were made pretty 
much in administrative isolation with relatively little out-
side input or consultation. This constrasts sharply with the 
aggressive scoping process, blizzards of brochures and news-
letter updates, far more frequent public meetings, and most 
notably, workshop opportunities of the later half of the de-
cade. 
A major problem with discussing the issue of change, 
however, is that perceptions of change cannot help but be of 
1 ~ Critics, however, are quick to point out that much of 
New Forestry is merely a modified form of clearcutting rath-
er than a wholly different approach, such as selective cut-
ting. To them, it represents "politically correct" clearcut-
ting as it were. 
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a largely subjective nature. The line between a real change 
and a symbolic distraction can be very difficult to distin-
guish. For example, the Siskiyou may now address issues of 
biodiversity and roadlessness in its EISs, discuss it in its 
workshops, and even minimize fragmentation in its New Fores-
try timber sales (cutting from the edges rather than the 
center), but the current long-term plans still aim to even-
tually log and road all roadless areas outside designated 
wilderness. Critics understandably perceive this more as a 
clever campaign to placate foes and distract them from an 
essentially unchanged mission of full-scale logging. 
In the previous chapter we saw how competing interests 
in the Siskiyou used various communicative strategies and 
symbolic manipulations in an attempt to achieve their policy 
aims. Others claim the government does this as well. 159 
Edelman, in fact, goes as far as to suggest that this is the 
state's chief role. 160 It is, therefore, certainly reason-
able to expect that the Forest Service, as an agency with 
its own set of goals and interests, employs its own brand of 
highly symbolic language and action as any interest would. 
And much of this symbolic communication could be expected to 
be employed to support positive perceptions of the agency 
and what it is doing (such as wisely stewarding America's 
159 See, for example Richard Merelman, "Learning and Legi-
timacy" American Political Science Review 60 (1966). 
160 Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, 
IL: University of Illinois Press, 1964). 
361 
forests into the future or, perhaps, being in the process of 
revolutionary change). 
One Siskiyou environmentalist who found the Forest to 
have a strong "public relations side," 1~ noted the agency's 
proclivity to use such heavily coded messages. What she 
calls the "language of dissociation," attempts to detach the 
current debate from the unpleasant realities of logging.1~ 
Hence, ancient trees are verbally converted to mmbf, fire 
salvage clearcutting becomes "restoration," groves of old 
growth are turned into numbered units, and landslides become 
as the Chief of the Forest Service once called them, "mass 
soil movements."1~ Such language should hardly come as a 
surprise; indeed it would be a bigger surprise if a larger 
government agency did not communicate strategically. What is 
important here is to determine if this predictable use of 
strategic communication and symbolic action is sometimes 
mistaken for authentically changing trends in agency atti-
tudes and behavior. 
No aspect of the Siskiyou's, or for that matter the 
entire agency's, recent history embodies this analytical 
dilemma better than the New Perspectives program. On one 
161 This activist did, however, observe that lately the 
Siskiyou seemed to be turning away somewhat from its concern 
over public relations and seemed to be more forthright as to 
its intentions to harvest timber. 
1~ Barbara Ullian, Siskiyou National Forest Roadless 
Areas: The Dissociation of Words and the Paper Fores_t, Sis-
kiyou Environmental Council press release (undated). 
1~ Then-Supervisor (of the Suislaw National Forest) F. 
Dale Robertson quoted in Frome, 120. 
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hand, this ambitious program, best typified by the Shasta 
Costa project, is held up by the Forest Service as the cen-
terpiece of the positive changes sweeping the agency. It is 
a program described by the Siskiyou's supervisor as giving 
"heartburn" to the forces of the status quo; a program that 
has moved away from clearcuts as we know them, incorporated 
a number of fundamental, heretofore alien, ecological prin-
ciples into forest management, and instituted a far more 
open partnership of agency official and concerned interests. 
It is, on the other hand, also a program that exists 
within a context of still unreduced long-term harvest tar-
gets for both the Shasta Costa basin and the forest in gen-
eral as well as an unaltered commitment to eventually log 
all unprotected old growth and penetrate all roadless areas 
on the Forest. With such incompatible goals something even-
tually has to give, and as of now, these latter goals seem 
to be the dominant ones on the Siskiyou. Even the Shasta 
Costa project leader admits that the project ultimately does 
little but buy three more years' time for the basin's old 
growth: "As you go further out in time, you can't hang onto 
goals like avoiding fragmentation. 11 164 
As we have seen, determining what accounts for real 
change is an extremely complex challenge in which the ob-
jective and subjective are difficult to separate. It is 
164 Shasta Costa Team Leader Rod Stewart quoted in Seth 
Zuckerman, "New Forestry, New Hype?" Sierra (March/April 
1992), 67. 
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tempting to claim that cases such as Shasta Costa are merely 
public relations scams that give lie to the Siskiyou offi-
cials' claims that the winds of change are blowing. But one 
can choose to focus instead on a number of real, and in some 
cases undeniably significant changes that have occurred in 
the past half-decade (including, perhaps, at least some ele-
ments of New Perspectives) in order to substantiate the 
pluralist's vision of an agency in flux. 
There is a third possibility which exists: both scen-
arios are, to some extent, accurate. The Siskiyou National 
Forest and probably the Forest Service at large are in the 
throes of authentic and maybe even far-reaching change 
brought on by a number of forces inside and outside the 
agency. The widespread internal dissatisfaction felt by line 
officers in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Mumma af-
fair, and the formation of AFSEEE (see this chapter and 
chapter three) all represent the beginnings of what very 
well might be a profound shift in the agency. But the values 
and imperatives that have previously defined and guided the 
agency are, as Kaufman shows, exceedingly deep-rooted, and 
as Twight suggests, difficult to move. 
The result may be a body of actions, decisions, and 
communications that in representing both realities, seems 
increasingly chaotic, contradictory, or hypocritical. What 
may seem like strictly a cynical ploy or distraction might 
sometimes be at least partly the product of the internal 
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clash of the forces of change and status quo (the latter of 
which, though, certainly seems to be holding its own, if not 
temporarily triumphing). 1M Thus, Shasta Costa may not sim-
ply be a cruel hoax, but also a sincere attempt by certain 
more ecologically-minded employees to introduce change into 
a largely hostile environment. The project's overall fail-
ures may represent their incomplete success. 
Once again, both Twight and the pluralists are proven 
partially correct in the Siskiyou case; the agency can be 
flexible and adaptive to changing realities, but only to a 
point. While it is capable of change, this ability is, to 
some extent, constrained by other powerful forces such as 
traditional utilitarian values or, as O'Toole would argue, 
structural budgetary realities, both of which dictate the 
continued harvest of timber above all. The result seems to 
be a state of tension wherein the inevitable, socially-
derived push towards reform is off set by tenacious attempts 
to maintain the status quo. These attempts may include overt 
and quite clear rejections of ecological initiatives or the 
more subtle use of symbolism to affect an air of change when 
little or none exists. 
iM Such internal schisms would be unthinkable in Kauf-
man's Forest Service of the 1950s. It was precisely its dis-
cipline and rigid adherence to a single set of norms and 
values which allowed the agency to be so decentralized, in 
both its geography and power structure. Evidence of wide-
spread internal dissatisfaction, especially in the lower 
ranks, would imply the existence of new values and expecta-
tions in the agency. 
365 
Conclusion 
When confronting the question of why the Forest's ad-
ministrators act as they do, one realizes that the evidence 
from the Siskiyou case is by no means as clearcut as are the 
various models we have used as a framework. One can, never-
theless, draw important conclusions from this analysis. 
First of all, the evidence from this case offers very 
little support for the assertion that during the period of 
1983-1992, the Siskiyou National Forest was captured by tim-
ber interests. The capture of local land managers becomes a 
possibility when the agency answers to a single dominant 
client. In the Siskiyou, it is clear that this was not the 
case. While local capture might technically have been feasi-
ble in previous decades in the Siskiyou before environmen-
talists became organized (especially prior to the 1970s), 
the post-1983 political landscape was one which clearly saw 
the Forest dealing with a multiple clientele which promi-
nently included environmentalists. As such it could be said 
that, in the course of making policy, the Siskiyou's admin-
istrators dealt with two advocacy coalitions of interests 
and their assorted governmental and non-govermental allies. 
It is important to note, however, that like Culhane's 
Public Lands Politics, this study tests capture only at the 
local level of Forest Service administration. One must keep 
in mind the untested possibility of capture or a situation 
akin to it occurring at the higher regional or national 
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levels of the agency or even higher in the administration 
(such as the Department of Agriculture or the executive of-
fice). Indeed, one district ranger Culhane interviewed re-
ported that the forest products industry's influence was 
most clearly felt higher on up the administrative ladder,166 
a notion echoed by several interviewees, both timber and en-
vironmentalist, in this study. It is within the realm of 
possibility, therefore, that an executive who is exception-
ally hostile to environmental goals (Reagan perhaps?) could 
appoint top administrators (Crowell?) who would essentially 
provide high-level access to only one set of interests while 
excluding all others. 
Rosenbaum calls this top-down influence of a dominant 
interest "backdoor capture" 1~ and although it violates the 
traditional local subgovernment capture theory (ala McCon-
nell), it might be the more appropriate model of undue cli-
ent influence in the post-Reagan era. 1~ Indeed, the history 
166 Culhane, Public Land Politics, 270. 
1~ Rosenbaum, "The Bureaucracy and Environmental Policy," 
226. 
1~ There are two important points to note here: (1) Des-
pite a number of similarities, it is very debatable whether 
backdoor capture technically represents agency capture in 
the literal sense. When such collusion takes place at the 
highest administrative levels, it might more appropriately 
be conceived of as an ideological/political decision which 
has an effect similar to true capture; (2) Backdoor capture 
does not require the actual jurisdictional agency (in our 
case the Forest Service) to be fully involved in such col-
lusion. The favoritism towards a certain interest that works 
its way down might originate in the Oval Office, various ex-
ternal agencies or committees (such as OMB, the God Squad, 
the Council on Competitiveness) or at the Cabinet level. Al-
though the Forest Service is clearly more favorable to tim-
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of the Siskyou case lends some credence to this notion of 
grossly inequal access and client recognition at higher ad-
ministrative levels (more about this in chapter six). 
To rule out capture theory at the local level is not 
the same thing as finding the Siskiyou National Forest com-
pletely balanced, pluralistic, and innocent of any bias. 
While the Forest is caught between two highly polarized in-
terests, it does not sit squarely in the middle. Given its 
organizational values and judging from the policy outputs it 
has produced from 1983 to 1992, one can fairly characterize 
the Siskiyou as biased to some extent towards commodity pro-
duction over any other uses and values of the forest. Be-
cause its interests coincide far more closely with the in-
terests of the timber industry, the agency's own inclina-
tions clearly lean towards the cutting of timber over eco-
logical preservation, a point even a staunch defender of the 
agency like Culhane admits. 169 As Culhane notes, agency-
client relations need not degenerate into capture when both 
groups values and interests are more similar from the out-
set.1ro Why go through the trouble of co-opting an organiza-
tion that wants to harvest trees nearly as much as you do? 
It is in this realm of organizational values that we 
can find one of the keys to understanding what motivates the 
ber at its higher levels, given its history and value struc-
ture, one might hesitate before hurling the charge of cap-
ture at the agency. 
1~ Culhane, Public Lands Politics, 229. 
170 Ibid. 324. 
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Forest Service. This chapter finds partial support for 
Twight's emphasis on rigid agency values; these pro-timber 
utilitarian values do exist and are probably quite inf luen-
tial, but they are not the absolute determinant in the for-
mulation of policy. This study also finds utilitarian and 
multiple use values to be less incompatible than Twight as-
sumes as the value-sets of nearly all of the Siskiyou poli-
cymakers interviewed consisted of both types of values held 
in seemingly good faith. We might be able to attribute this 
to the extremely ambiguous nature of the multiple use con-
cept or perhaps the changing sociocultural context of public 
land management. 
Another possible element in the Siskiyou's timber pro-
duction bias could be structural budgetary factors as pro-
posed by O'Toole. While this study has not systematically 
tested this possibility, it certainly cannot be ruled out as 
a potential source of this bias. While the Forest Service 
interviewees largely discount the idea, much of what we know 
about organizational behavior supports this notion of budget 
maximization by way of timber sales. Since much of this sys-
tem has been in place since 1930 (nearly a quarter century 
before the agency fully got into the timber production busi-
ness), there is really no way to tell if district rangers 
would be inclined to make less sales or at least more eco-
logically sound ones unless profound structural changes are 
made in the agency's budgetary process. There is, neverthe-
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less, a powerful logic in the speculation that budget reform 
would go a long way towards altering Forest Service behav-
ior. 
Just as ruling out capture theory does not guarantee 
pluralism, neither does finding a timber production bias ne-
cessarily preclude pluralism. Culhane's findings, in fact, 
find just that--an agency with a timber-oriented profession-
al ideology that, nonetheless, answers to a diverse, multi-
ple clientele and comports itself as a responsive, pluralis-
tic agency would. Perhaps the important measure of an agen-
cy's pluralism is how it deals with public participation. 
The evidence from the Siskiyou case suggests that while the 
Siskiyou National Forest's relationship with the participa-
tion process is far from the pluralist ideal, it is certain-
ly not the mere public relations ploy that some critics 
claim it is. 
Participation on the Siskiyou matters, but only to a 
point. It rarely steers decisions in any substantial way or 
changes the minds of policymakers, but rather exercises its 
limited influence in far more subtle ways. In identifying 
the participants' major concerns, the participation process 
might, for example, define some broad parameters within 
which the agency can feel free to act. One important factor 
here besides organizational goals and values, might be the 
individual values or personality of key administrators (in-
cluding their personal relationship with the various inte-
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rests). The history of the Siskiyou shows that while parti-
cipation may help construct a range of options, the simple 
matter of who is in charge often determines how final deci-
sions are reached. 
Whatever influence participation has, then, exists 
firmly within the framework of other realities such as in-
dividual and agency goals and values, budgetary concerns, 
and external political pressures, all of which, in the envi-
ronmentalists' case, are usually pushing in the opposite di-
rection. That last factor, outside political pressure, can 
be the most confining aspect of such a larger political 
framework. Indeed, while Siskiyou officials do have author-
ity and discretion over a wide range of important decisions, 
the fact remains that some larger, broader decisions--the 
annual timber quota, for instance--are simply out of their 
hands and sometimes even force their hands on other matters. 
Thus, it must be reiterated that this chapter's analysis is 
of local Siskiyou administration as it occurs within the 
confines of these external decisions (this will be discussed 
in greater detail in the next chapter). 
Another factor limiting the effectiveness of partici-
pation in the Siskiyou has been the existence of two fairly 
equal and highly polarized local interests--a situation 
which tends to minimize the pressure of the participants' 
demands upon the Forest Service and give the agency a some-
what freer hand. Still, even the limited influence of parti-
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cipation in the Siskiyou certainly seems sufficient enough 
to satisfy the minimal requirements of pluralist administra-
tion. 
Another test of pluralism is how flexible and amenable 
to change an agency is and in this regard, the findings in 
the Siskiyou are once again somewhat ambiguous. While the 
Siskiyou National Forest does seem to have changed in sever-
al significant respects since the late 1970s, much more sup-
posed change is less clearly authentic and may, in fact, be 
largely symbolic rather than substantive. Whatever changes 
have occurred, though, are most likely the result of a slow-
ly evolving shift in values and more importantly, an attempt 
to adapt to and thrive in a changing political milieu that 
is increasingly aware of environmental concerns. As such, 
the Siskiyou once again seems to minimally satisfy the plur-
alist criterion regarding agency flexiblity. 
The motives underlying the behavior of the Siskiyou 
National Forest's administrators cannot be explained by any 
one model of the Forest Service or larger administrative 
theories. When Paul Mohai studied the Forest Service's wil-
derness recommendation process of the 1970s, he found the 
agency to be "acting between the two contrasting poles of 
the Twight-Culhane perspectives. "111 Accordingly, he argued 
that there was a dual influence upon the agency wherein both 
client's participation and the agency's timber-biased values 
171 Mohai, 155. 
and ideology had a role. 172 In many ways, this chapter can 
draw a similar conclusion. Forest Service behavior in the 
Siskiyou can be traced to a number of factors. 
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While the agency can be deemed pluralistic for the 
period of 1983 to 1992, 1n its pluralism is of a somewhat 
minimalistic variety that is far removed from the ideal of 
balance and responsiveness that mainstream pluralist theory 
advances. It is more akin to the pluralism described by 
Davis and Davis (see page 302). What limits such pluralism 
is the fact that it exists in a context of fairly strong or-
ganizational values that favor commodity production, a bud-
getary structure that rewards timber sales, and an external 
political environment which includes congressional, state, 
executive, and cabinet-level demands that are difficult to 
ignore. 
This limited pluralism found to characterize the Sis-
kiyou National Forest regards pluralism in the "administra-
tor-as-honest broker" mold. What about Kelso's or Cobb and 
Elder's "big picture" pluralism which recognizes and even 
expects severe agency biases and looks instead to plural-
ism's decentralization to provide numerous points of access 
to an aggrieved interest? If the environmentalists cannot 
1n Ibid. 153-155. 
1n One could certainly cast grave doubt upon the notion 
of a Siskiyou National Forest that was pluralistic even to 
the most humble extent prior to the 1970s. Its client set 
and patterns of behavior, especially regarding public parti-
cipation, would most likely have precluded the possibility 
of satisfying even the most minimal pluralist criteria. 
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get a fair shake with a biased Forest Service, then how 
about other avenues for redress such as Congress, the 
courts, or other agencies? These questions are what we turn 
to in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF PLURALISM: 
CENTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION, AND ECOLOGY 
Planning and authority have been fragmented into a 
bewildering mosaic of different agencies and levels of 
government, producing frequent confusion, contradic-
tion, and frustration in environmental management. 
Walter Rosenbaum 
Given its inability to demand a place on the policy 
agenda because of its trancendant importance to voters 
and politicians, the fragmented structure provides op-
portunities for environmentalists to undertake initia-
tives, put together their own ad hoc coalitions, and 
gain a significant measure of success they might not 
achieve in a more orderly, coherent process where a 
clear center of power exists. 
Dean Mann 
As we have seen, critics have argued that the plural-
ist system is biased against ecological and other such non-
material or supposedly public interests. The last two chap-
ters have examined the critics' charges regarding the alleg-
ed inability of such interests to adequately organize and 
compete as well as the lack of balance that supposedly char-
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acterizes their dealings with administrators. There is one 
last area that these detractors focus upon in their critique 
of pluralism. The structural characteristics of pluralism, 
specifically the level of decentralization amongst policy-
makers, are alleged by critics to serve as another serious 
impediment to interests attempting to challenge the status 
quo. 
This chapter explores the debate between pluralist 
theorists who find pluralism's decentralization largely 
beneficial and desirable and their critics who see it as 
harmful to the political process and propose as a remedy 
increased centralization. After detailing the theoretical 
dimensions of this issue, this analysis turns specifically 
to the case of the Siskiyou conflict in an attempt to de-
termine how decentralization has affected environmental 
policymaking and whether it or more centralized modes of 
decisionmaking are more amenable to the demands of ecolog-
ical interests. 
Centralization, Decentralization, and 
Political Theory 
Pluralism's supporters and detractors alike see the 
ultimate reality of American politics today to be the frag-
mentation of authority. According to many observers, whatev-
er remains of potentially unifying forces such as political 
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parties and congressional leadership continues to decline,1 
as the political landscape devolves into a fractured system 
of "political molecules"2 each exercising, according to 
Rosenbaum, "its own tiny ration of authority."3 This frag-
mentation is so thorough, argues William Ophuls, that: 
In reality, the "American political system" is almost 
a misnomer. What we really have is a congeries of un-
integrated and competitive subsystems pursuing con-
flicting ends--a non-system.4 
In the realm of environmental politics, this govern-
mental fragmentation is especially notable. According to 
Mann, environmental policy is: 
.... a jerry-built structure in which innumerable in-
dividuals, private groups, bureaucrats, politicians, 
agencies, courts, political parties, and circumstances 
have laid down the planks, hammered the nails, plas-
tered over the cracks, (and] made sometimes unsightly 
additions and deletions .... s 
Varieties of Decentralization 
Within the context of American politics, decentraliza-
tion can take a number of forms. It can refer to a vertical 
decentralization of power such as the constitutionally sane-
tioned principle of federalism wherein considerable segments 
1Dean Mann, "Democracy and Environmental Policy" in 
Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clarke 
(editors), Controversies in Environmental Policy (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), 5-6. 2Joseph Califano quoted in H.R. Mahood, Interest Group 
Politics in America (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1990), 1. 3walter Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental Concern 
(New York: Praeger, 1977), 109. 4William Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity 
(San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1977), 189. 
5 Mann, 4. 
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of decisionmaking and administration are reserved for state 
and local governments (but with federal statutes, where they 
exist, ultimately prevailing). In addition to federalism, 
the downward diffusion of authority can also be found in the 
decentralized structure of various federal agencies and 
other governmental bodies. For instance, the decentraliza-
tion that Kaufman observes in the Forest Service occurs be-
cause the agency's central headquarters distributes signifi-
cant decisionmaking authority to its lower regional, local 
forest unit, and even sublocal ranger district levels.6 
While vertical decentralization occurs within a hier-
archical context of sorts (federal-state-local or HQ-region-
ranger district), pluralism is also marked by horizontal de-
centralization which refers to the fragmentation of politi-
cal authority across a great diversity of jurisdictions, 
each having only limited authority. Like federalism, a good 
deal of this sort of decentralization is, of course, by con-
stitutional design. The executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches all must share power in a divided system establish-
ed to maximize the principle of "checks and balances." This 
horizontal decentralization can also be manifest within the 
branches as can clearly be seen in the fragmentation of the 
executive bureaucracy. There is hardly a single issue area, 
except perhaps something like mail delivery, where only one 
6Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 
1960). 
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agency has complete and clear jurisdiction. It is far more 
typical for a host of agencies and sometimes even several 
cabinet departments to be involved in some capacity in a 
given policy issue. 
There occurs a good deal of legislative fragmentation 
as well. While Congress as a national legislature could the-
oretically be perceived as a more centralized source of pol-
icy, in reality, it is as fragmented as the executive bur-
eaucracy if not more so. It acts more as a loose collection 
of semi-sovereign local representatives, committees, and 
subcommittees than a single, unified policymaking body. And 
the trend in Congress in the last several decades has been 
towards even more decentralization as the subcommittee 
structure has expanded and specialized further, while the 
centralizing authority of congressional leadership has dis-
persed far and wide across the body. 7 
In addition to numerous agencies, cabinet departments, 
and congressional committees, horizontal decentralization 
can manifest itself in a given policymaking case through the 
involvement of a number of other governmental actors includ-
ing the executive office, state agencies, governors' of-
fices, various advisory commissions, and perhaps the state 
7 See, for example, Roger Davidson, "Subcommittee Govern-
ment: New Channels for Policy Making" in Thomas Mann and 
Norman Ornstein (editors), The New Congress (Washington 
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981); Steven Smith, 
"New Patterns of Decision Making in Congress" in John Chubb 
and Paul Peterson (editors), New Directions in American Pol-
itics (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985). 
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or federal judiciary. 8 While each of these players may pos-
sess more or less authority in a particular case, such hori-
zontal decentralizational is less a downward diffusion of 
authority than it is a centrifugal atomization of it. In the 
midst of such fragmentation, diverse and often competing 
governmental entities scramble to most fully assert their 
limited share of authority. 
Pluralism and Decentralization 
The decentralization of political authority, both ver-
tical and horizontal, is at the heart of pluralist theory. 
To pluralists, the existence of multiple points of access 
into the system is the key to assuring the balanced and dem-
ocratic representation of interests which will, in turn, 
lead to more equitable policy outcomes. For one thing, de-
centralization and the numerous points of access it provides 
are alleged by pluralists to serve as an antidote against 
bureaucratic capture and other biases in administration. As 
we have seen in the last chapter, pluralists such as Kelso 
acknowledge that due to inherent patterns in organizational 
behavior, agencies will often be biased in favor of a par-
ticular, well-positioned client.9 The only way to overcome 
such inevitabilities, it is argued, is for the system to 
8 rt should be noted that when state and federal officials 
have joint jurisdiction in a given policy area, federalism 
may actually more resemble horizontal than vertical decen-
tralization. 9William Kelso, American Democratic Theory (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1978), chap. 10. 
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provide alternative avenues for interests to find a sympa-
thetic ear and attempt to influence the policymaking 
process. 10 Such detours around captured or biased agencies, 
whether they be through other agencies, particular congress-
men, the executive office, or the courts, supposedly assure 
that the fullest range of voices are heard during the com-
plex business of making policy. 
Just as competition among interests nourishes democ-
racy by leading to bargaining, compromise, and accomodation, 
pluralists claim that competition amongst the scattered jur-
isdictions of a pluralist government is equally healthy.11 
Not only do competing agencies or even branches of govern-
ment assure responsiveness to a diversity of interests, but 
they also act as watchdogs over one another. Because of 
pluralism's necessary sharing of authority, these counter-
vailing forces serve to check the worst abuses of single 
client domination and other such undemocratic mischief. 
By forcing policy to be formulated and implemented in 
this decentralized context, the entire process becomes, ac-
cording to pluralists, one of inclusion. Conversely, notes 
Kelso, the smaller the policymaking realm is, the fewer the 
players, the more concentrated their power, and the greater 
the chance for a monopoly of influence. 12 This cannot hap-
pen, pluralists emphasize, when policy is constructed under 
10 Ibid. 119-120, 263-265. 11 Ibid. 264-266. 
12 Ibid. 21. 
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influence of pluralistic policy structures such as Heclo's 
broad and diverse issue networks or Sabatier's equally in-
clusive advocacy coalitions. 13 Pluralists suggest that by 
guaranteeing the participation of the broadest possible 
spectrum of interests and necessitating coalition-building, 
a pluralist system thus bestows considerable legitimacy upon 
the policy outputs that it produces.14 
Many pluralists admit that this fragmented landscape 
of political authority can be frustratingly contentious and 
inefficient. 15 Still, they contend that this is a necessary 
and ultimately worthwhile price to pay for its indispensible 
democratic virtues. Other pluralists, however, do not con-
cede that pluralism is so inept, characterizing it instead 
as actually quite flexible and innovative. Helen Ingram and 
Scott Ullery, for example, find that pluralism's decentrali-
zation actually encourages policy entreprenuership by pre-
senting increased opportunities and motivation for risk-
taking in the policy realm. The fragmentation of pluralism's 
policymaking structure, according to Ingram and Ullery, low-
13 Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Estab-
lishments" in Anthony King (editor), The New American Poli-
tical System (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Insti-
tute, 1978); Paul Sabatier, "Knowledge, Policy-Oriented 
Learning, and Policy Change" Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, 
Utilization 8 (1987), 649-692. 14 Helen Ingram and Scott Ullery, "Policy Innovation and 
Institutional Fragmentation" Policy Studies Journal 8:5 
(Spring 1980), 664-682. 15 see, for example, Mann, 4. or Peter Stillman, "Ecologi-
cal Problems, Political Theory, and Public Policy" in Stuart 
Nagel (editor), Environmental Politics (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1974). 
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ers the costs of innovation by offering numerous routes for 
influence as well as widely-dispersed resources. The pres-
sure of competition between interests and agencies, they 
argue, also serves to push actors towards seemingly risky 
innovation and large-scale change. 16 Not only might this 
innovation bloom from the horizontal competition of rival 
agencies and their constituent interests, but from the tink-
erings and experimentations of the myriad policymaking enti-
ties at the grassroots level (that is, among state and local 
bodies and sometimes even federal field offices). 
Specifically regarding environmental policy, Dean Mann 
finds empirical support for Ingram and Ullery's thesis in 
the wave of environmental legislation enacted in the 1970s. 
Such bold action, Mann confirms, was largely the result of 
entreprenuership on the part of various interests and con-
gressmen, made possible due to political fragmentation. 17 
More broadly, pluralists such as Mann, Michael Kraft, and 
Howard Mccurdy see the system's fragmentation as providing a 
crucial forum for ecological values and demands to be ex-
pressed and one that should not be taken for granted. 18 This 
hard-won place at the policymaking table, it is argued, can-
16 Ingram and Ullery, 664-682. 
17 Mann, 20. 
18 Mann, 18-19, Michael Kraft, "Conclusion: Toward a New 
Environmental Agenda" in Norman Vig and Michael Kraft (edit-
ors) Environmental Policy in the 1990s, (Washington D.C.: CQ 
Press, 1990), 385; Howard Mccurdy, Environmental Protection 
and the New Federalism: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Beyond" 
in Kamieniecki, et.al., 103-106. 
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not be guaranteed in a more centralized system. Because of 
its decentralization, claims Mann, the system "has responded 
well to the challenge of environmental damage and scarcity"; 
so well, in fact, that it "makes reversal towards anti-
environmentalism almost unthinkable." 19 Mccurdy, meanwhile, 
claims that in terms of fairer environmental representation, 
"pluralism .... is an imperfect solution, but it probably 
stands a better chance of reaching its payoff than the other 
alternatives."~ According to Mccurdy, environmentalists' 
best representation comes about through the balance, com-
petition, and cooperation between diverse agencies and the 
programs they administer as he shows in his case study of 
the multi-agency management of Louisiana's Atchafalya Bas-
in. 21 
The Costs of Fragmentation I: Subgovernments 
Where the pluralists see opportunity and access in the 
system's significant levels of political fragmentation, 
their critics see chaos and bias. This view is not strictly 
limited to academic critics; in the 1970s the President's 
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) identified pluralism 
19 Mann, 28. 
20 Mccurdy, 106. 
21 Ibid. 103-106. Unlike Kelso, however, Mccurdy does not 
see the inevitability of biased or single client-dominated 
agencies as he calls for increased agency neutrality and 
technical focus (ala Lowi) in addition to maintaining a 
decentralized administrative context. 
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in government as a major structural impediment to the devel-
opment of environmentally sound policies.22 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, one of frag-
mentation's greatest flaws, according to critics, has been 
that it leaves lawmakers and administrators vulnerable to 
capture by parochial interests. While pluralists perceive of 
fragmentation in terms of open windows of opportunity and 
checks and balances, critics such as McConnell or Lowi see 
it more in terms of isolated and inpenetrable knots of near-
sovereign political power. 23 In these closed subgovernments, 
claim critics, the line between regulator and regulated dis-
appears as the most well-established local interests form a 
stranglehold upon political influence in the extremely nar-
row and/or localized policy area that concerns them. To cri-
tics then, decentralized and thus localized administrators 
sit alone as isolated targets. 
The other part of the decentralized subgovernment 
equation is, of course, the Congress. It is argued that the 
diffusion of power all the way down to the subcommittees 
along with the associated decline of parties and congres-
sional leadership have spread legislative authority thin. 24 
22 Rosenbaum, 282. 23 Grant McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy, 
revised edition (New York: Vintage, 1970); Theodore Lowi, 
The End of Liberalism, 2nd edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1979). , 24 Davidson, "Subcommittee Government." It should be 
noted, however, that not all scholars would agree that par-
ties are in decline. See, for example, Cornelius Cotter, et 
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As in the case of their bureaucratic brethren, the numerous, 
atomized little clusters of committee and subcommittee power 
supposedly present easy pickings for interest groups in 
their attempt to gain influence. In some ways, congressper-
sons are even more vulnerable than bureaucrats since unlike 
the latter, their political survival depends directly upon 
reelection by locally-minded constituents. And this, in 
turn, requires a constant and substantial flow of funding 
which interest groups are all too able and willing to 
provide . 25 
This committee fragmentation is reinforced by the in-
herently local nature of Congress's representative function 
which has traditionally manifested itself through the dis-
tribution of tangible, material benefits to one's dis-
trict. 26 The immense value of such political "pork," in 
fact, is alleged by critics to be a crucial component in the 
maintenance of iron triangles as bureaucrats acquiesce to 
the dispensation of such benefits in exchange for high bud-
gets for their agencies.27 Rather than lawmakers or honest 
al., Party Organization in American Politics (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989. 25 For a good discussion of this, see Philip Stern, Still 
the Best Congress Money Can Buy (Washington D.C.: Regnery 
Gateway, 1992). 26 John Ferejohn, Pork Barrel Politics (Palo Alto CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1974); David Mayhew, Congress: 
The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1974). 27 Morris Fiorina, Congress: The Keystone of the Washing-
ton Establishment, 2nd edition (New Haven, CT: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1989). 
386 
brokers, critics see the congresspeople who populate these 
political fiefdoms as, in the words of James Burns, "little 
more than elected lobbyists."~ 
According to Lowi, the key ingredient that keeps these 
localized subgovernments viable is the broad discretion that 
Congress grants bureaucratic administrators.29 If legislated 
rules are to bend to the demands of special interests and 
their congressional patrons, they must, after all, be flex-
ible enough. Lowi argues that by passing these purposefully 
broad and ambiguous mandates, Congress effectively surren-
ders its traditional policymaking authority to bureaucrats 
who thereby gain the leeway necessary to pervert statutes in 
ways that benefit dominant clients, both bureaucratic and 
legislative. 30 
The Costs of Fragmentation II: Incrementalism 
According to critics of pluralism, fragmented policy-
making structures possess another fatal flaw in that they 
inherently produce short-sighted, piecemeal, and status-quo-
oriented policy. Best described by pluralist Charles Lind-
blom, incrementalism refers to the type of policymaking 
which tends to thrive in a highly fragmented system. 31 Sim-
28 James Burns quoted in L. Harmon Zeigler and G. Wayne 
Peak, Interest Groups in American Society (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972), 136. 
29 Low i , 2 7 4 -1 7 5 . 
30 Ibid. 105-108. 
~Charles Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through'" 
Public Administration Review 19:4 (Spring 1959), 79-88. 
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ply put, incrementalism (or what Lindblom specifically calls 
"disjointed incrementalism"32) occurs when policymakers, 
both legislative and administrative, rely upon previously 
established ideas, technical orientations, budgets, and pol-
icies as a starting point from which to modestly alter or 
"tinker" with existing policy rather than establish a sub-
stantially different course or plan. 
One reason the pluralist system tends to adopt the 
incremental style is due to its reliance upon bargaining, 
competition, and consensus among numerous interests in a 
fragmented policy structure.33 Each limited unit of author-
ity in such a system can exercise some degree of veto power, 
thereby reducing the chance that bold, innovative, or con-
troversial proposals could clear all potential hurdles.34 
Thus, the only proposals fit to emerge from such a fractured 
obstacle course of a system, argue critics, are heavily com-
32 Ibid. 33 There are, one must note, a number of other explana-
tions put forth for why incrementalism prevails including 
limits to policymaker rationality, the caution inherent to 
organizational behavior, other aspects of human nature, and 
the considerable "sunk costs," material and psychological, 
invested in a previously established policy program. For a 
general discussion, see Thomas Dye, Understanding Public 
Policy, 6th edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1987). 34 For a discussion of the difficulties implementation 
faces see, Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementa-
tion 3rd edition (Berkley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1984); Daniel Mazmanian and Paul Sabatier, Implemen-
tation and Public Policy revised edition (Lanham, MD: Uni-
versity Press of America, 1989). 
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promised, relatively innocuous policy tinkerings that close-
ly represent the previous policy. 
While critics argue that incrementalism, or "the poli-
tics of muddling through" as many call it, limits policy 
formulation in all areas, a great number of them find that 
it is especially deadly for environmental policy.35 The 
"ecological vices of muddling through," as one critics puts 
it,36 stem from the fact that environmental problems by na-
ture tend to be exceedingly complex and long-term--precisely 
the sort of issues incrementalism allegedly is least suited 
to address. With its focus on minimizing conflict and re-
lieving the most political pressure, critics charge that 
incremental decisionmaking takes the path of least resis-
tance rather than the path that will most effectively ad-
dress intricate and thorny environmental policy problems. 
Where bold and comprehensive solutions are called for, then, 
incrementalism is said by critics to offer only the "tyranny 
of small decisions"~--weak, piecemeal responses and tiny 
35 Arnongst the critics who make this point are Ophuls, 
Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity; Rosenbaum,The Politics 
of Environmental Concern; Charles Hardin, "Observations on 
Environmental Politics" in Nagel; Lynton Caldwell, Environ-
ment: A Challenge to Modern Society, (Garden City, NJ: 
Doubleday, 1971); and Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The 
Context of Environmental Politics (Lexington, KY: University 
Press of Kentucky, 1978). 
36 Ophuls, 191. . 37 Alfred Kahn quoted in Robert Bartlett, "Comprehensive 
Environmental Decision Making: Can It Work?" in Vig and 
Kraft, 244. 
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modifications of the existing patchwork of policy compro-
mises. 
Thus, through its cautious love of precedence and the 
tactical advantage it gives to the forces of the status quo, 
critics find that incrementalism thus renders bold ideas im-
potent as Peter Stillman shows: 
.... incremental decisionmaking--"muddling through"--
is, as even its proponents realize, inherently stag-
nant in that it tends to be bound by the logic of past 
decisions and not to consider nor strike out in new 
directions .... because it is narrow and backward-
looking, "muddling through" tends not to be a good 
method for the formation of ecological policies, ... 38 
To this characterization, Ophuls would add that: 
.... incremental decision-making largely ignores long-
term goals: it focuses on the problem immediately at 
hand and tries to find the solution that is most con-
gruent with the status quo. It is thus characterized 
by .... a remedial orientation in which policies are 
designed to cure obvious immediate ills rather than to 
bring about some desired future state.39 
Such an "adhocracy" as Ophuls terms it in his scathing 
critique of pluralism is utterly oblivious to the long-range 
consequences of the actions it takes~; it can recognize no 
common interests besides the short-term incremental comprom-
ises it spits out. Thus, major decisions of life-and-death 
importance are made almost by default by what Ophuls calls a 
"brokerage house government. "41 "Muddling through," contends 
Ophuls, "is almost tailor-made for producing policies that 
38 Stillman, 50. 39 0phuls, 191. 
~ Op h u ls , 19 3 . 
41 Ibid. 190. 
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will generate the tragedy of the cornmons" 42; that is, indi-
vidual interests and decisions adding up to collective dis-
aster. Ophuls borrows a famous line to describe the system's 
maximization of current benefits at the future's expense: 
"After us, the deluge."~ Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, 
meanwhile, find the skeptical question "what has posterity 
ever done for me?" to best sum up the spirit of pluralist 
politics. 44 
To critics, therefore, incrementalism automatically 
rules out precisely the type of holistic, "big-picture" so-
lutions that ecological problems require. To be effective, 
claim critics, such solutions would have to incorporate an 
understanding of systems, interrelationships, and long-term 
consequences. They would also have to comprehensively res-
pond to the causes of ecological problems rather than react 
to their symptoms on a crisis-by-crisis basis in which en-
vironmentalists always suffer the burden of proof . 45 
According to critics, then, an insidious reductionism 
afflicts policymakers who operate in an incremental system 
which, in words of Mann, has "generally defied 'holistic' or 
'ecological' principles of policy design."~ Ophuls, for ex-
42 Ibid. 192. 
43 Ibid. 169. 
~Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Poli-
tics: What Role for Political Scientists?" in Nagel, 9. 
45 Sprout and Sprout, The Context of Environmental Poli-
tics, 71, Daniel Henning and William Mangun, Managing the 
Environmental Crisis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1989), 34. 
~Mann, 4. 
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ample, notes how the bureaucratic division of labor bears 
little resemblance to ecological realities and environmental 
needs. 47 Bartlett makes this same point: 
The whole emphasis of comprehensiveness runs counter 
to the modern nature of expertise .... Expertise almost 
always means narrow, specialized, disciplinary exper-
tise; few persons by training, experience, or predi-
lection are prepared to engage in or promote compre-
hensive environmental decisionmaking. The idea of com-
prehensive environmental decisionmaking finds little 
institutional support in the ways universities, sci-
ence, or the professions generally are structured, or 
in the ways persons in government or business are em-
ployed. 48 
In such an inappropriately fragmented administrative 
and legislative realm, each policymaker operates, argue cri-
tics, according to his or her own rationalistic and reduc-
tionistic mindset. 49 As a result, they cannot help but per-
ceive of ecological problems in ways severely restricted by 
the blinders of their organization's or committee's parti-
cular specialization or technical orientation. Like a pul-
monary specialist who sees his patient as only a pair of 
lungs rather than a whole body, critics would suggest that 
environmental administrators look at a complex forest eco-
system and see only big game or merchantable timber or navi-
gable waterways or recreational opportunities or whatever 
their particular specialization leads them to see. As a re-
sult, truly comprehensive, holistic solutions which attempt 
to address ecological problems at their most fundamental 
47 0phuls, 194. 
48 Bartlett, 242. 
49 Ophuls, 195. 
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levels become all but impossible for the reductionistic pol-
itics of a fragmented system as Walter Truett Anderson 
points out: 
.... the whole style of American politics is non-
ecological. Ecology is a comprehension of systems, 
interdependencies, webs of relationship, connections, 
extending over space and time--and the very essence of 
our politics is to zero in on single causes .... Envi-
ronmental positions are required, by the very rules of 
the political game, to fix on a single issue - save 
the whale, clean up the air--that allow the real is-
sues to recede into the background.so 
Capitalist Values and the Status Quo 
To many critics, pluralism and its incremental, reduc-
tionist style of policymaking most often serve to perpetuate 
a status quo that heavily favors business interests, econom-
ic growth, and the current distribution of wealth, all of 
which are seen by many as being in direct conflict with eco-
logical goals.51 This argument, which assumes that pluralism 
is inseparable from capitalism, is a staple of many environ-
mental critiques of the political process. To critics, this 
economic status quo, therefore, represents another sort of 
deep structural bias which environmental policy must con-
50 walter Truett Anderson quoted in Paehlke, Environmen-
talism and the Future of Progressive Politics (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 210-211. Pluralists, 
though, might claim that these failings are just as much the 
product of inadequate efforts on behalf of advocates to ar-
ticulate the issue in such a way that it will be conceived 
by the public and policymakers in a more holistic and eco-
logical way in the first place. The fact that Greenpeace 
adopts splashy whale and seal campaign does little to ad-
vance appreciation of the intricacies of marine ecology. 51 Sprout and Sprout, The Context of Environmental Poli-
tics, 53-54, 129-154. 
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front. Given that these economic values have such a tena-
cious hold upon and fundamental position in American soci-
ety, this is no easy task. 
Perpetual economic growth, for example, seems at times 
to be no less than the foundational myth upon which all eco-
nomic, social, and political structures in this country, and 
more broadly, Western society, have been built. As Ophuls 
puts it: 
Growth is the secular religion of American society, 
providing a social goal, a basis for political soli-
darity, and a source for individual motivation; the 
pursuit of happiness has come to be defined almost 
exclusively in material terms, and the entire socie-
ty--individuals, enterprises, the government itself--
has an enormous vested interest in the continuation of 
growth. 52 
As such, growth has become, in the words of Daniel 
Bell, the quintessential "political solvent"53; the engine 
which endlessly churns out the stuff of pluralist distri-
butive politics, the raw material of compromise and politi-
cal placation. So central is it to the political structure 
that any policy proposal (such as protecting owls instead of 
cutting forests) which limits growth and its ability to 
serve in this capacity will likely be looked upon by many 
policymakers with a great deal of skepticism. Like incremen-
talism in general, critics argue that the pressures of 
growth and the market have the effect, therefore, of seri-
ously limiting options for comprehensive, long-term action 
52 Op h u ls , 18 5 • 53 Daniel Bell quoted in Ophuls, 186. 
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on behalf of less tangible goals. The market, both economic 
and political, favors instead, short-term, distributively 
oriented outputs as Henning and Mangun observe: 
Often environmental administrators are pressured to 
elevate the short-term material standard of living 
rather than maintain or improve long-term quality of 
life and environment. Those agencies managed under 
multiple use and sustained yield principles are most 
heavily affected by such pressures.S4 
Thus, the policy response to dire environmental prob-
lems is forced to bend to economic realities rather than the 
other way around.ss Kraft, for instance, observes that in 
the course of environmental politics thusfar: 
There has not yet been a serious challenge to the 
dominant or core values of American politics (for ex-
ample, private private property, capitalism, indivi-
dualism, and the unrestrained right to pursue one's 
self-interest, limited government, and, perha~s above 
all, material abundance and economic growth). 6 
To many critics of pluralism, then, the market system 
to which it is so closely aligned is an "environmental vil-
lain" s7 that at best, is incapable of recognizing and res-
ponding to complex ecological concerns, and at worst, is, in 
s4 Henning and Mangun, 10. 
ss Many others, though, argue that without a strong 
economy, there are less resources available to protect the 
environment or public welfare in general. Thus, the economy 
should justifiably be a society's main concern. Some envi-
ronmentalists, on the other hand, like to argue that "there 
are no jobs on a dead planet," as they tend to see environ-
mental problems as the paramount issue society faces. Thus, 
this most central (and perennial) of policy debates largely 
hin~es upon how priorities are ranked and threats perceived. 
Michael Kraft, "Ecological Politics and American Gov-
ernment: A Review Essay" in Nagel, 146. 
s7 0phuls, 168. 
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ideology and practice, fundamentally opposed to ecological 
goals and demands. 
The Costs of Fragmentation III: Jurisdictional Rivalry and 
Conflict 
Whereas pluralism's proponents look at competition 
among fragmented agencies and legislative committees and see 
a healthy and positive situation of mutual checks and bal-
ances, critics adhere to a darker vision of stubborn rival-
ry, needless conflict, and gridlock. Citing the organiza-
tional behavior research of Simon and others, critics por-
tray agencies as focused first and foremost upon their sur-
vival or even expansion in a zero-sum environment of limited 
bugetary resources. 58 As Henning and Mangun claim: 
A comprehensive environmental approach is seldom at-
tained in the administrative process because of .... an 
agency's own security and expansion interests. As a 
bureaucratic institution, an agency is concerned with 
its own welfare first. Other interests are of second-
ary consideration. 59 
Critics extend this argument to congressional commit-
tees as well, characterizing them as being beset by the same 
sort of jealous turf rivalry and ideology of self-
perpetuation as agencies. To be sure, not all rivalry 
amongst committees and agencies stems from a Darwinian 
struggle for expansion. Much conflict also stems from simple 
58 Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Mac-
millan, 1947); Norton Long, "Power and Administration" Pub-
lic Administration Review 9 (Autumn 1949), 257-264; Phillip 
Selznick, TVA and the Grassroots (Berkley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1949). 
59 Henning and Mangun, 49. 
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differences in goals, values, or technical orientations to 
problem solving (not to mention legislative mandate, if an 
agency). 
In such a competitive, fragmented setting, critics 
wonder how complex, invariably cross-jurisdictional envi-
ronmental policy questions can be settled in a scientif ical-
ly rational and comprehensive way.~ Instead of coordina-
tion, argue critics, the usual result is bickering, finger-
pointing, and deadlock as each policymaking entity clings to 
its own particular value-set and technical orientation while 
simultaneously defending its turf.~ 
The vertical fragmentation and rivalry of state and 
federal environmental managers, claim critics, can be just 
as destructive to sound environmental policymaking. The 
friction between federal bureaucracies and very conservative 
state game, forestry, or grazing agencies in the western 
United States is legendary and serves mostly to thwart com-
prehensive policies.~ The Reagan administration's New Fed-
eralism of the early 1980s which surrendered additional fed-
~How can, for example a commodity-oriented Forest Ser-
vice and a preservation/recreation-oriented Park Service, 
and the committees which oversee each, all operating in a 
competitive, zero-sum context, rationally and cooperatively 
coordinate sound land management policy in the greater Yel-
lowstone ecosystem or the Sierra Nevada (both of which con-
tains millions of acres of both national forest and park 
land)? 
61 Henning and Nangun, 79. 
~For a discussion of comparative state environmental 
policy, see James Lester, "A New Federalism?: Environmental 
Policy in the States" in Vig and Kraft, 73. 
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eral authority to the states confused and fragmented policy-
making even further as state agencies, left without coordi-
nation, funding, or direction, according to William Mangun 
and Jean Mangun: 
.... found themselves in a complicated, unsupported 
position because the federal government seemed to be 
more interested in ridding itself of responsibilities 
than helping the states do a better job.63 
Critics then, reject what they see as an "arthritic 
octopus"M of a government with its adversarial system of 
vetoes, delays, and stalemate. At most, critics contend, 
such a system can produce only disjointed policy fragments 
or extraordinarily ambiguous mandates, neither of which can 
adequately the complexity of real problems. 
The Centralized Solution 
Many of the critics of pluralism and its incremental-
ism and fragmentation look to increased coordination and 
centralization of government authority as the key to a more 
effective policymaking apparatus and thus better policy out-
puts. While a number of critics including McConnell, Samuel 
Huntington, and Robert Crain call for a consolidation of 
government power into more centralized and/or nationalized 
structures, it is Lowi who offers the most cogent and de-
~William Mangun and Jean Mangun, "Implementing Wildlife 
Policy Across Political Jurisdictions" Policy Studies Jour-
nal 19:3-4 (1991), 522. 
MGraeme Duncan quoted in Mann, 8. 
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tailed prescription in this respect. 65 Lowi argues that the 
only way to overcome the crippling ineffectiveness and spe-
cial interest domination of pluralism is to move closer to 
the traditional model of administration and shift policyrnak-
ing authority to the center. "A law made at the center of 
government," claims Lowi, "focuses politics there and re-
duces interests elsewhere."~ According to Lowi and other 
critics then, increased centralization would eliminate ri-
valry, deal-making, and special interest influence and re-
place it with clear goals and priorities made in the public 
interest by a government unafraid to plan and in an authori-
tative position to do so. 
To Lowi, the key to achieving such rational and effec-
tive policymaking, perhaps even more so than the actual 
streamlining and restructuring of government agencies, is to 
eliminate vague legislative mandates and broad discretion. 67 
In their place, clear, detailed, authoritative laws, accord-
ing to Lowi, should prevail. This juridical democracy, as he 
calls it, would necessitate a strong legislature which would 
represent the national interest and reclaim its constitu-
65 Lowi, The End of Liberalism; McConnell, Private Power 
and American Democracy; Samuel Huntington, American Poli-
tics: The Politics of Disharmony (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1981); Robert Crain, Elihu Katz, and David 
Rosenthal, The Politics of Community Conflict (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969). 
~ Lowi, 93. 
67 Ibid. 305-309. 
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tional policymaking authority from the interest-ridden scat-
tering of autonomous subgovernments.68 
Bureaucracies, for their part, would act as in tradi-
tional theory--as neutral, rational implementors of the le-
gislative (and hence public's) will. When agencies do have 
to make rules (due perhaps to changing circumstances or the 
agency's technical expertise), Lowi calls for "administra-
tive formality" whereby early rulemaking, formal rulemaking 
norms and procedures, and rigid criteria would replace the 
case-by-case bargaining approach that allegedly favors spe-
cial interests and creates ad hoc policies.69 Such clear 
centrally-derived regulations would supposedly be far more 
purposeful, efficient, and just than pluralism's "policies-
without-law ... 70 
In the realm of environmental policymaking, the calls 
for centralization have been especially loud and numerous. A 
number of observers including Barry Commoner, Lynton Cald-
well, Garrett Hardin, Charles Hardin, Rosenbaum, and Ophuls 
see less fragmented governmental authority and increased 
government planning and action as the solution to the envi-
ronmental gridlock that they believe threatens our exis-
tence. 71 As the only repository of legitimate power with the 
68 Ibid. 295-313. 69 Ibid. 302. 
70 Ibid. 299. 
71 Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle (New York: Knopf, 
1971); Caldwell, Environment: A Challenge to Modern Society; 
Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental Concern; C. Hardin, 
"Observations on Environmental Politics"; Garrett Hardin, 
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ability to coerce diverse, self-interested political actors, 
centralist critics look to government. Only a committed pro-
active government, they argue, can control the zero-sum 
struggle over increasingly scarce resources and enforce pos-
sibly unpopular, but ecologically necessary policies in the 
long-term public interest.n 
Ophuls makes this argument in an especially vigorous 
way, finding the firm implementation of political authority 
to be the only way to tame self-interest and step back from 
the brink of ecological disaster. With Aristotle, Burke, and 
Rousseau as his guides, Ophuls maintains that the only way 
to prevent the tragedy of the commons is to bid "farewell to 
economic man" and embrace true politics once more. 73 Unlike 
the short-term, distributive orientation of pluralist bar-
gaining, such truly political solutions would, according to 
Ophuls, involve some conception of the collective interest 
and would require the subordination of individual interests, 
policymaking by the most competent, and an acceptance of 
legitimate authority. 74 Only through this reinforcement of 
authority, argues Ophuls and others, can adequate attention 
be focused on the holistic, systemic nature of ecological 
problems and appropriate measures be pursued. 
"The Tragedy of the Commons" Science 162 (13 December 1968), 
1243-1248; Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity. 
72 Ophuls, 142-155. 
73 Ibid. 180. 
74 Ibid. 222-226. 
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While Ophuls's prescriptions tend to limit democratic 
perogatives, other environmental centralists argue that in-
creased comprehensiveness and centralization would actually 
enhance democratic decisionmaking. For instance, Edwin 
Haefele, in the style of Lowi, calls for a return to truly 
representative, legislatively-focused decisionmaking to deal 
with environmental issues. He suggests that the executive 
branch cannot fairly or adequately weigh competing inte-
rests. 75 Charles Hardin, likewise points out the potential 
democratic benefits of a reinvigorated party system which 
would be another centralizing influence. 76 Mangun and Man-
gun, meanwhile, find in their study of state-federal rela-
tions that environmentalists achieve better representation 
in cases where the federal government administers federal 
laws than in cases with state administration.n 
Thus, centralized authority is seen by those critics 
in the McConnell mold as better able to uphold democracy and 
the public interest by rescuing policy from the clutches of 
obscure and isolated and possibly captured bureaucracies or 
local governments and placing it in more open and account-
able forums. "Comprehensiveness," claims Paehlke, " ... shifts 
decision making out of specialized agencies and into central 
75 Edwin Haefele, Representative Government and Environ-
mental Management (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 
for Resources for the Future, 1976). 
76 C. Hardin, 191-19 2. 
n Mangun and Mangun, 520. 
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agencies, the courts, and/or the democratic process it-
self. "78 
Short of the actual structural centralization of poli-
cymaking authority (or perhaps alongside it), some critics 
emphasize increased interagency, state-federal, or 
legislative-executive coordination and cooperation as being 
essential if more effective and comprehensive environmental 
policy is to be achieved. Such a move towards coordinated 
environmental management would supposedly allow for more 
holistic policy consideration of such things as ecosystems, 
watersheds, or bioregions and would force at least a partial 
integration of highly fragmented and specialized decision-
making entities.N 
This overall approach to improving environmental poli-
cyrnaking has been loosely termed "the centralized solution." 
It should be noted, however, that the individual proposals 
cited above run the gamut from deep structural alterations 
presumably requiring the amending of the Constitution to 
fairly modest centralizing adjustments or reforms of the 
current system. Depending on the theorist, they also target 
a number of different manifestations of decentralization, 
from vertical forms (such as federalism or the downward 
~Robert Paehlke, "Environmental Values and Democracy: 
The Challenge of the Next Century" in Vig and Kraft, 362. 
79 Mangun and Mangun, 519-524; Mccurdy, 103, Bartlett, 
236. While Bartlett criticizes centralists who hold out what 
he considers unrealistic goals for achieving comprehensive-
ness, he still believes, nevertheless, that there is room 
for improved coordination. 
diffusion of power within an agency) to horizontal forms 
(such as separation of powers or overlapping agencies and 
committees). 
The Pluralist Critique of Centralization 
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Calls for increased centralization, environmental and 
otherwise, are met by fierce pluralist objections which re-
ject centralized solutions on several grounds. First, plur-
alists cast serious doubt upon a centralized policymaking 
structure's ability to formulate truly superior policy. Cen-
tralists are naive, argue pluralists, to believe that the 
consolidation of government authority alone will somehow al-
low better policy to magically emerge.so On the contrary, 
claim pluralists, it is centralization that embeds the stat-
us quo by stifling innovation and reducing opportunities for 
the competition of ideas. By isolating themselves from pub-
lie opinion and interest demands, argues Kelso, the policy-
making elite would cut themselves off from huge quantities 
of useful information and insight.81 
Pluralists contend that centralists vastly overrate 
policymakers' capacities to formulate rational policy. From 
what is known of the psychology and behavior of organiza-
tions, claim a number of pluralists, it is clear that there 
are serious limits upon the near-perfect rationality that 
policymakers are presumed by centralists to possess. Incom-
80 Kelso, 259. 81 Ibid. 236. 
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plete knowledge, cognitive limitations, the tendency towards 
"groupthink," personal values, and human nature are all 
thought by pluralists to work against policymaker rational-
ity.82 To pluralists, this alone would seem to justify the 
incremental method with its accumulated knowledge, well-
tested experience, and multiple points of access. 
Mann echoes these doubts about centralized policymak-
ing, arguing that the heavy-handed, overbureaucratized 
command-and-control style of centralization requires unreal-
istic and unworkable levels of knowledge, enforcement, and 
coordination.83 Charles Perrow reaches this same conclusion 
finding that Lowi-style centralized, rule-oriented bureauc-
racies are effective only at carrying out relatively simple, 
straightfoward tasks such as issuing passports.84 
~Bartlett, 243; Kelso, 236-239. For a fuller discussion 
see, Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure 
(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957); Peter Blau, The Dynamics of 
Bureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955). 83 Mann, 26. 84 Charles Perrow, Organizational Analysis (Belmont, CA: 
Brooks/Cole, 1970). Lowi, however, would probably argue that 
it is pluralism's hyper-fragmented, grossly overlapping 
executive branch that is rigid and "overbureaucratized" 
rather than his neutral and streamlined bureaucratic imple-
mentors of statutes. Ophuls also counters these pluralist 
warnings of unwieldy, unworkable, top-heavy bureaucracies by 
proposing that policy design standards rather than direct 
hands-on planning (ala the Soviet communism) be employed. 
Unlike the absolutism of planning, policy design standards 
set general limitations and identify important criteria that 
must be met, but leaves considerable latitude for democratic 
structures to determine how these goals are specifically go-
ing to be achieved. Thus social goals could be met, accord-
ing to Ophuls, without a huge governmental planning apparat-
us. Ophuls, 228-229. Similarly, Lowi maintains that when 
rule-making is done early in the life of a statute, central-
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Pluralists also take on Lowi regarding his call for 
legalism, formalism, and less administrative discretion. 
Kelso argues that it is the content of the law and not the 
manner of its formulation that is often the real problem 
with policy. 85 What guarantee is there, he asks, that unam-
biguous, centrally-derived laws would address the public in-
terest any better? Could it be, he asks, that the system's 
status quo biases are not necessarily inherent to pluralism 
but to American culture and society in general?~ 
Pluralists also portray centralized decisionmaking and 
strict mandates as inflexible and rigid. Kelso turns the 
centralists' attack on incrementalism on its head as he 
claims that it is actually centralized policymakers with 
their expanded jurisdictions and responsibilities who must 
more depend more heavily upon established "rules of thumb" 
and rigid rulemaking procedures or else risk overload.87 
Consequently, this is alleged to leave bureaucrats ill-
prepared to deal with unprecedented situations that their 
predetermined mandates do not address. Indeed, increased 
decentralization and wider discretion have evolved, argues 
Kelso, precisely because of the increased prevalence of com-
ization can be achieved without a heavy-handed "Prussian" 
hierarchy or overbureaucratization. Lowi, 304. 85 Kelso , 2 3 3 . 
~Ibid. 106. 
87 Ibid . 2 3 8 • 
plex, multi-dimensional problems which require flexibil-
ity.88 
The broader jurisdictional responsibilities of cen-
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tralized agencies, pluralists argue, also pose the risk that 
bureaus may be less than enthusiastic and committed to some 
aspects of their widened mission. Given the nature of bur-
eaucracies, Kelso speculates that it may be better to have a 
diversity of agencies each committed to the narrow task it 
knows best than fewer agencies with a host of tasks, some of 
which they might be hostile to.89 
Finally, pluralists condemn what they see as centrali-
zation's undemocratic, authoritarian tendencies. Pluralists 
such as Bartlett, Mann, or Stillman all warn of the possi-
bility that political authority, centralized to achieve 
noble environmental goals, might degenerate into rigid, 
heartless, overbureaucratized rule by a technocratic class 
with little patience for popular concerns or liberal val-
ues.~ Critics of Ophuls or Garrett Hardin paint a bleak 
Hobbesian picture of government power running roughshod over 
individual rights and aspirations in the name of some ruling 
88 Ibid. 254. 89 Ibid. 261-262. In fact, it can be argued that it is 
centralization rather than pluralist fragmentation that 
features a riskier capture scenario since the stakes are 
higher. To capture a centralized agency is to gain influence 
over a far greater amount of policymaking authority than 
capturing a fragmented agency. 
~Bartlett, 243, Mann, 28; Stillman, 51-52. 
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elite's arbitrary conception of environmental necessity. At 
its worst, an environmental police state is envisioned.91 
The centralists, argue Stillman, thus contradict them-
selves in calling for stronger and thus more remote, less 
accessible government while simultaneously seeking, and of-
ten presuming, wider public support. 92 It is a large and 
rather dubious assumption, contends Stillman, that central-
ized policy decisions, even if made in what the policymakers 
truly believe is the public's best interest, will enjoy pop-
ular consent. 93 Kelso is even more skeptical of the poten-
tial of centralized policymakers to achieve popular support 
as he suggests that "when government officials are not sub-
ject to the pressures of the bargaining table, they are less 
likely to perceive the objectives and needs of people other 
than themselves."M Thus, only through bargaining and com-
91 Once again Ophuls would def end his proposals by claim-
ing that his system's reliance on design criteria rather 
than planning would eliminate the need for heavy-handed 
government intervention in the everyday realm. He emphati-
cally denies, therefore, that his proposals would lead to a 
tyrannical regime. Still his enforcement of even design cri-
teria would require some sort of coercion and, as he admits, 
the subordination to some extent of individual rights to 
collective needs. Other centralists take a different line of 
defense. As was previously discussed in chapter one, some 
centralists argue that it is the governing elite in this 
country that is most sensitive and protective of liberal 
values and not the often extremely illiberal masses. See 
Giovanni Sartori, Democratic Theory (New York: Praeger, 
1958); Herbert Mccloskey, "Consensus and Ideology in Amer-
ican Politics" American Political Science Review 58:2 (June 
1964). 92 Stillman, 56-57. 93 Ibid. 53. 94 Kelso, 238. 
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promise between various interests and the government, argue 
pluralists, can true consensus and public support be forged. 
This alleged lack of representation of interests in a 
centralized system is stressed by Mccurdy as well in his 
Louisiana case study of multijurisdictional land management. 
McCurdy speculates that if management of the Atachaf alya 
basin were ever centralized under a single agency, the broad 
representation and participation granted by numerous agen-
cies to their diverse constituencies would inevitably be di-
minished. 95 Paehlke, meanwhile, finds that the broad access 
and participatory opportunities that pluralism provides ere-
ates a sense of efficacy that highly centralized systems 
cannot. This efficacy, he argues, is essential for encourag-
ing environmental mobilization.96 The distance at which cen-
tralization promises to keep interests would, therefore, 
seem to discourage the public from formulating their own 
collective responses, thus leaving environmental policymak-
ing strictly to the "experts." 
Decentralization vs. Centralization in the Siskiyou 
As we have already seen, the American political system 
in general is highly fragmented. It should come as no sur-
prise, then, that the politics of the Siskiyou have proven 
to be no exception. Despite the fact that the primary scope 
of this study is a single jurisdiction--the Siskiyou Nation-
95 McCurdy, 106. 
%Paehlke, "Environmental Values and Democracy," 363. 
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al Forest--old growth, and thus Siskiyou policymaking has 
involved, according to the former supervisor of the Siski-
you, "a lot of players with a lot of different authorities." 
First of all, even the principal administrative enti-
ty, the Siskiyou National Forest, is itself divided into 
five ranger districts. Beyond the Siskiyou, as previous 
chapters and figure 10 show, the Forest Service's Region Six 
office in Portland, its Washington D.C. headquarters, the 
Department of Agriculture, the Department of Interior, the 
executive office, various individual congresspersons, a num-
ber of committees and subcommittees, other federal agencies 
(such as the Fish and Wildlife Service), an interagency com-
mittee, the state of Oregon, and the federal courts all 
played some role, direct or indirect, in shaping policy on 
the Siskiyou. This involvement of so many governmental ac-
tors, some of them regional and national, not to mention 
private citizens and interest groups, would seem, therefore, 
to strongly confirm a model of broad and fragmented policy-
making such as, perhaps, Sabatier's advocacy coalition mod-
el. 
The evidence from the Siskiyou case can tell us a 
great deal about the effects of political fragmentation on 
environmental policymaking as well as allow us to ponder the 
implications of further centralization.97 Since the reality 
97 A centralized system, as it shall be defined here, 
would involve decisions that were made in a more unitary 
fashion by fewer, more consolidated jurisdictions and at 
Figure 10 Governmental Entities Involved in the SISKIYOU 
Legislative 
House 
Agric. Intr. Appr. 
Comm. Comm. Comm 
Forest/ Natl. 
Fanns Parks 
Subcom. Subcom. 
Intr. 
A ppr. 
Subcom. 
Con./ 
Forest 
Subcom. 
Individual Members 
State of Oregon 
Governor's Office 
Pub. In tr. 
Lands A ppr. 
Subcom. Subcom. 
OFDW DEQ Dept. Forestry 
Southwest Oregon 
County Boards 
Southwest Oregon 
City Councils 
Executive 
President, Advisors, 
Executive Office 
Dept. of 
Agriculture 
Oregon NW Reg. Region 6 
BLM Portland Portland 
Medford 
District 
Powers 
RD 
Siskiyou 
NF 
Judicial 
Court of 
Appeals SF 
9th District 
Court 
411 
of Siskiyou/old growth policymaking is a high degree of 
fragmentation, the question of how different a centralized 
system would be requires a good deal of speculation. Still, 
the evidence from this case could go a long way in providing 
at least some empirical basis to such speculation. 
While pluralism features an overall fragmentation of 
authority, this scattered authority can occur in the form of 
more centralized or higher-level sources such as the execu-
tive office, Forest Service headquarters, or the Department 
of Agriculture, or as more decentralized or localized 
sources such as a ranger district, the Siskiyou Forest it-
self, or a county surrounding the Forest. Let us assume then 
that a future scheme of increased centralization would f ea-
ture the enhanced prominence and power of the higher-level, 
more centralized policymaking entities which currently 
exist. Based on this assumption, one can gain at least some 
sense of how a more centralized system might behave by exam-
ining how these higher-level entities act today as compared 
to the more decentralized actors. 
This is, of course, an imperfect measure because cen-
tralization's actual implementation would involve far more 
than merely boosting the autonomy of the higher levels of 
higher levels within those jurisdictions. Furthermore, leg-
islative and executive directives would be more explicitly 
carried out with less room for administrative discretion. 
Finally, increased decisionmaking would probably occur at 
the federal level, at the expense of the state and local 
autonomy. 
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current policymaking bodies. True centralization, its ad-
vocates might argue, would feature a fundamental internal 
restructuring and consolidation of these current agencies. 
It would also require major changes in the way in which they 
operate, especially with respect to their relationship with 
Congress and its legislative mandates. These limitations 
notwithstanding, however, an examination of contemporary 
examples of high-level decisionmaking in the Siskiyou/old 
growth case provides perhaps the only opportunity there is 
to concretely measure anything even akin to true centrali-
zation. Though imperfect, such an approach provides at least 
a glimpse into possibilities that would otherwise be pure 
speculation. 
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the 
following questions: (1) Amongst the fragmented policymaking 
entities, how did decisionmakers at higher levels of a given 
jurisdiction or branch of government treat ecological goals 
and demands? Were they or more local or lower-level policy-
makers more likely to advocate policies supported by envi-
ronmentalists? (2) Were decisionmakers at the local or state 
level more or less amenable to comprehensive ecological 
goals than those at the federal level? (3) What were the 
overall effects of the fragmentation of Siskiyou/old growth 
policymaking upon the formulation of comprehensive, 
ecologically-oriented policy? 
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In order to address the first two questions, it is ne-
cessary to examine the various governmental bodies involved 
in this case in search of discrepancies in attitudes and be-
havior between those institutions as well as between differ-
ent levels within them. In doing so, one might be able to 
discern patterns wherein levels of policymaker centraliza-
tion would be linked to levels of ecological concern. In 
addition, such an examination might tell us something about 
the claims of centralists and pluralists regarding the ef-
fects of fragmentation (specifically capture, incremental-
ism, rivalry, and reductionism) on environmental policy. 
The Forest Service 
The most directly involved agency in the Siskiyou has 
been, of course, the United States Forest Service. With its 
many far-flung units, the Forest Service is widely recogniz-
ed as one of the most thoroughly decentralized agencies in 
the entire bureaucracy (for a brief description of its 
structure see chapter two). In fact, it is at its most local 
and decentralized administrative level, the ranger district, 
where many observers claim that the agency's most important 
decisionmaking occurs.~ 
Forest Service interviewees unanimously agreed with 
this characterization of ranger district autonomy. In the 
98 Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger; Paul Culhane, Pub-
lic Lands Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press for Resources for the Future, 1981). 
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Siskiyou, the district rangers, who, with their staff~, do 
almost all of the planning and detail work on timber pro-
jects, reported very few constraints on their actions from 
the supervisor's office. The supervisor's role has been des-
cribed by both interviewees and outside observers as being 
one of coordination, review, and guidance.100 At least on 
the Siskiyou, rangers and the supervisor have tended to see 
eye-to-eye on most all issues. No major disputes of any sub-
stance were mentioned in the interviews, thus indicating a 
similarity in goals and values. Such congeniality and shared 
purpose, as Kaufman points out, allows the delegation of au-
thority to assume far fewer risks.1m 
At the regional level, the relationship between the 
regional forester and the supervisors under his command is 
quite similar to the supervisor-ranger relationship. Regard-
ing the day-to-day administration of their forests and even 
the details of their forest plans, supervisors, and rangers 
for that matter, are reported by interviewees to have consi-
derable latitude. One Siskiyou ranger, for instance, claimed 
to "see hardly any influence from the regional office at 
all" and ventured to guess that it was the same for the su-
pervisor. In Region Six, according to the ranger, most indi-
~Staff specialists such as wildlife biologists or hy-
drologists have no decisionmaking authority; their role is 
only advisory. Only line officers (rangers and supervisors) 
have such authority. 100 Michael Frome, The Forest Service (Boulder, CO: West-
view Press, 1984), 43. 1m Kaufman, 222. 
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vidual forests plans lowered the ASQs and the regional of-
f ice did not try to prevent it. 
Other interviewees, however, argue that at the region-
al level certain contraints and pressures begin to be 
brought to bear upon local administrators. Although the Sis-
kiyou did manage a relatively miniscule eight mmbf drop in 
the ASQ in its forest plan, the former supervisor implies 
that he was prevented from reducing the harvest as much as 
he wanted. He states, " .... if anything [the forest plan] 
hadn't gone near far enough, but politically I went as far 
as I could in reducing the cut and emphasizing other 
values." 
So despite their near-total autonomy regarding day-to-
day administration, supervisors lose support and power, 
warns the current supervisor, when they prove "unable to 
perform." In this case, perform might be considered a 
euphemism for maintaining high levels of timber output. 
Using the goals and values of local Siskiyou adminis-
trators which were discussed in chapter five as a basis for 
comparison, the regional off ice might seem even more timber-
oriented than the Siskiyou. One Siskiyou environmentalist 
who finds Region Six "obstructionist," argues that even when 
local Siskiyou officials agree with environmentalists and 
make promises to alter policy, they are forced by regional 
timber goals to squeeze out so much timber that they.ulti-
mately have no choice but to go back on these promises. "No 
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matter what they agree to locally," she claims, "they don't 
have control over it" as the cut level "comes down on them 
like a big ole hammer. 01 02 The former supervisor also recog-
nized the timber production slant of the regional office: 
Traditionally, the Forest Service, at least in Region 
Six .... has been much more commodity oriented and much 
more tied to the production of timber and lumber pro-
ducts and tied into that whole economic picture and 
the political support base for it. 
Even less inclined towards ecological protection has 
been the top, Washington D.C. level of the Forest Service. 
Although the agency's characteristic decentralization and 
delegation applies to D.C.-regional interaction as well, the 
top echelons of the Forest Service do impose mandatory lev-
els of resource production (both internally and 
legislatively-derived) upon regional (and thus local) admin-
istrators which can be avoided only at the risk of termina-
tion or demotion. The controversy surrounding former Region 
One Forester John Mumma clearly attests to that fact. "I am 
expected to produce timber," explained Mumma who was forced 
out in 1991 for failing to meet his regional quota, "[t]here 
is no doubt about it. My longevity as Regional Forester is 
related to meeting the targets." 1~ Regional foresters, 
warns one D.C. level official, have no choice but to accom-
plish what they were funded to do. Thus, regional foresters 
1~ As we shall discuss latter on, there are actually a 
number of parties responsible for such high quotas. 
103 John Mumma quoted in Jeff DeBonis, "Timber Industry 
Wins Again, Congress Sets Dangerously High Timber Cut for 
'91" Inner Voice (Winter 1991), 11. 
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and supervisors have been faced with the impossible task of 
simultaneously meeting timber targets and protecting forest 
resources. There is little doubt that such intense pressures 
to get out the cut at all costs led supervisors to appeal as 
a group to Chief Robertson for change at their 1989 
convention. 104 
Consequently, both critics and agency personnel des-
cribe the D.C. office as being the level of the Forest Ser-
vice most aligned with timber production goals and as the 
former supervisor suggests, "pretty much stuck in a commod-
ity orientation." This is vividly shown by McCormick's ac-
count of his 1989 visit to Washington to explain to Chief 
Robertson and his deputies his proposal to reduce the Sis-
kiyou's ASQ to 155 mmbf: 
I did not get any questions about biological diversi-
ty, about anadromous fish, about spotted owls, about 
wildlife; all the questions I got, all the inquiries 
were having to do with how I was reducing the cut, 
what was causing that to happen .... It was close to 
being an inquisition .... r thought the Chief's office 
was missing the big picture of what was going on out 
here and where the public wanted to take management of 
the forest. 
Although he claims that it has profoundly changed for 
the better since 1989, McCormick still finds that by nature 
the Chief's office "is always a little behind the power 
104 
"Forest Managers Speak Out for the Forest" Headwaters 
(March 1990), 3. This was not the first time supervisors 
pressured for a reduction in the cut as a similar appeal and 
warning of impending crises were made to Chief Peterson as 
early as 1983. Kathie Durbin and Paul Koberstein, introduc-
tion to special report, "Forests in Distress" Oregonian (15 
October 1990), 26. 
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curve on what's really happening out here on the ground as 
regards folks changing, shifting values on how the forest is 
managed." Likewise, even the D.C. official, speaking of 
changes in agency direction such as the implementation of 
New Forestry techniques, conceded that "the field was .... out 
ahead of Washington on this." 
The Siskiyou's experiment with intense public partici-
pation from 1988-1990 also met with a certain degree of top-
level suspicion as the former supervisor reports that his 
program of workshop-style participation "made some Forest 
Service folks nervous .... The vibrations I would get would be 
that I might be going too far sometimes."1m 
Not surprisingly, the D.C. office is characterized by a 
number of observers as being the arena within the agency 
where the timber interests' influence is most directly 
felt)06 Interviewees tended to confirm this; environmental-
ists reported no direct contact whatsoever with the regional 
or D.C. office, while a timber official, on the other hand, 
saw his own group's influence and effectiveness slowly move 
from the ranger district level to the regional and national 
level (as environmentalists grew stronger on the local 
front). Whereas his predecessor never went to Washington, 
this official reported travelling there twelve to thirteen 
times a year. Thus, while they have lost their local advan-
1~ Although again, McCormick expressed confidence.that 
D.C. was slowly moving in this direction as well. 106 See, for example, Culhane, 270. 
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tage, according to one environmental activist, timber has 
enjoyed far superior higher-level access in the executive 
branch. 107 The former supervisor confirms this point admit-
ting that at the D.C. level, interest groups tied to commod-
ity production tend " to have the Chief's ear." Frome claims 
that the chief may have no choice: 
The chief is cautious to avoid defying leaders of in-
dustry, for they can get his scalp one way or another. 
He acknowledges the role of citizen groups, but is 
careful not to go overboard or become overly intimate 
with them since such behavior is likely to stir up the 
industry. 108 
The Administration and the Cabinet 
Compared with its executive branch superiors, even the 
fairly pro-timber top echelon of the Forest Service has 
seemed positively moderate in the period from 1983 to 1992. 
Almost without exception, the environmental attitudes of top 
advisors, cabinet heads, and other top-level administrative 
officials who dealt with the old growth issue in both the 
Reagan and Bush administrations, have ranged from hostile to 
extremely hostile. Although these top-level administrative 
officials only very occasionally intervene in the day-to-day 
management of or detailed planning for public lands, the 
broad priorities they set can still exert tremendous indi-
rect pressure upon land managers. Such priorities set the 
tone and the boundaries for policymaking and cannot help but 
1~ During this time, environmentalists did, howe~er, 
maintain their national access in the legislative realm. 
108 Frome, 39. 
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weigh heavily upon even seemingly autonomous lower-level 
bureaucrats. In the Reagan and Bush administrations there 
can be no mistaking these priorities: the maximization of 
commodity production on public lands and the minimization of 
ecosystem, wildlife, and other resource protection. 
The cabinet official most directly reponsible for 
overseeing the Forest Service is the Assistant Secretary of 
Agriculture for Natural Resources and the Environment. Dur-
ing the early and mid-1980s, this position was occupied by 
John Crowell Jr., a former top executive of Louisiana Pacif-
ic. 109 While most assistant secretaries have tread cautious-
ly when dealing with the proud and independent Forest Ser-
vice, Crowell was a man with an agenda and set about his 
task of overseeing the agency with a missionary zeal. During 
Crowell's tenure, timber and road budget requests skyrocket-
ed while wildlife, recreation, and soil budgets atroph-
ied. 110 In fact, Crowell, who favored the complete liquida-
tion and conversion of all unprotected old growth, sought a 
full doubling of the already high total annual national for-
est timber output to ten billion board feet.1 11 Consequent-
ly, Crowell, reviled by environmentalists, was also viewed 
with suspicion by the Forest Service. Even the fairly 
109 Kathie Durbin, "Politics Helped Delay Northwest Timber 
Management Plans" Oregonian special report, 8. Crowell had 
as his deputy Douglas MacCleery, previously an official with 
the National Forest Products Association. Frome, 8. 110 Durbin, 8. 111 Ibid. 
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timber-friendly Region Six forester was moved to comment 
that "John has no idea what's out there on the ground. He's 
not in touch with reality .... He's living out there in fan-
tasy land. "112 
Despite Crowell's unusually active stance as an as-
sistant secretary, the Forest Service, for the most part, 
resisted his more outlandish plans for the national forests. 
Still Crowell played a big role in implementing the Reagan 
administration's maximum development policies and setting 
the agency down the path of unsustainably high timber pro-
duction. Crowell, who left in 1985, was succeeded by assis-
tant secretaries (George Dunlop and James Moseley) who, 
while still firmly production-oriented, stayed much further 
out of the spotlight and did not attempted to directly man-
age Forest Service policy. 
The various secretaries of Agriculture during the per-
iod of 1983 to 1992 (John Block, Richard Lyng, Clayton Yeut-
ter, and Edward Madigan) have all held largely the same una-
bashedly pro-development points of view. 11 3 Though Agricul-
ture is very careful not to step on the toes of its largest 
and most prestigious bureau, what is usually subtle, behind-
112 Former Region Six Forester James Torrence quoted in 
Ibid. 
113 This might be due, in large part, to the very nature 
of the department which is, of course, dedicated to the pro-
duction of crops. It is small wonder then that a perennial 
demand of many environmentalists and others interested in 
Forest Service reform is that the agency to be transferred 
to Interior. 
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the-scenes pressure infrequently makes its way to the sur-
face. An especially prominent example of this would be the 
department directive that forced a reluctant Forest Service 
to go along with the very controversial proposal to ban ad-
ministrative timber sale appeals (the Forest Service sought 
only some revisions in the process). As the stakes and ten-
sions in the old growth struggle began to rise after 1990, 
the usually silent secretary (by now, Madigan) started to 
become more vocal and strident. After publicly calling for 
the Forest Service to be "freed from the interference of the 
federal courts, "114 In a 1992 speech to an agricultural 
group, Madigan later defiantly proclaimed that "[t]his owl 
is ultimately going to go the way of the ice truck .... 11 115 
The other cabinet level department involved in the old 
growth issue has been Interior. While the ideogically fero-
cious anti-environmentalism of Reagan's forest secretary, 
James Watt, is legendary, his successors in the Reagan ad-
ministration (William Clark and Donald Hodel) largely con-
tinued his policies, albeit with a less antagonistic style. 
It has been during the tenure of Bush's appointee Manuel 
114 Edward Madigan quoted in "Legal Update" Headwaters 
(Late Summer 1991), 10. 
115 Even more stridently, Madigan suggested, at that same 
speech that the 1992 Republican platform should call for 
"more money, higher income, more markets. String all the 
environmentalists up." Madigan quoted in "U.S. Can't Save 
Endangered Owl, Agriculture Secretary Warns" Chicago Tribune 
(16 July 1992), sec.1, 13. 
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Lujan, however, that Interior has had to deal most directly 
with the old growth/spotted owl controversy. 
Like his predecessors, Lujan brought to his job what 
Vig terms a "dismal environmental record "11 6 and his stance 
regarding old growth has done little to change that reputa-
tion. Lujan's policies, according to one observer, "dis-
tinctly tilt towards industry 11 117 and he has intervened in 
his agencies' affairs far more vigorously than any of his 
counterparts in Agriculture have. Lujan did just about all 
in his power, for example, to prevent or delay the listing 
of the spotted owl as threatened by his department's Fish 
and Wildlife Service and when finally forced by the courts 
to do so, he strongly lobbied for the activization of the 
ESA-exempting God Squad committee of which he is chair. 118 
At the very top of the executive branch during the 
time frame of this study have been Presidents Reagan and 
116 Norman Vig, "Presidential Leadership: From the Reagan 
to the Bush. Administration" in Vig and Kraft, 49. 
117 Ted Gup, "The Stealth Secretary" Time ( 25 May 1992), 
57. 
118 Like his predecessor Watt, Lujan has left a vivid 
trail of notable quotes, calling the BLM's three hundred-
plus million acres of public land, for example, "a place 
with a lot of grass for cows." Referring to the questionable 
value of the ESA, Lujan said, "I believe that man is at the 
top of the pecking order. I think that God gave us dominion 
over these creatures .... ! just look at an armadillo or a 
skunk or a squirrel or an owl or a chicken, whatever it is, 
and I consider the human being on a higher scale. Maybe 
that's because a chicken doesn't talk." Lujan goes on to 
testify to the hardiness of species: "All species adjust to 
change. I can't give you any specific examples, but .I'm sure 
biolo-gists could give you examples of fish that all of a 
sudden here comes saltwater intrusion and slowly they adapt 
to a saltwater environment." Lujan quoted in Gup, 58. 
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Bush and their circle of advisors. For the most part, the 
old growth issue did not reach the point where it received 
direct presidential attention until the Bush years. While 
Bush is generally recognized as being less ideologically 
hostile to environmental objectives than Reagan, 119 with the 
old growth issue his administration left little doubt that 
it stood with timber interests, perhaps more so than any 
other element of government, save congressmen from timber 
districts. During the 1992 presidential campaign, Bush cast 
aside any remaining pretensions of being the "environmental 
president," adopting harsh anti-environmental rhetoric re-
garding old growth and the "spotted owl crowd."1~ Well be-
fore this point, however, the administration sought to keep 
up a steady rate of old growth harvest and prevent or limit 
protection of the owl. 1~ Concerning the violation of envi-
ronmental laws, Judge Dwyer writes: 
119 vig, 53. 
1 ~ Bush repeatedly used the phrase "spotted owl crowd" in 
a dirisive way in 1992 campaign speeches and in the presi-
dential debates. 
1~ Strongly pushing these positions has been a circle of 
advisors with a commodity production-orientation more pro-
nounced than that of Bush himself. These executive office 
advisors (many of whom sat on the God Squad committee) have 
included Dan Quayle in his capacity as both Vice President 
and chairman of the anti-regulatory Council On Competitive-
ness, Chief of Staff John Sununu, Council of Economic Advi-
sors chairman Michael Baskin, and Office of Management and 
Budget director Richard Darman. Darman especially, is known 
as a unrepentent arch-enemy of environmentalism. Darman 
emphasized in a 1990 lecture that "Americans did not fight 
and win the wars of the twentieth century to make the world 
safe for green vegetables." Darman quoted in John Newhouse, 
"The Diplomatic Round: Earth Summit" New Yorker (l June 
1992), 70. 
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This is not the doing of scientists, foresters, ran-
gers, and others at working levels of these agencies. 
It reflects decisions made by higher authority in the 
executive branch of government.1~ 
What is most interesting about top-level adrninistra-
tion in the case of the Siskiyou is the level of access pub-
lie lands user groups seemed to have been granted. As men-
tioned in the previous chapter, this is actually the reverse 
of the localized capture McConnell and others warn of. 
Mahood, in fact, speaks of a recent trend in direct lobbying 
of the formerly more aloof president and his advisors.123 
Lowi, too, notes and bemoans this phenomenon of the "person-
al president" directly involved in the pettiness of special 
interest politics . 124 This trend of high-level timber influ-
ence probably extends back prior to this case, as Barney, 
speaking of the Nixon administration, finds that "[n]o agri-
business interest group has found the doors to the White 
House more open than the timber industry. "125 Even a local 
timber official conceded that, as a whole, his industry was 
most effective at the highest levels of national government. 
Congress 
Not all of the eagerness of the Forest Service to "get 
122 From the opinion of Judge William Dwyer, Seattle Au-
dubon Society v. Evans 771 F. Supp. 1081 (9th U.S. District, 
199lj, Finding of Fact # 15, Section V. 12 Mahood, 133. 
1~ Theodore Lowi, The Personal President (Ithaca,_ NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1985). 125 Daniel Barney, The Last Stand (New York: Grossman, 
1974), xvi. 
out the cut" was internally generated or due to pressure 
from Agriculture or the executive office. To some extent 
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this push for high levels of commodity production was also a 
product of congressional pressure on an agency understanda-
bly keen on maintaining its high budgets. In the Siskiyou 
and larger old growth conflict, Congress has played a very 
complex and often contradictory role, proving to be, in one 
capacity or another, both the environmentalists' best hope 
and worst foe. At the root of Congress's ambivalent stance 
towards old growth is its dual nature. Determining how eco-
logically oriented Congress has been has largely depended 
upon which segment of the institution is considered. Like-
wise, the literature on Congress's environmental performance 
tends to reflect the body's dualism with some observers 
stressing its notable achievements and others citing its pa-
ralysis and "lack of coherence" on environmental matters.1U 
In the inherent institutional conflict between the 
goals of representation and distribution of benefits on one 
hand and rational and comprehensive lawmaking on the other, 
the former has clearly prevailed in the politics of old 
growth. As Lowi and other critics would predict, such dis-
1u Michael Kraft, "Congress and Environmental Policy" in 
James Lester (editor), Environmental Politics and Policy 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press); Mary Cook and Roger 
Davidson, "Deferral Politics: Congressional Decision Making 
on Environmental Issues in the 1980s" in Helen Ingram and R. 
Kenneth Godwin (editors), Public Policy and the Natural En-
vironment (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985); Richard Cooley 
and Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith, Congress and the Environment 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970). 
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tributive politics has been dominated by local representa-
tives positioned on key committees. The Siskiyou's congress-
men along with the rest of the Pacific Northwest's delega-
tion as well as the delegations from other timber-rich West-
ern states have heavily populated the various committees 
which oversee the Forest Service and public lands manage-
ment. 
Six committees and six subcommittees have been in-
volved in the politics of old growth. The House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees and both of their Interior Approp-
riations Subcommittees are responsible for setting timber 
budgets, and thus ASQs, for the Forest Service. The task of 
crafting ancient forest and forest management legislation 
falls upon the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 
Committee and its Conservation and Forestry Subcommittee, 
the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and its 
Public Lands, National Parks, and Forests Subcommittee, the 
House Agriculture Committee and its Forests, Family Farms, 
and Energy Subcommittee, and the House Interior and Insular 
Affairs Committee and its National Parks and Public Lands 
Subcommittee. 
In 1990, Oregon's Senator Hatfield (R) sat on the 
Senate Appropriations Committee as well as the Public Lands 
Subcommittee. Both of the Siskiyou's representatives, Peter 
DeFazio ( D) and Robert Smith ( R), were on the Nation_al Parks 
and Public Lands Subcommittee, while Smith also sat on the 
428 
the Forests, Family Farms, and Energy Subcommittee. Nearby 
representative Les Aucoin (D) and Washington's Norm Dicks 
(D) were on the House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee, 
while Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA) and Rep. Sid Morrison (R-
WA) among other Western and Northwestern congressmen also 
figured prominently on these committees and subcommit-
tees .127 
While there have been too many other outside players 
to constitute a classic iron triangle, the relationship be-
tween some of these committees (especially Interior Approp-
riations), the Forest Service, and timber constituents have, 
at times, contained many elements of this situation. When it 
comes to pleasing constituents in home districts and guaran-
teeing their votes, timber is a tangible, distributable, and 
thus politically lucrative item, while standing trees and 
owls are not. As such, various members of Congress have con-
sistently imposed upon a fairly compliant and understandably 
budget-conscious Forest Service timber quotas higher than 
even the timber-oriented agency has requested--700 mmbf more 
in 1986, 1 bbf in 1987, 300 mmbf in 1988, and 200 mmbf in 
1989.1~ In the Siskiyou alone, the congressionally mandated 
target for 1987 was 46.7% more than the Forest Service had 
127 Committee membership information is from: Michael Ba-
rone and Grant Ujifusa, Almanac of American Politics· 1992 
(Washington D.C.: National Journal, 1991). 
128 Durbin, 11. 
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planned. 1~ According to an aide to Chief Robertson, these 
congressional imposed ASQs of the 1980s were "earmarked" and 
"untouchable, "130 Thus, much of the rangers' mad scramble in 
that decade to squeeze sales from every available corner of 
their districts was attributable to these unsustainable quo-
tas. Not surprisingly, Siskiyou officials reported in the 
interviews that Congress did place some constraints upon 
their decisionmaking. 131 
As one might expect, the loyalties of most of the 
Northwest delegation have been beyond doubt.1~ "In my six 
years on the House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee," 
Representative Aucoin wrote in a 1986 letter to a constitu-
ent, "I have made the well-being of the Northwest's forest 
products industry my number one priority. 111 33 In keeping 
with these priorities, Northwestern and often Rocky Mountain 
129 Catherine Caufield, "The Ancient Forest" New Yorker 
(14 May 1990), 56. 
1~ Quoted in Durbin, 11. 131 Still, Siskiyou officials reported a very cordial 
working relationship with the Oregon delegation and seemed 
to understand congressional intervention as a legitimate 
part of doing business. 
1~ The few notable exceptions would include former Wash-
ington Sen. Brock Adams, his replacement Sen. Patty Murray 
(D) and Reps. Jolene Unsoeld (D-WA) and Jim McDermott (D-
WA). 1
" AuCoin letter quoted in Cary Groner, "The Congres-
sional Connection" What's Happening (Eugene OR: 12 May 
1988), 7. Aucoin represented an adjacent district to the 
Siskiyou area before his def eat to Senator Packwood in the 
1992 Oregon Senate race. In that race, Packwood made a point 
of blaming the spotted owl and the ESA for Oregon's economic 
woes, while the equally pro-timber Aucoin moved to a more 
environmental position. Oregon's other senator, of course, 
was Mark Hatfield, "the politician most feared and detested 
by ancient forest activists," according to Caufield, 82. 
legislators have not hesitated to use their congressional 
clout to bully bureaucrats on behalf of timber interests. 
AuCoin, for example, publicly threatened Chief Max Peter-
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son's job during hearings when the Chief reported trouble 
meeting the 1986 quota's 20% increase. 1~ Peterson resigned 
soon thereafter. 135 
While the power of the Northwest delegation on the 
various forestry committees (and independently as well) has 
been substantial, various observers have noticed a slow but 
profound shift occurring as committee makeup over over the 
1980s has moved slightly away from Westerners. Midwestern 
and Eastern representatives are becoming less shy, according 
to both Egan and Davis, when it comes to intervening in pub-
lie lands issues--traditionally an area where strict defer-
ence to Western legislators had been the norm. 1~ While a 
number of commitees (especially Agricultural ones) still 
134 Durbin, 7. 
135 There is a long history congressional intimidation of 
Forest Service personnel when certain congressmen believe 
that the agency is not keeping up with commodity production. 
Most recent examples besides the Aucoin-Peterson flap in-
clude the resignation of Regional Forester Mumma in which 
Senator James McClure (R-ID) was perhaps the driving force 
and Senator John McCain's (R-AZ) confrontation with Coronado 
National Forest Supervisor Jim Abbott over an endangered 
squirrel. Timothy Egan, "Forest Supervisors Say Politicians 
Are Asking Them to Cut Too Much" New York Times (16 Septem-
ber 1991); John Pickens, "Arizona Senator Threatens Forest 
Service Chief and Forest Supervisor" Inner Voice (Winter 
1991l, 15. 
13 Timothy Egan, "Fighting for Control of America's Hin-
terlands" New York Times (11 November 1990), 4:18; Phillip 
Davis, "Cry for Preservation, Recreation Changing Public 
Lands Policy" Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review (3 
August 1991), 2145-2151. 
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have, to varying degrees, a pro-development tilt, the House 
National Parks subcommittee could now be said to be firmly 
environmentalist. 
In the House Appropriations Subcommittee, meanwhile, 
the staunch pro-timber stance of the early and mid-1980s has 
eased somewhat as non-timber legislators such as Subcommit-
tee Chairman Sidney Yates (D-IL) have increasingly asserted 
themselves to offset pro-timber influence. Yates, represent-
ing Chicago, typifies this Eastern environmental counterbal-
ance to Western timber interests. "These are the classic 
giants we read so much about," said Yates speaking of old 
growth at a 1988 hearing, "Coming from the city, I'm preju-
diced about those forests. We want them to stand. 11 137 While 
environmentalists naturally welcome public lands issues be-
ing treated as matters of national policy rather than the 
domain of local congressmen seeking pork, this trend has en-
raged Western pro-timber legislators who resent such "inter-
ference." Rep. Don Young (R-AK) went as far as to deride his 
colleague Jim Jontz and other pro-environmental representa-
tives as "pimps for Eastern environmentalists. "138 
What the growing prominence of non-Western or non-
timber congresspeople in public lands issues represents is a 
movement away from the strictly distributional, "iron-
1 ~ Rep. Sidney Yates quoted in Alan Hayakawa "Fight 
Erupts at Forest Service Hearings" Oregonian ( 15 Apr_il 
l 988J. 
1 Rep. Don Young quoted in Egan, "Fighting for Con-
trol .... " 
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triangle" brand of legislative politics that Lowi and McCon-
nell decry. Instead, such politics is more akin to the 
national-interest policymaking that both critics advocate 
for Congress. In such a scenario, broader concern over 
national-scale policy would replace some of the traditional 
deference to local representatives' policy preferences and 
the vote-trading that often accompanies it. Increased na-
tionalization of old growth politics also assumes that the 
relevant agency--the Forest Service--will answer to all of 
Congress and not just the local representatives in their 
subgovernments as Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) explains: 
At the national level, the Forest Service must work 
with a broader segment of Congress than it has in the 
past. Many of us care deeply about forests located far 
beyond our state's borders. Timber target levels are 
set by the whole Congress--not just the two senators 
in whose state a particular forest is located. 139 
In the same vein, Interior Chairman George Miller perceives 
the old growth issue as: 
.... sort of like the national debt. You're just screw-
ing generations down the line out of their inheritance 
.... It's going to be a national decision. This is a 
national resource. 140 
Although it is changing, Congress is still, however, 
quite far from this Lowiesque ideal regarding forest issues. 
Rather, this move away from strict distributional politics 
1~ Senator Patrick Leahy quoted in Terence Tipple and J. 
Douglas Wellman, "Herbert Kaufman's Forest Ranger Thirty 
Years Later: From Simplicity and Homogeneity to Complexity 
and Diversity" Public Administration Review 51:5 (September/ 
October 1991), 424. 
140 Miller quoted in "Chairman Miller Tours Southwest Ore-
gon" Headwaters Journal (Summer 1992), 16. Author's italics. 
has resulted in a nearly complete stalemate as far as an-
cient forest legislation is concerned. The pro-timber and 
pro-environmental factions in Congress are each strong 
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enough to thwart the other, but not enough so to see their 
policy preference triumph. So on one hand, the worst abuses 
of the 1980's congressional super-quotas have ceased as tim-
ber targets, though still unsustainably high, have leveled 
off somewhat and threats to judicial review and citizen ap-
peals have been soundly beaten back since 1990. And for all 
the grief congressional timber quotas have caused environ-
mentalists, most would still claim that they are taken most 
seriously and find their closest allies at the congressional 
level. Yet in keeping within its overall environmental am-
bivalence, Congress is no closer, as of 1992, to producing 
any sort of long-term comprehensive solution than it was a 
half decade earlier. 1~ 
Perhaps where Congress has most closely conformed to 
Lowi's critique is regarding the flexibility of the legisla-
tive mandates it has given the Forest Service. In the case 
of old growth, Lowi's thesis that broad discretion is vul-
nerable to being perverted to suit powerful interests has 
been irrefutably realized. Not only has the Forest Service 
taken extreme liberties with the acts under which it must 
operate (most prominently, the Multiple Use/Sustained Yield 
1 ~ This may finally change in 1993 if the ascende~ce of 
the more environmentally inclined Clinton administration 
provides any impetus to resolve the issue. 
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Act, NFMA, NEPA, the ESA, and the Clean Water Act), but in 
many cases Congress itself has directly ordered the agency 
to take action that would violate such laws and in some 
cases has then shielded the agency from citizen or judicial 
review. 1Q Regulations regarding reforestation, water qual-
ity, sustained yield levels, wildlife habitat, endangered 
species, and environmental impact documentation, to name but 
a few, have been routinely violated whether through the For-
est Service's own volition or under the congressional 
gun. 143 
Thus, there exists a profound irony in congressional 
behavior regarding forest issues: Congress passes seemingly 
tough laws to protect forest resources, but when the actual 
implementation of those laws threatens to reduce the flow of 
distributive benefits, various congresspersons become indig-
nant and threaten bureaucratic jobs if unsustainable 
1Q The Interior Appropriations Subcommittee's quotas in 
the 1980s, for example, could not be fulfilled without 
wholesale violations of Congress's own mandates. The Silver 
Fire court ban rider and the infamous Section 318 are clear 
examples of congressional protection of agencies who neglect 
to enforce mandates and would otherwise be subject to legal 
action. 
1~ The laws listed above are each characterized by vary-
ing degrees of vagueness or clarity. On one hand, ESA, the 
Sustained Yield half of the MU/SY Act and parts of NFMA are 
relatively straightfoward, while the Multiple Use half of 
MU/SY, much of NEPA, and the more general, non-procedural 
goals of NFMA are notoriously ambiguous. Regardless of their 
level of precision, however, Congress has generally ·allowed 
implementing agencies wide latitude in reinterpreting or se-
lectively enforcing these laws. 
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congressionally-mandated quotas are not met.144 More than 
anything else, this points to Congress's dualistic nature 
regarding ecological issues. There is great tension between 
national-interest lawmaking which tends to favor ecological 
goals and local, distributively-oriented representation 
which tends to favor commodity production. 
Because they mostly live far away from old growth for-
ests and do not represent timber workers, the former contin-
gent in Congress has the luxury to consider very important 
long-term costs and benefits which logically seem to favor 
environmental protection. The latter contingent, however, is 
afforded no such luxury to be far-sighted since the short-
term costs of preservation would be borne almost entirely 
upon their constituents (just as they previously almost en-
tirely reaped the short-term benefits). Thus we have Sidney 
Yates simultaneously hailed as an issue-oriented statesman 
def ending the national interest and our natural heritage and 
denounced as a sanctimonious meddler with nothing at stake. 
144 Appearing with President Bush at a 1991 speech in 
Port-land in which Bush complained of "extreme environmental 
positions," Sen. Packwood candidly and perhaps inadvertantly 
confirmed this congressional double-standard regarding the 
laws it passes. When asked by reporters if any of the ex-
tremism to which the President ref erred was to be found in 
his own agencies or the courts, Packwood replied, "I think 
he was pointing out those who file petitions .... Under the 
law, those bills (environmental protection measuresr are not 
self-enforcing." Packwood quoted in David Sarasohn, "Pack-
wood Connects Bush to a Tree" Oregonian (20 September 1991). 
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The Courts 
Perhaps the clearest evidence of Congress's environ-
mental dualism and the failure of broad discretion has been 
the pivotal role played by the federal judiciary in the 
Siskiyou/old growth case. Just as centralists would predict, 
in the absence of clear and authoritative goals whose imple-
mentation is beyond question, unresolved policy conflicts 
end up by default in an overloaded court system.1~ As a 
forum of last resort for gridlocked committees, interests, 
and agencies wrangling over vague or unimplemented statutes, 
the prominence of the judicial branch in old growth politics 
is clear testament to pluralism's weakness in this regard. 
Despite a number of judicial setbacks (and the fact 
that the burden of proof usually rests with environmental 
litigants in such a way as to favor the status quo146 ), sue-
cessful lawsuits have, nevertheless, been the environmental-
ists' most effective weapon and the cornerstone of their ef-
forts to save old growth. In fact, according to one acti-
vist, the only real tangible success environmentalists have 
ever achieved with old growth has been through litigation. 
They have scored key victories in which the courts have 
ruled that land management agencies have flagrantly violated 
statutes such as NFMA, NEPA, and the Endangered Species Act. 
Judge Dwyer writes in his 1991 opinion of "a systematic re-
1~ c. Hardin, 188. 146 Henning and Mangun, 34. 
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fusal by the Forest Service to comply with laws protecting 
wildlife. "147 
Because the law and irrefutable scientific evidence 
has mostly been on their side, environmentalists have been 
able, therefore, to achieve legally what they could not 
achieve politically, forcing their demands to be heard by a 
largely resistant legislature and bureaucracy. According to 
one environmentalist, it has been the rude crisis caused by 
tens of thousands of acres of enjoined timber sales and the 
subsequent disruption in the smooth flow of constituent ben-
efits, rather than her group's lobbying and organizing that 
has caught Congress's attention and granted the group's de-
mands legitimacy. At least in this case, Petulla is correct 
when he claims that "the citizens' 'agency' remains the 
courts" in matters environmental. 1~ 
Naturally, timber interests, their congressional al-
lies, and the Forest Service do not hold judicial interven-
tion in nearly as high esteem. A number of interviewees 
spoke of the "total frustration" the Forest Service feels 
with the constant litigation and the courts' undoing of all 
147 Dwyer opinion, Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, sec. 
VI. Actually, a representative of Headwaters claimed that 
although the Forest Service was in gross violation of the 
ESA, the group "had enough goods on 'em already" using only 
NFMA and NEPA. Dwyer's decision on the spotted owl, there-
fore, found the Forest Service to be in violation of NFMA 
procedures. Zilly's ruling against the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, on the other hand, did rely on the ESA. 
1~ Joseph Petulla, Environmental Protection in the United 
States (San Francisco: San Francisco Study Center, 1987), 
103. 
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their work. Timber interests, meanwhile, have been simply 
apoplectic. One timber company official complained bitterly 
about judges who know nothing about forestry making "academ-
ic" decisions which prevent Forest Service professionals 
from doing their job. According to that official, court-
directed forest policy was akin to having a "dentist running 
a spaceship" or an "astronaut drilling on your teeth." In-
stead, timber interests generally preferred broad mandates 
within which Forest Service professionals could practice 
forestry as they felt most appropriate. Furthermore, most of 
their forest legislation proposals have also included some 
sort of limit on judicial review of timber sales. 
The courts owe their prominence in the politics of old 
growth not only to their accessibility (court-banning riders 
notwithstanding), but to a highly fragmented and conflictual 
policymaking apparatus as well. Although the federal judici-
ary, as an antidote to vague or unimplemented statutes and 
decentralized confusion, does represent a type of central-
ized authority, the courts cannot simply be regarded as a 
typical manifestation of political centralization as called 
for by centralist theorists. A centralized system, at least 
as Lowi calls for it, would actually feature a less active 
judiciary that would be called on to referee policy disputes 
far less often. Still, by serving as a partial corrective to 
mischieviously interpreted statutes, judicial rulings do al-
low us to gain at least some idea of how ecological policy 
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might be treated in a more centralized system. Thus, in an 
indirect way, court decisions such as Dwyer's or Zilly's al-
low us to sneak a glimpse into a world in which legislative 
mandates are interpreted as being clear and authoritative 
and bureaucracies are expected to implement those laws with 
some degree of fidelity to the law's intent. 
State and Local Government 
Although neither the state of Oregon nor the various 
counties or municipalities surrounding the Siskiyou had any 
direct jurisdiction over policymaking in the federal Forest, 
these local governments did, to varying degrees, wield in-
fluence. For example, although there was no legal or regula-
tory requirement for the Siskiyou's administrators to clear 
the Forest Plan with the state, the former supervisor re-
ported that the Governor's forestry advisor worked closely 
with him on the Plan and that the state's influence was 
"significant." In fact, one district ranger claimed that 
state pressure on the Plan was much more intense than that 
from the regional office or D.C. McCormick confirmed that it 
was politically impossible to ignore the state (which went 
as far as drafting its own version of the Plan), especially 
since Senator Hatfield made it known that he would not agree 
to any Plan that Governor Neil Goldschmidt (a Democrat, no 
less) did not sign on to. The result was a plan with a 
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slightly higher ASQ than the Siskiyou's administrators would 
have preferred. 
Not all elements of state government, however, were as 
timber-oriented as Governor Goldschmidt's office. While many 
Western states have fairly anti-environmental wildlife and 
public lands agencies, Oregon, traditionally one of the 
West's most liberal states, 1~ has two fairly vigilant agen-
cies, the Department of Fish and Wildlife (ODFW) and Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality (ODEQ). Throughout the plan-
ning process for the Siskiyou's many timber projects, these 
two departments (especially the latter) would often raise 
doubts and clearly register their misgivings concerning the 
negative wildlife and water quality implications of Forest 
Service proposals. These agencies, however, enjoyed far less 
clout than the Governor's office. 150 The strongly pro-timber 
state Department of Forestry and the governor's office (al-
though it was far less anti-environmental than many of its 
149 In his evaluation of state environmental policies, 
James Lester lists Oregon in the top ttprogressive" category 
with high commitment and high institutional capability. 
James Lester, "A New Federalism?", 73. 
1 ~More environmentally inclined state wildlife agencies 
such as Oregon's or Washington's have long clashed with the 
Forest Service. They argue that national forest wildlife, 
although on federal land, are still partly their jurisdic-
tion. When dealing with the hunting and game management 
goals and responsibilities of traditional wildlife agencies, 
the Forest Service usually is happy to defer to the state. 
When confronted with state demands for increased habitat 
protection for non-game species, though, the agency is far 
less willing to share turf. "State Game Agency Appeals For-
est Service Timber Sales" Inner Voice 3:2 (Spring 1991), 4. 
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western counterparts) were much more likely than the ODFW or 
the ODEQ to support federal plans. 
This gubernatorial support, however, became far less 
assured after Democrat Barbara Roberts' victory in 1990 
state elections. Roberts, who leans towards environmental 
protection, quickly shifted the weight of the governor's 
office away from strict commodity production. For instance, 
the Governor submitted an official brief in early 1992 urg-
ing the God Squad to reject the BLM and Interior's request 
to partially lift the old growth logging injunction. Calling 
the God Squad process "disgraceful," Roberts claimed that 
the federal government was "playing on the fears of our 
workers and offering them false hope. 0 151 Not surprisingly, 
this position earned her the enmity of the timber interests 
who promptly initiated a recall petition drive to oust her 
from office. 1~ Needless to say, then, the overall environ-
mental stance of the state has been largely dependent upon 
who has occupied the governor's office. If the Siskiyou had 
to work with a Roberts administration when developing their 
Plan, the final outcome may have been somewhat different. 
While the state has wavered from a moderate pro-timber 
position to a fairly environmentalist one, county and muni-
cipal governments around the Siskiyou have had only one un-
changing stance--maximum timber harvest. Although the for-
151 
"Governor Blasts Lujan .... And Gets Blasted in Return" 
Headwaters Journal (Spring 1992), 16. 
1~ Ibid. 
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mer supervisor claims that local officials were a "strong 
factor" in policymaking, their positions were so invariably 
uncompromising (essentially the same as the timber 
interests153 ), that this probably kept them a further dis-
tance from Siskiyou officials than the state government. For 
instance, while the state and the supervisor's office hag-
gled over a relatively small ten or twelve mmbf difference 
for the Plan's ASQ, local governments, almost without excep-
tion, signed on to the timber industry's Evergreen Alterna-
tive which called for a huge 188 mmbf ASQ and short eighty-
year rotations. Such an unbending stance probably led to 
them being treated more as another timber interest than as 
governmental representatives and potential policy brokers. 
The Effects of Fragmentation in the Siskiyou 
Whether policy in a given instance has been influenced 
at the top administrative levels or in the field, or by 
local, constituent-focused or national policy-focused legis-
lators, or at the federal or state/local levels, the overall 
picture in the politics of old growth has, as mentioned be-
fore, been one of considerable fragmentation. The most cru-
cial question, therefore, is whether the policymaking flaws 
of fragmentation as alleged by critics (namely, capture, in-
crementalism, rivalry, and reductionism) have been readily 
apparent in the Siskiyou case. 
153 In fact, many mill owners and other timber officials 
sat on these local government boards. 
443 
Chapter five has already addressed the issue of local-
ized capture and it was determined that while timber-biased 
to some extent, the local administrators of the Siskiyou 
were certainly not captured. Thus, the isolation of adminis-
trative decentralization that critics warn leads to capture, 
was simply not enough for local commodity-using clients to 
control the Siskiyou, at least after 1983. 1~ In fact, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the history of the Sis-
kiyou case shows far more one-sided access (akin to a cap-
ture situation) at the higher, rather than lower levels of 
the agency, the Agriculture Department, and the executive 
office. 
The effects of incrementalism, however, cannot be as 
easily dismissed. Throughout the course of Siskiyou and old 
growth politics, the grip of previously established policy 
patterns has been tenacious; precedence has been king. As we 
have seen, the main battlegrounds have been in the business-
as-usual forums of timber budgets, ASQs, or EIS processes 
for timber projects. The battles that have raged have been 
whether to raise or lower targets by a few mmbf or budgets 
by a few percentage points. Proposals which have seriously 
deviated from the status quo in either direction, whether 
eliminating the Endangered Species Act, completely banning 
judicial review, establishing large-scale ecosystem-based 
1 ~ While not captured, some aspects of the agency's rela-
tionship with local congressmen did, however, resemble as-
pects of the traditional subgovernment setup. 
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old growth protection, or restricting exports, have been 
routinely beaten back. 155 In fact, the only serious jolt to 
the status quo--the Dwyer injunctions--were imposed from 
outside the administrative/legislative realm. Otherwise, all 
the process could produce, at least through 1992, were ad-
visory commission studies and incremental adjustments in the 
ASQ. And, of course, a fairly steady flow of timber, injunc-
tions notwithstanding. 
Policymaking structures in the old growth case have 
thus been incapable of producing radical or comprehensively 
conceived realignments of policy such as, perhaps, ecosystem 
reserves or true biodiversity protection or a program of 
economic restructuring and retraining for timber-dependent 
areas or, for that matter, eliminating sustained yield re-
quirements. While perhaps they were never designed to be 
capable of such things, this inability, regardless of in-
tent, is precisely what prompts critics to call for reform 
or fundamental restructuring. 
155 It could feasibly be argued that the incorporation of 
New Forestry techniques in Forest Service timber projects 
represent a radical deviation from previous policy. As we 
discussed in chapter five, however, there are good reasons 
to doubt whether the New Perspectives program is truly revo-
lutionary. While New Forestry techniques are authentically 
preferable to clearcutting, until they are unmistakably part 
of an integrated attempt to achieve ecological sustainabil-
ity on the national forests and not just designed to_keep 
logging high volumes in more acceptable ways, then it cannot 
really be considered much of a deviation from an incremen-
talist status quo. 
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The critics' arguments regarding the rivalry and re-
ductionism of decentralized policymaking units can also be 
confirmed by evidence from this case. As should be expected, 
there was some friction between various policymaking enti-
ties, whether state-federal, congressional-Forest Service, 
or even within various levels or disciplines within the For-
est Service. While there were no spectacular clashes (such 
the epic Forest Service-Park Service struggle over the Olym-
pic forest which Twight chronicled), this friction has, on 
occasion, caused problems. The rivalry between the timber-
oriented Agriculture committees and more environmentally-
oriented Interior committees over the domain of ancient for-
est legislation, for instance, has certainly played a role 
in creating the half-decade-long legislative stalemate. 
Far more destructive to environmental goals, however, 
has been the reductionism that has characterized the policy-
making realm. Within the world of public lands policy, the 
goals, values, and technical orientations of the various 
policymaking entities involved have served to constrict 
their abilities to formulate long-term, comprehensive solu-
tions to the old growth question. Policies have largely been 
drawn up instead, by disparate parties in something of a 
vaccuum, without regard to related problems, facts, or 
events. The Forest Service, for example, routinely planned 
timber sales with little consultation with Fish and_Wildlife 
personnel as to spotted owl or marbled murrelet habitat or 
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salmon runs, while Fish and Wildlife drew up habitat conser-
vation areas strictly as it concerned their charge, the 
spotted owl, rather than the larger old growth community.156 
The result of this sort of policymaking-with-blinders-
on and lack of coordination has been, at times, chaos and 
confusion on the Siskiyou; even the policymakers most inti-
mately involved have not always known what exactly is going 
on. The Forest Service sold old growth timber while drawing 
up their own spotted owl plan, while Fish and Wildlife for-
mulated a completely unrelated recovery strategy which in-
cluded protection of some of the timber the Forest Service 
was busy cutting. The ISC, meanwhile, issued their own spot-
ted owl recommendations as rival congressional committees 
with the help of opposing interest groups each drew up their 
own tentative ancient forest reserve systems. And throughout 
all of this, upper-level executive appointees worked to un-
dermine any potential protective measures, while the federal 
court rulings kept up a steady stream of pressure upon agen-
cies in the opposite direction. 
It is no wonder then, that with numerous authorized 
parties working with so little coordination and pushing in 
1 ~ One reason, besides differing specializations, for the 
fairly poor coordination between the Forest Service and the 
Fish and Wildlife Service, according to several Siskiyou 
personnel, has been that the latter's chronic understaffing 
and underfunding limit its ability to communicate and co-
ordinate. Clarke and McCool goes as far as to term the near-
ly friendless agency an "organizational gnat." Jeanne Niena-
ber Clarke and Daniel McCool, Staking Out the Terrain (Al-
bany, NY: State University Press of New York, 1985), 145. 
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such disparate directions, each has tended, in their isola-
tion and specialization, to be, as one observer put it, 
somewhat "out of the loop." One activist claims of the For-
est Service, "We know more than they do. We can tell them 
what's going on." This reductionism goes beyond interagency 
relations as even the various specializations within the 
Forest Service have often tended to act with a minimum of 
internal coordination, mirroring the larger external pic-
ture. "The right hand," says a timber official, "doesn't 
know what the left hand is doing." Thus, with one of those 
hands, agency biologists work to formulate a spotted owl 
recovery plan, while with the other, foresters and line 
officers draw up unrelated forest plans with ASQs and road-
less entries which might very well violate the owl plan. 
This lack of a truly comprehensive vision of land man-
agement in favor of disjointed, piecemeal, timber sale-
driven management might be partly attributable to the fact 
that the agency is so highly compartmentalized into the 
realms of specialists--foresters, engineers, wildlife biol-
ogists, hydrologists, soil scientists, archeologists, recre-
ationists, and so on. Perhaps more importantly, some of 
these specializations are powerful while others are margin-
alized. As such, comprehensive solutions integrating old 
growth ecology, wildlife, and economic concerns into a long-
term, big-picture strategy have faced enormously difticult, 
nearly insurmountable obstacles in such a fragmented and 
biased structure. 
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The closest thing to true coordination and interagency 
cooperation in the old growth case has been the work of the 
Interagency Scientific Committee, made up of experts from a 
number of state and federal agencies. Theoretically, at 
least, such a commission should be able to transcend the 
conflictual fragmentation of jurisdictions deadlocked on a 
particular policy problem and in doing so, provide some co-
ordination and basis for cooperation to these same jurisdic-
tions. The degree of legitimacy that the committee's recom-
mendations eventually garnered, as well as the centrality of 
the !SC as a player in the old growth politics of 1989-1991, 
points to their surprising success. They did indeed coordi-
nate scientific efforts to understand and manage the spotted 
owl. Their exclusive focus on the owl and nothing else, how-
ever, has limited their effectiveness at offering the truly 
comprehensive sorts of solutions to the larger root problem 
(that of vanishing old growth ecosystems) that many obser-
vers would expect from an organization of this nature. At 
least in this case, therefore, good coordination did not 
guarantee comprehensiveness. A newer interagency commission, 
the Northern Spotted Owl Recovery Team, similarly made of 
various state and federal agencies and individuals, has 
since supplanted the !SC as the main vehicle for policy 
coordination. 
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Conclusion 
When considering whether political fragmentation in 
the Siskiyou has been harmful to ecological goals or when 
comparing the policy preferences of higher levels versus 
lower levels of political authority, the only thing that 
becomes perfectly clear is that not much is clear. Is poli-
tical centralization necessary if ecological values are to 
be taken seriously and comprehensively considered or does 
decentralization offer these values their best chance? The 
conclusions that can be drawn from the Siskiyou are decided-
ly mixed. 
As table 18 shows, there has been no clear trend cor-
relating higher-level, more centralized decisionmakers with 
more ecologically enlightened attitudes or vice versa. Ra-
ther, all policymaking levels advocated all sorts of old 
growth policy. Specifically, the federal courts and the ISC 
conformed most closely to the thesis that centralized struc-
tures are the most environmentally friendly. Internally, 
Congress also seemed to follow this pattern to some extent. 
For the most part, local and regional legislators, respond-
ing to timber's important role as a constituent benefit, 
were among the actors most closely aligned with timber inte-
rests and most consistently against old growth protection. 
On the other hand, representatives from non-timber dis-
tricts, adhering to a more national policy (rather than 
local representation) orientation, were amongst the environ-
TABLE 18 
LEVELS OF POLICYMAKER CENTRALIZATION ANO ENVIRONMENTALISM 
CENTRALIZED 
DECENTRALIZ 
Administration 
Interior Dept. 
Agriculture Dept. 
Congress ISC 
Federal 
Courts 
Agriculture 
Co11aittees 
Interior 
Coaaittees 
USFWS (DC) 
USFS (DC) 
Agriculture Subco•. 
Int. Appr. Subcom. 
OR Dept.of 
Forestry 
USFS Region 6 
USFWS NW Region 
Gov.Goldschmidt 
ODFW 
local reps 
Interior 
Subcoms. 
Gov.Roberts 
ODEQ 
SNF Supervisor's 
Off ice 
county boards 
city councils 
LESS 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
ranger 
districts 
MORE 
ENVIRONMENTAL_ 
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mentalists' closest allies. Because of this dualism, the 
Congress as a whole must be considered as neither wholly 
pro-timber or pro-environmental. 
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While the examples of Congress, the courts, and the 
ISC reinforce the centralization thesis, the evidence from 
the administrative sector seems to point to the reverse. 
Relatively speaking, in the Siskiyou it was the most decen-
tralized units of administration, the National Forest and 
the ranger districts, who were a fair degree more environ-
mentally sensitive than regional or headquarter offices. In 
fact, as one climbs the administrative ladder from the Sis-
kiyou to Region Six to Forest Service headquarters to 
Cabinet-level departments to top administrative officials, 
the anti-environmentalism and commodity-user bias intensi-
fies further and further. 
This top-level anti-environmentalism is probably very 
case and time specific, however. As such, it points to the 
obvious importance of presidential politics and a given ad-
ministration's ideology. One could easily envision an alter-
native scenario where top administrators were more ecologi-
cally inclined than their decentralized counterparts. For 
example, it is probably safe to say that the Assistant Sec-
retary of Agriculture under Carter, Rupert Cutler (who went 
on to head the Defenders of Wildlife) was environmentally 
way ahead of most of the "on-the-ground" personnel he over-
saw in the Forest Service. Similarly, the Clinton adrninis-
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tration may very well prove to have stronger environmental 
leanings than most rank-and-file Agriculture or Forest Ser-
vice personnel. If this case study began after 1992, its 
findings in terms of administrative centralization might, 
therefore, be quite different. Thus, the hostility this 
study found in the Reagan and Bush administrations is far 
less about inherent patterns in centralized authority re-
garding environmental protection than it is about the 
changeability of such patterns. 
Finally, in terms of differences between federal, 
state, and local positions, the evidence from the Siskiyou 
case has again been mixed. Prior to 1990, the governor's 
off ice and federal administrators stressed timber production 
to roughly the same extent, while several state agencies, on 
the other hand, were far more ecologically inclined than 
either. Since Governor Roberts came to power in 1991, 
though, the state government as a whole could be considered 
far more in favor of environmental protection than the fed-
eral government, a rare achievement in the West where the 
federal government is usually considerably more 
preservation-oriented than the states. Locally, however, 
things were far more traditional as the county and city 
governments surrounding the Forest were, without exception, 
vigorously opposed to old growth protection. 
Regarding decentralization's alleged flaws, on~y lo-
calized capture has been shown in the Siskiyou case to have 
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very little basis. A cautious, status quo-oriented incremen-
talism and a. divisive reductionism, on the other hand, 
proved to be serious, even crippling problems for comprehen-
sive environmental goals. Incremental policy formulation has 
heavily favored a strongly unecological status quo of high 
timber budgets and a steady flow of constituent benefits. 
The fragmentation and narrow reductionistic perceptions of 
policymakers, meanwhile, have turned old growth politics, at 
times, into a chaotic and incoherent jumble, inherently in-
capable of producing, let alone conceiving of holistic or 
systematic approaches to ecological problems. Instead, a 
series of fractured proposals responding only to isolated 
aspects of this issue (the spotted owl, particular patches 
of big trees, jobs, or the steady flow of timber) have been 
the most this fragmented and highly specialized system could 
produce. 
Does it follow, then, that centralization would cor-
rect these shortcomings? While this study can offer no truly 
conclusive evidence of this, one can surely speculate that a 
more centralized and integrated policymaking structure might 
indeed be able to churn out more comprehensive policy. 1~ If 
the case of the Siskiyou shows anything, though, it is that 
centralization can be a double-edged sword that offers no 
157 Though it has the potential, centralization cannot ab-
solutely guarantee comprehensiveness. While comprehensive-
ness probably needs some degree of centralization, the re-
verse is not necessarily true. 
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guarantee of environmental correctness. For environmental-
ists, therefore, the centralization and integration of gov-
ernment power is a risky and highly volatile affair. 
If the centralized administration is sympathetic to 
ecological objectives, then such a system might have the 
potential to work brilliantly. If not, however, centralized 
structures could be used towards a very different end--
perhaps comprehensive anti-environmentalism and comprehen-
sive resource exploitation. As long as this country has free 
elections, then administrations will change and, as was the 
case in Oregon in 1990 or the United States in 1980 or 1992, 
fairly significant differences in environmental attitudes 
may result. Thus, only an environmental dictatorship could 
absolutely assure that a centralized and comprehensive poli-
cymaking structure would maintain fidelity to ecological 
values. What centralization does, therefore, is to raise the 
stakes and turn policymaking into a gamble in which inte-
rests could win big or lose big. Conversely, decentraliza-
tion offers opportunities for neither a sweeping ecological 
overhaul of policy or an equally sweeping revocation or to-
tal backlash.1~ 
Despite all of its considerable flaws, fragmentation 
has the one advantage of providing a sturdy guarantee of ac-
158 The only possible scenario for far-reaching policy 
change might be if either environmental interests or -their 
resource-using opponents lost so much power as to become 
irrelevant and completely marginalized; in either case (but 
especially the latter), an unlikely scenario. 
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cess for environmentalists that a more fickle centralized 
system cannot. In a decentralized system opportunities to 
influence policy are simply more numerous. Environmentalists 
who found themselves shut out of top-level decisionmaking 
and kept at arms-length by the Forest Service still had 
cards to play as they turned, in this case, to Congress 
where they cultivated close non-timber district allies, and 
even more importantly, to the federal courts. By contrast, 
if an interest in a highly centralized system is shut out at 
the top, they are shut out period. Thus, fragmentation does 
indeed increase opportunities for participation, help groups 
maintain flexible strategies for achieving influence, and 
allow multiple policymaking entities to keep each other in 
check. 
While these are undoubtedly attractive qualities to 
environmental interests who sometimes find themselves on the 
margins of politics, fragmentation inflicts a heavy price 
for its virtues. The costs of easy access and checks and 
balances are precisely the sorts of incrernentalism and nar-
row vision that strangle holistic ecological policymaking. 
Mann recognizes this as he argues that fragmentation "im-
poses its own controls" 1~ on the very reform movements it 
so generously gives an initial forum to: 
[T]he same fragmented system that provided opportuni-
ties for fractional groups when public pressures where 
159 Mann, 2 3. 
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significantly intense, made further progress very dif-
ficult after the initial wave passed.160 
Fragmentation, therefore, offers environmentalists 
half a loaf: guaranteed access to the system and a wide ar-
ray of tools and strategies to work with, but practically no 
chance to achieve the truly comprehensive, systemic ecologi-
cal policy they feel is ultimately the only solution. Cen-
tralization, on the other hand, does hold out that paten-
tial, but it holds the chance for total disaster (James Watt 
or John Crowell with no restraints) as well. While the guar-
antee of heavy compromise and the knowledge that truly sound 
ecological policy will always be defeated are bitter pills 
to swallow, many environmentalists prefer the devil they 
know to one they do not, as Bartlett suggests: 
The consequences of abstract and often untried compre-
hensive decisionmaking proposals are necessarily un-
certain; what is certain is that political advantage 
would shift in poorly understood (and thus politically 
risky) ways.1M 
In sum, then, pluralist decentralization and its poli-
tics of "muddling through" are clearly antithetical to eco-
logical policy goals, as its critics suggest. While they 
provide widespread access to the political system and often 
serve to prevent some of the more grievous and overt envi-
ronmental abuses in the short term, they cannot prevent the 
slow, long-term deterioration and unraveling of ecosystems, 
something only a more comprehensive approach can address. It 
160 Ibid. 21. 
iM Bartlett, 242. 
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cannot be concluded with much confidence, however, that the 
centralized alternative would be any better, and in some 
scenarios, might even be worse. 
Centralization will be foolproof only after ecological 
values have been firmly associated with the public interest 
and universally and authentically accepted and internalized. 
Otherwise, the best strategy might be what Mccurdy suggests: 
maintain the system's decentralization and access, but work 
to improve coordination, install procedures for integrated 
policymaking, and encourage the neutral professionalism of 
agencies. More interagency commissions (perhaps with binding 
authority), more unambiguous language in legislation which 
guarantees citizen and judicial review and allows less 
overtly subversive administrative discretion, and a less 
parochial public lands policy orientation in Congress would 
all go a long way towards improving coordination, and possi-
bly the even the chance for comprehensiveness without assum-
ing centralization's greatest risks. 
CHAPTER 7 
RADICAL DECENTRALIST AND MAJORITARIAN ALTERNATIVES 
.... there are limits to the environmentalist slogan 
"think globally, act locally." 
Robert Paehlke 
Centralization is but one structural adjustment that 
the critics of pluralism advance as a preferable alternative 
to this process they oppose. This chapter examines two other 
forms of democratic organization commonly put forth by vari-
ous critics--radical decentralization and majoritarianism--
within the framework of ecological politics and the politics 
of the Siskiyou specifically. 
While the centralist critique of the pluralist process 
prescribes increased governmental centralization, integra-
tion, and rationality as the solution to pluralism's alleged 
shortcomings, these other critics look to increased public 
participation and even final authority in matters of policy-
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making. What these various advocates of public involvement 
all share in common is a firm belief that pluralism's spe-
cial interest-dominated governmental apparatus or the cen-
tralist's rigid "expert"-dominated bureaucracy can only 
serve to thwart the public's interests and desires. Thus, 
the most legitimate and appropriate source of policymaking 
authority is seen to be the public. 
Radical Decentralist Alternatives 
Participatory Democracy 
As the last chapter has shown, the centralist critique 
of pluralism emphasizes excessive decentralization as the 
root of pluralism's flaws. Another group of critics, how-
ever, come to quite the opposite conclusion, arguing that 
pluralism's alleged inequality and bias can be overcome only 
through even more decentralization all the way down to the 
most localized level. To participatory democrats such as 
Robert Wolff, Alan Altschuler, Milton Kotler, Carole Pate-
man, or Frank Bryan and John McClaughtry, it is only at this 
very local community level that direct and meaningful public 
participation in governance can take place. 1 
1 Robert Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1968}; Alan Altschuler, Community Control (New York: 
Pegasus, 1970); Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Government (In-
dianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967); Carole Pateman, Participa-
tion and Democratic Theory (Cambridge, MA: At the University 
Press, 1970); Frank Byran and John McClaughtry, The Vermont 
Papers: Recreating Democracy on a Human Scale (Post Mills, 
VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Co., 1989). 
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According to these participatory democrats, or commun-
itarians as some call them, 2 the virtues of such intense 
public involvement are twofold. Not only will it lead to au-
thentically democratic decisionmaking with increased access 
to and responsiveness of government, but will also accrue 
benefits for the participants themselves. Direct participa-
tion, it is argued, bestows upon citizens a priceless sense 
of efficacy, belongingness, and civic responsibility.3 Thus, 
participation becomes, to participatory democrats, not only 
a means for more egalitarian policy, but a virtuous politi-
cal and social end as well. 
Pluralism's process of participation, on the other 
hand, is alleged to be a sham, offering only lopsided access 
and government-sanctioned inequity and bias, especially 
against marginal and/or more diffuse interests.4 Thus, only 
through community control by a fully mobilized citizenry can 
all the voices of a community be heard and the power of the 
2 While it used by some to denote the movement for decen-
tralized community control, the term communitarian is used 
by other political theorists to refer more broadly to a be-
lief in individual responsibility and obligation to the 
greater society. As such, it is the political opposite of 
libertarianism. To avoid confusion, the term participatory 
democrats will be used to refer to proponents of decentral-
ized community control. 
3 This is a theme that runs through Wolff, The Poverty of 
Liberalism, Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, 
and Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism· (Bos-
ton: Little, Brown, and Co., 1967). 4Richard Hamilton, Class and Politics in the United 
States (new York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), 35-46. 
461 
elite be reined in. One decentralist sums up participatory 
democracy's advantages: 
Thus the virtue of the community of direct democracy 
is that it does not easily succumb to governing elites 
and is able to offer systemic resistance to autocratic 
leaders. It provides the forum where new ideas may at 
least be considered and, through free debate, the 
means of making their virtues known. It produces in 
time an openness and tolerance in political matters 
and processes that can extend into the social sphere. 
It encourages participation, not simply because it is 
in everyone's self-interest to show up at the meeting 
and keep from being elected dog-catcher, but because 
the whole range of community problems tends to become 
as real as--in effect to be--personal problems. If it 
is in addition consensual, its workings will militate 
against the unjust treatment of any individual--indi-
viduals presumably having a say in their own fate .... 
Consensus, too, if a regular process, works to round 
off the edges of minority opinions after a while so 
that in time they fit in more smoothly with--or at 
least accepted between--the opinions of the majority.s 
While many ecological thinkers call for centralization 
(see chapter six), so-called deep ecologists such as Kirk-
patrick Sale or William Devall and George Sessions and so-
cial ecologists like Murray Bookchin or Andre Gorz place 
blame for the ecological crisis firmly upon what they see as 
the large, remote, and thoroughly undemocratic social, eco-
nomic, and political structures which pervade our society. 6 
According to Sale, these impersonal and hierarchical insti-
5 Kirkpatrick Sale, Human Scale (New York: Coward, Mccann, 
and Geoghegan, 1980), 509-510 
6 Kirkpatrick Sale, Human Scale and Dwellers in the Land: 
The Bioregional Vision (San Francisco, Sierra Club Books, 
1985); William Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecol9gy 
(Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith, 1985); Murray Bookchin, 
The Ecology of Freedom (Palo Alto, CA: Chesire, 1982); Andre 
Gorz, Ecology as Politics (Boston: South End Press, 1980) 
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tutions are struck by the disease of giantism and are con-
trolled by the elite few to the detriment of the many. 7 
The indifferent destruction huge, centralized indus-
trial structures bring, say decentralist ecologists, can 
only be reversed by the philosophy of small is beautiful 
wherein power is devolved to the local community, bioregion, 
or even watershed. It is only at this most decentralized le-
vel, they argue, that truly ecological policy can flourish, 
made possible by a direct democracy involving those who ac-
tually live in and love their local environs (rather than 
distant and unsympathetic interests or power brokers) as 
Sales shows: 
If, further, the community is guided by the tenets of 
ecological harmony and steady-state equilibria, it is 
hardly the type to despoil its environment or readily 
admit the toxic or polluting industry (which, being in 
control of its economy, is free to reject). Conscious 
of the way it relates to the ecosystem, it would like-
ly establish, and value, its connections to other com-
munities within the bioregion .... Conservative it would 
certainly be, in the best sense of that word, for that 
is precisely what recycling and resource recovery, 
precisely what self-sufficiency is all about, .... 8 
Because the future configurations of politics and so-
ciety they envision rely upon a somewhat optimistic view of 
human nature, participatory democrats and radical ecological 
decentralists are accused by pluralists and others of ideal-
istic utopianism. As attractive as it seems in theory, say 
7 This is the main theme running throughout Sale, Human 
Scale. 
8 Sale, Human Scale, 510. 
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critics, participatory democracy will inevitably break down 
in practice due to a number of factors. 
First, pluralists point out that while diffusing power 
to the community level might seem to enhance individual con-
trol, in the bigger scheme of things, it diminishes one's 
actual problem-solving efficacy. Not only does radical de-
centralization leave each local jurisdiction with less re-
sources to cope with problems, but also less authority to 
deal with transjurisdictional issues outside their control 
which are often the real source of their problems.9 Thus, 
even the most ecologically committed community's perogatives 
are limited when dealing with the sovereign town upstream 
which is dumping sewage into the river both share as Kelso 
suggests: 
In their quest for meaningful participation, communi-
tarian democrats thus seem to confront an unresolvable 
paradox. By reducing the size of the polity, they in-
crease the opportunities for individuals to partici-
pate; but by increasing the opportunities for citizen 
involvement, they run the risk of trivializing its im-
portance. The smaller the unit of government, the less 
significant become the issues that the individuals 
within the political community can effectively inf lu-
ence. 10 
Paehlke, too, notes this dilemma regarding environmen-
tal protection: 
The contradictions between the "anarchist" and "local-
ist" utopias of Bookchin and other environmentalists 
and the burgeoning bureaucracies cannot be ignored. 
But one cannot simply dismiss the growth of national 
9william Kelso, American Democratic Theory (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1978), 201. 
10 Ibid. 
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environmental bureaucracies as a betrayal of the 
cause. Were regulatory powers not established on a 
national basis, pollution "havens" would abound--some 
jurisdictions would choose a massive industrial tax 
base over a clean environment, and surrounding areas, 
if not whole nations, would soon bear the costs. Na-
tional, even international environmental standards and 
regulations make a great deal of sense .... there are 
limits to the environmentalist slogan "think globally, 
act locally. 11 11 
To its advocates, then, pluralism's seemingly chaotic mix of 
centralized and decentralized structures provides just the 
right blend of meaningful authority and access to make par-
ticipation, though less direct, really count. 
Pluralists and other detractors also call into doubt 
participatory democracy's workability. Contrary to the de-
centralists' claims, pluralists such as Edward Banfield and 
James Q. Wilson argue that the smaller the jurisdiction, the 
more intense conflict will become. 12 Pluralists thus predict 
that communitarian systems will collapse under the weight of 
the inevitable conflict pure democracy brings. Robert Hine, 
in his study of California communes, in fact, finds that the 
most democratic ones had the least longevity. 13 
Other critics go as far as to suggest that a partici-
patory democracy can ironically degenerate into something 
less than democratic. Kelso, for instance, borrowing an ar-
gument from centralist critics of pluralism, suggests that 
11 Robert Paehlke, Environmentalism and the Future of Pro-
gressive Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1989), 156. 
12 Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New 
York: Random House, 1963). 
13 Robert Hine cited in Kelso, 200. 
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radical decentralization might actually increase rather than 
break the power of dominant groups in such a limited and 
isolated political realm. 14 He also finds that communal pat-
terns of social organization often serve to stifle and re-
press rather than celebrate diversity as is claimed.15 As 
such, minority groups, far from being empowered, may actual-
ly be oppressed within a community with none of the multiple 
avenues for redress which pluralism offers. 
Finally, critics find participatory democracy unviable 
due to the sheer weight of public indifference. In addition 
to being over-confident about the logistics of mass involve-
ment, argue critics, participatory democrats overestimate 
the public's willingness to overcome their indifference and 
narrow self-interest. Kelso, for example, points to a number 
of studies of direct democratic structures such as Kib-
butzim, communes, and autonmous workers' councils which find 
not only widespread conflict, but also debilitating apathy 
in the face of the awesome obligations demanded by partici-
patory systems.16 Recreating pre-modern political associa-
tions in an intensely modern world filled with individual-
istic, consumeristic, and technological pressures may very 
well be, therefore, an impossible task. The indirect parti-
14 Kelso, 227. 
15 Ibid. 198-199, 203. 
16 rbid. 181-195. Participatory democrats, however, might 
respond by pointing to fairly successful examples of direct 
democracy in the industrialized world such as the Swiss con-
federation or New England town meetings. 
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cipation of interest groups in a pluralist system, on the 
other hand, is alleged to be a far more realistic and less 
burdensome manifestation of democracy and civic 
involvement. 17 
Participatory democrats respond to such charges by 
claiming that pluralists create a straw man when they base 
their criticisms of participatory democracy's potential upon 
observations and assumptions originating from a pluralist 
context. If people do not seem ready to take on the respon-
sibility of self-rule, they argue, it is because the current 
undemocratic system leaves them cynical, apathetic, and un-
prepared. 18 It is only through the act of direct participa-
tion and the actual witnessing of its many benefits, that a 
culture of civic duty and political efficacy can develop and 
eventually flourish. 19 Few participatory democrats promise 
that this will be a quick or easy shift and some even seem 
to suggest that some sort of transition will be necessary. 20 
Privatization 
There exists another form of radical decentralization 
based upon assumptions very different from those of partici-
patory democracy. The political ideology of privatization is 
17 Ibid. 179. 
18 Pateman, 79-101. 
19 Ibid. 
20 There is disagreement among participatory democrats as 
to whether the public is ready to assume the substan~ial 
burdens of self-rule. Theorists such as Wolff feel that the 
public is currently ready, while others such as Pateman con-
cede that they must first gain the skills to participate. 
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founded largely upon the beliefs of libertarianism and free-
market capitalism. Its advocates claim that the decentrali-
zation of authority to its most basic unit--the individual 
(especially in his or her capacity as a potential property 
owner and economic free-agent)--provides the best alterna-
tive to what is seen as pluralism's scandalous inefficiency 
and illiberal (as in anti-private property) tendencies. Pri-
vatization as both coherent theory and political movement is 
perhaps most developed in the area of public lands politics 
where calls are made for public land to be divested to pri-
vate owners, thereby decentralizing management even beyond 
local community control. 
Theorists such as John Baden and Richard Stroup, Baden 
and Dean Lueck, and William Dennis and Randy Simmons all ar-
gue that distributively-oriented pluralist administration 
creates bureaucratic inefficiency in management, clientel-
ism, and worst of all, government subsidization of environ-
mental destruction.21 Speaking of pluralism, Simmons and 
Dennis maintain that "authority is separated from responsi-
bility;" in this case, the responsibility conferred by pri-
21 John Baden and Richard Stroup, Bureaucracy vs. Environ-
ment (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1981); 
John Baden and Dean Lueck, "Bringing Private Management to 
the Public Lands: Environmental and Economic Advantages" in 
Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clarke (ed-
itors), Controversies in Environmental Policy (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 1986); William Dennis 
and Randy Simmons, "From Illusion to Responsibility: Re-
thinking Regulation of Federal Public Lands" in Kamieniecki, 
et al. 
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vate ownership. 22 According to its advocates, privatization, 
by forcing a reliance upon the free market, would actually 
benefit ecological goals as in many cases, commodity produc-
tion and associated environmental despoilation would become 
too costly without government subsidies.23 Most privatizers 
would agree, then, with ideological bedfellow James Watt who 
as Secretary of the Interior claimed that, "there is no 
greater wisdom than the marketplace."~ 
Most all environmental theorists, whether centralist, 
pluralist, or communitarian, vehemently oppose the ideology 
and practice of privatization. To suggest widespread privat-
ization would benefit the environment, critics would argue, 
requires an appreciation of the fantastic far greater than 
that of even the most utopian communitarian. As wrong-headed 
and client-dominated as they often find it, government ad-
ministration of public lands is far preferable to most envi-
ronmentalists than private ownership; a point made by the 
pluralist Mccurdy: 
Privatizers conclude that government agencies are 
inefficient mechanisms for reflecting public choice. 
Pluralists, on the other hand, view the absence of 
government interference as inefficient given the 
public's desire for participation in resource 
decisions.a 
22 Dennis and Simmons, 71-75. 23 Baden and Lueck, 51-54; Dennis and Simmons, 71. 
24 James Watt quoted in Walter Rosenbaum, Environmental 
Politics and Policy (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1985), 29. 
a Howard Mccurdy, "Environmental Protection and the New 
Federalism: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Beyond" in Kamien-
iecki, et al, 101. 
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Thus, government management, as poor as it may be, at 
least holds out the potential for public involvement and in-
fluence and maybe even policy change. On the other hand, 
private ownership, according to Mccurdy, offers no represen-
tation, no appeal, and no redress, all standard in a plural-
ist system. 26 The only thing standing between healthy pri-
vate land and a stripmine, therefore, is some ambiguous no-
tion of owner "responsibility". And when the free market is 
the operative factor, the owner's responsibility is clear: 
to be efficient with his or her assets as the market deter-
mines. The problem here, claim Thomas Ingersoll and Bradley 
Brockbank is that the market has no real way to measure eco-
logical value; those elements considered essential to the 
functioning of an ecosystem are usually considered "free 
goods" with little or no market value.V 
The Potential of Radical Decentralization: The Evidence from 
the Siskiyou 
As has been discussed, decentralist ecologists would 
argue that, ultimately, land use decisions that are relevant 
to and respectful of bioregional ecosytems can come only 
from small autonomous communities exercising democratic par-
ticipatory policymaking. They would probably suggest that if 
authority rested at the local level, whether as part of a 
26 Ibid. 100. 
vThomas Ingersoll and Bradley Brockbank, "The Role of 
Economic Incentives in Environmental Policy" in Kamieniecki, 
et al, 207. 
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loose confederation within the Cascadia bioregion of the 
Northwest or as a cluster of settlements within the Rogue or 
Illinois watersheds, the old growth would stand. 
What then, would land management policy in what is now 
the Siskiyou National Forest really look like if authority 
was vested in the local community? Evidence from the Siski-
you case is based, of course, upon only what has been in the 
past and is presently; the rest is speculation. With that in 
mind, one should consider that what is observable from the 
southwest corner of Oregon does not seem to bode well for 
either old growth or the spotted owl. True community con-
trol, as things stand today, would most likely translate in-
to a level of resource exploitation aggressive enough for 
environmentalists to yearn for the "good old days" of Forest 
Service management. 
Simply put, on the most local level, pro-timber senti-
ment would overpower ecological concern. This is not to say 
that environmentalists are not a powerful presence in south-
west Oregon; to the contrary, they are a dynamic, aggres-
sive, and numerically respectable contingent of the area's 
population. But they also are a minority. 28 In a truly par-
ticipatory context (that is, assuming fairly universal par-
28 Polls show that while Oregonians are split fairly 
evenly over the old growth and spotted owl controversies, 
most environmentalist support comes from urban areas, while 
rural areas strongly favor logging. Southwest Oregon, it 
should be remembered, is one of the more rural parts· of the 
state. Kathie Durbin, "Polls Show Oregonians Deeply Split 
Over Owl" Oregonian (6 May 1990). 
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ticipation) environmental voices would be drowned out and 
timber production would rule the day in local community 
governing structures. The resolutely pro-timber attitudes 
and behavior of municipal and county boards in the Siskiyou 
area in the past decade provide some idea as to what true 
local control might look like if implemented today. 
Perhaps the only alternative scenario to outright tim-
ber domination might be the sort of extreme polarization and 
conflictual stand-off that pluralists warn about. Sales's 
claim that intense participation brings opponents closer to-
gether, seems somewhat wishful knowing the bitter political 
divisions that have so deeply split the Siskiyou community 
in the past decade. 
It seems very doubtful, therefore, that mere decen-
tralization would bring about ecologically sound policy un-
less such a structural change was preceded by a major value 
shift. In theory, at least, deep ecologists make sense when 
they suggest that local folks know and can thus care for 
their local ecosystems far better than remote centralized 
bureaucracies bent upon industrialization and economic 
growth. The problem is that there are two questionable as-
sumptions implicit in this: (l) local people are unified in 
their commitment to ecological principles, and (2) they are 
self-sufficient enough to be free of the competition inher-
ent to the global-scale economy that is the reality 9f the 
day. In actuality, however, local residents are sometimes 
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even hungrier and more desperate for economic growth and de-
velopment than centralized bureaucrats are. 
Some participatory democrats, as noted before, are 
cognizant of this dilemma and might concede that some sort 
of economic restructuring and value shift or socialization 
process is necessary before radical decentralization can be 
put into practice. The more that new ways of perceiving the 
forests, the planet, economics, and citizen responsibility 
gain currency, they would argue, the more appropriate and 
desirable becomes community control. 
Just as troublesome would be transjurisdictional prob-
lems which, by their very nature, would abound in the Siski-
you case. Even assuming a particular county or watershed 
shared an unshakeable committment to ecologically sustain-
able land use, how would it deal with the community up-
stream, perhaps less committed, whose logging chokes streams 
with debris and destroys interconnected salmon runs or frag-
ments the larger forest ecosystem and owl habitat that the 
first community shares with it? Hardin's "tragedy of the 
commons" would likely be realized. Thus not only must com-
munities be internally united in their values for community 
control to work smoothly, but all communities must be simi-
larly united or else one community's policies, no matter how 
noble and well-intentioned, will become isolated and trivi-
alized. As the example of the Siskiyou shows, environmental-
ists were most successful in addressing issues of larger 
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scope--forest management laws, endangered species--than 
fighting their battles on a local timber sale-by-timber sale 
or even forest-by-forest basis. 
What about the other decentralist option--that of pri-
vatization? Here, there is more concrete evidence to judge 
by in that forest tracts adjacent to the Siskiyou are pri-
vately held and subject more directly to market forces. If 
this private land in southwest Oregon (or, for that matter, 
most anywhere else in the country), is any indication, then 
privatization would be an unmitigated environmental disaster 
for the Siskiyou forest. While Forest Service and BLM man-
agement has indeed often been extremely destructive, it 
pales in comparison to the land management history of adja-
cent private forest land, especially in areas of high com-
mercial value. 
Far from being "responsible" as advocates claim, pri-
vate ownership in southwestern Oregon has mostly led to the 
wholesale liquidation of "assets" in ways that very often 
violate completely the principles of sustained yield, mul-
tiple use, ecological sustainability, public participation, 
or the right of appeal. Only on the steepest ridges or in-
accessible slopes would privatization offer any advantage; 
the lack of government subsidization of prohibitively costly 
roads or helicopter logging would probably grant these areas 
a temporary reprieve until the price of timber rose_ high 
enough to justify such investments. Otherwise, any reasonab-
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ly accessible acreage, especially low-lying areas along 
streams, would be sure to be harvested for its valuable old 
growth timber and probably with cost-effective clearcutting 
techniques. The private lands surrounding the Siskiyou Na-
tional Forest, much of it either denuded pasture or monocul-
ture tree farms, provide a fairly clear glimpse into any fu-
ture scenario of privatization. 
Ma1oritarianism 
Majoritarian Theory and Ecological Politics 
Advocates of majoritarian democracy comprise yet 
another school of thought critical of pluralism. Like parti-
cipatory democrats, they object to pluralism on the grounds 
that it violates the public int~rest in favor of private in-
terests. Also, they too argue that the public should be far 
more directly involved in their own goverance. Unlike parti-
cipatory democracy, though, advocates of majoritarianism, or 
populist democracy as Kelso calls it,29 do not see radical 
decentralization as a prerequisite for achieving direct dem-
ocracy. Nor do they share participatory democrats' suspicion 
of large-scale governmental institutions. On the contrary, 
an active and aggressive government endowed with the neces-
sary resources is seen by majoritarians such as Michael 
Harrington as essential to the protection of the public 
29 Kelso, American Democratic Theory. 
interest and the implementation of the public's sovereign 
will. 30 
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Thus, majoritarians basically favor a consolidation of 
government authority in order to render it unresponsive to 
any interest save the public's. 31 How majoritarians differ 
from the centralist thinkers discussed in the last chapter 
involves where they believe government ought to get its man-
date. To centralists, a rational and expert elite develops 
policy according to their conception of the long-term public 
interest. A majoritarian government, on the other hand, 
would exist merely to implement the popular will as expres-
sed to them by the public (even at the state or national le-
vel) as directly as possible, especially by means of refer-
enda and initiatives. 32 Such a system, in all its directness 
and simplicity, argue majoritarians, maximizes democracy and 
assures that majority rule does not degenerate, as they feel 
it does in pluralism, into minority rule.33 
When it comes to environmental issues, for instance, 
majoritarians such as Mark Kann see a clearcut case of such 
minority rule, claiming that overwhelming public desires are 
30 Michael Harrington, Towards A Democratic Left (New 
York: Macmillan, 1968), chap. 5. 31 Here the majoritarians resemble the elite-centralists. 
In fact, scholars who call for such a consolidation from a 
somewhat left-of-center perspective such as McConnell or 
Schattschneider are quite difficult to definitively cate-
gorize as either purely centralist or majoritarian. 32 Harrington, chap.5. 33 Austin Ranney and Willmore Kendall, Democracy and the 
American Party System (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 
1956), 24. 
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constantly being thwarted by an unholy alliance of private 
and governmental elites.~ If "the people" only had their 
say and saw it enforced, majoritarians argue, environmental-
ism would triumph. To bolster their point, majoritarians 
might point to a number of public opinion studies which sug-
gest that the American people overwhelmingly support envi-
ronmentalism. 35 
According to Robert Mitchell, such public support at 
the beginning of the 1990s, stands stronger than ever.36 Ac-
cording to Mitchell, protection of the environment is now a 
bona-fide "motherhood issue", a fact made clear by the over-
all failure of Reagan's anti-environmental crusade.37 In 
fact, a 1989 Roper poll found only 15% of the public suppor-
ting cutbacks in environmental protection, while another 
poll found 53% in 1988 agreeing that the government regu-
lates and is involved in environmental issues "too lit-
tle."~ Thus, as Riley Dunlap says, environmentalism has 
~Mark Kann, "Environmental Democracy in the United 
States" in Kamieniecki et al, 253-261. 35 For overviews of such studies see, Robert Mitchell, 
"Public Opinion and the Green Lobby: Poised for the 1990s?" 
in Norman Vig and Michael Kraft (editor), Environmental Pol-
icy in the 1990s (Wahington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990); Riley 
Dunlap, "Public Opinion and Environmental Policy" in James 
Lester (editor), Environmental Politics and Policy (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 1989); and a somewhat dated, 
though still informative article by J. Fred Springer and 
Edmond Constanti, "Public Opinion and the Environment: An 
Issue in Search of a Home" in Stuart Nagel (editor), Envi-
ronmental Politics (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974). 
36 Mitchell, 81. 37 Ibid. 82-83. 38 Roper and Cambridge Reports polls cited in Ibid. 85. 
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become not only an "enduring concern" but has achieved "the 
status of an important value. "39 If left up to the public 
rather than bureaucrats or private interests, a majoritarian 
would probably be quite confident that environmental objec-
tives would almost always prevail. 
Critics of majoritarianism, however, find the question 
of the popular will--both how to express it and how much au-
thority to vest in it--to be far more complex than majori-
tarians would admit. First of all, critics argue that the 
referenda process which majoritarians rely so heavily upon, 
is deeply flawed or at least highly limited in its useful-
ness.~ How can referenda, ask critics, address the tech-
nical intricacies of the extremely complex, multi-faceted 
issues which account for so many current policy problems? An 
undifferentiated public, argue critics, simply does not pos-
sess the knowledge to render a well-informed vote on many 
policy options.41 Such an uninformed mass, it would seem, 
could easily be fall prey to media campaigns of manipulation 
and deceit run by the most savvy and/or well-financed inte-
rests affected by a particular policy question. 
Other critics, meanwhile, even question whether the 
public's will is synonymous with the public interest. 
Ophuls, for example, maintains that the problem with ecolo-
gical policy is not that the public's voice has been silen-
39 Dunlap, 133. 
~Kelso, 67-82. 41 Ibid. 67, 87. 
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ced, but that the clamor for economic growth or political 
pork--the destructive sum of individual desires--is heard 
all too well. 42 To Ophuls, therefore, only a rational elite 
could save us from ourselves and act on behalf of a true 
public interest that cannot simply be tallied through votes. 
Another problem with such a majoritarian arrangement, 
according to critics, is that referenda can realistically 
produce only vague, large-scale directives, rather than 
technically detailed, workable policy. Consequently, "the 
linkage between the public's original wishes and the opera-
tions of the state will become more tenuous." as the power 
and discretion of the state become magnified to the detri-
ment, rather than enhancement of the public interest. 43 
Thus, Kelso argues that "the very quality of popular partic-
ipation may become more symbolic than substantive in na-
ture."~ Ironically, according to pluralists, the public is 
more involved in the actual nitty-gritty of the policymaking 
process in a pluralist rather than majoritarian system. 45 
Critics call attention to what they see as another 
serious flaw in the majoritarian process--it has no way to 
gauge the intensity by which different people support or op-
pose various policy outcomes. How democratic is it, critics 
would ask, for the votes of those who passionately desire 
~William Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity 
(San Francisco, W.H. Freeman, 1977), 189-190. 
43 Kelso, 88. 
~Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 65. 
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some outcome or are deeply affected by it to be swamped by 
the votes of those who know or care little but still cast 
their obligatory vote?~ According to Kelso, "it may be more 
fair for the political system to decide in favor of those 
government policies which are most pref erred rather than 
those programs which are preferred by most."Q Otherwise, 
one risks confronting the so-called "Arrow Problem"--the 
paradox of a collective policy choice which does not faith-
fully correspond to most individuals' preferences.~ Again, 
only pluralism is said to be appropriate--in this case, able 
to weigh intensity through its bargaining process. 
At the root of this problem of intensity is what plur-
alist emphatically insist is a diverse and fragmented poli-
ty. In such a setting, they argue, majoritarian referenda 
are simply too unsubtle and inflexible a tool to truly cap-
ture the public will and decide complex issues. Kelso makes 
this point: 
While populists often talk as if there were a popular 
or majoritarian sentiment on most issues, we can see 
that in many cases, such sentiment simply does not 
exist .... Thus efforts to force a majority stand out of 
a diverse and heterogeneous set of publics are likely 
to lead to .... problems .... While the referendum will 
mechanically generate a majority opinion of an issue, 
~This might especially be a problem in public lands pol-
itics, alleged by Rosenbaum to be an "arcane business to 
most Americans." Rosenbaum, Environmental Politics and Pol-
icy 283. 
47Kelso, 83. Kelso claims that it is, perhaps, only in a 
fairly small community with roughly similar values that ref-
erenda can weigh all votes in a truly equitable way. 
~Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New 
York, John Wiley & Sons, 1951). 
that opinion may not correspond to any well-defined 
set of beliefs in the larger population.49 
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Without universal goals and values amongst the polity, 
it would run the risk, therefore, of alienating significant 
portions of the electorate and in its worst manifestation, 
imposing a tyranny of the majority. 
Majoritarianism and the Siskiyou 
The question at hand, then, is whether a process which 
offers less distilled, more direct public choice (through, 
perhaps, state or national referenda) would treat ecological 
goals and values more kindly. Would the Siskiyou case have 
been settled in the environmentalists' favor long ago if the 
influence of interest groups was lifted and the public spoke 
its mind through the ballot? While evidence exists as to the 
broad public support environmentalism enjoys, how reliably 
would this translate in a majoritarian system into Siskiyou 
National Forest policy? 
Like similar questions regarding decentralized partic-
ipatory democracy, much of what can be offered here as anal-
ysis involves, by necessity, a good deal of conjecture. 
Still, various polls and two very telling California refer-
enda in 1990 offer at least some empirical basis with which 
to ponder the potential of majoritarianism in the politics 
of old growth. 
49 Kelso, 70. 
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It has already been speculated that if left strictly 
up to local, timber-dependent communities, there would be a 
good chance that policy on the Siskiyou would shift towards 
even more commodity production. A majoritarian system, how-
ever, would rely upon a much broader scope of public opinion 
to set policy in what majoritarians would stress is a na-
tional forest established for the benefit of all Americans. 
In this broader context, the nature of public opinion, 
according to most of the public opinion literature on the 
environment, shifts rather dramatically to favor environmen-
talism.so While it cannot be said for certain, national, and 
to a lesser extent state (Washington and Oregon) opinion on 
old growth today is probably quite a bit more environmental-
ly inclined than local community opinion. 
Whether mass opinion would treat old growth more kind-
ly than current policy does is less clear. A 1990 Media 
General/Associated Press poll, however, suggests it would. 
The poll shows 61% of the public favoring a "ban on woodcut-
ting in old forests."s1 Another 1990 poll conducted by the 
Seattle Times finds similar support for old growth amongst 
Washington residents with 52% backing "a logging ban to pro-
50 once again, see the summaries of this issue offered by 
Dunlap, Mitchell and Springer and Constantini (see footnote 
32) 
51 Media General/AP poll cited in Wild Oregon (Summer 
1990), 9. The same poll also found 75% favoring prompt gov-
ernment action "to deal with global deforestation." 
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tect spotted owl habitat" versus 38% opposed.~ In a 1990 
Elway Research poll, meanwhile, 64% of Washington residents 
found wildlife habitat and the number of trees left to be 
the primary considerations in logging issues as opposed to 
30% who the felt the economy and jobs were.53 In less urban 
and more timber-dependent Oregon, on the other hand, a 1990 
Oregonian poll shows public opinion over old growth to be 
far more polarized and evenly split.54 
Even if one could construe from these polls the impli-
cation that state or national referenda would put an end to 
the cycle of over-cutting in the national forests, environ-
mentalists would be wise to look deeper into the nature of 
public opinion on the environment before declaring majori-
tarian decisionmaking a panacea (as some of their more fan-
ciful literature seems to suggest). 
While almost every commentator looking at this issue 
has found overall public support for the environment, nearly 
~Seattle Times poll cited in "Old Growth Wins in Poll" 
Oregonian (25 April 1990). While the AP poll has somewhat 
simplistic wording, the Seattle Times poll is fairly expli-
cit.· For instance, the question cited above included a warn-
ing that opponents of such a ban "say it will cost thousands 
of jobs in the timber-dependent communities in western Wash-
ington." 53 Elway Research poll cited in "Old Growth Wins in Poll." 54 Kathie Durbin, "Polls shows Oregonians Deeply Split 
Over Owl" Oregonian (6 May 1990). This poll should serve as 
a reminder that reliability of polling data is never indis-
putable. When a key statement in the poll was worded, "For-
est jobs must be protected even if it means the loss of 
spotted owl habitat," 46% agreed and 48% disagreed. But when 
it was worded, "To protect the spotted owl, we should stop 
logging on large tracts of federal timberland," only 34% 
agreed and 60% disagreed. 
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all have also remarked upon the relative shallowness and 
fragility of much of this support. Dunlap, for instance, 
questions how salient environmental issues really are to the 
public, their professed support notwithstanding.SS Anthony 
Downs agrees as he claims that ecological issues are on an 
"attention cycle" in which issues have their "moment in the 
sun" and then fade from view as media hype decreases and 
public boredom and doubts about costs increase.s6 
Culhane, meanwhile, finds a similar lack of public 
interest regarding the Forest Service's participation pro-
cess. After describing why the Forest Service could never, 
despite their efforts, get a grasp on the views of the non-
existent "silent majority", he suggests that: 
.... the Service face reality, understand that the un-
differentiated public is never going to pref er attend-
ing public meetings over watching "Dallas" and thus 
concentrate upon groups which actively profess an in-
terest [that is, groups with a high level of inten-
si ty--ed. ] s7 
Despite the old growth controversy's relatively high 
profile (at least as environmental issues go) and its sue-
cessful expansion beyond the Northwest into a national is-
sue, Culhane is likely right in that forest issues are pro-
bably never going to capture the full public's imagination 
ss Dunlap, 132-134. 
S6 Anthony Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology: The Issue-
Attention Cycle" Public Interest 28 (1972), 38-50. 
~Paul Culhane, "Public Participation in National.Forest 
Planning: Is it Different of Just More?" conference paper, 
Western Political Science Association, annual meeting, Seat-
tle WA (April 1991), 11-12. 
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or attention. Especially in areas in the East or Midwest 
with few public lands, forest issues will never be very 
salient to more than a select group of citizens and activ-
ists interested in environmental affairs. 
While Dunlap or Downs find the public's broad support 
somwhat shallow, other observers such as Charles Hardin, al-
so find it contradictory as demands for environmental pro-
tection and sacrifice-free material abundance are simultane-
ously made.58 Dunlap, meanwhile, finds that the public, des-
pite their self-professed environmentalism, holds politi-
cians far more accountable for economic rather than environ-
mental problems.59 Americans, he goes on to argue, tend to 
have a profound lack of understanding of ecological issues 
and what is often their incompatibility with other deeply-
held values such as economic growth or private property.~ 
Thus, the public may not yet appreciate that the envi-
ronmentalist, as Rosenbaum suggests, "may well be a revolu-
tionist disguised as a reformer" asking "for some form of 
cultural suicide."M This is a point Ophuls strongly echoes: 
The irony is, of course, that the ideas of human ecol-
ogy, despite their resemblence to older conservative 
ideas, will not be interpreted as conservative at all 
by most Americans, but as revolutionary in the most 
profound and radical way. Compared to them, Marxism, 
~ Charles Hardin, "Observations on Environmental Poli-
tics" in Nagel, 183-184. 59 Dunlap, 134. 
~Ibid. 122. Dunlap does finds, however, that there is an 
emerging knowledgability that may someday change this. 
61 walter Rosenbaum, The Politics of Environmental Concern 
(New York: Prager, 1977), 57, 280. 
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which merely asks that "progress" be given central di-
rection in the interest of social justice, seems like 
an old friend.62 
This supposed failure of the public to recognize the 
deeper costs and implications of ecology would seem, there-
fore, to set the stage for a potential backlash or some such 
eventual erosion of superficially held support at the first 
signs of oncoming hardships or sacrifice. Said one observer 
several years ago at the height of the so-called "green" 
craze: 
Today, its anything green. Tomorrow, it'll be anything 
jobs. Try to cut thousands of jobs in the middle of a 
recession and see what happens. You'll have recipe 
books for spotted owl corning out of Congress.63 
The continuing recession and budgetary problems of the 
early 1990s may be just the event to fray this fragile sup-
port. Already, donations to environmental groups have de-
clined in the past few years, prompting layoffs and scaled-
back operations among formerly booming groups.M Thus, pub-
lie opinion that once seemed solid may, if challenged, ac-
tually turn out to be quite unstable. 
How, then, does all this relate to the Siskiyou case? 
While public support for old growth might seem fairly clear, 
environmentalists should want to think hard before unreserv-
edly embracing the power of rnajoritarianism on forest is-
62 William Ophuls, "Reversal is the Law of Tao: The Immi-
nent Resurrection of Political Philosophy" in Nagel, 44. 
63 Quoted in Margaret Kriz, "Shades of Green" Natic:rnal 
Journal (28 July 1990), 1831. 
MEliza Carney and w. John Moore, "From the K Street 
Corridor" National Journal (4 January 1992), 30. 
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sues; the ecological impact of vox populi is not quite 
clear. While national and regional public support of envi-
ronmental goals has certainly been crucial to the success of 
Siskiyou environmentalists (Lou Gold, after all, knew exact-
ly why he had to give hundreds of lectures coast-to-coast), 
public opinion is, at best a volatile ally of ecology. Be-
fore they surrender the current legal and scientific advan-
tage they enjoy in an otherwise hostile pluralist arena, en-
vironmentalists ought to be sure their public support is un-
wavering, something they cannot now do. 
A good example of this volatility of public opinion 
might be California's Propositions 128 and 130, perhaps the 
best pieces of evidence that exist today regarding old 
growth and majoritarianism in action. These two measures, 
informally known as "Big Green" and "Forests Forever" were 
put on the 1990 state ballot after the requisite 600,000 
signatures were collected. Big Green was a sweeping, compre-
hensive proposal which would place limits upon greenhouse 
gases, ozone-depleting chemicals, and pesticide usage, in 
addition to prohibiting the clearcutting of redwood forests 
and raising a $300 million bond for reforestation and pri-
vate forestland acquisition.65 The Forests Forever initia-
tive, which dealt exclusively with forests, proposed to 
raise $742 million for the purchase of highly endangered 
65 Robert Guskind, "Big Green Light" National Journal (6 
October 1990), 2401-2402. 
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private old growth redwood forest, end clearcutting on all 
forests in the state, tax whole log exports, and assist 
displaced mill workers.~ 
After early polls showed environmentalists with a sub-
stantial lead in both initiatives, opponents, including the 
timber industry, went all out, spending tens of millions of 
dollars to defeat the proposal.67 In the state hardest-hit 
by an increasingly severe national recession, timber inter-
ests successfully managed to portray Big Green and Forests 
Forever not only as billion dollar taxpayer boondoggles, but 
a potential death-blow to the state's wood products indus-
try.~ In the end, Big Green was trounced by a two-to-one 
margin while Forests Forever was more narrowly defeated 52% 
to 48%.~ 
~Ibid.; Bald Mountain Bulletin (Winter 1990/1991), 1. 67 Big Green's opponents, which included an array of busi-
ness and agriculture groups were reported to have spent 
$16.5 million to defeat the proposal. The timber industry, 
meanwhile, reportedly spent $10 million to defeat both Big 
Green and Forests Forever. Jorge Casuse, "Black Tuesday for 
Big Green Backers" Chicago Tribune (11 November 1990) sec.1, 
6; Bald Mountain Bulletin, 1. 
~Robert Reinhold, "Once Considered a Sure Thing, Cali-
fornia's Environmental Package Falters" New York Times (16 
September 1990), 30. 69 Casuso, 6; Bald Mountain Bulletin, 1. It should be 
noted, however, that the timber industry's counterinitia-
tive, paradoxically titled, "The Global Warming and Clear-
cutting Reduction, Wildlife Protection, and Reforestation 
Act", nicknamed by the media "Big Stump" was defeated 70% to 
30%. In all, however, the 1990 elections were fairly bleak 
for environmentalists and their various referenda and initi-
atives. Environmental propositions in six states--mining 
regulations in South Dakota, a bond for wild land purchase 
in New York, a recycling measure in Oregon, stream protec-
tion measures in Missouri, land use measures in Washington 
and California's two initiatives all went down in defeat as 
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At least from the environmentalists' perspective, one 
lesson of this initiative and its defeat might be that even 
a generally supportive public is quite vulnerable to the 
fear and doubt-provoking media campaigns of a well-financed 
opposition, thereby making referenda a risky proposition.70 
Such riskiness and unpredictablity largely sum up the diff i-
culty environmental initiatives have not only with 
majoritarian-style referenda, but decentralized community 
control as well. Perhaps even more so than schemes of cen-
tralization, community and/or popular sovereignty on issues 
of environmental policy, given the social, cultural, and 
economic context which exists today, are subject to extreme-
ly volatile and unpredictable forces. Ecological crises, 
severe unemployment, corporate media campaigns, or popular 
culture trends can all sway public opinion quite suddenly 
and forcefully for or against environmental protection. 
Local community opinion, meanwhile, is influenced by the 
added dimension of local culture, history, and socio-
prospects for a worsening recession loomed. Robert Pear, 
''Voters Spurn Array of Plans for Protecting Environment" New 
York Times (8 November 1990), sec.B, 1. 70 Majoritarians, however, might argue that Big Green, al-
though a majoritarian-style referendum, occurred within a 
larger context of pluralism. In this case then, administra-
tive or legislative pluralism was simply replaced by "refer-
enda pluralism" in which powerful interests still compete 
for influence and dominate the policymaking process. In a 
truly majoritarian system, its advocates would argue, the 
power of special interests to fragment, confuse, or manipu-
late the public would have previously been diminished. 
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economic circumstance which can all militate against compre-
hensive, holistic national environmental policies. 
The mostly positive but fairly shallow and unstable 
body of public opinions towards the environment that exist 
today must be harnessed into a stable and deeply-held value-
set if ecological advocates can more fully trust referenda 
or local control. Working towards this end should, there-
fore, be an imperative of the environmental movement. 
CHAPTER 8 
PLURALISM AND ECOLOGY: SOME CONCLUSIONS 
Thus emerges the classic environmental dilemma: what 
must be done cannot be done. 
Robert Bartlett 
This study's long journey through the thickets of dem-
ocratic theory, ecological politics, and the history of the 
Siskiyou National Forest, by its very design, is not capable 
of definitively proving broad theories or constructing grand 
models of ecological politics. But by concentrating in great 
detail upon a specific and very fascinating case of such 
politics, it has, nevertheless, provided quite a bit of in-
sight, in a way that studies of broader scope could not, in-
to the relationship of democracy {particularly of the plur-
alist variant} and ecology. 
Critics have raised doubts about the pluralist process 
regarding both how well it actually functions and how norrna-
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tively desirable it is as a form of democratic organization. 
As a fairly diffuse, non-material public interest, environ-
mentalism would seem to strongly qualify as one such poli-
tical movement likely to be disadvantaged by the pluralist 
process. 
The doubts of the critics center around three issues: 
(1) the inherent inequality of interest group organization 
and competition, (2) the bias of bureaucratic administration 
towards more powerful economically-oriented interests, and 
(3) structural characteristics in the system, particularly 
the fragmentation of political authority, which are also 
alleged to favor the status quo. As alternatives to plural-
ism, critics prescribe a diversity of arrangements depending 
upon their perspective. These include increased centraliza-
tion and formalized administration and lawmaking, increased 
decentralization and community control, and broad-scale 
majoritarian control through referenda and other direct par-
ticipatory mechanisms. 
The question that has remained consistent throughout 
this study has been: what does the political history of the 
Siskiyou National Forest from 1983 to 1992 tell us about how 
interests and policy demands rooted in ecological values 
fare in a pluralist political process? As such, this work 
has tried to determine whether the arguments of pluralism's 
detractors or advocates seem more valid concerning the three 
main issues of interest group competition, bureaucratic ad-
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ministration, and the potential biases of pluralist struc-
tures? Would the various forms of democratic organization 
offered as alternatives more reliably advance ecological in-
itiatives? 
Principal Findings 
The history of the Siskiyou National Forest from 1983-
1992 reveals that environmentalists have had mixed success 
in the pluralist system as it now stands. While losing (to 
various degrees) practically every battle they fought over 
local timber projects and plans on the Siskiyou, they still 
managed to move the Forest's administration away from a 
strictly one-dimensional preoccupation with timber produc-
tion and forced the agency to at least acknowledge and con-
front issues important to them. 
Local environmentalists have also had mixed success 
when working in conjunction with regional and national 
groups on broader old growth and spotted owl issues. They 
have very effectively built public support and expanded 
their issue into a matter of national concern attended to 
even by Presidents. In Congress, environmentalists have 
mostly taken a battering in the politics of timber approp-
riations and riders, but have recently had a few triumphs 
here as well. As for the high-stakes game of ancient forest 
legislation, stalemate has prevailed with both sides thwart-
ing the other. 
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Only in the judicial realm have environmentalists 
clearly dominated. Court victories have been their ace-in-
the-hole, a weapon so strong that it could hold off an 
actively belligerent presidential administration. Without 
such judicial support, the story of old growth politics 
would have been a very different one, with thousands more 
acres of ancient forest sure to have been cut in the last 
decade and the spotted owl, probably left unlisted as an 
endangered species, rapidly approaching extinction. 
In the case of the Siskiyou, pluralist theory was most 
strongly supported as it concerned interest group organiza-
tion. While ecological interests did face some obstacles and 
were at a distinct, but not overwhelming, disadvantage in 
terms of material resources, they seemed to suffer few of 
the problems of formation and mobilization that many of the 
critics would have predicted. Contrary to Olson's thesis, 
environmentalists vigorously organized and did so (at least 
locally) without offering selective incentives of any real 
value nor threatening sanctions. Instead, common values, 
ideology, and the shared perception of a serious threat 
seemed to be the chief motivating factors. 
Despite some inequities, environmentalists in the Sis-
kiyou proved to be more than worthy opponents of timber in-
terests. They clearly served as the countervailing force 
that pluralists foresee, effectively voicing their concerns 
and pursuing their objectives. Part of this may have been 
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due to their successful use of strategic communication and 
symbolic language and imagery--f acets of interest group com-
petition which rely less upon the sheer weight of group re-
sources. Timber, however, held their own in this regard, em-
ploying many of the same techniques. 
Although the environmentalists made their presence 
keenly felt and effectively projected themselves into the 
policy struggle, the realm of bureaucratic administration 
(especially important in a national forest) offered less 
support for pluralist theory. The main bureaucratic actor in 
the Siskiyou case, the Forest Service, just barely met the 
criteria regarding how a pluralist agency is supposed to act 
(namely, as a fairly open, balanced, and flexible policy 
broker). While participation has been institutionalized and 
access opened, the real impact of this has been, at best, 
limited. Instead, other factors mentioned by critics, in-
cluding deeply-held agency values, budgetary imperatives, 
and perhaps some vestiges of old-fashioned clientelism, all 
serve to produce a distinct bias in Forest Service adminis-
tration in the Siskiyou. While the notion of agency capture 
by dominant clients (the centerpiece of many critiques of 
pluralist administration) could not at all be supported in 
the Siskiyou, the agency's bias often ends up serving the 
same ends. Regarding agency flexibility, the Forest Service 
could once more be found to inhabit a fairly hazy area that 
is not quite as pluralistic as advocates claim nor as in-
495 
flexible as critics suggest. In the end, the Siskiyou Na-
tional Forest could be considered an agency that simultane-
ously manages to act pluralistically to some extent while 
also maintaining a fairly strong timber production orienta-
tion. This orientation is most likely due to a combination 
of professional norms and values, the agency's budgetary 
structure, and perhaps some degree of obligation to a 
resource-using client group whose demands strongly reinforce 
the agency's own internally-derived mission. 
Perhaps the most severe criticism of pluralism's ef-
fect on ecological policymaking centers around how the sys-
tem's decentralized, fragmented authority renders policyma-
kers impotent to tackle complex, multi-faceted ecological 
problems. The pluralist policymaking process is accused of 
being inertia-bound and heavily favoring the status-quo of 
environmental destruction. As a remedy, a number of critics 
call for centralized political authority capable of breaking 
the incrementalist logjam and producing rational, comprehen-
sive policies. 
In the Siskiyou, political fragmentation did indeed 
seem to have the deleterious effects upon ecological policy-
making that critics argue it does (with the exception of 
agency capture). Narrow turf-bound reductionism, cautious 
piecemeal incrementalism, and a fractious tendency towards 
stalemate all cursed policymaking in the Siskiyou and the 
entire old growth region, and all clearly thwarted the crea-
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tion of any sort of comprehensive and scientifically and 
socially defensible approach to old growth policy. For all 
their successes, environmentalists never really got the 
chance to move beyond reactive "preserve what you can" types 
of responses and address the root causes of ecological dis-
ruption. 
What centralist critics do not give pluralist fragmen-
tation enough credit for, however, has been the undeniably 
open access and broad strategic opportunities it has provid-
ed ecological advocates with. By contrast, centralization, 
while holding out the (not yet proven) potential for more 
comprehensive policy, also presents the risk of much more 
restricted decisionmaking access and fewer strategic weapons 
in the environmentalists' arsenal. To consolidate authority 
in such a way will work for environmentalists only if such 
authority is resolutely committed to ecology. At least in 
the Siskiyou/old growth case, however, there is no evidence 
that more centralized levels of policymaking are, by nature, 
any more or less ecologically sensitive than decentralized 
policymakers. 
Prescriptions for Change 
One must consider next, then, the question of which 
democratic arrangement would be most beneficial to ecologi-
cal goals if the Siskiyou case is to serve as any indica-
tion. Many of pluralism's alleg~d flaws and biases were 
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abundantly clear and well-documented in this study. Central-
ized and formalized administration, though, is an extremely 
risky solution as a dependence upon the questionable ecolog-
ical enlightenment of elites puts any environmental initia-
tive on very shaky ground. Furthermore, if centralized ad-
ministration ever does turn hostile, environmentalists could 
depend on far fewer avenues for redress or appeal, especial-
ly regarding the lawsuits that have been their salvation. 
Majoritarianism, meanwhile, depends upon a similarly 
fickle source of authority. While currently supportive, pub-
lic opinion, especially if not reinforced with high levels 
of knowledge and salience, could easily turn on environmen-
talism, regardless of its stature as a long-term public in-
terest. This would especially be true if economically hard 
times prevail and/or significant sacrifices are asked to be 
made. 
Highly decentralized participatory democracy and com-
munity control offers substantial risks and limitations of 
their own. There is simply no guarantee that without a deep 
and broad-based value shift, local populations will act as 
more vigilant defenders of the environment than more cen-
tralized authorities. In fact, in the case of the Siskiyou, 
some fairly good evidence exists suggesting they would act 
less so. And even if vigilant, the scope of authority in 
such small autonomous jurisdictions might prevent co~un-
i ties from dealing with more complex, transjurisdictional 
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aspects of ecological problems thus threatening to trivial-
ize even the most well-intentioned policy decisions. 
Although decentralization has, in the last decade, 
probably eclipsed centralization as the solution most in 
vogue among ecological theorists, it should be remembered 
that the bulk of environmentalist's political achievements 
thus far have been realized through fairly centralized 
policies. Paehlke echoes this point: 
.... there is an important caveat with regard to the 
relationship between decentralization and environmen-
talism. However strongly environmentalists prefer a 
decentralized, self-managing future, environmental-
ism's effect in advanced industrial economies has of-
ten been to broaden and strengthen the powers of the 
central government. 1 
Where does this leave ecology as a political movement 
then? From the above summary, it would seem that no demo-
cratic formulation offers a rock-solid guarantee to treat 
ecological values and objectives sympathetically. While this 
is a sobering conclusion for ecologists, it is an important 
one if it reminds them that no prescription is a panacea, an 
unfortunate notion that frequently shows up in much ecologi-
cal theory. Those who value things such as old growth or 
healthy streams would do well to beware of simple theoreti-
cal solutions to what in reality is so complex and multi-
faceted an issue. 
1 Robert Paehlke, Environmentalism and the Future of 
Progressive Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1989), 155-156. 
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It is clear that the pluralist process places signif i-
cant, sometimes seemingly fatal obstacles and biases in the 
path of ecologically enlightened policy. Yet environmental-
ists must never forget that pluralism also grants them one 
precious gift that no other form of political organization 
can guarantee in quite the same way--multiple channels of 
diverse and open access to the political process. Observes 
the head of the Sierra Club: 
"Of all the countries in the world, the U.S. has, by 
far, the most easily influenced government .... there is 
often pretty good recourse if you're systematic and 
organized in how you go about it."2 
Thus, the "baby" of access, redress, and appeal must 
not be thrown out with the "bathwater" of status quo biases, 
delay, and incoherent policy. This naturally provides all 
thoughtful environmentalists, and political scientists for 
that matter, with a thorny dilemma that Robert Fluno sums up 
well: 
.... so long as pluralism is so frustrating and so em-
barassingly selfish, men will be angered by it. As a 
process of collective policy-making, it is too intel-
lectually unattractive, too incredibly clumsy, for 
those of us who prize order in a world so depressingly 
chaotic .... But the gamble that concentration [or devo-
lution--ed.) is better than pluralism is simply that: 
a gamble, perhaps the most ancient and risky of poli-
tical gambles.3 
2Quoted in Trip Gabriel, "If a Tree Falls in the Forest, 
They Hear It" New York Times Magazine, (4 November 1990), 
59. 3Robert Fluno quoted in G. David Garson, Group Theories 
of Politics (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1978), 155-156. 
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Yet to be content with the status quo of pluralism as 
it stands today is and should be unacceptable to most envi-
ronmentalists. Their significant legal successes notwith-
standing, environmentalists, in dealing with the Forest Ser-
vice, Congress, and the Administration, have had a grueling 
uphill fight every step of the way. For all the access it 
grants, this pluralist status quo mostly has brought short-
sightedness, paralysis, and a profound bias towards the dis-
pensation of those material, distributable political goods 
that cause old growth to fall and the web of biodiversity to 
further unravel. This is the paradox of pluralism and the 
case of the Siskiyou can serve as a metaphor for this ambiv-
alence as it occurs across the political spectrum. 
Here one must return to a question raised in the first 
chapter: are ecological values, because of their immaterial, 
firmly zero-sum nature, hopelessly out of place in a plural-
ist process that stresses bargaining and compromise and is 
far more comfortable distributing material benefits? To a 
pluralist, the environmentalists might be considered to have 
enjoyed great success and influence in the old growth cam-
paign. They did, after all, gain much access and clearly 
push policymaking, however grudgingly, their way. By plural-
ist standards, this is about the most any reasonable player 
could ask for. To an environmentalist with zero-sum beliefs, 
however, ecological disruption is an either/or thing which 
no amount of access or even success in nudging arguments 
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around can make up for; only the halting of such disruption 
will do. A cartoon printed in a Northwestern newspaper dur-
ing the height of controversy captures the environmental-
ists' dissatisfaction with pluralist-style solutions. It 
shows a politician, presumably seized by the spirit of com-
promise, pointing to a giant Douglas fir and offering a log-
ger the top half and an environmentalist the bottom half .4 
When analyzing the outcome of this case, it is quite impor-
tant, then, to keep in mind these differing standards of 
what constitutes policy-influencing success. 
Ultimately, it is quite difficult to determine whether 
the pluralist system holds out the potential to adequately 
confront ecological problems in the long-term; that is, 
without mistaking interest group access or even influence 
for the resolution of real problems. Perhaps pluralism's 
worst flaws in this regard cannot be rectified; maybe they 
are rooted too deeply in its structural core and very nature 
and the best the process can be expected to produce is a 
continuation of muddling through with haphazard, piecemeal 
reactions. If one feels that such a critique overemphasizes 
structural factors, on the other hand, this might be a bit 
too pessimistic an assessment in that it does not adequately 
recognize the importance of situational, historical, and 
sociocultural factors in shaping the outcomes a pluralist 
4 This cartoon appeared with Keith Ervin, "The Tree Fight" 
Seattle Post-Intelligencer (24 September 1989). 
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process can produce. Perhaps profound changes in these 
external policymaking factors (deep values shifts, worsening 
ecological deterioration, etc.) can, in some cases, exert 
enough pressure to overcome or off set the effects of plural-
ism's fragmented structure and piecemeal orientation. 
Even if it is assumed that this latter scenario is 
true, the need for radical reform in the process as it re-
gards environmental policymaking should be vividly clear. 
Undertaking such reform will not be as easy as wishing it 
so, however, as the more admirable aspects of pluralism are 
clearly the flipside of its more troublesome ones. To banish 
reductionist fragmentation, for instance, is to possibly 
banish checks and balances or multiple access as well. To 
preserve pluralism's beneficial qualities while addressing 
its many problems, therefore, is a very precarious task 
which, if at all possible, must be attempted with immense 
precision. 
With that warning in mind, it must also be said that 
if ecological problems are ever to be adequately confronted, 
this process of reform must carry on even to the point where 
pluralism actually incorporates significant aspects of the 
critics' remedial alternatives. From the centralists, for 
example, pluralism must far more vigorously adopt mechanisms 
for formulating more comprehensive policy and coordination 
and cooperation across jurisdictions. Policymaking p~oce­
dures must also be allowed to assign adequate value to those 
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less material, less tangible ecological values that so often 
fail to be incorporated or given full weight in distributive 
pluralist bargaining. A reformed pluralist system must also 
allow less administrative reinterpretation and outright dis-
respect for the law and better attempt to ensure the scien-
tific and legal integrity of bureaucratic administrators. 
From participatory democrats and majoritarians, the 
pluralist process should adopt a thorough institutionaliza-
tion of meaningful citizen participation and review in every 
stage of the policymaking process as well as uphold standing 
to sue in the courts. For environmentalists, such rights and 
opportunities, to the extent they have been extended, have 
proven simply indispensible. At least in this regard, the 
validity of Paehlke's thesis that democracy goes hand-in-
hand with environmentalism should be abundantly clear. 
And perhaps most importantly, from all critical theor-
ies, however divergent, should be borrowed and incorporated 
into a pluralist democracy the heretofore alien concept that 
there sometimes does exist a clear and identifiable public 
interest that unites all citizens (whether they recognize it 
or not) and transcends all notions of "issue publics" or 
"attentive publics" or any other use of public in the plural 
form. There must come a time when our collective needs as a 
polity to protect the ecosystems that sustain us, conserve 
the future's resources, and safeguard the biodiversity upon 
which we depend and are an integral part of are recognized 
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as more than "just another interest" in the pluralist bat-
tleground of so many interests. 5 This reluctance to rank 
problems and values and collective needs beyond simply as-
suaging whichever interes~ cries out the loudest is one of 
the most insidious aspects of pluralism. Perhaps more than 
anything else, then, the pluralist process needs to be al-
t lowed the courage and resolve to identify the long-term pub-
lic interest better. If it does, then it just may be able to 
adequately address the ecological problems that we all must 
confront. 
5 Even Kelso, pluralism's ardent defender, argues for 
reform in this respect, calling for a public pluralism in 
which the government actively sponsors and encourages those 
groups it deems to be working on the public's behalf. While 
preserving pluralism's basic competition of interests, gov-
ernment would, in effect, act to level the playing field so 
to speak. William Kelso, American Democratic Theory (West-
port, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978). 
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APPENDIX A 
THE NATURE OF ECOLOGICAL VALUES 
To fully appreciate how pluralism and ecology inter-
act, one must delve more deeply into the nature of ecolog-
ical values than merely recognizing that they are complex 
and often intangible. It must be understood just how fun-
damentally such values and priorities differ from economic-
ally quantifiable ones. 
The dominant attitudes towards nature prevalent 
throughout America's early history has been characterized by 
most observers as being utilitarian and fairly antagonis-
tic .1 These attitudes stemmed largely from two sources. 
First is what historians Lynn White and Roderick Nash each 
suggest is the influence of European culture and religion.2 
The first settlers brought these cultural and religious 
values with them to the New World and were, consequently, 
guided by them in their endeavors to subdue what they felt 
was a savage, desolate and godless wilderness. 
The influence of the Enlightenment, which figured so 
prominently in shaping American political thought, also had 
a role in shaping early attitudes towards the natural world. 
Besides basing political legitimacy upon the foundations of 
property rights and economic self-interest, Enlightenment 
thought, in a more general sense, offered a vision of con-
tinual material progress based upon the rational scientific 
unraveling and manipulation of nature. The achievement of 
this goal of optimal rationality and material progress, of 
course, required a substantial alienation from any affective 
attachment to the natural world which, by necessity, had to 
be seen as nothing more than raw material and potential eco-
nomic opportunity.3 "In the vocabulary of material prog-
ress", claims Nash, "wilderness had meaning only as an ob-
stacle."' By overcoming this obstacle and making the land 
accessible and productive, its full economic and thus ra-
tional value could then be realized. 
1 There are seemingly countless treatments of this sub-
ject; perhaps the best is Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the 
American Mind revised ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1973). 2Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind; Lynn White, 
"The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis" Science 155 
10 March 1967), 1203-1207. 3Perhaps the best summation of Enlightenment Thou9ht's 
views on nature is in William Leiss, The Domination of 
Nature (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974). 
4 Nash, 41. 
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Originating with the Romantic and Transcendentalist 
movements of the early to mid-19th century and continuing 
ever since, dissent towards this dominant view of nature has 
steadily grown in both scope and complexity, developing 
eventually into what today we can broadly call the ecologi-
cal position. In its original and most precise sense, the 
term ecology, according to Henning and Mangun, is the "study 
of the relationships between all living things and the phys-
ical environment." 5 As shall be shown, however, ecology has 
come to be used far more broadly than merely referring to a 
field of study. Ecological values can be considered to en-
compass at least three dimensions, which although distinct, 
are usually characterized by so much overlap and intercon-
nection of concepts, that they now rarely, if ever, occur in 
isolation. 
The first dimension of the ecological value system in-
cludes biocentric or what Henning and Mangun call, "appreci-
ative and non-utilitarian" attitudes; 6 that is, the belief 
that all natural things have inherent value and thus do not 
require having utility for human beings in order to have 
worth. Such thinking necessitates, of course, a rejection 
not only of utilitarianism, but humankind's privileged po-
sition in the grand natural scheme of things. The naturalist 
and writer John Muir who was deeply influenced by Transcen-
dentalists Emerson and Thoreau makes this point: 
The world, as we are told was made especially for man 
--a presumption not supported by the facts. A numerous 
class of men are painfully astonished whenever they 
find anything, living or dead, in all God's universe 
which they cannot eat or render in some way that which 
they call useful to themselves .... Now it never seems 
to occur to these .... that Nature's object in making 
animals and plants might possibly be first of all the 
happiness of each one of them, not the creation of all 
for the happiness of one. Why should man value himself 
as more than a small part of one great unit of crea-
tion?7 
Similarly, the forester and naturalist Aldo Leopold 
admonishes us to develop the respect for nature necessary to 
change from "conquerer" of the land community to "plain mem-
5 Daniel Henning and William Mangun, Managing the Environ-
mental Crisis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 2. 
6 Ibid. 8. 7John Muir quoted in Joseph Petulla, American Environmen-
talism (College Station, TX: TeAas A&M University Press, 
1980), 29. 
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ber and citizen of it", 8 while the author Edward Abbey in-
vokes an existentialist plea for us "to let Being be."9 
Although biocentric ideas have been a common thread 
throughout the writings of the ecologically-minded from the 
Transcendentalists on down, it has not been until the last 
decade that they have been fully articulated as a coherent 
and well-developed body of social, ethical, and philosoph-
ical thought. Works by William Devall and George Sessions, 
Fritjof Capra, Arne Naess, and Gary Synder have heartily 
rejected anthropocentrism while attempting to clearly and 
formally stake out the alternative biocentric or deep ecol-
ogy position and its implications for society.10 
Another subtly different component of the ecological 
value system, what Joseph Petulla calls the "ecologic" per-
spective, emphasizes the interdependence and interrelated-
ness of all elements in nature.11 This perspective borrows 
many of its ideas from the science of ecology which was for-
mally established around the turn of the century as a means 
to measure the flow of energy and balance of life throughout 
natural communities. Scientific ecologists such as Rachel 
Carson, Barry Commoner, or Garrett Hardin, have all attempt-
ed to document the self-regulating balances of natural sys-
tems and humankind's disruptive effects upon those bal-
ances. 12 
Not surprisingly, this focus upon interdependencies 
and equilibriums makes ecology the most holistic and in-
clusive of all the sciences. Perhaps Commoner offers the 
starkest rejection of reductionism in his field when he 
declares simply that, "everything is related to everything 
else. 11 13 To ignore this basic fact of ecology and foolishly 
attempt to do "just one thing", ominously warns William 
8 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1949), 204. 9Edward Abbey, Down the River (New York: E.P. Dutton, 
1982), 119. 10 william Devall and George Sessions, Deep Ecology (Salt 
Lake City: Peregrine Smith, 1985); Fritjof Capra, "Deep 
Ecology: A New Paradigm" Earth Island Journal 2:4 (1987), 
27-30; Arne Naess, "The Shallow and Deep, Long-Range Ecology 
Movement" Inquiry 16 (1973), 95-100; Gary Synder, The Prac-
tice of the Wild (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1990). 
11 Petulla, 30. 
12 Amongst their many works, perhaps the most representa-
tive are: Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1962); Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle (New 
York: Knopf, 1971); Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Com-
mons" Science 162 (13 December 1968), 1243-1248. 
13 Commoner, 3 3 . 
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Ophuls, is to be assured of facing "unintended consequen-
ces. "14 Because of this holistic and systemic orientation, 
those operating from the ecologic perspective value, above 
all, the integrity, stability, and proper functioning of 
complex and biologically diverse natural systems both for 
the entire planet's and our own species' sake. 
To the ecologists, therefore, the gravest sin possible 
is to disrupt this delicate balance. Such priorities, how-
ever, naturally find themselves on a collision course with 
values and priorities associated with the economic growth 
demanded by modern industrial society. Leopold recognizes 
this value gap as he argues that a policy towards the land 
that is: 
.... based solely on economic self-interest is hope-
lessly lopsided. It tends to ignore, and thus even-
tually eliminate, many elements in the land community 
that lack commercial value, but are (as far as we 
know) essential to its healthy functioning. It as-
sumes, falsely, I think, that the economic parts of 
the biotic clock will function without the uneconomic 
parts. 15 
Similarly, Commoner likens life on earth to a complex 
web in which humankind, through its destructive activities, 
is continually breaking strands. Eventually, he warns, when 
enough of the threads have been eliminated, the entire web 
will disintegrate.16 Thus, ecologists' chief role is to 
serve, in Petulla's words, as the "enemies of disruption." 17 
The final element of the ecological value system in-
volves that which can be considered primarily spiritual or 
aesthetic. It is rare that ecological values are articulated 
without at least some reference made to the awesome beauty 
and sublimity of nature as well as the serenity, wisdom, and 
spiritual power to be either gained by the observer or found 
within the observed. In fact, aesthetic and spiritual argu-
ments formed the original basis for the preservationist po-
sition as ecologic and biocentric rationale were added only 
later. 
Aesthetics provided the grounds upon which the Roman-
tic movement, which gave birth to some of the earliest pre-
servationist sentiments, justified the value of nature. The 
wilderness provided to the Romantics and their modern off-
14 william Ophuls, Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity 
(San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1977), 22-23. 15 Leopold, 214. 16 Commoner, 38. 17 Petulla, chap.4. 
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spring the most perfect standard of beauty and, according to 
Bob Marshall, "perhaps the best opportunity for .... pure es-
thetic rapture." 18 Thus, to the Romantics and their kin, on 
the basis of its sheer, overpowering beauty alone, nature 
clearly justifies its own value and thereby deserves pro-
tection. 
The spiritual aspect of ecological values is a bit 
more complex as it can take one of two forms: the upholding 
of nature as spiritually sacred in its own right or else the 
belief that nature offers spiritual benefits to those who 
become intimate with it. In American thought, the former 
sentiment goes all the way back to Transcendentalist thought 
which, in seeing nature as synonymous with or at least sym-
bolic of the Universal Spirit and hence, goodness, morality, 
and truth, provided the starkest of counterpoints to the 
hostile Puritan or frontier vision of the wilderness. 
Perhaps no one linked nature to the divine with as 
much enthusiasm and quasi-religious fervor as did Muir who 
spoke of nature as a "window opening into heaven" and a 
"mirror reflecting the Creator." 19 Muir's writings are 
filled with all sorts of religious imagery as he refers to 
natural objects as "sparks of the divine Soul", to forests 
as "God's First Temples" and the business interests who 
would commercially exploit them as "temple destroyers. 11 20 
Thus, to Muir and those who follow in his footsteps, nature 
and especially wondrous natural places are the sacred 
dwellings of whatever their conception of the divine is (be 
it God or gods or animistic spirits). As such, defiling 
these places would not merely be wrong or ill-advised, but 
profanity and blasphemy of the worst sort. 
There is another angle to this notion of nature and 
spirituality that is less concerned with the divine nature 
of nature itself than it is with the spiritual and psycho-
logical benefits nature offers humankind. According to such 
thinking, nature has value and deserves protection as the 
antidote for the nerve-shattering alienation, dehumaniza-
tion, and brutality of modern civilization. To Justice 
William O. Douglas, for example, wilderness provides a res-
pite from society's "mass compulsions" and a place where 
"man need not become an automaton",~ while Nash quotes 
neurologist William Gibson as deeming wilderness areas "the 
greatest mental health guardians we have."~ Historian 
Theodore Roszak, meanwhile, argues that nature's magical, 
18 Bob Marshall quoted in Nash, 204. 
19 Muir quoted in Nash, 125. 
20 Ibid. 125, 130, 161. 
21 william o. Douglas quoted in Nash, 248. 
22 william Gibson quoted in Nash, 249. 
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mystical, and wondrous qualities are one of the only things 
left that can stand up to the modern era's crushing cyni-
cism. 23 
In addition to wilderness's tonic effect on humankind, 
preservationists also suggest that it serves the essential 
function of providing a real, present contrast to civiliza-
tion; in other words, wilderness plays the vital role of the 
Other through which civilization gains definition and even 
value. Wilderness, then, is thought to be crucial as the 
wellspring of civilization, the raw material out of which 
civilization was forged. Without wilderness, its proponents 
warn, civilization loses its source and hence, its iden-
tity .24 
In a similar vein is wilderness's alleged role as a 
storehouse of raw freedom. To William O. Douglas, for exam-
ple, a society which maintains roadless areas makes a 
"pledge to Freedom ... 25 To eliminate wilderness, then, would 
be to strike a direct blow at freedom as Abbey clearly be-
lieves as he confesses his fear "that if we allow the free-
dom of the hills to be taken from us, then the very idea of 
freedom may die with it. 11 26 To Abbey, then, the destruction 
of the wilderness in all its dark, mysterious, and dangerous 
glory and its replacement with the mind-numbing bland safety 
of modern conveniences is synonymous with the destruction of 
freedom by an ever more obstrusive and totalitarian techno-
logical state: 
I see the preservation of wilderness as one sector of 
the front in the war against the encroaching industri-
al state. Every square mile of range and desert saved 
from the strip miners, every river saved from the darn 
builders, every forest saved from the loggers, every 
swamp saved f rorn the land speculators means another 
square mile saved for the play of human freedom. 27 
The summation of the ecological value system is best 
left to Thoreau who ties together all the strands of ecol-
23 Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture (Gar-
den City, NY: Anchor, 1969), chap. 8. 
24 Such arguments are particularly well put by such wri-
ters as Aldo Leopold, Howard Zahniser, and Joseph Wood 
Krutch among others who contribute to the text of Francois 
Leydet (editor), Time and the River Flowing: Grand Canyon 
(San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1964), as well as in Ed-
ward Abbey, Down the River. 
25 oouglas quoted in Nash, 248. 
26 Abbey, Down the River, 120-121. 
27 Edward Abbey, The Journey Home (New York: E.P. Dutton, 
1977) I 235-236 
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ogy, biocentrism, romanticism, Transcendentalism, aestheti-
cism, and spirituality when he boldly proclaims in no moral-
ly uncertain terms that, "In wildness is the preservation of 
the world.~ 
~Thoreau quoted in Paul Brooks, "Wilderness in West~rn 
Culture" in William Schwartz (editor), Voices for the Wil-
derness (New York: Ballantine, 1968), 39. 
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APPENDIX B 
THE INTERVIEWS 
Much of the data used in this study were gathered 
through in-depth interviews. Although conducting such de-
tailed and time-consuming interviews inevitably limits the 
number of individuals contacted (as compared to say, tele-
phone surveys or questionnaires), it was the goal of this 
study to collect information from a well-balanced and high-
ly relevant group of participants. Those I interviewed met 
one of three criteria: (1) they were known to me through my 
research as a significant participant, (2) they were recom-
mended by other participants as someone to talk to, or (3) 
they were representative of a larger group of actors whose 
perspective I sought (such as Siskiyou district rangers or 
D.C. level Forest Service officials). I certainly did not 
get to interview every last person my research told me was 
important or whom was recommended to me due to a number of 
practical constraints inherent to the research design (for 
one, I would probably be interviewing until 1994!). Never-
theless, I feel that my final roster of interviewees was 
relevant, diverse, and well-balanced enough to offer a very 
full and richly multi-dimensional view of Siskiyou politics. 
Specifically, I interviewed fifteen individuals. These 
included eight fairly active local interest group partici-
pants and seven Forest Service officials. The interest group 
interviewees were evenly split between four timber industry 
officials from several different trade associations or com-
panies and four environmentalists, similarly from a variety 
of groups. Of the Forest Service personnel interviewed, five 
were from the Siskiyou National Forest, one was a regional 
official from Portland and one was an official from the 
agency's Washington D.C. headquarters. The five Siskiyou 
personnel included the Forest Supervisor, the now-retired 
former Supervisor (who served from 1983-1990), two district 
rangers, and a staffer involved in timber planning and ap-
peals. All interviewees were asked a similar set of open-
ended questions which varied slightly depending upon whether 
the individual represented timber, environmentalists, or the 
agency. 
Since most of the interviewees are still actively in-
volved in the politics of the Siskiyou and must deal with 
one another, maintaining their confidentiality was of utmost 
importance. Thus, information, opinions, and quotes taken 
from these interviews, with the exception of the former and 
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current Forest Supervisors, are attributed only in a generic 
manner and none are cited in the footnotes. All interviews 
were conducted by the author between April 1991 and November 
1992 in either southwest Oregon or Chicago and were tape 
recorded. Approximately half were conducted in person and 
half by telephone. 
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APPENDIX C 
LIST OF OTHER NOTABLE NATIONAL, AND STATE/REGIONAL 
INTEREST GROUPS INVOLVED IN OLD GROWTH AND RELATED ISSUES.1 
Environmental 
Save America's Forests, 
Washington D.C. 
Western Ancient 
Forest Campaign, 
Washington D.C. 
Ancient Forest Alliance, 
Washington D.C. 
Association of Forest Service 
Employees For Environmental 
Ethics, Eugene, OR 
Cascade Holistic Economic 
Consultants, Portland 
Forest Conservation Council 
Eugene, OR 
Greater Ecosystem Alliance, 
Bellingham, WA 
Washington Environmental 
Council, Seattle. 
Central Oregon Audubon 
Society, Bend, OR 
Greenpeace U.S.A., 
Washington D.C. 
Native Forest Council, 
Eugene, OR 
Sierra Club, San Francisco 
Forest Reform Network, Dallas 
Lighthawk, Sante Fe, NM 
Seattle Audubon Society 
Mazamas, Portland 
Timber 
American Forest Resource 
Alliance, Washington D.C. 
Western Washington 
Commercial Logging Action 
Committee, Seattle 
American Forest Products 
Alliance, Washington D.C. 
Oregon Project/Oregon 
Public Lands Coalition 
Salem, OR 
National Forest Products 
Alliance, Washington D.C. 
Public Timber Council, 
Washington, D.C. 
Oregon Forest Industries 
Council, Salem, OR 
Washington Contract Loggers 
Association Olympia, WA 
Gifford Pinchot 
Alliance2 
Western Public Lands 
Coalition, Salt Lake City 
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1 This listing includes some of the more notable interest 
groups involved in the old growth issue and related issues 
(such as national forest management policy, Forest Service 
reform, or wilderness) which did not directly take part in 
the conflict over the Siskiyou National Forest. Still, these 
groups had an indirect impact upon the Siskiyou through 
their more general activities regarding old growth and other 
forest issues. Measuring indirect impact is, of course, an 
extremely difficult proposition in that the Siskiyou con-
flict took place on so many levels and involved so many fac-
tors. As such, it is very difficult to draw the line as to 
which indirectly involved groups to include and which to 
leave out. A truly comprehensive listing would have to in-
clude literally hundreds of local environmental groups or 
sawmills focused on a particular county, national forest, or 
watershed all across the nation. As the forest reform issue 
has heated up in the past decade such groups, at least on 
the environmentalist side, have been established in every 
part of the country where there are National Forest units 
(including Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, New England, and the Ap-
palachian states). Because such local groups' influence on 
events in the Siskiyou is so much more indirect and diluted 
than the more broadly focused national and state/regional 
groups, they will not be included here. Groups that are in-
cluded are: (1) of a national or Pacific Northwest focus; 
(2) mentioned by a Siskiyou participant in an interview; (3) 
mentioned in a journalistic account of old growth/forest 
policy issues; or (4) a litigant in federal case regarding 
old growth or the northern spotted owl 1988-1991. 
2I was unable to track down the headquarters location of 
this organization. 
APPENDIX D 
DDESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND SOURCES OF DATA FOR 
TABLES 1 and 2. 
Table 1 -
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Group--This list of groups includes those determined to 
have directly participated at some level in the politics of 
the Siskiyou National Forest. A group included in this list 
must have satisfied one of the following criteria: (1) iden-
tified as a Siskiyou National Forest workshop attendee; (2) 
litigant in a lawsuit involving solely the Siskiyou National 
Forest; (3) filed an administrative appeal to the Siskiyou 
National Forest 1986-1991; (4) mentioned by participants 
interviewed as a group actor (not including participant's 
own affiliation; (5) mentioned as a participant in at least 
two separate non-interest group journalistic accounts of the 
Siskiyou conflict. 
Scope--Local refers to an area of concern that corres-
ponds to southwest Oregon, the Siskiyou National Forest, or 
a watershed or section of the Siskiyou. State refers to the 
state of Oregon. Regional refers to the Pacific Northwest or 
the western United States. 
Level of Participation-- 1 = very active and/or sus-
tained participation; 2 = moderate and/or infrequent parti-
cipation. Category l's high level of participation would in-
clude any group that was identified as being a regular and 
active participant in the Siskiyou conflict and its many 
subissues. Such a group would consistently and energetically 
engage in the various activities listed in table 1. While 
such groups did not necessarily have to engage in all of 
these activities, it had to have at least pursued its speci-
ality consistently and vigorously. Category 2 is essentially 
a catchall category for any group that did not qualify as 
having a high level of participation. It may, therefore, in-
clude a range of levels of participatory intensity. Note al-
so that this variable does not necessarily measure effec-
tiveness, but instead intensity of involvement. The measure 
in this variable was determined by the identification of a 
group participant by interviewees (from a group other than 
the one being measured) as a group with a high or less than 
high level of involvement in the Siskiyou. In addition, any 
group determined to have been a regular workshop attendee 
was automatically considered to have a high level of parti-
cipation. 
Group Type and Membership-- M = individual membership 
group; CG = coalition group or trade association with other 
groups or companies as members. The actual membership figure 
is the number of dues-paying individual or group members, 
if the group does not collect dues, members which satisfy 
that group's minimum requirements for membership. 
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or 
Paid Staff--Number of paid, non-volunteer staff. Paid 
part-time staff are measured as .5 staff each. Thus, the 
staff of a group with 2 full and 2 part-time workers would 
be calculated as 3. 
Annual Budqet--Total annual operating budget. A (*) 
next to the figure indicates an approximation and/or the 
average of a range. Sometimes interviewees could only give 
an approximate, non-official figure for their group's annual 
budget. Other interviewees gave a range such as "somewhere 
between x and y dollars." In the latter case, the average of 
these figures was presented in the table. 
Source of Fundinq--Listed in order of the amount of the 
group's budget for which each accounts: 1 = membership dues; 
2 = grants (donations beyond annual or life membership re-
quirements, foundation grants, or grants from any other 
source); 3 = fundraising (special projects, speaker's fees, 
auctions, benefits, etc.); 4 =sales (proceeds from the sale 
of group-sponsored products or services). 
Activities--This variable shows how groups participated 
in the political conflict in the Siskiyou. M = monitoring, 
tracking, mapping, or appealing timber sales, the Forest 
Plan, or similar projects and/or attendance at Forest Ser-
vice workshops, advisory boards, or hearings; LT = litigant 
or intervener in any lawsuit regarding activities in the 
Siskiyou; E = public education and publicity including news-
letters, press releases, speaking engagements, guided field 
trips, letter-writing campaigns, advertising, and related 
organizing; LB = lobbying public officials in order to im-
part information and influence policy; R = technical, eco-
nomic, or scientific research; P = group maintains state or 
federally registered political action committee to dispense 
campaign contributions. Activities have been determined by 
interviews with participants and a multitude of data from 
the case, including Forest Service documents and journalis-
tic accounts 
Table 2 -
Company--This is a list of politically active local 
woods products companies. Several large corporations have 
local operations which are listed as well. The criteria for 
listing these companies is the same as for the interest 
groups in table 1 (see this appendix). 
Employees - Number of total employees. 
Annual Sales - Amount of total sales in millions of 
dollars. 
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Annual Lumber Production - Number of millions of board 
feet of timber the company produces annually. Note that most 
of the timber produced by smaller companies comes from pub-
lic land, much of that from the Siskiyou. The large corpora-
tions, on the other hand, get their timber from a number of 
sources, most prominently their own private timberlands. 
Level of Participation - See same heading for table 1 
in this appendix. 
Activities - See same heading for table 1 in this ap-
pendix. Note, however, that there are less possible activi-
ties in table 2. 
Sources of data: 
Personal interviews (see main text for specific cita-
tions) and telephone survey of various group partici-
pants by author (April 1991 to February 1992). 
Robert Clayton, "The Environmentalists" Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report (20 January 1990), 146. 
Encyclopedia of Associations, 26th edition (Detroit: 
Gale Research, Inc., 1992). 
Forest Industries 1988-1989 North American Factbook 
(San Francisco: Miller Freeman, 1988). 
Trip Gabriel, "If a Tree Falls in the Forest, They Hear 
It" New York Times Magazine (4 November 1990). 
Margaret Kriz, "An Environmental Who's Who" National 
Journal (28 July 1990), 1828. 
Million Dollar Directory (Parsippany NJ: Dun's Market-
ing Services, 1991). 
1990 Directory of the Forest Products Industry (San 
Francisco: Miller Freeman, 1990). 
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USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest, Appeal Number Record 1986-1990. 
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest, minutes from Shasta Costa workshop, 
(June 1991). 
State and Regional Associations of the U.S., 3rd ed. 
(Washington D.C.: Columbia Books, Inc., 1991). 
USDA Forest Service, Report to Congress on Implementa-
tion of Section 318 of the Interior and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act for FY1990, 1st Report (1 De-
cember 1989). 
Ward's Business Directory (Detroit: Gale Research, 
Inc., 1991). 
Western Ancient Forest Campaign, Oregon Grassroots 
Inventory, unpublished document (22 April 1991). 
Western Ancient Forest Campaign, Oregon Grassroots 
Survey, unpublished document (April 1991). 
Edward Zuckerman, Almanac of Federal PACs: 1990 
(Washington D.C.: Amward Publications, Inc., 1990). 
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APPENDIX E 
MAJOR LEGISLATIVE MANDATES OF THE UNITED STATES FOREST 
SERVICE 
1. The 1897 Organic Act--broadly sets forth the prin-
ciples of the Forest Reserve System and how it is to be ad-
ministered .1 
2. The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960--
recognizes a diversity of values inherent in the national 
forests 2 and mandates that they be administered for a mul-
tiplicity of uses that best suits the public interest and is 
"not necessarily the combination of uses that will give the 
greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output." The act 
also requires that the annual output of renewable resources 
from a given forest not exceed that forest's ability to per-
petually sustain those resources. 
3. The Forest and Rangeland.Renewable Resources 
Planning Act of 1974 (RPA)--directs the Forest Service and 
the BLM to engage in periodic long-range review and planning 
on its various units. 
4. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 
(FLPMA)--besides serving as the BLM's charter, also pro-
vides additional guidelines for systematic Forest Service 
and BLM planning, reiterates multiple use/sustained yield 
principles, and provides mechanisms for public participa-
tion. 
5. The Rational Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA)--
amends previous legislation to add further requirements for 
comprehensive planning (such as ten year plans for each 
unit) and public participation. In addition it reaffirms and 
specifies additional multiple use/sustained yield principles 
(regarding such issues as annual timber quotas, watershed 
protection, and reforestation), as well as establishes reg-
ulated clearcutting as an allowable harvesting method. 
10ne key provision of the Organic Act specifically pro-
hibits the cutting of any timber other than dead or mature 
trees, a prohibition which essentially precludes clearcut-
ting. The Forest Service was successfully sued in 1973 for 
this violation of their own organic act and consequently, 
legislation was passed in 1976 (NFMA) which amended the 
Organic Act to allow clearcutting. 
2specif ically these are identified as recreation, range, 
timber, watershed, and fish and wildlife. 
521 
Other major environmental legislation not exclusively 
directed at the Forest Service but with which it is required 
to comply include: 
6. The National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 
(NEPA)--a sweeping and somewhat vague law which among other 
things requires federal agencies to prepare detailed envi-
ronmental impact statements for any federal actions "signif-
icantly affecting the quality of the natural environment." 
7. The Wilderness Act of 1964--sets strict guidelines 
for the management of congressionally designated wilderness 
areas, many of which are on national forest land. 
8. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)--mandates 
that the federal government document, protect, and attempt 
to revive species determined to be officially threatened or 
endangered. 
9. The Clean water Act--establishes water quality 
standards for the nation's waterways and contains provisions 
regulating activities that affect wetlands. 
10. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1966--
establishes restrictive management guidelines for congres-
sionally designated Wild and Scenic Rivers and the land 
immediately along the banks. 
APPENDIX F 
STAGES OF TYPICAL FOREST SERVICE EIS PARTICIPATION 
PROCESS 
PRE-DRAFT EIS STAGE 
1. Notice of intent regarding a proposed action is issued 
through various local media outlets. 
2. Participants are notified and recruited through Forest 
Service mailings, calls, and media appeals. 
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3. Public meetings and small group presentations are held to 
explain the proposed action and identify issues and partici-
pant concerns to be incorporated into the various EIS alter-
natives that the Forest Service must construct. 
4. Mail comment solicited and analyzed to identify issues 
and participant concerns. 
5. In some cases, workshop sessions are held for partici-
pants and the Forest Service to discuss issues and concerns 
and jointly design EIS alternatives. 
PRE-FINAL EIS STAGE 
6. Draft EIS is formulated and released; it compares the 
various alternatives in terms of key issues and indicators 
measuring those issues and identifies the Forest Service's 
draft preferred alternative(s). 
7. The DEIS comment period commences; mail comments regard-
ing the various alternatives, including the preferred alter-
native are solicited and analyzed. 
8. Public meetings and small group presentations are held to 
explain and describe the alternatives including the prefer-
red alternative and identify participant concerns. 
POST-FINAL EIS STAGE 
9. Final EIS is formulated and released; it compares the 
various alternatives, including any new or modified ones, 
and identifies the Forest Service's final preferred alter-
native. 
10. Final EIS comment period commences; mail comments 
regarding the various alternatives, including the final 
preferred alternative are solicited and analyzed. 
11. The Record of Decision is formulated and released. 
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APPENDIX G 
PRE-DRAFT EIS ISSUES, PARTICIPANT CONCERNS, AND 
POLICY POSITIONS 
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The period preceding the development of a draft envi-
ronmental impact statement is a crucial period for policy 
formulation and one in which the most meaningful participa-
tion supposedly takes place. This is the stage when alterna-
tives to be considered in the EIS are constructed and the 
crucial issues to be measured and compared between alterna-
tives are identified. 
It is important for this study, therefore, to estab-
lish the primary issues, concerns, objections, and demands 
raised by the various participants during this stage for 
each of the seven EISs considered in this study. Participa-
tion at this stage differs from that in post-draft stage. 
Post-draft participation focuses, in large part, on support-
ing or opposing the various alternatives, including the For-
est Service's preferred one. All of these alternatives can 
be expressed in quantifiably measurable ways; board feet of 
timber, acres harvested, miles of roads built and so on. 
Pre-draft participation, on the other hand, very often re-
volves around essentially non-quantified demands. At this 
stage, participatory input most often does not take the form 
of explicit numerically-expressed policy preferences, but 
rather broader types of demands; cut more timber, don't en-
ter such-and-such roadless area, protect old growth, etc. 
The pre-draft positions identified here are taken from 
the EIS documents themselves. NEPA regulations require that 
such issues and concerns expressed during public meetings, 
workshops, and mail comments be identified, summarized, and 
documented in the EIS (both draft and final). The issue 
headings are as presented in each EIS. The specific sources 
for this data are: 
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest, Silver Fire Recovery Project Record of 
Decision, (Region 10: GPO, 1988), 9-15. 
Land and Resources Management Plan Final Environmen-
~~~t-a-1 Impact statement Appendices, Volume 1 (Region 10: 
GPO, 1989), sec. A, 2-7. 
Shasta Costa Timber Sales and Integrated Resource 
~~~P-r-o-jects Final Environmental Impact statement, Volume 1 
(Region 10: GPO, 1990), sec. I, 14-29. 
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~~~~-Canyon Integrated Resource Project Final Environmen-
tal Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1992), sec. 1, 8-
14. 
~~~~-Quosatana/Bradford Timber Sales and Integrated Re-
source Projects Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
(Region 10: GPO, 1992), sec. I, 12-21. 
~~~---,--Two Forks Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft En-
vironmental Impact Statement (Siskiyou National Forest: 
1992), sec. I, 1-3. 
~~~~-West Indigo Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO 1992), 
sec. 1, 9-11. 
Silver Fire Recovery Project Issues and Concerns 
RAPID TIMBER RECOVERY -
Timber--Rot and insect damage will reduce quality of 
burned timber and drop volume 35-90% unless salvage is con-
ducted promptly. 
WATER QUALITY/FISHERIES -
Environmentalists--Salvage logging and road construc-
tion will compound fire-caused to fish habitat through in-
creased sedimentation and loss of stream-side shading caus-
ing stream temperatures to rise. 
PRODUCTIVITY -
Environmentalists--Salvage logging and road construc-
tion will cause increased soil erosion and will remove or-
ganic matter/woody material essential for the recovery and 
future productivity of the burned areas. 
WILDLIFE -
Environmentalists--Salvage activities will compound 
adverse effects of the fire upon wildlife populations (in-
cluding the northern spotted owl) and their habitats. 
Timber--Salvage activities will enhance big-game 
habitat and restore badly damaged habitat. 
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REFORESTATION -
Timber--Only full-scale salvage can return burned area 
to optimum stocking levels; natural regeneration would lower 
sustained yield harvest levels. 
ROADLESS AREAS -
Environmentalists--Entering roadless areas will in-
crease erosion and fragmentation and preclude future wilder-
ness or national park designations in North Kalmiopsis. 
Timber--New roads are necessary for salvage/recovery 
activities, future fire protection, and recreation, hunting, 
and sightseeing. 
RECREATION AND VISUAL RESOURCES -
Environmentalists--Salvage activities would destroy 
remoteness, solitude, and scenic value of Bald Mountain area 
and would thus preclude highly-valued recreational and 
aesthetic opportunities. 
Timber--Burn area is an unsightly wasteland and only 
full salvage/recovery program will make area fit once again 
for recreational usage. 
ECONOMICS -
Environmentalists--Costs of expensive salvage opera-
tion will far outweigh revenue that salvaged wood products 
will generate, thus costing the Federal government and tax-
payers. 
Timber--Only full-scale, rather than limited salvage 
harvests enough timber to be cost-effective. 
-Alternative logging methods such as helicopter 
logging are too expensive to be cost-effective. 
-Maximum salvage operations are necessary to 
maintain jobs, community stability, and local revenue. 
ISSUES CONSIDERED OUTSIDE SCOPE OF THE EIS -
Environmentalists--The burn area should not be 
developed so that the portions of the Siskiyou National 
Forest, including the North Kalmiposis, can be designated 
the Siskiyou National Park. 
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Forest Plan Issues and Concerns1 
TIMBER MANAGEMENT -
Environmentalists--current harvest levels are unsus-
tainable and damaging to forest ecosystem health and biodi-
versity; harvest levels need to be reduced. 
-Unproductive, unsuitable land needs to be removed 
from forest land base when calculating the Siskiyou's sus-
tained yield level; much land currently in the forest land 
base has soil that is too fragile to allow for harvesting 
and successful reforestation. 
-Economic criteria, such as whether a sale is below-
cost, should be incorporated in management decisions regard-
ing timber harvesting. 
Timber--Annual harvest levels need to be increased, or 
in the very least maintained, in order to assure a steady 
flow timber necessary for local and regional jobs, county 
revenue for schools and services, and overall community 
stability. 
-The forest land base cannot be reduced any further 
if there is to be an adequate flow of timber into local 
economies; further withdrawals will make the ASQ impossible 
to meet and will thus reduce the overall annual output and 
lock up high-quality marketable timber. 
-certain methods of logging mandated by the Forest 
service in given sales (such as helicopter logging, for ex-
ample) are not cost-efficient. 
OLD GROWTH -
Bnvironmentalists--Old growth forests are a vital com-
ponent of the forest ecosystem and their protection is ne-
cessary to maintain biodiversity, especially as habitat for 
old growth-dependent species as well as aesthetic values and 
certain recreational opportunities. 
Timber--Old growth is overmature, wasteful, and keeps 
the sustained yield rate down; converting old growth into 
younger, managed stands would boost forest yields. 
isome issues mentioned in the EIS that are not relevant 
to the forest management issues this study is concerned with 
were excluded. 
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RESIDUE MANAGEMENT -
Environmentalists--Disposing of timber harvest wastes, 
especially through burning, damages soil productivity by 
sterilizing the soil and removing decomposing organic mater-
ial; it can threaten other resources such as air and water 
as well. 
Timl:>er--Disposal of wastes is necessary to prevent 
catastrophic forest fires and improve yields. 
DEPARTURE FROM NON-DECLINING FLOW -
Environmentalists--Accelerating harvest schedules 
and/or shortening rotations would lead to even more unsus-
tainable harvest levels and would seriously damage forest 
resources. 
Timl:>er--Accelerating harvest schedules and/or shorten-
ing rotations is a means by which to fill a projected void 
in private timber supplies as well as make up for recent 
losses in the forest land base. 
WILDLIFE HABITAT -
Environmentalists--Unsustainable levels of timber 
harvest will damage wildlife habitat, especially that of 
interior forest-dependent species. 
Timl:>er--Logging will open up closed forest environ-
ments and create habitat beneficial to a number of big-game 
species. 
SOILS -
Environmentalists--Logging activities damage soil 
through compaction, erosion, increased landslides, and the 
reduction of organic matter; this will, in turn, decrease 
soil productivity to the detriment of the entire ecosystem. 
SENSITIVE PLANTS -
Bnvironmentalists--A number of rare, unusual, and 
locally occurring plants exist only in the Siskiyou National 
Forest and many occupy fragile ecosystems that are not res-
torable if disrupted by logging activities. 
FISHERIES -
Bnvironmentalists--Logging and road construction will 
damage fish habitat and cause declines in fish production in 
one of the most economically valuable fisheries in the 
United States. 
VISUAL RESOURCES -
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Environmentalists--Logging activities destroy scenic 
values which, in turn, precludes recreational opportunities 
and hurts the local tourist industry. 
Tim.ber--A large number of scenic areas are already 
protected; to prevent timber management to protect addition-
al scenic values would require too high a cost in terms of 
lost timber volume. 
RECREATION -
Environmentalists--Logging activities irreversibily 
alter wild, scenic, and remote areas and thus preclude val-
uable and increasingly rare recreational opportunities cen-
tered around solitude and primitive, unspoiled settings. 
Tim.ber--A major portion of the forest is already re-
served for primitive recreational opportunities. 
WATER -
Environmentalists--Logging activities can degrade 
water quality through increased siltation, water tempera-
ture, and possibly other pollutants; changes in vegative 
cover and ground water recharge can also adversely affect 
the Forest's delicate hydrology, leading to the increased 
potential for both drought and flooding. 
WILDERNESS AND UNROADED AREAS -
Environmentalists--Additions to the existing wilder-
ness system should be made or recommended; in the least, 
timber harvesting should not occur in unprotected roadless 
areas so to not preclude the potential for future congres-
sional wilderness designation. 
Tim.ber--Any additions to the already large areas of 
protected wilderness on the Siskiyou would further reduce 
the forest land base, lock up economically valuable re-
sources, and force reductions in harvest levels. 
HARDWOOD CONVERSION -
Bnvironmentalists--Loss of hardwood forest acreage 
through timber harvesting and subsequent conifer reforesta-
tion adversely affects wildlife habitat, biodiversity, and 
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aesthetic variety; soils and water are also damaged when the 
unmarketable hardwoods are disposed through burning. 
Timber--Economic benefits gained from converting com-
mercially valueless hardwoods to valuable conifers would 
outweigh the wastage of the logged hardwoods. 
ISSUES CONSIDERED OUTSIDE OF THE SCOPE OF THE EIS -
Environmentalists--Herbicide usage for brush control. 
-National Park proposals. 
Timber--Lifting of protected status of congressionally 
designated wilderness areas. 
Shasta Costa Project Issues and Concerns 
AESTHETIC/ROADLESS VALUES -
Environmentalists--Logging in the highly scenic Shasta 
Costa basin would destroy the aesthetic attributes of this 
area, especially along the heavily travelled Bear Camp Road, 
the main east-west route through the Forest. 
-Logging and road construction would impact upon 
the area's wild, unroaded character and thereby preclude op-
portunities for solitude and various recreational activi-
ties. 
BIODIVERSITY/ECOSYSTEM RESILIENCE -
Environm.entalists--Logging and road construction would 
adversely affect the forest ecosystem and its ability to 
sustain itself as well as reduce the diversity of plant and 
animal species. 
-Fragmentation of old growth stands is especially 
injurious to ecosystem sustainability and makes it very dif-
ficult to maintain viable populations of old growth-
dependent species. 
-Local issues of forest health are tied into global 
environmental concerns such as the issue of global warming. 
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COMMODITY OUTPUTS/FOREST PLAN -
Timl>er--Suf f icient timber output from the Shasta Costa 
basin is necessary to maintain local jobs, county revenue 
for roads, schools, and services, and overall community 
stability. 
-Projects employing New Forestry methods in the 
basin would feature significantly reduced timber yields and 
would thus violate the harvest targets laid out in the For-
est Plan and would lead to an eventual reduction in the 
Plan's overall ASQ for the entire Forest. 
-New Forestry projects would be economically in-
efficient; timber sales in the basin should stress cost-
effectiveness and long-term positive cash flow. 
WATER QUALITY/FISH HABITAT -
Environmentalists--Previous logging activities in the 
area as well as naturally occurring landslides have already 
adversely affected water quality and fish habitat through 
sedimentation in portions of Shasta Costa Creek; additional 
logging activities would further damage already degraded 
parts of the creek and offset the benefits of any stream 
restoration efforts. 
-Further degradation of Shasta Costa Creek would 
damage water quality, appearance, and turbidity on the 
National Wild and Scenic Rogue River into which it flows. 
The Rogue is a very heavily used recreational river and 
damage to it might adversely impact the local tourist/re-
creational industries. 
canyon Project Issues and Concerns 
WATER QUALITY/FISHERIES -
Environmentalists--Logging, mining, and road construc-
tion in the Canyon area would reduce water quality, espe-
cially in the Wild and Scenic Illinois River, by increasing 
stream sedimentation and temperature, thereby damaging fish 
habitat including that of the Fall Chinook and Coho Salmon 
currently listed by the state as sensitive species. 
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ECONOMICS/FLOW OF WOOD PRODUCTS -
Environmentalists--The costs of preparing timber sales 
in this difficult, marginal area would exceed revenue. 
Timber--Initial preparation costs (i.e. roads) would 
be offset by futures sales. 
-overall benefits of maintaining steady flow of wood 
products from the area is worth the costs; a steady supply 
of timber is necessary to generate county revenue and main-
tain jobs and community stability. 
-certain harvest methods designed for maximum re-
source protection are too costly and remove too low a volume 
of timber. 
-The timber base on the Forest is shrinking and all 
areas destined for harvest in the Forest Plan ought to be 
intensively manage~ for maximum timber production. 
NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL -
Environmentalists--Logging in the Canyon area may ad-
versely affect northern spotted owl habitat and/or individu-
al spotted owls located in the area. 
Timber--canyon is very marginal spotted owl habitat 
with an extremely sparse owl population and the area is not 
currently listed by the USFWS as critical habitat. 
FOREST HEALTH/BIODIVERSITY -
Environmentaiists--Logging and road construction may 
adversely affect the very fragile and unique ecosystem of 
the canyon area by reducing soil productivity, fragmenting 
and removing biologically valuable stands of mature interior 
forest habitat, and reducing the diversity of plant and an-
imal species. 
-The rate of projected harvest for the Canyon area 
is unsustainable and will lead to the breakdown of the for-
est ecosystem. 
Timber--Timber harvesting would increase biological 
diversity be creating new types of habitat. 
ROADLESS CHARACTER -
Environmentalists--Logging and road construction in 
roadless portions of the Canyon area would alter its natur-
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al, wild character and jeopardize backcountry recreational 
opportunities. 
-Entering roadless areas would rule out possibili-
ty for future wilderness designation, national park status, 
or U.N. World Heritage Site status for the area. 
Timber--Roads are necessary for more productive timber 
management and more cost-efficient logging. 
ISSUES CONSIDERED OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE EIS -
Environmentalists--Limits on mining activity. 
-Nomination of the canyon area as a U.N. World Her-
itage Site. 
-Scenic and aesthetic values in the canyon area. 
-Preventing the spread through roads and logging of 
the Port Orford cedar root rot disease. 
Quosatana/Bradford Projects Issues and concerns 
SCENERY -
Environmentalists--Logging would destroy the area's 
high scenic quality and adversely impact the local Rogue 
River-based tourist industry. 
WILDLIFE HABITAT -
Environmentalists--Fragmentation of interior forest 
habitat would adversely affect various wildlife species, 
especially those dependent upon old growth such as the 
northern spotted owl and the marbled murrelet. 
-Logging and road construction might cause the 
loss of connective wildlife habitat between the planning 
area and the adjacent Kalmiopsis Wilderness. 
FISH HABITAT AND WATER QUALITY -
Environmentalists--Logging and road construction would 
adversely impact water quality and consequently fish habitat 
through increased siltation, sediment deposition, and 
changes in water temperature. 
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-Diminished water quality might reduce the Rogue 
River's aesthetic quality as well as adversely impact upon 
economic sectors (fishing, recreation, and tourism) depen-
dent upon the Rogue. 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY -
Environmentalists--Conversion of natural forests to 
plantations reduces the diversity of plant and animal 
species. 
-Soil compaction, erosion, and loss of woody debris 
may adversely impact upon soil productivity and consequently 
forest health. 
-Logging would reduce the amount of especially di-
verse old growth forest. 
PORT ORFORD-CEDAR ROOT ROT DISEASE -
Environmentalists--Road construction and logging 
activities would pose a serious risk of introducing Port 
Orford-Cedar root rot disease into currently uninfected 
areas. 
GEOLOGICAL STABILITY -
Environmentalists--Logging increases the potential for 
landslides, especially near sensitive riparian areas. 
ROADLESS CHARACTER -
Environmentalists--Logging and road construction would 
alter the area's roadless character, preclude future wilder-
ness designation, and adversely affect primitive recreation-
al opportunities. 
ECONOMICS -
Environmentalists--Logging in areas of marginal pro-
ductivity will lead to expensive reforestation efforts. 
-Certain timber sales in the planning area will be 
below-cost, money-losing sales. 
Timber--Proposed helicopter logging in certain areas 
would adversely affect local logging companies which do not 
have such capabilities. 
- Adequate levels of timber harvesting will provide 
important county revenues. 
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HARDWOOD CONVERSION -
Tim.ber--Conversion of hardwood stands to coniferous 
plantations is necessary to increase commercial forest base 
in order to maintain adequate timber yields. 
ISSUES CONSIDERED OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE EIS -
Environmentalists--Additional wilderness designation 
for parts of the planning area. 
-Global environmental concerns such as global warming. 
-Northern spotted owl and marbled murrelet protection. 
Two Forks Project Issues and Concerns 
INTERIOR HABITAT -
Environmentalists--Proposed logging activities would 
reduce habitat for interior forest-dependent wildlife spe-
cies including old growth species such as the northern spot-
ted owl and the marbled murrelet. 
ROADLESS CHARACTER -
Environmentalists--Proposed logging and road construc-
tion would adversely impact upon the roadless character of 
the area and thereby preclude future wilderness designations 
in the Windy Valley Roadless Area as well as various recrea-
tional and aesthetic opportunities. 
LONG-TERM TIMBER YIELD -
Tim.ber--The proposed action does not truly abide by 
the Forest Plan in that it does not harvest and intensively 
manage as many acres as the original Plan calls for thereby 
reducing future timber yields. 
FISH HABITAT -
Environmentalists--Proposed logging activities would 
lead to increased sedimentation thereby damaging high-
qual i ty spawning areas for steelhead and trout in sensitive 
areas. 
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ISSUES CONSIDERED OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE EIS -
Environmentalists--Logging would reduce the number of 
critical wildlife corridors between larger blocks of forest. 
-Logging and road construction would risk spread-
ing Port Orford-Cedar root rot disease into currently unin-
fected areas. 
West Indigo Project Issues and Concerns 
WATER QUALITY/FISHERIES -
Environmentalists--Logging and road construction would 
degrade fish habitat in West Indigo Creek by increasing ero-
sion and stream sedimentation. 
ECONOMICS -
Environmentalists--Some timber sales in the planning 
area might be below-cost, money-losing sales. 
Timber--A steady flow of timber into the local area is 
essential to maintain jobs, county revenue, and community 
stability. 
INTERIOR HABITAT -
Environmentalists--Logging and road construction would 
fragment mature/old growth forest and adversely impact old 
growth and interior forest-dependent species such as the 
northern spotted owl and the marbled murrelet. 
FOREST HEALTH/BIODIVERSITY -
Environmentalists--Logging and road construction might 
adversely affect forest ecosystems by disrupting soils, hy-
drology, nutrient cycles, natural fire activity, and forest 
productivity and leading to a reduction in the diversity of 
plant and animal species. 
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APPENDIX H 
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND CATEGORIES AND INDICATOR 
VALUES FOR TABLE 17 
Table 17 attempts to compare seven Siskiyou National 
Forest final and/or draft EIS decisions (as well as one non-
EIS decision) in terms of both level of formal participation 
and the timber-environmental index, a quantifiable measure 
of where a decision stood relative to the timber interests' 
and the environmentalists' favored positions. 
Level of Formal Participation--This variable measures 
the degree to which a given EIS process offered opportuni-
ties for formal participation (as opposed to informal calls, 
visits, etc.) in the crucial period preceding the release of 
the draft EIS. It consists of three categories: low, moder-
ate, and high. Decisions in the low category offered no pre-
draft workshops or public meetings; at most they included 
only mail comments. Decisions featuring moderate levels of 
participation included pre-draft public meetings and mail 
comments, but no workshops. High participation decisions 
incorporated all three forms of participation in the pre-
draft stage. 
Timber-Environmental Index--This index measures where 
the Forest Service's preferred alternative for a given EIS 
stands in relation to the timber interests' and the environ-
mentalists' preferred alternatives. The index values fall 
between the scores of O which represents the timber interest 
position and 1.0 which represents the environmentalist posi-
tion. The index is calculated as follows with x = timber EIS 
alternative, y = environmentalist EIS alternative and z = 
Forest Service preferred alternative: 
lx-zl x-y 
The specific indicators which are measured by the in-
dex (i.e. total harvest volume) vary in some cases from EIS 
to EIS. This lack of direct comparability is a serious prob-
lem and a major reason this index was designed; it allows 
for a more comparable cross-EIS measure. The index is not 
foolproof, however, as indicators measuring things that are 
just too different might still allow a certain skewing of 
the index value to occur.1 It is, therefore, still important 
1This was the case with the indicators chosen to measure 
water quality and silviculture. They were so completely 
disparate from EIS to EIS that even the index value was of 
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to choose ind{cators that are as similar as possible. While 
specific indicators may vary, they can all be organized into 
four broad categories: timber production, road construction, 
roadless areas, and old growth (for the specific indicators 
themselves, see the following tables). 
The summary index value given to each to each EIS 
decision in table 17 is calculated as the mean of only the 
first four categories listed above. This is because these 
categories tended to employ indicators that were consis-
tently the most similar from decision to decision. This 
hopefully would avoid skewed index numbers. When a category 
consisted of two or more relevant individual indicators, the 
mean index value of these indicators was used to obtain the 
broader category's index value.2 
There is one last note about the index that is impor-
tant to consider. While the index measures Forest Service 
decisions between a scale of O to 1.0, a score of .50 does 
not necessarily imply perfect Forest Service balance; only 
that its preferred alternative fell exactly halfway between 
the range defined by the timber and environmental alterna-
tives. For example, the fact that the agency enters a major 
roadless area or stand of old growth but plans to log only 
half of what the timber industry wants may not necessarily 
represent a balanced decision or a true mid-point compro-
mise. Thus, the index is by no means a perfect measure of 
how the Forest Service balances interests and their demands. 
It is rather a measure limited by the bounds of the EIS al-
ternatives and the indicators by which the Forest Service 
chose to analyze those alternatives. Still, the index can 
provide, in the very least, a means by which to compare 
various EIS decisions against one another in terms of their 
relative leanings. 
The Alternatives--The various alternatives upon which 
calculation of the index depends are listed, described, and 
compared in each EIS. Identifying the DEIS and FEIS prefer-
red alternatives is a straightfoward task--each EIS announ-
ces such a preference and as such it constitutes Forest Ser-
vice policy. Identifying the timber and environmental alter-
natives, however, is not nearly so simple. The most direct 
and certainly most desirable manner by which to determine 
which EIS alternative comes closest to each interest's posi-
questionable validity. For this reason, they were left out 
of the analysis. 
2For example, if the old growth category has two indica-
tors, acres of old growth remaining and acres of mature 
interior habitat remaining and their values are .60 and .40 
respectively, the overall old growth index value would be 
considered .50 when it was figured into the overall EIS 
index. 
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tion is to find a clear trend in participant support and en-
dorsement for a given alternative in the post-DEIS mail com-
ment that is exerpted, summarized, and in some cases, repro-
duced in the appendices of all final EISs. Thus, if a clear 
majority of comments urge adoption of Alternative A, then an 
assumption will be made that that alternative comes closest 
to capturing the essence of that interest's positions and 
demands. 
Occasionally, though, interests voiced clear prefer-
ences for alternatives ouside the range of those described 
in the EIS. In such cases, the EIS alternative or combina-
tion of alternatives that come closest to approximating the 
major points of the outside alternative were considered as 
that group's alternative. Fortunately, in the few cases 
where this happened, there were fairly similar EIS stand-in 
alternatives (see the proceeding tables). When more than one 
alternative was commonly supported or several were needed to 
capture the full essence of an outside alternative, the 
timber-environmental index value was figured by taking the 
mean of those several alternatives that collectively corres-
pond to a given interest. 
Perhaps a more serious problem occurs when attempting 
to determine which alternatives match interest positions in 
the decisions for which there is only a DEIS document cur-
rently available. The problem is that draft EISs do not, of 
course, contain information on post-draft comments support-
ing or opposing the various alternatives. In these cases, a 
best guess as to the interest-favored alternative had to be 
made based upon the pre-draft issues, concerns, and posi-
tions documented in Appendix G as well as previous patterns 
and tendencies made evident in other decisions. 
Trying to capture the full nature of an interest's 
policy desires by matching the interest to an EIS alter-
native is, admittedly, an imperfect and rather constrained 
measure that at best at can only off er a partial approxima-
tion of an interest's overall policy orientation (appendix 
G's pre-draft issues and concerns perhaps come closer to 
achieving this). Still, these alternatives are supposedly 
drawn up in accordance with the information gained through 
pre-draft public comment and participation and so, at least 
indirectly, they reflect the interests' positions to some 
extent. Thus, however limited this preferred alternative 
approach may be, these alternatives are by no means 
arbitrary. 
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Silver Fire Recovery Project1 
Timber Envir. DEIS pref. T-E FEIS pref. T-E 
Alt.D Alt.J Alt.I index2 Alt. I -mod. index 
TIMBER PRODUCTION 
salvage volume 241 0 146 .39 157 .35 
(nunbf) 
ROAD CONSTRUC-
TION (miles) 38.0 0 20.5 .46 20.0 .47 
SUMMARY INDEX 
VALUE .43 .41 
1source: USDA Forest service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest, Silver Fire Recovery Project Final Environmental 
Imp~ct statement, (Region 10: GPO, 1988). 
Timber-Environmental index; O • timber position, 1.0 = environ-
mentalist position. 
Forest Plan1 
Timber 
Alts. 2 
C.D.Dl 
TIMBER PRODUC- 177 /170/185 
TION- annual 177.3 mean 
ASQ (mmbf) 
ROAD CON- 308/271/271 
STRUCTION 289.5 mean' 
(miles) 
ROAD LESS 
AREAS-acres 69/69/69 
retained by 5th 69 mean 
decade (1000s) 
OLD GROWTH 67/72/72 
acres mature/OG 69.2 mean 
retaineds (1000s) 
% of forest as 17/17.5/16 
OG by 5th decade 16.7 mean 
(lOOOs) 
SUMMARY INDEX 
VALUE 
Envir. 
Alt.M3 
34 
0 
284 
190.6 
32.6 
541 
DEIS pref. T-E FEIS pref. T-E 
Alt.K index Alt.S index 
155 .16 162 .11 
206 .29 228 .21 
92 .11 126 .27 
85.7 .14 99.1 .25 
18. 3 .10 19.1 .:..!! 
C .12 mean> C .20 mean) 
.17 .20 
1source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest, Land and Resources Management Plan Final Environ-
men~al Impact Statement Appendices, Volume 1 (Region 10: GPO, 1989) 
The majority of timber interest participants supported their 
own "Evergreen Alternative" which the Siskiyou N.F. did not speci-
fically develop as an EIS alternative. However the main features of 
the "Evergreen Alternative" are featured in Alternatives c,D, and 
Dl. 3Many environmentalists also wanted a national park alternative, 
but that was ruled out on the basis that it was beyond Forest Ser-
vicf jurisdiction. 
on those indicators where Alt. D and its quicker rotation vari-
ation Dl are the same the mean is calculated counting them as only 
a s!nqle value. 
outside already protected wilderness areas. 
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Shasta Costa Project1 
Timber Envir. DEIS pref. T-E FEIS pref. T-E 
Alts. 2 Alt.A Alt.C index Alt.SC index 
B 
TIMBER PRODUCTION 
3 yr. harvest 17.5/22.5 
volume (mmbf) 20.0 mean 0 11.2 .44 13.4 .33 
ROAD CONSTRUC- 6. 23/11. 54 
TION (miles) 8.89 mean 0 2.47 • 72 5.09 .43 
ROADLESS AREAS 
t roadless acres 85/84 
maintained 84.5 mean 100.0 93.0 .55 92.0 .48 
OLD GROWTH 
t interior old 83/84 
growth retained 83.5 mean 100.0 96.0 .76 90.0 .39 
SUMMARY INDEX 
VALUE • 62 .41 
1source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Reqion, Siskiyou 
National Forest, Shasta Costa Timber Sales and Integrated Resource 
Projects Final Environmental Impact statement, Volume 1 (Reqion 10: 
GPO 1990). ~Some in the timber community merely wanted the Forest Service 
to implement the Forest Plan objectives for the basin (Alt. B), 
while others wanted maximum harvest. 
543 
canyon Project1 
Timber Envir. DEIS pref. T-E FEIS pref. T-E 
Alt.c Alt.A Alts.E.PA2 index Alt.S index 
TIMBER PRODUCTION 
2 yr. harvest 6.2/10.7 
volume (mmbf) 16.5 0 8.5 mean .49 9.0 .45 
ROAD CONSTRUC- 0.4/7.3 
TION (miles) 7.9 0 3.9 mean .51 4.0 .49 
ROADLESS AREAS 
acres harvested 34/247 
in roadless areas 323 0 140,5 mean .57 240 .26 
OLD GROWTH 141/66 
acres OG retained 66 141 103.5 mean .so 141 1.00 
acres owl habitat 1982/1748 
retained 1610 2187 1865 mean .44 1859 .43 
acres interior 
mature forest 2119/2299 
retained 1908 3137 2209 mean di 1928 &1. 
.39 mean .48 mean 
SUMMARY INDEX 
VALUE .49 .42 
1source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest, Canyon Integrated Resource Project Final Environ-
men~al Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1992). 
In the Canyon DEIS, the Forest Service identified two different 
preferred alternatives. 
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Quosatana/Bradford Projects1 
Timber Envir. DEIS pref. T-E 
Alts.D.E Alt.A Alt.F index 
TIMBER PRODUCTION 
3 yr. harvest 19.4/28.2 
volume (mmbf) 23.8 mean 0 18.55 .22 
ROAD CONSTRUCTION 5.23/10.61 
(miles) 7.92 mean 0 3.97 .so 
ROADLESS AREAS 
acres harvested 471/587 
in roadless areas 529 mean 0 294 .44 
road construction in 1. 69/5. 93 
roadless areas (miles) 3.81 mean 0 0.20 ~ 
.70 mean 
OLD GROWTH-acres 
interior mature/OG 1676/1605 
forest retained 1640.5 mean 2396 2212 .76 
% area in mature/ 35/33 
old growth forest 34 mean 39 35 .20 
.48 mean 
SUMMARY INDEX VALUE .48 
1source: USDA Forest service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest, Quosatana/Bradford Timber Sales and Integrated Re-
source Projects Draft Environmental Impact Statement (Region 10: 
GPO, 1992). 
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Two Forks Project1 
Timber Envir. DEIS pref. T-E 
Alt.B Alt.A Alt.F index 
TIMBER PRODUCTION 
2 yr. harvest 20.0 0 13.8 .31 
volume (mmbf) 
ROAD CONSTRUCTION 
(miles) 5.4 0 5.2 • 04 
ROAD LESS AREAS-acres 
road less area retained 10566 11484 9558 <0.00 
road construction in 
roadless areas (miles) 3.04 0 3.04 o.oo 
OLD GROWTH-acres 
interior mature/CG 12220 13374 12085 <0.00 
habitat retained 
SUMMARY INDEX VALUE .o82 
1source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Reqion, Siskiyou 
National Forest, Two Forks Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft 
Env~ronmental Impact statement (Siskiyou National Forest: 1992). 
Index values less than o.oo are counted as o.oo when calcula-
tinq the summary index. 
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West Indigo Project1 
Timber Envir. DEIS pref. T-E 
Alt.E Alt.A Alts.D.G2 index 
TIMBER PRODUCTION 16.0/10.6S 
harvest volume (mmbf) 28.6S 0 13.3 mean .S3 
ROAD CONSTRUCTION 9.7/4.S 
(miles) 13.6 0 7.1 mean .47 
OLD GROWTH-acres 
interior mature/old 2726/3087 
growth retained 2428 343S 2906.S mean .48 
acres total old 3S88/3682 
growth retained 3367 3883 363S mean ~ 
.so mean 
SUMMARY INDEX VALUE .so 
1source: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest, West Indigo Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft 
Env~ronmental Impact Statement (Region 10: GPO, 1992). 
In the West Indigo DEIS, the Forest Service identified two pre-
ferred alternatives. 
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Surrmary Index Values 
Silver Fire DEIS •••.•••••• .43 
Silver Fire FEIS •••••••••• .41 
Forest Plan DEIS •••••••.• o • 17 
Forest Plan FEIS ..•••••..• .20 
Shasta Costa DEIS ••••••••• • 62 
Shasta Costa FEIS ••••••••• .41 
Can.yon DEIS . .............. .49 
Carlyon FEIS . ·e ••••••••••••• .42 
Quosatana/Bradford DEIS ••. . 48 
Two Forks DEIS .. o•••······ 008 
West Indigo DEIS •••••••••. .50 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books and Book Chapters 
Abbey, Edward. The Journey Home. New York: E.P. Dutton, 
1977. 
~~~~-Down the River. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1982. 
548 
Altschuler, Alan. Community Control. New York: Pegasus, 
1970. 
Arrow, Kenneth. Social Choice and Individual Values. New 
York, John Wiley & Sons, 1951. 
Bachrach, Peter. The Theory of Democratic Elitism. Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Co., 1967. 
Bachrach, Peter and Morton Baratz. Power and Poverty. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1970. 
Baden, John and Richard Stroup. Bureaucracy vs. Environment. 
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1981. 
Baden, John and Dean Lueck. "Bringing Private Management to 
the Public Lands: Environmental and Economic Advan-
tages." In Controversies in Environmental Policy, eds. 
Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael 
Clarke. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
1986. 
Banfield, Edward and James Q. Wilson. City Politics. New 
York: Random House, 1963. 
Barney, Daniel. The Last Stand. New York: Grossman, 1974. 
Barone, Michael and Grant Ujifusa. Almanac of American 
Politics 1992. Washington D.C.: National Journal, 1991. 
Barry, Brian. Economists, Sociologists, and Democracy 
London: Collier-Macmillan, 1970. 
Bartlett, Robert "Comprehensive Environmental Decision 
Making: Can It Work?" In Environmental Policy in the 
1990s, eds. Norman Vig and Michael Kraft. Washington 
D.C.: CQ Press, 1990. 
549 
Bennett, W. Lance. News: The Illusion of Reality. New York: 
Longman, 1988. 
Bentley, Arthur. The Process of Government. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1908. 
Bernstein, Marver. Regulating Business by Independent 
Commission. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1955. 
Blau, Peter. The Dynamics of Bureaucracy. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1955. 
Bookchin, Murray. The Ecology of Freedom. Palo Alto, CA: 
Chesire, 1982. 
Bosso, Christopher. Pesticides and Politics. Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987. 
Brooks, Paul. "Wilderness in Western Culture." In Voices for 
the Wilderness, ed. William Schwartz. New York: 
Ballantine, 1968. 
Brown, William. Private Interests, Public Policy, and 
American Agriculture. Lawrence KS: University Press of 
Kansas, 1988. 
Bryan Frank and John McClaughtry, The Vermont Papers: 
Recreating Democracy on a Human Scale. Post Mills, VT: 
Chelsea Green Publishing Co., 1989. 
Caldwell, Lynton. Environment: A Challenge to Modern Soci-
ety. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1971. 
Calef, Wesley. Private Grazing and the Public Lands. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. 
Calhoun, John. "A Disquisition on Government." In American 
Political Thought, ed. Kenneth Dolbeare. Chatham, NJ: 
Chatham House, 1984. 
Campbell, Angus, et.al. The American Voter. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1960. 
Capra, Fritjof. "Deep Ecology: A New Paradigm" Earth Island 
Journal, 2:4, 1987. 
Carson, Rachel. Silent Spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1962. 
550 
Clarke, Jeanne Nienaber and Daniel McCool. Staking Out the 
Terrain. Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1985. 
Cobb, Roger and Charles Elder. Participation in American 
Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1972. 
Cook, Mary and Roger Davidson. "Deferral Politics: Congres-
sional Decision Making on Environmental Issues in the 
1980s." In Public Policy and the Natural Environment, 
eds. Helen Ingram and R. Kenneth Godwin. Greenwich, CT: 
JAI Press, 1985. 
Cook, Terrence and Patrick Morgan. Participatory Democracy. 
San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1971. 
Cooley, Richard and Geoffrey Wandesforde-Smith. Congress and 
the Environment. Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1970. 
Commoner, Barry. The Closing Circle. New York: Knopf, 1971. 
Cotter, Cornelius, et al. Party Organization in American 
Politics. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1989. 
Crain, Robert, Elihu Katz, and David Rosenthal. The Politics 
of Community Conflict. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 
1969. 
Culhane, Paul. Public Lands Politics. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 
1981. 
Dahl, Robert. Pluralistic Democracy in the United States. 
Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1956. 
~~~~~ 
Who Governs? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1961. 
Davidson, Roger. "Subcommittee Government: New Channels for 
Policy Making" In The New Congress, eds. Thomas Mann 
and Norman Ornstein. Washington D.C.: American Enter-
prise Institute, 1981. 
Dennis, William and Randy Simmons. "From Illusion to Res-
ponsibility: Rethinking Regulation of Federal Public 
Lands." In Controversies in Environmental Policy, eds. 
Sheldon Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael 
Clarke. Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1986. 
551 
Devall, William and George Sessions. Deep Ecology. Salt Lake 
City: Peregrine Smith, 1985. 
Domhoff, G. William. Who Rules America? Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967. 
Dunlap, Riley. "Public Opinion and Environmental Policy." In 
Environmental Politics and Policy, ed. James Lester. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989. 
Dye, Thomas. Understanding Public Policy. 6th edition. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987. 
Edelman, Murray. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1967. 
Egan, Timothy. The Good Rain. New York: Knopf, 1990. 
Elder, Charles and Roger Cobo. The Political Uses of 
Symbols. New York: Longman, 1983. 
Encyclopedia of Associations. 26th edition. Detroit: Gale 
Research, Inc., 1991. 
Ferejohn, John. Pork Barrel Politics. Palo Alto CA: Stan-
ford University Press, 1974. 
Fiorina, Morris. Congress: The Keystone of the Washington 
Establishment. 2nd edition. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1989. 
Forest Industries 1988-1989 North American Factbook. San 
Francisco: Miller Freeman, 1988. 
Foss, Philip. Politics and Grass. Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1960. 
Frome, Michael. The Forest Service. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1984. 
Garson, G. David. Group Theories of Politics. Beverly Hills, 
. CA: Sage, 1978. 
Gorz, Andre. Ecology as Politics. Boston: South End Press, 
1980. 
Habermas, Jurgen. Communication and the Evolution of 
Society. Boston: Beacon Press, 1979. 
552 
Haefele, Edwin. Representative Government and Environmental 
Management. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 
for Resources for the Future, 1976. 
Hamilton, Richard. Class and Politics in the United States. 
New York: Wiley & Sons, 1972. 
Hardin, Charles. "Observations on Environmental Politics.'' 
In Environmental Politics, ed. Stuart Nagel. New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1974. 
Harrington, Michael. Towards A Democratic Left. New York: 
Macmillan, 1968. 
Hays, Samuel. Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959. 
Heclo, Hugh. "Issue Networks and the Executive Establish-
ment." In The New American Political System, ed. Anthony 
King. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 
1978. 
Henning, Daniel and William Mangun, Managing the Environmen-
tal Crisis. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989. 
Huntington, Samuel. American Politics: The Politics of Dis-
harmony. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981. 
Ingersoll, Thomas and Bradley Brockbank. "The Role of 
Economic Incentives in Environmental Policy." In 
Controversies in Environmental Policy, eds. Sheldon 
Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clarke. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986. 
Ingram, Helen and Dean Mann. "Interest Groups and Environ-
mental Policy." In Environmental Politics and Policy, 
ed. James Lester. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1989. 
Kann, Mark. "Environmental Democracy in the United States." 
In Controversies in Environmental Policy, eds. Sheldon 
Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clarke. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986. 
Kaufman, Herbert. The Forest Ranger. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press for Resources for the Future, 
1960. 
Kelso, William. American Democratic Theory. Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1978. 
553 
Kingdon, John. Agenda, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 
Boston: Little, Brown, 1984. 
Kolter, Milton. Neighborhood Government. Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1967. 
Kornhauser, William. The Politics of Mass Society. Glencoe, 
IL: Free Press, 1959. 
Kraft, Michael. "Ecological Politics and American Gov-
ernment: A Review Essay." In Environmental Politics, ed. 
Stuart Nagel. New York: Prager Publishers, 1974. 
_____ "Congress and Environmental Policy." In Environmen-
tal Politics and Policy, ed. James Lester. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1989. 
_____ "Conclusion: Toward a New Environmental Agenda." In 
Environmental Policy in the 1990s, eds. Norman Vig and 
Michael Kraft. Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990. 
Leiss, William. The Domination of Nature. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1974. 
Leopold, Aldo. A Sand County Almanac. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1949. 
Lester, James. "A New Federalism?: Environmental Policy in 
the States." In Environmental Policy in the 1990s, eds. 
Norman Vig and Michael Kraft. Washington D.C.: CQ 
Press, 1990. 
Leydet Francois, ed. Time and the River Flowing: Grand 
Canyon. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1964. 
Lowi, Theodore. The End of Liberalism. 2nd edition. New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1979. 
-----
The Personal President (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1985. 
Madison, James. "Federalist #10." In The Federalist Papers, 
ed. Roy P. Fairfield. 2nd edition. Garden City, NY: 
Anchor, 1966. 
Mahood, H.R. Interest Group Politics in America. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990. 
Makinson, Larry. Open Secrets: The Dollar Power of PACs in 
Congress. Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 1990. 
554 
Mann, Dean. "Democratic Politics and Environmental Policy." 
In Controversies in Environmental Politics, eds. Sheldon 
Kamieniecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clarke. Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 1986. 
Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press, 
1964. 
Mayhew, David. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974. 
Mazmanian, Daniel and Jeanne Nienaber. Can Organizations 
Change? Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1979. 
Mazmanian, Daniel and Paul Sabatier. Implementation and 
Public Policy. Revised edition. Lanham, MD: University 
Press of America, 1989. 
McConnell, Grant. Private Power and American Democracy. 
Revised edition. New York: Vintage, 1970. 
Mccurdy, Howard. "Environmental Protection and the New Fed-
eralism: The Sagebrush Rebellion and Beyond." In Contro-
versies in Environmental Politics, eds. Sheldon Kamieni-
ecki, Robert O'Brien, and Michael Clarke. Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 1986. 
Merton, Robert. Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, 
IL: Free Press, 1957. 
Miliband, Ralph. The State in Capitalist Society. New York: 
Basic Books, 1969. 
Million Dollar Directory. Parsppany, NJ: Dun's Marketing 
Services, 1991. 
Mills, c. Wright. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1956. 
Mitchell, Robert Cameron. "Public Opinion and the Green 
Lobby: Poised for the 1990s?" In Environmental Policy 
in the 1990s, eds. Norman Vig and Michael Kraft. 
Washington o.c.: CQ Press, 1990. 
Moe, Terry. The Organization of Interests. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1980. 
Nash Roderick. Wilderness and the American Mind. Revised 
edition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973. 
1990 Directory of the Forest Products Industry. San 
Francisco: Miller Freeman, 1990. 
Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1965. 
555 
Ophuls, William. "Reversal is the Law of Tao: The Imminent 
Resurrection of Political Philosophy." In Environmental 
Politics, ed. Stuart Nagel. New York, Praeger Publish-
ers, 1974. 
_____ Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity. San Francisco: 
W.H. Freeman, 1977. 
O'Toole, Randall. Reforming the Forest Service. Washington 
D.C.: Island Press, 1988. 
Paehlke, Robert. Environmentalism and the Future of Progres-
sive Politics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1989. 
_____ "Environmental Values and Democracy: The Challenge 
of the Next Century." In Environmental Policy in the 
1990s, eds. Norman Vig and Michael Kraft. Washington 
D.C.: CQ Press, 1990. 
Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. 
Cambridge, MA: At the University Press, 1970. 
Petulla, Joseph. American Environmentalism. College Station, 
TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1980. 
Environmental Protection in the United States. San 
-----Francisco: San Francisco Study Center, 1987. 
Perrow, Charles. Organizational Analysis. Belmont, CA: 
Brooks/Cole, 1970. 
Pomper, Gerald. Elections in America. New York: Dodd, Mead, 
and Co., 1974. 
Pressman, Jeffrey and Aaron Wildavsky. Implementation. 3rd 
edition. Berkley, CA: Unviersity of California Press, 
1984. 
Ranney, Austin and Willmore Kendall. Democracy and the 
American Party System. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and 
Co., 1956. 
Reich, Charles. Bureaucracy and the National Forests. Santa 
Barbara, CA: Center for the Study of Democratic Insti-
tutions, 1962. 
556 
Ripley, Randall and Grace Franklin. Congress, the Bureauc-
racy, and Public Policy. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 
1984. 
Rosenbaum, Walter. "The End of Illusion: NEPA and the Limits 
of Judicial Review." In Environmental Politics, ed. 
Stuart Nagel. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974. 
_____ The Politics of Environmental Concern (New York: 
Praeger, 1977) 
_____ Environmental Politics and Policy. Washington D.C.: 
CQ Press, 1985. 
_____ "The Bureaucracy and Environmental Policy." In Envi-
ronmental Politics and Policies, ed. James Lester. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989. 
Roszak, Theodore. The Making of a Counter Culture. Garden 
City, NY: Anchor, 1969. 
Sale, Kirkpatrick. Human Scale. New York: Coward, Mccann, 
and Geoghegan, 1980. 
Dwellers in the Land: The Bioregional Vision. San 
-----Francisco, Sierra Club Books, 1985. 
Sartori, Giovanni. Democratic Theory. New York: Praeger, 
1958. 
Sayre, Wallace and Herbert Kaufman. Governing New York: 
Politics in the Metropolis. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1960. 
Schattschneider, E.E. The Semi-Sovereign People. New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1960. 
Schiff, Ashley. Fire and Water. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1962. 
Schlesinger, Arthur. The Age of Roosevelt Vol.II: The Coming 
of the New Deal. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958. 
Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 
(New York: Harper, 1950. 
Selznick, Phillip. TVA and the Grassroots. Berkley, CA: 
University of Califor-nia Press, 1949. 
Shepherd, Jack. The Forest Killers. New York: Weybri.ght and 
Talley, 1975. 
557 
Short, C. Brant. Ronald Reagan and the Public Lands. College 
Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1989. 
Simon, Herbert. Administrative Behavior. New York: Macmil-
lan, 1947. 
Simon, Herbert and James March. Organization. (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1958. 
Smith, Steven. "New Patterns of Decision Making in Cong-
ress." In New Directions in American Politics, eds. 
John Chubb and Paul Peterson. Washington D.C.: Brook-
ings Institution, 1985). 
Springer, J. Fred and Edmond Constanti. "Public Opinion and 
the Environment: An Issue in Search of a Home." In 
Environmental Politics, ed. Stuart Nagel. New York, 
Praeger Publishers, 1974. 
Sprout, Harold and Margaret Sprout. "Environmental Poli-
tics: What Role for Political Scientists?" In Environ-
mental Politics, ed. Stuart Nagel. New York, Praeger 
Publishers, 1974. 
~~~~-The Context of En-vironmental Politics. Lexington, 
KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1978. 
State and Regional Associations of the U.S. 3rd edition. 
Washington D.C.: Columbia Books Inc., 1991. 
Stern, Philip. Still the Best Congress Money Can Buy 
Washington D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1992. 
Stillman, Peter. "Ecological Problems, Political Theory, and 
Public Policy" In Environmental Politics, ed. Stuart 
Nagel. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1974. 
Synder, Gary. The Practice of the Wild. San Francisco: North 
Point Press, 1990. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. Edited by 
Richard Heffner. New York: Mentor, 1956. 
Truman, David. The Governmental Process. New York: Knopf 
1951. 
Tucker, William. Progress and Privilege: America in the Age 
of Environmentalism. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 
1982. 
Twight, Ben. Organizational Values and Political Power: The 
Forest Service Versus the Olympic National Park. Uni-
558 
versity Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1983. 
Verba, Sidney and Norman Nie. Participation in America. New 
York: Harper & Row, 1972. 
Vig, Norman. "Presidential Leadership: From the Reagan to 
the Bush Administration." In Environmental Policy in 
the 1990s, eds. Norman Vig and Michael Kraft. Washing-
ton D.C.: CQ Press, 1990. 
Vig, Norman and Michael Kraft. "Conclusion: Toward a New 
Environmental Agenda" In Environmental Policy in the 
1990s, eds. Norman Vig and Michael Kraft. Washington 
D.C.: CQ Press, 1990. 
Ward's Business Directory. Detroit: Gale Research, Inc., 
1991. 
Whittaker, Robert. Vegetation of the Siskiyou Mountains, 
Oregon and California Ecological Monographs Series, 
vol. 30, 1960. 
Wilson, James Q. The Politics of Regulation. New York: Basic 
Books, 1980. 
Wolff, Robert. The Poverty of Liberalism. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1968. 
Zeigler, L. Harmon and G. Wayne Peak. Interest Groups in 
American Society. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1972. 
Zuckerman, Edward. Almanac of Federal PACs: 1990. Washington 
D.C.: Arnward Publications Inc., 1990. 
Articles 
Allen, T.A. "Lou Gold Escapes Bald Mt." Earth First!, 1 
November 1987. 
"America's Forests in Crisis" Save America's Forests Citizen 
Action Guide, January 1992. 
"Another Bird May Curb Logging in the Northwest." Chicago 
Tribune, 27 September 1992. 
Arias, Ron and Liz McNeil. "A Boy Sides With Dr. Seuss's 
Lorax and Puts a Town at Loggerheads." People, 3 
February 1990. 
559 
Bachrach, Peter and Morton Baratz. "Two Faces of Power." 
American Political Science Review, 56, 1962. 
Barron, David. "CD Begins Anew in Kalmiopsis." Earth First!, 
1 May 1987. 
Britell, Jim. "When You Must Negotiate .... Negotiate to Win." 
Forest Watch, May 1991. 
"The Broken Promise of the Timber Compromise." Headwaters, 
March 1990. 
Brothers, Robert. "Wildfire Adds New Twist to the Politics 
of Logging v. Wilderness." Forest Watch, April 1988. 
-----
Letter to the Editor. Medford Mail Tribune, 20 
August 1988. 
Bullen, Gail. "Sheriff Maps Out Strategy to Handle Forest 
Protests." Grants Pass Daily Courier, 12 July 1988. 
Bullis, Connie and James Kennedy. "Value Conflicts and Pol-
icy Interpretation: Change in the Cases of Fisheries 
and Wildlife Managers." Policy Studies Journal, 19:3-4, 
1991. 
"Bush's God Squad Defeated Despite Face-Saving Ruling." 
Headwaters Journal, Summer 1992. 
Campbell, Linda. "Endangered Owl Loses in High Court." 
Chicago Tribune, 26 March 1992. 
Carney, Eliza and w. John Moore. "From the K Street 
Corridor." National Journal, 4 January 1992. 
Casey, Carrie. "The Bird of Contention." American Forests, 
October 1991. 
Casuso, Jorge. "Black Tuesday for Big Green Backers." 
Chicago Tribune, 11 November 1990. 
Caufield, Catherine. "The Ancient Forest." New Yorker, 14 
May 1990. 
"Chairman Miller Tours Southwest Oregon." Headwaters 
Journal, Summer 1992. 
Clark, Peter and James Q. Wilson. "Incentive Systems: A 
Theory of Organization." Administrative Science 
Quarterly, VI, September 1961. 
Clayton, Robert. "The Environmentalists." Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report, 20 January 1990. 
560 
Clearwater, Jericho. "Kalmiopsis Shutdown!" Earth First!, 1 
August 1987. 
"Court Won't Lift Logging Ban in Northwest." New York Times, 
6 September 1992. 
"The Crisis Mounts." Save America's Forests D.C. Update, 
March 1992. 
Culhane, Paul. "Public Participation in National Forest 
Planning: Is it Different or Just More?" Conference 
paper, Western Political Science Association, annual 
meeting, Seattle, WA, April 1991. 
Davis, Charles and Sandra Davis. "Analyzing Change in Public 
Lands Policymaking: From Subsystems to Advocacy Coali-
tions." Policy Studies Journal, 17:1, Fall 1988. 
Davis, Phillip. "Ruling Gives Lawmakers a Push To Resolve 
Spotted Owl Issue." Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report, 1 June 1990. 
-----
"From the Shade to the Spotlight" Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report, 1 June 1991. 
_____ "Cry for Preservation, Recreation Changing Public 
Lands Policy." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review, 3 
August 1991. 
"BLM Calls on God Squad to Let Timber Go." Congres-
------=--sional Quarterly Weekly Report, 14 September 1991. 
_____ "'God Squad' Called on to Weigh Timber Interests, 
Spotted Owl." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 5 
October 1991. 
_____ "Logging Decision Set for May 14." Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Review, 2 May 1992. 
"Critics Say Too Few Jobs, Owls Saved Under 'God 
---Sq-u-ad' Plan." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review, 16 
May 1992. 
DeBonis, Jeff. "Timber Industry Wins Again, Congress Sets 
Dangerously High Timber Cut for '91." Inner Voice, 
Winter 1991. 
"DeFazio Raps Timber Salvage Plan." Eugene Register-Guard, 
20 May 1988. 
561 
Doherty, Shawn. "Oregon's Not-So-Sweet Home." Newsweek, 11 
December 1989. 
Downs, Anthony. "Up and Down with Ecology: The Issue-
Attention Cycle." Public Interest, 28, 1972. 
Durbin, Kathie. "Polls Show Oregonians Deeply Split Over 
Owl." (Portland) Oregonian, 6 May 1990. 
____ "BLM Mandate Collides With Owl" from special report: 
Forests in Distress, Oregonian, 15 October 1990. 
_____ "Clearcut Logging Ravages Soil in Areas of Siski-
yous." From special report: Forests in Distress, Oregonian, 
15 October 1990. 
_____ "Innovative Forestry Arrives in Siskiyou." From 
special report: Forests in Distress, Oregonian, 15 
October 1990. 
_____ "Lou Gold." From special report: Forests in 
Distress, Oregonian, 15 October 1990. 
_____ "Politics Helped Delay Northwest Timber Management 
Plan." From special report: Forests in Distress, 
Oregonian, 15 October 1990. 
_____ "Rangers Scramble to Meet Timber Quotas." From 
special report: Forests in Distress, Oregonian, 15 
October 1990. 
Durbin, Kathie and Paul Koberstein. Introduction to special 
report: Forests in Distress, Oregonian, 15 October 
1990. 
____ "New Forestry: Trying Logging with a Lighter Touch." 
From special report: Forests in Distress, Oregonian, 15 
October 1990. 
"Earth First Protests Hobson Horn Sale." Grants Pass Daily 
Courier, 4 April 1987. 
Egan, Timothy. "Forest Service Abusing Role, Dissidents 
Say." New York Times, 3 March 1990. 
____ "Softening Stand on Spotted Owl, Administration 
Delays Protection." New York Times, 27 June 1990. 
"Split on How to Save Spotted Owl is Reported.in 
---B-u-sh' s Study Group." New York Times, 8 September 1990. 
562 
_____ "Administration Offers Plan to Limit Northwest Log-
ging." New York Times, 22 September 1990. 
____ "Fighting for Control of America's Hinterlands." New 
York Times, 11 November 1990. 
_____ "Forest Supervisors Say Politicians are Asking Them 
to Cut Too Much." New York Times, 19 September 1991. 
"Photos Show Forests in Pacific Northwest Are in 
-----Peril, Scientists Say." New York Times, 11 June 1992. 
_____ "Forest Damage, North and South." New York Times, 14 
June 1992. 
"Eighteen Arrested in 3 Actions in North Kalmiopsis." Earth 
First!, 21 June 1987. 
Ellis, Barnes. "Back From the Dead." Oregonian, 24 April 
1988. 
"Environmental Groups Like State Alternative." Medford Mail 
Tribune, 2 November 1988. 
Ervin, Keith. "The Tree Fight." Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 
24 September 1989. 
Facaros, Nickolas. "Public Involvement in National Forest 
Planning: What the Council on Environmental Quality 
Requires and the Forest Service Neglects." Journal of 
Environmental Law and Litigation, 4, 1989. 
Fattig, Paul. "Supervisor Says Forest Service Must Slow 
Down." Grants Pass Daily Courier, 9 June 1987. 
"Silver Fire Plan Awaits Hatchet." Grants Pass Daily 
-----Courier, 22 March 1988. 
_____ "Group Says Recovery Plan Uneconomical" Grants Pass 
Daily Courier, 29 April 1988. 
"Closure to Block Protests." Grants Pass Daily 
-----Courier, 8 July 1988. 
"Protesters Take to the Trees." Grants Pass Daily 
-----Courier, 21 July 1988. 
"Environmentalists Seek To Halt Silver Salvage." 
___ G_r_a-nts Pass Daily Courier, 9 September 1988. 
"State Wants Siskiyou Harvest Increased." Grants 
-----Pass Daily Courier, 26 September 1988. 
_____ "New Yorkers Hope to Stop Siskiyou Sale." Grants 
Pass Daily Courier, 19 May 1990. 
563 
"Feds Order Study on All Kalmiopsis." Medford Mail Tribune, 
22 February 1988. 
"Fires, Controversy Scorch Forest's Past," Eugene Register-
Guard, 13 March 1988. 
Fishman, David. "America's Ancient Forests." E Magazine, 
October 1989. 
"Forest Managers Speak Out for the Forest." Headwaters, 
March 1990. 
"Forest Officials Expect Major Battles Over Salvage of Fire-
Damaged Timber." Oregonian, 2 October 1987. 
"Forest Service Chops Whistleblowers." Environment, 34, 
April 1992. 
"Forest Service Illegally Diverted Funds." Inner Voice, 3:2, 
Spring 1991. 
"Forest Service to Decide on Silver Fire Study." Medford 
Mail Tribune Extra, 28 January-3 February 1988. 
"Forests, Jobs, and Owls." Editorial, Washington Post, 29 
June 1990. 
Friedman, Mitch. "Ancient Forests: The Perpetual Crisis." 
Wild Earth, Summer 1991. 
"F.S. Appeals Made Law." Headwaters Journal, Winter 1992. 
"Fundamental Rights Trampled." Forest Voice, 2:1, 1990. 
Gabriel, Trip. "If a Tree Falls in the Forest, They Hear 
It." New York Times Magazine, 4 November 1990. 
Gais, Thomas, Mark Peterson, and Jack Walker. "Interest 
Groups, Iron Triangles, and Representative Institutions 
in American National Government." British Journal of 
Political Science, 14, 1984. 
"Governor Blasts Lujan .... And Gets Blasted in Return." 
Headwaters Journal, Spring 1992. 
Gray, Gerald. "Seeing Eye-to-Eye on Old Growth." American 
Forests, October 1991. 
_____ "The Politics of Old Growth." American Forests, 
October 1991. 
564 
Gray, Gerald and Anita Eng. "How Much Old Growth is Left?" 
American Forests, October 1991. 
Gregory, Gordon. "Siskiyou Falls Short of its Timber Tar-
get." Grants Pass Daily Courier, 20 July 1990. 
_____ "Future Forestry Taking Root in Shasta Costa." 
Grants Pass Daily Courier, 12 July 1991. 
Groner, Cary. "The Congressional Connection." What's 
Happening (Eugene OR), 12 May 1988. 
Gup, Ted. "Owls vs. Man." Time, 25 June 1990. 
_____ "The Stealth Secretary." Time, 25 May 1992. 
Guskind, Robert. "Big Green Light." National Journal, 6 
October 1990. 
Hamilton, Bruce. "Unfinished Business." Sierra, Septem-
ber/October 1989. 
Hands, Kathy. "Protesters Get Jail Terms." Grants Pass Daily 
Courier, 30 June 1987. 
Hardin, Garrett. "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science, 162, 
13 December 1968. 
"Hatfield Riders Fade; Owl Suits Come Alive." Headwaters, 
Late Winter 1991. 
Hayakawa, Alan. "Fight Erupts at Forest Service Hearings." 
Oregonian, 15 April 1988. 
_____ "Compromise Would Block Timber Salvage Appeals." 
Oregonian, 24 June 1988. 
"House Speaker Tom Foley Crushes Ancient Forest Pro-tection 
Bill." Save America's Forests D.C. Update, August 1992. 
"House Panel Cancels Vote on Bill to Protect Forests." New 
York Times, 18 June 1992. 
"Industry Sues USFS; Headwaters Intervenes." Headwaters, 
Late Winter 1991. 
Ingram, Helen and Scott Ullery. "Policy Innovation and In-
stitutional Fragmentation." Policy Studies Journal, 
8:5, Spring 1980. 
"Interior Appropriations Hits and Misses." Wilderness, 
Winter 1990. 
"Kalmiopsis Fire: The Reality and the Politics." Earth 
First!, 2 February 1988. 
565 
Keene, Roy. "'New Perspectives' to Limit Clearcutting." High 
Country News, 19 November 1990. 
_____ "Forest Focus: The Siskiyou" Public Forester, Autumn 
1991. 
Kelly, David. "The Grove." Excerpted in Wild Oregon, Winter 
1988-1989. 
Kerr, Andrew. "ONRC's Legislative Vision." Wild Oregon 
Summer 1990. 
_____ "New (Age) Perspectives." Forest Watch, October 
1990. 
Klay, William and James McElveen. "Planning as a Vehicle for 
Policy Formulation and Accomodation in an Evolving Sub-
government." Policy Studies Journal, 19:3-4, 1991. 
Koberstein, Paul. "Private Forests Face Critical Log Shor-
tages." From special report: Forests in Distress, 
Oregonian, 15 October 1990. 
Kriz, Margaret. "An Environmental Who's Who." National 
Journal. 28 July 1990. 
-----
"Shades of Green." National Journal, 28 July 1990. 
-----
"Owl 1, Timber O." National Journal, 4 May 1991. 
-----
"A New Ball Game?" National Journal, 2 January 1993. 
Kysar, Leila. "A Logger's Lament." Newsweek, 22 October 
1990. 
Latham, Earl. "The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a 
Theory." American Political Science Review, 52:2, June, 
1952. 
"Legal Update." Headwaters, Late Summer 1991. 
Lemonick, Michael. "Showdown in the Treetops." Time, 28 
August 1989. 
566 
Letter to the ·Editor (untitled). Grants Pass Daily Courier, 
3 October 1987. 
Line, Les. "Gambits and Skirmishes." Audubon, May 1990. 
Lindblom, Charles. "The Science of 'Muddling Through'." 
Public Administration Review, 19:4, Spring 1959. 
"Liquidation of the Public Forests Since 1960 Leads Citizens 
to Court and Now Congress." Headwaters, Late Summer 
1991. 
"Log Exports Liquidating our Forests for Insatiable Inter-
national Demand." Forest Voice, 2:2, 1990. 
"Loggers Protest Owl Decision." New York Times, 25 June 
1990. 
Long, Norton. "Power and Administration." Public Administra-
tion Review, 9, Autumn 1949. 
Lowi, Theodore. "American Business, Public Policy, Case 
Studies, and Political Theory." World Politics, 16:4, 
July 1964. 
Luoma, Jon. "New Logging Approach Tries to Mimic Nature." 
New York Times, 6 June 1990. 
"New Government Plan for National Forest Generates a 
-----Debate." New York Times, 30 June 1992. 
Mangun, William and Jean Mangun. "Implementing Wildlife 
Policy Across Political Jurisdictions." Policy Studies 
Journal, 19:3-4, 1991. 
Manzano, Phil. "Old Growth Timber Auctioned Off as Protes-
ters Chant, Beat Drums." Oregonian, 24 June 1987. 
McCarthy, Catherine, Paul Sabatier, and John Loomis. "Atti-
tudinal Change in the Forest Service: 1960-1990." Con-
ference paper, Western Political Science Association 
annual meeting, Seattle, WA, April 1991. 
Mcclosky, Herbert. "Consensus and Ideology in American Poli-
tics." American Political Science Review, 58:2, June, 
1964. 
McFarland, Andrew. "Interest Groups and Theories of Power in 
America." British Journal of Politics, 17, April 1987. 
567 
_____ "Why Interest Groups Organize: A Pluralist Response 
to Olson." Conference paper, Western Political Science 
Association annual meeting, Seattle, WA, April 1991. 
McLean, Herbert. "Paying the Price for Old Growth." American 
Forests, October 1991. 
McNulty, Timothy and Carol Jouzaitis. "Bush, Clinton Try to 
Balance Environment and Economy." Chicago Tribune, 15 
September, 1992. 
Merelrnan, Richard. "Learning and Legitimacy." American 
Political Science Review, 60, 1966. 
"Miller Gets Aerial Tour of Forest." Medford Mail Tribune, 
20 April 1992. 
Mills, Mike. "Spotted Owl Gains in Timber Controversy." 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 4 May 1991. 
Mitchell, John. "Sour Times in Sweet Horne." Audubon, March 
1991. 
Mohai, Paul. "Public Participation and Natural Resource 
Decision-Making: The Case of the RARE II Decisions." 
Natural Resources Journal, 27, 1987. 
Morton Roger. "Santa's List Won't Make Some Jolly." 
Editorial, Grants Pass Daily Courier, 17 December 1987. 
"Mr. Bush's Political Environment" Editorial, New York 
Times, 19 May 1992. 
Muiderrnan, Jeff and Carolyn Moran. "Part of the Solution." 
Talking Leaves (Eugene, OR), September 1991. 
Murphy, Douglas. "Earth First! and the North Kalrniopsis!" 
The Sneak Preview (Ashland, OR), 11 June 1987. 
Naess, Arne. "The Shallow and Deep, Long-Range Ecology 
Movement." Inquiry, 16, 1973. 
Newhouse, John. "The Diplomatic Round: Earth Summit." New 
Yorker, 1 June 1992. 
Nicholas, Jonathan. "The Once and Future Forest" Oregonian, 
20 June 1988. 
"No Peace for Owl." Time, 9 July 1990. 
Norman, Julie. "Our Choices to Keep Overcutting." Headwa-
ters, September 1990. 
_____ "Dwyer Shuts Down USFS Sales Again." Headwaters 
Journal, Summer 1992. 
_____ "Forest Protection Legislation is Moving." Head-
waters Journal, Summer 1992. 
568 
_____ "Legislative Stalemate in D.C." Headwaters Journal, 
Fall 1992. 
_____ "Ecosystem Management Directive is Here." Headwaters 
Journal, Winter 1992/93. 
_____ "Fresh Breezes in D.C." Headwaters Journal, Winter 
1992/93. 
"Old Growth Wins in Poll." Oregonian, 25 April 1990. 
O'Toole, Randall. "Incentives to Mismanage." Inner Voice, 
3:2, Spring 1991. 
"Owl-Gate: Bush's Election Year Extinction Plan." Headwaters 
Journal, Summer 1992. 
"Owls are People Too." Editorial, Wall Street Journal, 9 
April 1990). 
"Panel Fells Timber Sales Bill." Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Review, 16 May 1992. 
"Park Service Aide Tells of Sununu Pressure." Chicago Trib-
une, 25 September 1991. 
Pear, Robert. "Voters Spurn Array of Plans for Protecting 
Environment." New York Times, 8 November 1990. 
"Perspective: Forest Service Opposes Park." Evergreen, April 
1987. 
Peterson, Jim. "In Search of Excellence: Lew Krauss." Ever-
green, April 1987. 
-----
"In Search of Excellence: The Firefighters." Ever-
green, October 1987. 
Pickens, John. "Arizona Senator Threatens Forest Service 
Chief and Forest Supervisor." Inner Voice, Winter 1991. 
Pytte, Alyson. "Bush's Modest Proposal." Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report, 29 September 1990. 
569 
_____ "The Timber Bureaucracy" Congressional Quarterly 
Weekly Report, 29 September 1990. 
_____ "Timber, Spotted Owl Interests Find Middle Ground 
Elusive." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 29 
September 1990. 
"Radical Activists Join Battle for Forests." Oregonian, 20 
November 1987. 
Reinhold, Robert. "Once Considered a Sure Thing, Califor-
nia's Environmental Package Falters." New York Times, 
16 September 1990. 
Ribe, Tom. "Pork Barrelling Our National Forests." Inner 
Voice, 3:2, Spring 1991. 
"Roadless Area is No Excuse to Waste Wood." Editorial, 
Grants Pass Daily Courier, 12 October 1987. 
Rothman, Hal. "A Regular Ding-Dong Fight: Agency Culture and 
Evolution in the NPS-USFS Dispute 1916-1934." Western 
Historical Quarterly, xx:2, May 1989. 
Sabatier, Paul. "Knowledge, Policy-Oriented Learning, and 
Policy Change." Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utili-
zation, 8, 1987. 
Sarasohn, David. "Packwood Connects Bush to a Tree." Oregon-
ian, 20 September 1991. 
Satchell, Michael. "The Endangered Logger." U.S. News and 
World Report, 25 June 1990. 
"Saving an American Original." Audubon Activist Special 
Report, no date, circa winter 1988. 
Scates, Shelby. "Running Out of Trees." Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, 19 November 1989. 
Schneider, Keith. "To Save Jobs, U.S. Seeks to waive Rule on 
Saving Owl." New York Times, 21 February 1992. 
-----
"U.S. to Push for Logging in Owl's Forests." New 
York Times, 21 February 1992. 
-----
"Forest Service May Alter Rule Blocking Logging." 
New York Times, 28 April 1992. 
"White House on Conflicting Paths as it Agre_es to 
-----Protection for Owl." New York Times, 15 May 1992. 
-----
570 
"U.S. Forest Service Increases Protection of Public 
Timber." New York Times, 9 June 1992. 
_____ "When a Whistle Blows in the Forest .... " Audubon, 
January/February 1992. 
"Science and the Siskiyou." Siskiyou Project, December 1992. 
Shabecoff, Philip. "Senate Votes to Allow Cutting of North-
west's Virgin Forests." New York Times, 27 July 1989. 
"The Battle for the National Forests." New York 
-----Times, 13 August 1989. 
"Siskiyou Sale Bordering Wild Rogue Wilderness Blocked By 
Court." Headwaters, Late Winter 1991. 
Smith, Kerry. "A Theoretical Analysis of the Green Lobby." 
American Political Science Review, 79:1, 1984. 
Somer, Scott. "Northwest's Old Growth Forests Shrink." 
Medford Mail Tribune, 22 May 1990. 
Staal, Robert. "Do They Really Care About Diversification?" 
Editorial, Ashland Daily Tiding, 23 May 1990. 
Stahmer, John. "Gold Beach RD Planning Lawson Timber Sale." 
Headwaters Journal, Winter 1992. 
"Star Wars Forestry." Evergreen, February 1989. 
"State Game Agency Appeals Forest Service Timber Sales." 
Inner Voice, 3:2, Spring 1991. 
Sterling, Robert. "Headwaters Notes Flaw in Forest Plan." 
Medford Mail Tribune, 22 January 1988. 
____ "DeFazio Seeks Pact on Logging." Medford Mail Trib-
une, 9 June 1988. 
____ "Both Sides Unhappy With Silver Salvage." Medford 
Mail Tribune, 24 June 1988. 
"Sniper was Prepared to Shoot Sitter." Medford Mail 
-----,-Tribune, 5 August 1988. 
_____ "In a Strikingly Different Ecological Overlap Zone." 
Medford Mail Tribune, 25 June 1989. 
-----
"Owl Reports Impact Studied." Medford Mail T:ribune, 
5 Aprii 1990. 
571 
_____ "Wilderness Group Claims Siskiyou Forest Unprofit-
able." Medford Mail Tribune, 4 October 1990. 
Sterling, Robert and Bill Manny. "Bob Smith Proposal 
Opposed." Medford Mail Tribune, 21 September 1988. 
"Storm Brews Over Fate of Roadless Area." Grants Pass Daily 
Courier, 25 September 1987. 
"Studies Probe Bias in Forest Service." Inner Voice, Spring 
1991. 
Swanson, Stevenson. "When in Office, Gore May Find it isn't 
so Easy Being Green." Chicago Tribune, 8 November 1992. 
Thomas, Chant. "Return to Bald Mountain." Earth First/, 20 
March 1987. 
"Timber Congressmen and Bush Administration Attack Citizen 
Rights." Save America's Forests D.C. Update, March 
1992. 
"Timber Groups Lose Another Round to Owl." Chicago Tribune, 
2 June 1992. 
"Timber Salvage Plan is a Compromise No One Likes." Grants 
Pass Daily Courier, 24 June 1988. 
Tipple, Terence and J. Douglas Wellman. "Herbert Kaufman's 
Forest Ranger Thirty Years Later: From Simplicity and 
Homogeneity to Complexity and Diversity." Public Admin-
istration Review, 51:5, September/October 1991. 
Twight, Ben,and Fremont Lyden. "Multiple Use vs. Organiza-
tional Commitment." Forest Science, June 1988. 
-----
"Measuring Forest Service Bias." Journal of Fores-
try, 87:5, May 1989. 
"2 in an 'Earth' Group Hurt as Car Explodes." New York 
Times, 25 May 1990. 
"2-Year Logging Delay Forecast in Owl Habitat." New York 
Times, 2 August 1992. 
Ullian, Barbara. "Agencies Continue Plans for Massive Timber 
Cutting." Headwaters Journal, Spring 1992. 
"Roadless Area Timber Sales." Headwaters Journal, 
-----Fall 1992. 
572 
_____ "Roads and Cuts Planned for the Heart of Canyon." 
Headwaters Journal, Fall 1992. 
"Unknowns Make Park a Gamble." Editorial, Grants Pass Daily 
Courier, 1 April 1989. 
"U.S. Can't Save Endangered Owl, Agriculture Secretary 
Warns." Chicago Tribune, 16 July 1992. 
"U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Credibility Hits New Low ... 
At Owl's Expense." Headwaters, September 1990. 
"The U.S. Government Subsidizes Logging on the National For-
ests." Forest Voice, 4, Spring 1991. 
"U.S. Proposes Giant Refuge in Northwest To Save Spotted 
Owl." Chicago Tribune, 27 April 1991. 
"U.S. Sets Aside 6.9 Million Acres to Save Owl." Chicago 
Tribune, 10 January 1992. 
White, Lynn. "The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis." 
Science, 155, 10 March 1967. 
Williams, Ted. "The Spotted Fish Under the Spotted Owls." 
Fly, Rod and Reel, January/February 1990. 
Wines, Michael. "Bush, in Far West, Sides With Loggers." New 
York Times, 15 September 1992. 
"Woodsy Owl Still Gives a Hoot, But in Siuslaw He Gets a 
Boot." Oregonian, 4 April 1990. 
Young, Steve. "Tree Slaughter: Your Taxes at Work." Washing-
ton Post, 13 August 1989. 
"Your Taxes Pay for this Outrage." Forest Voice, 2:2, 1990. 
Ziemba, Stanley. "Owl Dispute Helped Lift Lumber Cost." 
Chicago Tribune, 27 June 1991. 
Zuckerman, Seth. "New Forestry, New Hype?" Sierra, March/ 
April 1992. 
Government Documents 
Government Accounting Office. Endangered Species: Spotted 
Owl Petition Evaluation Beset by Problems, GAO/RCED-89-
79, Washington D.C.: GPO, 1989. 
Interagency Scientific Committee. A Conservation Strategy 
for the Northern Spotted Owl, Region 10: GPO, 1990. 
573 
Northern Spotted Owl (Strix occidentalis caurina) v. Donald 
Hodel. 716 F. Supp. 479, 9th U.S. District, 1988. 
Northern Spotted Owl (Strix occidentalis caurina) v. Manual 
Lujan. 758 F. Supp. 621, 9th U.S. District, 1991. 
Public Law #101-122. Section 318, 103 Stat. 701, 1989. 
Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans. 771 F. Supp. 1081, 9th 
U.S. District, 1991. 
Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley. 798 F. Supp. 1494, 9th 
U.S. District. 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs. Management of Federal Timber Resources: The 
Loss of Accountability, Washington D.C.: 15 June 1992. 
USDA Forest Service. Report to Congress on Implementation of 
Section 318 of the Interior and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations Act for FY1990. 1st Report and 9th Report. 
Washington D.C.: GPO, 1 December 1989 and 1 August 
1990. 
USDA Forest Service. Pacific Northwest Forest and Range Ex-
periment Station. Ecological Characteristics of Old 
Growth Douglas-fir Forests, by Jerry Franklin et al., 
General Technical Report PNW-118, 1981. 
USDA Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, Siskiyou 
National Forest. Press Release, 24 March 1987. 
~~~~-
Content Analysis Report for Silver Fire Recovery 
Project DEIS. Internal document, May 1988. 
~~~~-Silver Fire Recovery Project Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement. Region 10: GPO, 1988. 
~~~~-
Silver Fire Recovery Project Final Environmental 
Impact Statement. Region 10: GPO, 1988. 
~~~~-Silver Fire Recovery Project Record of Decision. 
Region 10: GPO, 1988. 
~~~~-
Press Release, 10 March 1989. 
Land and Resource Management Plan. Region 10: GPO, 
~~~~-
1989. 
574 
~~~~-Land and Resource Management Plan Final Environmen-
tal Impact Statement. Region 10: GPO, 1989. 
~~~~-Land and Resource Management Plan Final Environmen-
tal Impact Statement Appendices, Volume I. Region 10: 
GPO, 1989. 
~~~~-Shasta Costa Timber Sales and Integrated Resource 
Projects Final Environmental Impact Statement, Volumes 
1 & 2. Region 10: GPO, 1990. 
~~~~-Appeal Number Record 1986-1990. Internal document, 
1991. 
~~~~-Canyon Integrated Resource Project Draft Environmen-
tal Statement. Region 10: GPO, 1991. 
~~~~-Minutes from Shasta Costa Workshop. Internal docu-
ment, June 1991. 
~~~~-Quosatana/Bradford Timber Sales and Integrated Re-
source Projects Draft Environmental Impact Statement. 
Region 10: GPO, 1992. 
~~~~-Two Forks Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft En 
vironmental Impact Statement. Siskiyou National Forest: 
1992. 
~~~~-West Indigo Timber Sales and Other Projects Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement. Region 10: GPO, 1992. 
Other Sources 
Atkin, David. Fire Salvage Issue Not So Simple. Flier, 
Portland, no date. 
Cascades Holistic Economic Consultants to Ron McCormick. 
CHEC xeroxed transcripts, 28 April 1988. 
Cascades Holistic Economic Consultants. Newsletter, Eugene 
OR, 23 September 1988. 
Earth First!. In the Fight to Save the Earth ... Will Our 
Constitutional Rights Become Sawdust Too? Pamphlet, 
1988. 
Evans, Brock. We Can Protect our Remaining Ancient Forests 
and Maintain a Strong Timber Economy in the Pacific 
Northwest. Memorandum, 3 February 1989. 
Gold, Lou. Untitled pamphlet for Native Forest Action 
Council, no date, circa winter 1990. 
575 
Gore, Albert. This Week With David Brinkley, 12 July 1992. 
Transcripts distributed by Native Forest Council. 
Headwaters. Press Release, 29 April 1988. 
-----
Press Release, 6 May 1988. 
-----
Press Release, 11 December 1989. 
-----
Press Release, 22 October 1990. 
Oregon Project. Who's Endangered?. Pamphlet, no date. 
Oregon State Forestry Department, et. al. Oregon Trees and 
Forests. Pamphlet, no date. 
Save America's Forests. "Ancient Forests Legislation Prog-
ress Report." Save America's Forests News. Newsletter, 
no date. 
Southern Oregon Timber Industries Association. Advertisement 
in Grants Pass Daily Courier, 1 October 1987. 
Southern Oregon Resource Alliance. Advertisement in Medford 
Mail Tribune, 18 October 1987. 
Torrence James to Supervisor Ron McCormick. Internal Forest 
Service document, 17 November 1987. 
Ullian, Barbara. Siskiyou National Forest Roadless Areas: 
The Dissociation of Words and the Paper Forest. Siski-
you Environmental Council, Press Release, undated. 
Western Ancient Forest Campaign. Oregon Grassroots Inven-
tory. Unpublished document, 22 April 1991. 
Oregon Grassroots Survey. Unpublished document, 
----.,.-April 1991. 
Steven Davis graduated in 1986 with honors from Lake 
Forest College with a bachelor of arts degree in Politics 
and Psychology. In 1988, he earned a master of arts degree 
in Political Science at Loyola University Chicago. He went 
on at Loyola to complete the requirements for his Ph.D. in 
1993. His dissertation, Pluralism and Ecological Values: The 
Case of the Siskiyou National Forest, explores the relation-
ship between environmental policymaking and pluralism as 
democratic theory. 
At Loyola, Mr. Davis was a research assistant from 
1986-1989 and a lecturer in political science from 1989 to 
the present. In addition, he won two competitive university-
wide fellowships; a teaching fellowship in 1989 and the 
Schmitt Dissertation Fellowship in 1992. As a lecturer, Mr. 
Davis has taught a fairly wide range of courses including 
American politics, Congress, American political thought, 
public policy and politics of developing areas. 
Mr. Davis's main research interests center around pub-
lic policy; most specifically environmental politics and 
policy. Other interests include bureaucratic politics, poli-
tical behavior, and democratic theory. He has published an 
article entitled, "Judicial Nominating Commissioners: A 
National Profile" in Judicature and has a forthcoming book 
review in Social science Quarterly. Other publications in 
the area of environmental policy are pending. 
The dissertation submitted by Steven M. Davis has been read 
and approved by the following committee: 
Dr. Barbara Bardes, Director 
Dean, Mundelein College 
Loyola University Chicago 
Dr. John Frendreis 
Professor, Political Science 
Loyola University Chicago 
Dr. Alan Gitelson 
Professor, Political Science 
Loyola University Chicago 
The final copies have been examined by the director of the 
dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies 
the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated 
and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the 
Committee with reference to content and form. 
The dissertation is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfill-
ment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philo-
sophy. 
